DECISION

 

Morgan Stanley v. John White

Claim Number: FA1906001846927

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Morgan Stanley (“Complainant”), represented by Eric J. Shimanoff of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., New York, USA.  Respondent is John White (“Respondent”), United Kingdom.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <mstanly.com>, registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Sandra J. Franklin as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on June 7, 2019; the Forum received payment on June 7, 2019.

 

On June 10, 2019, PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <mstanly.com> domain name is registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com has verified that Respondent is bound by the PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On June 11, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of July 1, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@mstanly.com.  Also on June 11, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On July 3, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Sandra J. Franklin as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

1.    Respondent’s <mstanly.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark.

 

2.    Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <mstanly.com> domain name.

 

3.    Respondent registered and uses the <mstanly.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to file a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant operates in the financial services industry.  Complainant holds a registration for the MORGAN STANLEY mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 1,707,196, registered Aug. 11,1992).

 

Respondent registered the disputed domain name on May 25, 2019, and uses it to pass off as Complainant in furtherance of a phishing scheme.  

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The Panel finds that Complainant has rights in the MORGAN STANLEY mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) based upon registration with the USPTO.  See DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrate its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).

 

Respondent’s <mstanly.com> domain name uses Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark with the abbreviation “M” for MORGAN and the omission of the “E” in “STANLEY.”  Complainant also adds the “.com” gTLD.  These changes do not distinguish the disputed domain name from Complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Acme Lift Company, L.L.C. v. VistaPrint Technologies Ltd, FA 1607039 (Forum Apr. 11, 2015) (“Where a respondent has created a domain name in an effort to visually deceive Internet users via a simple misspelling (and when such misspellings are visually similar to the mark), a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) is appropriate.”); see also Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. zhang qin, FA 1626511 (Forum Aug. 4, 2015) (“The relevant comparison then resolves to the trademark, TWITCH, with the term, ‘titch,’ which, as can be readily seen, merely removes the letter ‘w’ from the trademark.  In spite of that omission the compared integers remain visually and aurally very similar and so Panel finds them to be confusingly similar for the purposes of the Policy.”).  Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent’s <mstanly.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark.

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Once Complainant makes a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <mstanly.com> domain name, as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name and is not authorized by Complainant to use the MORGAN STANLEY mark.  The WHOIS information lists Respondent as “John White.”  Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name and therefore lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. LY Ta, FA 1789106 (Forum June 21, 2018) (concluding a respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name where the complainant asserted it did not authorize the respondent to use the mark, and the relevant WHOIS information indicated the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name); see also Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because Respondent uses the disputed domain name to pass off as complainant.  A respondent’s use of a disputed domain name to pass off as a complainant is evidence of a lack of rights or a legitimate interest in the domain name.  See Netflix, Inc. v. Irpan Panjul / 3corp.inc, FA 1741976 (Forum Aug. 22, 2017) (“The usage of Complainants NETFLIX mark which has a significant reputation in relation to audio visual services for unauthorised audio visual material is not fair as the site does not make it clear that there is no commercial connection with Complainant and this amounts to passing off . . . As such the Panelist finds that Respondent does not have rights or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name.”).  Complainant provides screenshots of the disputed domain name’s resolving webpage, which uses the name “Morgan Stanley” in the same stylization as Complainant, copies content from Complainant’s website, and purports to offer financial services.  The Panel finds that this is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

Complainant also argues that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because Respondent uses the disputed domain name in furtherance of a phishing scheme.  A respondent’s use of a disputed domain name in furtherance of a phishing scheme is evidence of a lack of rights or a legitimate interest in the domain name.  See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent lacked rights and legitimate interests in a domain name with which it conducted a phishing scheme to procure “Internet users’ personal information”).  Complainant provides screenshots of the disputed domain name’s resolving webpage showing that Respondent attempts to engage in phishing by encouraging Internet users to disclose personal information such as user login and password information.  Therefore, the Panel finds further evidence that Respondent fails to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

Complainant also argues that Respondent engages in typosquatting, additional evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  The Panel agrees.  See Webster Financial Corporation and Webster Bank, National Assocation v. Pham Dinh Nhut, FA1502001605819 (Forum Apr. 17, 2015) (“Respondent’s acts of typosquatting provide additional evidence that respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Complainant argues that Respondent registered and uses the <mstanly.com> domain name in bad faith because Respondent attempts to attract, for commercial gain, users to the disputed domain name by using the disputed domain name to pass off as Complainant in furtherance of a phishing scheme.  Passing off in furtherance of a phishing scheme constitutes evidence of bad faith.  See Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (finding bad faith per Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv) where the respondent used the disputed domain name to resolve to a website upon which the respondent passes off as the complainant and offers online cryptocurrency services in direct competition with the complainant’s business); see also United States Postal Service v. kyle javier, FA 1787265 (Forum June 12, 2018) (“Use of a domain name to phish for Internet users’ personal information is evidence of bad faith.”).  Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to pass off as Complainant is in bad faith under both Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv).

 

Complainant also asserts that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the MORGAN STANLEY mark due to Complainant’s extensive use of the mark predating Respondent’s use.  The Panel agrees, noting Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to pass off as Complainant, and finds that Respondent had actual notice of Complainant’s rights in the MORGAN STANLEY mark, showing bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Finex Inc. v. xu shuaiwei, FA 1760249 (Forum Jan. 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s prior knowledge is evident from the notoriety of Complainant’s BITFINEX trademark as well as from Respondent’s use of its trademark laden domain name to direct internet traffic to a website which is a direct competitor of Complainant”).

 

The Panel also notes that Respondent engages in typosquatting, which is further evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Adorama, Inc. v. Moniker Privacy Services, FA1503001610020 (Forum May 1, 2015) (“Respondent has also engaged in typosquatting, which is additional evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  Respondents who capitalize on common typing errors engage in bad faith registration under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <mstanly.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Sandra J. Franklin, Panelist

Dated:  July 4, 2019

 

 

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