Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. NAMES REDACTED
Claim Number: FA2008001907869
Complainant is Chevron Intellectual Property LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Fred W. Hathaway of DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC, District of Columbia, USA. Respondent is NAMES REDACTED (“Respondent”).
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The domain names at issue are <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com>, registered with Google LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Steven M. Levy, Esq. as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on August 10, 2020; the Forum received payment on August 10, 2020.
On August 11, 2020, Google Llc confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names are registered with Google LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the names. Google LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the Google LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On August 17, 2020, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of September 8, 2020 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@cchevron.com, postmaster@chveron.com, postmaster@chevrcn.com. Also on August 17, 2020, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
On August 28, 2020 the Forum received, from an individual who had received Written Notice of the Complaint, an email disclaiming any ownership or knowledge of the disputed domain name.
On September 9, 2020, the Forum received, from Complainant, an “Additional Submission Pursuant to Forum Supplemental Rule 7”.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On September 14, 2020, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Steven M. Levy, Esq. as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: MULTIPLE RESPONDENTS
In the instant proceedings, Complainant has alleged that the entities which control the domain names at issue are effectively controlled by the same person and/or entity, which is operating under several false aliases. Paragraph 4(f) of the Policy provides that “[i]n the event of multiple disputes between [a respondent] and a complainant, either [the respondent] or the complainant may petition to consolidate the disputes before a single Administrative Panel….” This is allowed where it “promotes the shared interests of the parties in avoiding unnecessary duplication of time, effort and expense, reduces the potential for conflicting or inconsistent results arising from multiple proceedings, and generally furthers the fundamental objectives of the Policy.” MLB Advanced Media, The Phillies, Padres LP v. OreNet, Inc., D2009-0985 (WIPO Sep. 28, 2009). Further, Paragraph 3(c) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) provides that a “complaint may relate to more than one domain name, provided that the domain names are registered by the same domain name holder.” UDRP Panels have looked to a variety of factors in determining whether multiple domains are, in fact, of common ownership. Such factors as similar naming conventions, website content, and IP addresses, as well as similarities in some of the Whois information, etc. may lead to the conclusion that domain names with differing WHOIS information are, nevertheless, owned by a single entity. See, e.g., Delta Dental Plans Association v. ICS INC., et al., D2014-0474 (WIPO June 16, 2014) (Consolidation of 31 domains allowed where “[t]he Panel notes that each of the disputed domain names follows an identical naming convention, namely (DELTA DENTAL marks+ of + state name or two-letter state abbreviation); F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v. Aleksandr Bannikov, et al., D2015-0066 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2015) (consolidation of complaint against 154 domains allowed where many had similar website content and listed the same customer service phone number).
In the present case, Complainant points out that all three of the disputed domain names utilize a highly similar format of slight misspellings of its CHEVRON mark by only a single letter; use the same WHOIS privacy shield; were registered at the same registrar; are used in an identical manner to perpetuate an email phishing scheme; were registered within approximately two months of each other; and use name servers that only vary by 1 letter each. Complainant has submitted evidence to support each of these commonalities.
In consideration of the evidence before it, and in the absence of any repose or other submission from Respondent to contest Complainant’s assertions, the Panel finds it more likely than not that all three of the disputed domain names are owned by a single person or entity who has listed different aliases when registering the domain names. As such, the disputes against each of the disputed domain names may be consolidated into a single case.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: RESPONDENT’S IDENTITY
On August 28, 2020, the Forum received an email from an individual stating “I received a complaint notice about a domain name registered and used by me. I have never registered a domain name or used one so I don't know how to respond to this request.” Further, on September 8, 2020, the Forum received an email from an attorney claiming to represent the same individual stating that his client “claims no ownership in any of the relevant domains listed (or any for that matter). So I am writing to see why he has been included in this complaint? If he is not supposed to be included we would appreciate you removing him from this case.” Subsequent to this correspondence Complainant has asked that the name of this individual be redacted in the decision of this case. Also, once the concerned Registrar revealed the WHOIS information hidden by a privacy shield, the Complainant conducted further research and submitted evidence showing that the revealed names and addresses for all three disputed domain names appear to be false.
According to Policy ¶ 4(j), “[a]ll decisions under this Policy will be published in full over the Internet, except when an Administrative Panel determines in an exceptional case to redact portions of its decision.” In Wells Fargo & Co. v. John Doe as Holder of Domain Name <wellzfargo.com>, FA 362108 (Forum Dec. 30, 2004) and Wells Fargo & Co. v. John Doe as Holder of Domain Name <wellsfargossl>, FA 453727 (Forum May 19, 2005), the panels omitted the respondents’ personal information from the decisions, pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(j). In light of the Panel’s findings regarding the Respondent’s use of false aliases in the WHOIS records for the disputed domain names, it is necessary to protect the names and identities of those individuals and entities so named in the WHOIS records. The Panel will exercise its discretion under Policy ¶ 4(j) and determines that exceptional circumstances exist in this case. As such, this decision will be issued against Respondent with the names that appear in the WHOIS records redacted for privacy.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a worldwide business that develops and uses technology to extract fossil fuel and other sources of energy. Complainant has rights in the trademark CHEVRON through its its registration with numerous trademark offices throughout the world including the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (“CIPO”), and the European Intellectual Property Office (“EUIPO”), dating back to 1939. Respondent’s <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names, registered on July 26, 2019, Sep. 30, 2019, and Sep. 26, 2019, respectively, are each confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHEVRON mark, as they incorporate the mark in its entirety and slightly misspell the mark, while adding the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) to the end.
Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names. Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names, and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use the CHEVRON mark in them. Respondent does not use the disputed domain names for any bona fide offering of goods or services, nor any legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Respondent attempts to pass itself off as Complainant in fraudulent emails, attempting to phish for confidential information. Respondent also typosquats with the disputed domain names.
Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith. Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business for commercial gain by attempting to pass off as Complainant in fraudulent emails that phish for confidential information. Respondent also had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the CHEVRON mark when it registered the disputed domain names. Respondent further used false or misleading WHOIS information to register the disputed domain names. Respondent uses two of the disputed domain names to send fraudulent emails in furtherance of a phishing scheme. Finally, Respondent typosquats with the disputed domain names.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
C. Additional Submissions
After the concerned Registrar revealed the information listed in the WHOIS records for the disputed domain names, Complainant filed an Additional Submission in which it asserted Respondent’s use of false WHOIS aliases as further evidence of its bad faith and requesting that certain names be redacted from the decision in this case.
(1) each of the domain names registered by Respondent is confusingly similar to a trademark in which Complainant has rights;
(2) Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in respect of the domain names; and
(3) the disputed domain names were registered and are being used by Respondent in bad faith.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
Complainant asserts rights in the CHEVRON mark through its registration with numerous trademark offices throughout the world (e.g. USPTO, CIPO, EUIPO, and others). Registration with multiple trademark agencies is generally sufficient to satisfy rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Emerson Electric Co. v. Cai Jian Lin / Shen Zhen Shi colorsun Zi Dong Hua You Xian Gong Si, FA 1798802 (Forum Aug. 31, 2018) (“Registering a mark with multiple trademark agencies around the world is sufficient to establish rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”) Therefore, the Panel finds that Complainant has rights in the CHEVRON mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant argues that each of Respondent’s <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHEVRON mark, as they incorporate different misspelled variations of the mark along with the “.com” gTLD. Slightly misspelling a mark and adding the “.com” gTLD is generally insufficient in differentiating a disputed domain name from the mark it incorporates under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (“Respondent arrives at each of the disputed domain names by merely misspelling each of the disputed domain names and adding the gTLD ‘.com.’ This is insufficient to distinguish the disputed domain names from Complainant’s trademark.”). The disputed domain names each incorporate a slight misspelling of the CHEVRON mark by adding a “c” to the front of the mark, transposing the letters “e” and “v” in the mark, and replacing the “o” in the mark with a “c”, respectively. Each disputed domain name also adds the “.com” gTLD to the end of the mark. Therefore, the Panel finds that each of the disputed domain names is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHEVRON mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Should it succeed in this effort, the burden then shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).
Complainant argues that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names because Respondent is not commonly known by any of the disputed domain names, and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its CHEVRON mark in the disputed domain names. In considering this issue, relevant WHOIS information may demonstrate that a Respondent is or is not commonly known by a disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Fred Wallace, FA 1626022 (Forum July 27, 2015) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <chevron-europe.com> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information named “Fred Wallace” as registrant of the disputed domain name). The WHOIS records identify Respondent as using three different names which bear no resemblance to the word “Chevron” and, for the reasons stated above, are redacted to protect the privacy of those named individuals and entities. Further, nothing the in the record rebuts Complainant’s assertion that it never authorized or licensed Respondent to use the CHEVRON mark in the disputed domain names. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by any of the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant next asserts that Respondent is not using the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names for any bona fide offerings of goods or services, nor making any legitimate noncommercial or fair use thereof under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii). Instead, Respondent attempts to pass itself off as Complainant in furtherance of various email phishing schemes using the <chveron.com> and <chevrcn.com> domain names. Attempting to pass oneself off as a complainant in emails to phish for confidential information is generally not considered a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii). See Emerson Electric Co. v. Adilcon Rocha, FA 1735949 (Forum July 11, 2017) (finding that respondent’s attempt to pass itself off as complainant through emails does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services and, as such, respondent lacked rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name). None of the disputed domain names resolve to any website content. However, Complainant provides copies of emails sent from the <chveron.com> and <chevrcn.com> domain names that attempt to schedule meetings with Complainant’s employees or that are directed to Complainant’s vendors and suppliers and request invoices and other confidential information. Complainant also notes the use of false alias information in the WHOIS records for these domain names. For its part, Respondent has filed no reply or made any other submission in this case to explain its actions or otherwise refute Complainant’s claims. Therefore, based upon a preponderance of the available evidence, the Panel finds that Respondent does not use the <chveron.com> and <chevrcn.com> domain names for any bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).
As for the <cchevron.com> domain name, Complainant further asserts that “Respondent presumably has used or intends to use the <cchevron.com> domain name in a similarly fraudulent manner.” However, Complainant apparently was not able to gather evidence showing misuse of this domain name for phishing emails. Nevertheless, it is noted that this domain name does not resolve to any website content. Resolving a disputed domain name to an error page or to no content at all is not a bona fide use thereof. See Kohler Co. v. xi long chen, FA 1737910 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (where the disputed domain name resolves to an inactive webpage displaying the message “website coming soon!” the Panel held that ”Respondent has not made a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain.”) In light of the non-resolution of the confusingly similar <cchevron.com> domain name for well over one year the Panel finds that Respondent has not demonstrated any rights or legitimate interests therein under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).
Finally, Complainant argues that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names by engaging in typosquatting with the disputed domain names. Slightly misspelling a trademark to divert internet users who mistakenly enter the typosquatted mark typically demonstrates a lack or rights or legitimate interests in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). See Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA 1610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) (“Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark. Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”). The Panel notes that all three of the disputed domain names incorporate different, slight misspellings of the CHEVRON mark. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) on the ground that Respondent has engaged in typosquatting.
Complainant argues that Respondent registered the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names in bad faith, as it had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the CHEVRON mark when it registered the disputed domain names. Actual knowledge of rights in a mark at the time of registering a disputed domain name is generally sufficient to establish bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), and can be demonstrated through such actions as a respondent’s use of a well-known mark in its disputed domain names to send phishing emails to employees or business partners of a complainant. See AutoZone Parts, Inc. v. Ken Belden, FA 1815011 (Forum Dec. 24, 2018) (“Complainant contends that Respondent’s knowledge can be presumed in light of the substantial fame and notoriety of the AUTOZONE mark, as well as the fact that Complainant is the largest retailer in the field. The Panel here finds that Respondent did have actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark, demonstrating bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”); see also Spectrum Brands, Inc. v. Guo Li Bo, FA 1760233 (Forum Jan. 5, 2018) (“[T]he fact Respondent registered a domain name that looked identical to the SPECTRUM BRANDS mark and used that as an email address to pass itself off as Complainant shows that Respondent knew of Complainant and its trademark rights at the time of registration.”). Complainant argues that in light of the notoriety and widespread recognition of its CHEVRON mark, along with Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to send fraudulent emails to Complainant’s own employees and business partners, Respondent must have registered the disputed domain names with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the CHEVRON mark. Complainant submits into evidence images of its own website and 2018 Annual Report as well as copies of some of its advertisements. It also submits copies of some of Respondent’s phishing emails which specifically mention Complainant and its CHEVRON mark. In light of this evidence, the Panel finds that Respondent registered the disputed domain with actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark.
Next, Complainant argues that Respondent registered and uses the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names in bad faith by disrupting Complainant’s business for commercial gain. Using disputed domain names to pass oneself off as a complainant in emails attempting to further a phishing scheme is generally considered bad faith disruption as well as the seeking of commercial gain based on trademark confusion under Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv). See Chevron Intellectual Property, LLC v. Jack Brooks, FA 1635967 (Forum Oct. 6, 2015) (finding that Respondent’s use of <chevron-corps.com> to impersonate an executive of Complainant in emails is in opposition to Complainant and is therefore in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)); CoorsTek, Inc. v. Gwendolyn K Bohn / CoorsTek Inc, FA 1764186 (Forum Feb. 2, 2018) (“Respondent sent email to users seeking employment at Complainant’s business and asked for personal information such as a photo ID. Therefore, the Panel finds Respondent’s emails constitute a phishing scheme and this indicates bad faith registration and use per Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”) See also Qatalyst Partners LP v. Devimore, FA 1393436 (Forum July 13, 2011) (finding that using the disputed domain name as an e-mail address to pass itself off as the complainant in a phishing scheme is evidence of bad faith registration and use). As noted above, Complainant provides screenshots of emails sent from email addresses utilizing the <chveron.com> and <chevrcn.com> domain names that impersonate Complainant and attempt to schedule meetings with Complainant’s employees or that reach out to Complainant’s vendors and suppliers and request invoices and other confidential information. Therefore, the Panel finds, with respect to the <chveron.com> and <chevrcn.com> domain names, that Respondent has sought to disrupt the business of Complainant and has sought commercial gain by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark as to the source of its phishing emails under Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv).
As for the <cchevron.com> domain name, failure to actively use a disputed domain name can be evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Dermtek Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Sang Im / Private Registration, FA 1522801 (Forum Nov. 19, 2013) (holding that because the respondent’s website contained no content related to the domain name and instead generated the error message “Error 400- Bad Request,” the respondent had registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)). As there is no evidence that the <cchevron.com> domain name has resolved to any website content since its registration over one year ago, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant also argues that Respondent’s bad faith registration and use is further found through its use of false or misleading WHOIS information. Using false or misleading WHOIS information is generally considered evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See CNU ONLINE Holdings, LLC v. Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp., FA 1614972 (Forum May 29, 2015) (“As the Panel sees that Respondent has provided false or misleading WHOIS information, the Panel finds bad faith in Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”) The Panel notes that at least one individual named in the WHOIS record for one of the disputed domain names was a victim of identity theft by Respondent who used different false names and addresses as aliases to register each of the domain names. Therefore, the Panel finds that bad faith registration and use is further supported by Respondent’s using false WHOIS information to register the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Finally, Complainant argues that Respondent registered and uses the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names in bad faith by typosquatting the CHEVRON mark within the disputed domain names. Registering slight misspellings of a mark as domain names for the purpose of diverting internet users who mistakenly type the misspelled domain names is generally considered evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Homer TLC, Inc. v. Artem Ponomarev, FA 1623825 (Forum July 20, 2015) (“Finally, under this head of the Policy, it is evident that the <homededpot.com> domain name is an instance of typosquatting, which is the deliberate misspelling of the mark of another in a domain name, done to take advantage of common typing errors made by Internet users in entering into a web browser the name of an enterprise with which they would like to do business online. Typosquatting is independent evidence of bad faith in the registration and use of a domain name.”). As each of the disputed domain names is a slightly misspelled version of the CHEVRON mark, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) by typosquatting.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <cchevron.com>, <chveron.com>, and <chevrcn.com> domain names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Steven M. Levy, Esq., Panelist
Dated: September 16, 2020
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