Studypool Inc. v. Study Tutors Inc
Claim Number: FA2009001913788
Complainant is Studypool Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by John L. Slafsky of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, California, USA. Respondent is Study Tutors Inc. (“Respondent”), Washington, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <studypool.us>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on September 25, 2020; the Forum received payment on September 25, 2020.
On September 28, 2020, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <studypool.us> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On September 29, 2020, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of October 19, 2020 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@studypool.us. Also on September 29, 2020, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on October 19, 2020.
On October 23, 2020, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for the usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (“Rules”).
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant offers an online tutoring and study platform. It has common law rights in the STUDYPOOL mark through use in commerce since 2014. The <studypool.us> Domain Name is nearly identical and confusingly similar to the STUDYPOOL mark as it includes the mark as its dominant part, and differs from the mark only by the addition of the “.us” country-code top-level domain (“ccTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not commonly known by the Domain Name, has not been licensed or permitted by Complainant to use the STUDYPOOL mark, and is not affiliated with Complainant. Respondent has not acquired any trademark rights in the term “STUDYPOOL”. Further, Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor is it making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the name. Instead, Respondent redirects Internet traffic from Complainant to Respondent’s web site, where it passes off as Complainant and phishes for information from visitors to the site.
Respondent registered or uses the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent uses the Domain Name to attract users to its web site for commercial gain by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, endorsement or affiliation of that site and disrupts Complainant’s business. Additionally, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the STUDYPOOL mark when it registered the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Complainant cannot claim exclusive rights to the STUDYPOOL mark because it has not registered the name or any of its variants. Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name because it runs a legitimate business in association with the name. Additionally, Respondent’s use of the Domain Name does not conflict with Complainant, and no confusion can arise from its use. Respondent’s Domain Name is not used in connection with any phishing activity.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.
Given the similarity between the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) and the usTLD Policy, the Panel will draw upon UDRP precedent as applicable in rendering its decision, except where differences in the two policies require a different analysis.
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
Complainant has not registered its STUDYPOOL mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) does not require a complainant to own a registered its mark if it can demonstrate common law rights in the mark. Microsoft Corporation v. Story Remix / Inofficial, FA 1734934 (Forum July 10, 2017) (finding that “The Policy does not require a complainant to own a registered trademark prior to a respondent’s registration if it can demonstrate established common law rights in the mark.”). To establish common law rights in a mark, a complainant must prove that the mark has acquired a secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA 1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that Complainant established common law rights in her personal name since “[a] mark can generate a secondary meaning sufficient to establish Complainant’s rights when consistent and continuous use of the mark has created distinctive and significant good will….”), Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) (“Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”). The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including “(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys.”
Complaint Exhibit D is a screenshot of Complainant’s web site at <studypool.com> as of September 24, 2020, which demonstrates its use of the STUDYPOOL mark at that time. Complaint Exhibit E consists of screenshots of social media web pages (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, LinkedIn) demonstrating the presence of Complainant’s mark on those site as of September 2020. Complaint Exhibit F consists of copies of a number of articles published by various sources during the years 2016 through 2018 describing Complainant’s business and its success in the on-line tutoring industry, some of which refer to its start-up in 2014. The Complaint states that Complainant registered its <studypool.com> domain name in January 2014 and began offering its services under the STUDYPOOL mark that year. It states that Complainant offers its services in almost every country in the world and currently has more than one million active users. Respondent does not dispute these allegations and the Panel takes them as true. On the foregoing evidence the Panel has no trouble finding that Complainant has demonstrated its rights in the STUDYPOOL mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
The <studypool.us> Domain Name is virtually identical to the STUDYPOOL mark. It incorporates that mark verbatim, the only difference being the “.us” ccTLD appended to it. This change does not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. Henkel, FA 827652 (Forum Dec. 11, 2006) (holding that “it is well established that the top-level domain, here “.us,” is insignificant with regard to UDRP analysis” when determining confusing similarity). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
Respondent’s only argument with respect to this element of the case is that Complainant cannot claim exclusive rights to the STUDYPOOL mark because it has not registered that mark with a governmental trademark authority. As set forth above, however, it is well-recognized that common law rights in a mark are sufficient to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), and Complainant has demonstrated such rights.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the STUDYPOOL mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) The respondent is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark that is identical to the domain name;
(ii) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(iii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iv) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent or commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use the STUDYPOOL mark and Respondent has no affiliation with Complainant, (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because its resolving web site impersonates and passes off as Complainant and attempts to solicit sensitive private information from visitors, and (iv) Respondent has no rights in a mark that is identical to the Domain Name. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complaint Exhibit G is a screenshot of the web site resolving from the Domain Name as of May 25, 2020. Complaint Exhibit H is a screenshot of the web site resolving from the Domain Name as of September 24, 2020. The web site shown on each of these exhibits is commercial in nature. It prominently features the name STUDYPOOL and purports to offer the same services as those offered by Complainant, using the same general appearance and layout, including the STUDYPOOL logo, as that used by Complainant on its <studypool.com> web site (Complaint Exhibit D). Respondent’s web site clearly represents itself as being that of Complainant. An Internet user reaching this site could easily believe that he or she has reached that of Complainant. Using a confusingly similar domain name to pass off as a complainant is not a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use for the purposes of and Policy ¶ 4(c)(iv). Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (finding the respondent did not use the domain name to make a bona fide offering of goods or services per Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) where the website resolving from the disputed domain name featured the complainant’s mark and various photographs related to the complainant’s business), Fadal Engineering, LLC v. DANIEL STRIZICH,INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGY SERVICE INC, FA 1581942 (Forum Nov. 13, 2014) (finding that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain to sell products related to Complainant without authorization “does not amount to a bona fide offering of goods or services under policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”). [i]
Complainant states that it has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way and that Respondent is not affiliated with it. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and Respondent does not contest or dispute it. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
The information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists the registrant of the Domain Name as “Study Tutors, Inc.” The only common element between this name and the Domain Name is the word “study,” but that is a common generic term and by itself does not serve in any way to identify or link the name Study Tutors with the <studypool.us> Domain Name. The descriptive name “Study Tutors” is fundamentally distinct from the whimsical, made-up name “Studypool.” Although Respondent asserts that its “domain name and business model is [sic] not reliant on the complainant’s name,” implying that it has a business which uses the Domain Name, it has submitted no evidence whatever to establish that it might have become commonly known by the Domain Name. As discussed above, Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s mark, and the evidence before the Panel gives no indication that Respondent has used the Studypool name for any purpose other than to impersonate and pass off as Complainant. On the evidence before the Panel, it is clear that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).
Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) affords a respondent the ability to demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a domain name by showing that it is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark which is identical to the domain name. To make a prima facie case on this element is its allegation, Complainant alleged that “Respondent has not acquired any trademark rights in the STUDYPOOL mark.” Complainant did not elaborate or expressly address the Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) issue, but Panel notes that the Domain Name was registered on February 24, 2020 (Complaint Exhibit A), and the likelihood that Respondent might be the owner or beneficiary of a registered trademark identical to the Domain Name at this time is essentially nil. More importantly, Respondent has neither argued nor offered evidence that it is such owner or beneficiary. It alleges that it runs a “thriving and legitimate business model” but it does not explain what that business model is, nor does it even allege any trademark rights in a mark identical to the Domain Name. Clearly, the registration and use of the Domain Name for Respondent’s web site impersonating and passing off as Complainant cannot serve as the basis for any common law trademark rights in that name. On the evidence before the Panel, it is clear that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a trademark that is identical to the Domain Name.
Complainant alleges that Respondent is using its web site to “manipulate visitors into providing their personally identifiable information” via a ‘Register’ link.” The Panel was unable to locate any such link on either Complaint Exhibit G or H, however, nor did Complainant offer any evidence of a request by Respondent to supply personally identifiable information. In sum, there is no evidence of phishing in any of the exhibits submitted by either party. The allegations of phishing are not proven.
Nevertheless, on the evidence discussed above, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use or registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent ‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration or use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is clearly using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site. This fits squarely within the circumstances articulated by Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is clear evidence of bad faith registration and use. Walgreens Co. v. MUHAMMAD SALEEM / WALGREENSGENERAL TRADING LLC, FA 1790453 (Forum Jul. 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s registration and use of the confusingly similar <walgreensshop.com> domain name in furtherance of trading competitively on Complainant’s WALGREENS trademark demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv).”), Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA1504001612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) (“The Panel agrees that Respondent’s use of the website to display products similar to Complainant’s, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”).
Complainant alleges that Respondent’s conduct also falls within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). By using the Domain Name for a web site which passes off as and impersonates Complainant, Respondent is clearly disrupting the business of Complainant. Complainant has received a number of complaints from disappointed visitors to Respondent’s site who thought they were dealing with Complainant. The evidence is unclear, however, whether Respondent is actually a competitor of Complainant. Its web site purports to offer the same types of services as Complainant, but the evidence does not demonstrate that Respondent actually provides any such services. It may well be that it simply defrauds site visitors who pay for services that are never rendered, or that any services actually rendered are so inadequate or substandard as to be a sham. A number of UDRP panels have found that using a confusingly similar domain name to disrupt the business of a complainant was bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), even when the respondent was not a competitor. Others have essentially by-passed the competition factor, focusing instead on disruption, and have simply found bad faith under ¶ 4(b)(iii), without further discussion or analysis.[ii]
Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) reads as follows: “you [the respondent] have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor” (emphasis supplied). The concept of “competition” in the context of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) has been subject to various interpretations by UDRP panels. Some have interpreted that term broadly to mean someone who “acts in opposition to the complainant.” Mission KwaSizabantu v. Benjamin Rost, Case No. 2000-0279 (WIPO June 7, 2000). Others have limited the term to parties who vie commercially with each other in the same industry, offering the same or similar goods or services. Tribeca Film Center Inc. v. Lorenzo Brusasco-Mackenzie, Case No. 2000-1772 (WIPO April 10, 2000). This Panel favors the second view, concurring with the panel in Britannia Building Society v. Britannia Fraud Prevention, Case No. 2001-0505 (WIPO July 8, 2001) that to accept the interpretation first above described would “render so many parties ‘competitors’ as to dilute the Policy’s bad faith requirement beyond recognition.” There is no conclusive evidence here that Respondent is vying with Complainant for customers or business in the on-line tutoring industry, offering its own services as alternatives to those offered by Complainant. It is certainly impersonating Complainant but there is no conclusive evidence that it is competing with Complainant. In the absence of actual commercial competition between Complainant and Respondent, Respondent here cannot be considered a competitor for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).
If Respondent does offer legitimate tutoring services, it may well be a competitor of Complainant for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Even so, it does not appear that Respondent registered the Domain Name primarily for the purpose of disrupting Complainant’s business. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that Respondent’s primary purpose in registering the Domain Name was not to disrupt the business of a commercial adversary but instead to attract internet traffic to its web site by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his site, as discussed above in the context of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Considering all of the factors present in this case, it cannot be said that Respondent’s conduct falls within the circumstances stated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).
That said, using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a commercial web site used to pass off as and disrupt the business of a complainant is still bad faith. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and using a confusingly similar domain name to disrupt the business of a complainant by passing off as and impersonating that complainant is sufficient evidence of bad faith to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Respondent’s primary intent in registering and continuing to use the Domain Name is less important than the effect of his conduct. Respondent knew or should have known the disruptive impact its conduct would have upon Complainant’s business. Respondent went forward with its plans in spite of that and this demonstrates bad faith independently of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Red Wing Shoe Company, Inc. v. wei zhang / Magdalena Jennifer / Mu Yan / Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico, FA1911001873163 (Forum Jan. 3, 2020).
Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in February 2020 (Complainant Exhibit A establishes the creation date). Complainant’s STUDYPOOL mark had been used since 2014 by that time (Complaint Exhibit F). Respondent copied that mark verbatim into the Domain Name and uses it as the name of the entity advertised on the resolving web site. The extent to which Respondent’s web site mimics and copies Complainant’s site conclusively establishes that Respondent knew of Complainant and its rights at the time of registration. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <studypool.us> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
October 26, 2020
[i] The cases cited in this section were decided under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which does not include the provisions incorporated into the usTLD Policy as ¶ 4(c)(i). The usTLD Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(ii), (iii) and (iv) are identical to UDRP Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i)(ii) and (iii).
[ii] PopSockets LLC v. san mao, FA 1740903 (Forum Aug. 27, 2017) (finding disruption of a complainant’s business which was not directly commercial competitive behavior was nonetheless sufficient to establish bad faith registration and use per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)), Love City Brewing Company v. Anker Fog / Love City Brewing Company, FA 1753144 (Forum Nov. 27, 2017) (Finding that Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business by pointing Internet users to an expired webpage. This may create the perception that Complainant is closed, never existed, or is not a legitimate business. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).).
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