Sierra Canyon High School Foundation, doing business as Sierra Canyon School v. Nguyễn Văn Lư
Claim Number: FA2010001918647
Complainant is Sierra Canyon High School Foundation, doing business as Sierra Canyon School (“Complainant”), represented by Taylor C. Foss of Michelman & Robinson, LLP, California, USA. Respondent is Nguyễn Văn Lư (“Respondent”), Vietnam.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <sierracanyonschool.com>, registered with April Sea Information Technology Company Limited.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on October 28, 2020; the Forum received payment on October 28, 2020.
On November 3, 2020, April Sea Information Technology Company Limited confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <sierracanyonschool.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with April Sea Information Technology Company Limited and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. April Sea Information Technology Company Limited has verified that Respondent is bound by the April Sea Information Technology Company Limited registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On November 5, 2020, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint written in Vietnamese, setting a deadline of November 25, 2020 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@sierracanyonschool.com. Also on November 5, 2020, the Written Notice of the Complaint written in Vietnamese, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On November 30, 2020, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: Language of the Proceedings
The registration agreement for the Domain Name is written in Vietnamese. Rule 11(a) provides that the language of the proceedings is the language of the registration agreement, subject to the authority of the Panel to determine otherwise, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Complainant filed its Complaint in English and requests that this proceeding be conducted in English. Factors which previous panels have seen as important include evidence showing that the respondent can understand the language of the complaint, the language of the domain name, the content on any web pages resolving from the domain name, prior correspondence between the parties, and potential unfairness or unwarranted delay in ordering the translation of the pleadings and the Decision. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.5.1, The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, D2009-0610 (WIPO July 1, 2009) (panel exercising discretion in deciding that the language of the proceedings advance in English, contrary to the Registration Agreement, based on evidence that respondent has command of the language), Finter Bank Zurich v. Shumin Peng, D2006-0432 (WIPO June 12, 2006) (deciding that the proceeding should be in English, stating, “It is important that the language finally decided by the Panel for the proceeding is not prejudicial to either one of the parties in his or her ability to articulate the arguments for the case.”).
As stated above, Complainant filed its Complaint in English, but the Written Notice of the Complaint, written in both Vietnamese and English, was served upon Respondent in accordance with Rules 1 and 2. The parking page to which the Domain Name resolved as recently as October 8, 2020 is written exclusively in English (Complaint Exhibits N and O), and the Domain Name itself is composed of English words. It thus appears that Respondent is conversant and proficient in the English language. Inasmuch as the Panel is not proficient in Vietnamese, proceeding in that language would involve substantial additional expense and time for translation. Further, Respondent has not submitted a Response or any indication that he desires to participate in this proceeding, in the Vietnamese language or otherwise. Under these circumstances the Panel finds that the additional time and expense of proceeding in Vietnamese would be unwarranted inasmuch as the only party who might benefit from that has declined to participate. For this reason, the Panel determines that this proceeding will be conducted in English.
A. Complainant
Complainant is an elementary, middle, and high school institution in California. It has rights in the SIERRA CANYON and SIERRA CANYON SCHOOL marks through its registration of those marks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Complainant also has common law rights in the SIERRA CANYON mark through its longstanding use and widepread recognition of that mark. Respondent’s <sierracanyonschool.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks as it incorporates the marks in their entirety, merely adding the generic term “school” and the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) in one case and only the “.com” gTLD in the other.
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. He is not commonly known by the Domain Name, nor has Complainant authorized or licensed him to use its SIERRA CANYON or SIERRA CANYON SCHOOL mark. Respondent does not use the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, as the web page resolving from it is nothing but a parked page with hyperlinks to related and unrelated topics.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. He had actual knowedge of Complainant and its marks when he registered the Domain Name. He has made no active use of it apart from parked pages and failed to respond Complainant’s correspondence offering to discuss Respondent’s willingness to sell the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires the complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The SIERRA CANYON mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. 4,524,711) on May 6, 2014 (Complaint Exhibit C), and the SIERRA CANYON SCHOOL mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. 4,520,597) on April 29, 2014 (Complaint Exhibit D). Complainant’s registration of its marks with the USPTO is sufficient to establish its rights in those marks for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (stating, “Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”).
Complainant also claims common law rights in the SIERRA CANYON mark. To establish common law rights in a mark, a complainant must prove that the mark has generated a secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA 1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that Complainant established common law rights in her personal name since “[a] mark can generate a secondary meaning sufficient to establish Complainant’s rights when consistent and continuous use of the mark has created distinctive and significant good will….”), Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) (“Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”). The WIPO Overview, at ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including “(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys.”
Complainant submitted a copy of its articles of incorporation dated September 14, 2000 (Complaint Exhibit G), a screenshot of its web site using the <sierracanyon.com> domain name and SIERRA CANYON branding as of December 12, 1998 (Complaint Exhibit H), and a screenshot of its web site using the <sierracanyon.com> domain name and SIERRA CANYON branding as of March 8, 2005 (Complaint Exhibit I). Respondent has established secondary meaning and common law rights in the SIERRA CANYON mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Respondent’s <sierracanyonschool.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s SIERRA CANYON and SIERRA CANYON SCHOOL marks. It incorporates the SIERRA CANYON SCHOOL mark verbatim, merely adding the “.com” gTLD. It incorporates the SIERRA CANYON mark in its entirety, merely adding the generic term “school” and the “.com” gTLD. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s marks for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. George Whitehead, FA 1784412 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“[S]light differences between domain names and registered marks, such as the addition of words that describe the goods or services in connection with the mark and gTLDs, do not distinguish the domain name from the mark incorporated therein per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s marks are clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the SIERRA CANYON and SIERRA CANYON SCHOOL marks, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to respondent of the dispute, respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use the SIERRA CANYON or SIERRA CANYON marks, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the web site resolving from it consists only of a parked page with no substantive content. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Nguyễn Văn Lư” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark or to register its mark as a domain name. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Exhibits N, O and P are screenshots of the web site resolving from the Domain Name in October 2020 and March 2009. It features links such as “Kendall Jenner Hot,” “Online School In,” “High Schools Online,” and “Homeschooling for High School Students” and appears to be a typical pay-per-click site. Using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links to goods and services, related and unrelated to a complainant’s business, is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). McGuireWoods LLP v. Mykhailo Loginov / Loginov Enterprises d.o.o, FA1412001594837 (Forum Jan. 22, 2015) (“The Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to feature parked hyperlinks containing links in competition with Complainant’s legal services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees), Materia, Inc. v. Michele Dinoia, FA1507001627209 (Forum Aug. 20, 2015) (“The Panel finds that Respondent is using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect users to a webpage with unrelated hyperlinks, that Respondent has no other rights to the domain name, and finds that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web site, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent obtains commercial gain from his use of the Domain Name and the resolving web site to generate pay-per-click revenues. Pay-per-click sites are common on the Internet. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to these sites, when a visitor to Respondent’s site clicks on one of the links which appear there, Respondent receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. Most likely, Respondent receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent’s web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain). Respondent’s use of the Domain Name is commercial also because the sponsors of the various web sites forwarded from Respondent’s web site benefit from the subsequent interest and purchases of those who visit the sites. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO,2000) (finding that “[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone” for a use to be commercial).
Second, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its marks when he registered the Domain Name in March 2006 (Complaint Exhibit A shows the creation date). This registration pre-dates Complainant’s registration of its SIERRA CANYON and SIERRA CANYON SCHOOLS marks with the USPTO but, as discussed above in the Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis, Complainant had been using the SIERRA CANYON mark since 1972 and had developed common law rights in that mark long before Respondent registered the Domain Name. Respondent copied both marks into the Domain Name, and included school-related links on his web site. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in the incorporated mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons first set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <sierracanyonschool.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
December 2, 2020
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