Seabourn Cruise Line Limited v. Michael Nava / Domain Nerdz LLC
Claim Number: FA2112001978372
Complainant is Seabourn Cruise Line Limited (“Complainant”), represented by Jaime Rich Vining of Friedland Vining, P.A., Florida, USA. Respondent is Michael Nava / Domain Nerdz LLC (“Respondent”), Nevada, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <seabourn.xyz>, registered with Sav.com, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on December 27, 2021; the Forum received payment on December 27, 2021.
On December 28, 2021, Sav.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <seabourn.xyz> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Sav.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Sav.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the Sav.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On December 29, 2021, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of January 18, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@seabourn.xyz. Also on December 29, 2021, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On January 20, 2011, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant offers small-ship, luxury cruising services. It has rights in the SEABOURN mark through its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Respondent’s <seabourn.xyz> Domain Name is virtually identical and confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it incorporates the SEABOURN mark in its entirety, merely adding the “.xyz” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”)
Respondent has no legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not commonly known by the Domain Name and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use the SEABOURN mark. Additionally, Respondent does not use the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, as the Domain Name resolves to an inactive web page containing an offer to sell the name.
Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith. It attempts to attract for commercial gain internet users to its web site and commercially benefit from the goodwill of Complainant’s trademarks. Respondent registered the Domain Name with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the SEABOURN mark, and offers the Domain Name for sale without making some bona fide use of it.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The SEABOURN mark was registered to Complainant with USPTO (Reg. No. 2,167,162) on June 23, 1998 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Annex C). Complainant’s registration of the SEABOURN mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy 4(a)(i). DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrate its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).
Respondent’s <seabourn.xyz> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s SEABOURN mark as it contains that mark in its entirety, merely adding the “.xyz” gTLD. This change does not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy 4(a)(i). Kellogg North America Company v. Private Registration, FA 1613347 (Forum June 2, 2015) (finding that the <kelloggs.xyz> domain name is identical to the complainant’s KELLOGG’S mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)), Reese v. Morgan, FA 917029 (Forum Apr. 5, 2007) (finding that the mere addition of the generic top-level domain “.com” is insufficient to differentiate a disputed domain name from a mark). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the SEABOURN mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is has not been commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark, and (ii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the Domain Name resolves to an inactive web site which offers the Domain Name for sale. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Michael Nava / Domain Nerdz LLC” as the registrant of the Domain Name. Neither of these names bears any resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no Response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Annex G is a screenshot of the “dan” web site to which the Domain Name resolves. This web site promotes and brokers the sale of domain names. Prominently featured in the banner at the top of this page are the words “The domain name seabourn.xyz is for sale!” The remainder of the page explains how the visitor might go about purchasing the Domain Name. The page is not that of a domainer, who offers many domains for sale—it pertains only to the Domain Name. This is not an active use of the Domain Name. As such it is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Morgan Stanley v. Francis Mccarthy / Baltec Marine Llc, FA 1785347 (Forum June 8, 2018) (“both Domain Names resolve to a web site that shows the words, ‘Not Found, The requested URL / was not found on this server.’ ’ Inactive holding of a domain name does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), 3M Company v. Kabir S Rawat, FA 1725052 (Forum May 9, 2017) (holding that “a general offer for sale… provides additional evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests” in a disputed domain name).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, it is evident that Respondent’s primary, if not its sole purpose in registering the Domain Name was to sell it to Complainant. The sole and exclusive purpose of the content on the web page to which the Domain Name redirects (Complaint Annex G) is to sell the Domain Name. The offer is not directed at Complainant, but the Doman Name is so obviously associated with Complainant and Complainant’s SEABOURN mark is so well-known in the cruise industry that no one other than Complainant would be likely to buy it. The $1,988.00 stated list price is far in excess of the costs directly associated with the Domain Name. This places Respondent squarely within the circumstances articulated by Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). Pocatello Idaho Auditorium Dist. v. CES Mktg. Group, Inc., FA 103186 (Forum Feb. 21, 2002) ("[w]hat makes an offer to sell a domain [name] bad faith is some accompanying evidence that the domain name was registered because of its value that is in some way dependent on the trademark of another, and then an offer to sell it to the trademark owner or a competitor of the trademark owner"). Even a general offer to sell a domain name has been held to be evidence that the respondent intended to make such an offer at the time it registered the name, supporting a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). Citigroup Inc. v. Kevin Goodman, FA1506001623939 (Forum July 11, 2015) (holding that the evidence showed that the respondent registered the disputed domain name primarily for the purpose of transferring it for a profit and demonstrates the respondent’s bad faith registration and use of the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i).).
Second, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in October 2021 (Complaint Annex F WHOIS information shows registration date). Complainant’s SEABOURN mark had been used by it in commerce since at least as early as 1988 (USPTO Registration Certificate included in Complaint Annex C shows date of first use in commerce). The spelling of the SEABOURN mark is unique and whimsical in nature and Respondent copied it exactly into the Domain Name. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The nonexclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for the consideration of many factors in an analysis for bad faith and registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in a mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <seabourn.xyz> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
January 24, 2022
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