VKR Holding A/S v. Cory Neal
Claim Number: FA2201001980173
Complainant is VKR Holding A/S (“Complainant”), represented by Joe Viviani of CSC Digital Brand Services AB, Sweden. Respondent is Cory Neal (“Respondent”), Utah, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <velix.us>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on January 13, 2022; the Forum received payment on January 13, 2022.
On January 13, 2022, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <velix.us> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (“the Policy”).
On January 14, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of February 3, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@velix.us. Also on January 14, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On February 10, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules to the usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (“Rules”). Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the usTLD Policy, usTLD Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant distributes windows, skylights and other indoor climate products in 40 countries, including the U.S. It has rights in the VELUX mark based upon its registration of that mark with various governmental trademark authorities, including the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <velix.us> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it contains the VELUX mark in its entirety, merely substituting the letter “i” for the letter “u” and adding the “.us” country code top-level domain (“ccTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. He is not commonly known by the Domain Name and is not using it in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because it redirects users to a website featuring pay-per-click links to third-party products, some of which compete with Complainant.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. He is guilty of typosquatting, is using the Domain Name to attract for commercial gain Internet users to his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web site by Complainant, and he had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the VELUX mark when he registered the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.
Given the similarity between the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) and the usTLD Policy, the Panel will draw upon UDRP precedent as applicable in rendering its decision, except where differences in the policies require a different analysis.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The VELUX mark was registered to VILLUM BENEDIKT KANN dba VELUX INTERNATIONAL with the USPTO (Reg. No. 1,091,446) on May 16, 1978 and was subsequently assigned to Complainant (TESS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit A). Complainant’s ownership of this registration establishes its rights in the VELUX mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). ). DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrates its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). As assignee and current owner of the May 1978 registration, Complainant has sufficient rights in the VELUX mark to bring and maintain this proceeding.
Respondent’s <velix.us> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it contains the VELUX mark in its entirety, merely substituting the letter “i” for the letter “u” and adding the “.us” ccTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Coachella Music Festival, LLC v. Domain Administrator / China Capital Investment Limited, FA 1734230 (Forum July 17, 2017) (“The addition of letters—particularly of those that create a common misspelling—fails to sufficiently distinguish a domain name from a registered mark.”), Microsoft Corp. v. Domain Registration Philippines, FA 877979 (Forum Feb. 20, 2007) (finding the respondent’s <microssoft.com> domain name to be confusingly similar to the complainant’s MICROSOFT mark because they differ by only one letter, and “such a small alteration is insufficient to avoid a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)”), Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. Henkel, FA 827652 (Forum Dec. 11, 2006) (holding that “it is well established that the top-level domain, here “.us,” is insignificant with regard to UDRP analysis” when determining confusing similarity). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the VELUX mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) The respondent is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark that is identical to the domain name;
(ii) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(iii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iv) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) he is not commonly known by the Domain Name, and (ii) he is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the web site resolving from it is a pay-per-click site. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complainant neither addressed not offered evidence specifically bearing upon the Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) factor stated above. Complainants in usTLD cases can search one or more governmental trademark authorities and report negative results to establish a prima facie case as to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i). Complainant here offered no such evidence. Nevertheless, while it would have been preferable for Complainant to have offered evidence bearing specifically upon this element of the case, the evidence that is available is sufficient to establish an inference that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name. The TESS report demonstrating Complainant’s rights in the VELUX mark evidences its rights in that mark dating from at least as early as the 1977 filing date. Complainant’s presence and goodwill in the window and skylight industry are well-established in many countries in Europe and North America (information about Complainant and the VELUX products submitted as Complaint Exhibits F and G). It is extremely unlikely that any governmental trademark authority would have registered a trademark identical to <velix.us> or any other mark identical or similar to the VELUX mark in the name of any person other than Complainant or one of its affiliates, or that Respondent could be the owner or beneficiary of a valid common law trade or service mark identical to either Domain Name. Additionally, although directed at another element of the case, the Complaint states that “internet searches yielded no results that may suggest Respondent is known by the Disputed Domain Name” (Complaint ¶ V.a.). On this evidence, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Panel finds that he is not the owner or beneficiary of a valid trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name.
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar and the WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit B list “Cory Neal / Summer in Utah, Inc.” as the registrant of the Domain Name. These names bear no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no Response has been filed UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name.
Complaint Exhibit C is a screenshot of the web site resolving from the Domain Name. The site features links such as “Skylight Roof,” “Statewide Windows and Doors,” “Velux Roof Windows,” “A+ Garage Doors” and the like. It is a typical pay-per-click site. Using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links to goods and services, related and unrelated to a complainant’s business, is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iv). McGuireWoods LLP v. Mykhailo Loginov / Loginov Enterprises d.o.o, FA1412001594837 (Forum Jan. 22, 2015) (“The Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to feature parked hyperlinks containing links in competition with Complainant’s legal services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees), Materia, Inc. v. Michele Dinoia, FA1507001627209 (Forum Aug. 20, 2015) (“The Panel finds that Respondent is using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect users to a webpage with unrelated hyperlinks, that Respondent has no other rights to the domain name, and finds that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”).[i]
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web site, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent here obtains commercial gain from his use of the Domain Name and the resolving web site to generate pay-per-click revenues. Pay-per-click sites are common on the Internet. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to these sites, when a visitor to the site clicks on one of the links which appear there, the site sponsor receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. In most cases, the site sponsor receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent’s web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain). Respondent’s use of the Domain Name is commercial also because the sponsors of the various web sites forwarded from Respondent’s web site benefit from the subsequent interest and purchases of those who visit the sites. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO,2000) (finding that “[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone” for a use to be commercial).
Next, by registering the Domain Name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant’s mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. This may not fit precisely within any of the circumstances listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The list of circumstances set forth in Policy ¶ 4(b) is non-exclusive, allowing for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a typosquatted domain name has been held to be bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).
Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when he registered the Domain Name in July 2021 (WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit C shows the creation date). Complainant has been using the VELUX mark since at least as early as 1977 (TESS report submitted with Complaint Exhibit A shows a 1977 filing date), and that mark is well-known as the brand of Complainant, a supplier of high quality building materials (information about Complainant and its VELUX mark submitted as Complaint Exhibits F and G). Respondent copied that mark into the Domain Name, albeit with a subtle misspelling, and structured the links on his web site to relate in many cases to vendors of windows and skylights. In light of the non-exclusive nature of Policy, ¶ 4(b) registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in the incorporated mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons first set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <velix.us> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
February 11, 2022
[i] The cases cited in this section were decided under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which does not include usTLD Policy ¶ 4(c)(i). The usTLD Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(ii), (iii) and (iv) are identical to UDRP Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i)(ii) and (iii).
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