Compagnie Générale des Etablissements Michelin v. Endywork Mode / Apponline
Claim Number: FA2203001988668
Complainant is Compagnie Générale des Etablissements Michelin (“Complainant”), represented by Nathalie Dreyfus of Dreyfus & associés, France. Respondent is Endywork Mode / Apponline (“Respondent”), California, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <michellin.us>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on March 17, 2022; the Forum received payment on March 17, 2022.
On March 17, 2022, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <michellin.us> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On March 18, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of April 7, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@michellin.us. Also on March 18, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On April 13, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules to the usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (“Rules”). Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the usTLD Policy, usTLD Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant, Compagnie Générale des Etablissements Michelin, is the world’s largest tire company. It has rights in the MICHELIN mark based on its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Respondent’s <michellin.us> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s MICHELIN mark, incorporating the entirety of the mark, merely adding an “L” and the “.us” country code top-level domain (“ccTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not commonly known by the Domain Name, it is not affiliated or associated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized or licensed it to use the MICHELIN mark. Additionally, Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offer of goods or services, or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, the Domain Name resolves to a parked webpage with no substantive content. Moreover, Respondent has configured email servers on the Domain Name, which indicates that Respondent may be using the Domain Name in furtherance of a phishing scheme. Finally, the Domain Name is a typosquatted version of Complainant’s mark.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. It had actual knowledge of Complainant and its MICHELIN mark when it registered the Domain Name, and it registered the Domain Name having no connection with Complainant.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.
Given the similarity between the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) and the usTLD Policy, the Panel will draw upon UDRP precedent as applicable in rendering its decision, except where differences in the two policies require a different analysis.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
The MICHELIN mark was registered to Michelin North America, Inc. with the USPTO (Reg. No. 3,329,924) on November 6, 2007 and was subsequently assigned to Complainant (TESS Report included in Complaint Annex 4). Complainant’s registration of its mark with a national trademark authority such as the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Recreational Equipment, Inc. v. Liu Chan Yuan, FA 2107001954773 (Forum Aug. 9, 2021) (“Registration of a mark with the USPTO is sufficient to demonstrate rights in the mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)”), Ecolab USA Inc. v. (name redacted), FA 2003001888902 (Forum Apr. 20, 2020) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for ECOLAB is sufficient to demonstrate its rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).
Respondent’s <michellin.us> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s MICHELIN mark. It incorporates the mark in its entirety, albeit with a subtle misspelling which adds a second “L” next to the existing “L” in Complainant’s mark and adds the “.us” ccTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). OpenTable, Inc. v. Above.com Domain Privacy, FA 1626187 (Forum Aug. 10, 2015 (“Respondent’s <oipentable.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the OPENTABLE mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) because the disputed domain merely adds the letter ‘I’ . . . “), MIGROS-GENOSSENSCHAFTS-BUND v. Tayfun yalcin, FA 1621184 (Forum July 8, 2015) (“In light of the fact that Respondent’s disputed domain name incorporates Complainant’s whole mark and merely adds the ccTLD “.us,” the Panel here finds that the disputed domain name is identical to Complainant’s MIGROS mark.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the MICHELIN mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) The respondent is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark that is identical to the domain name;
(ii) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(iii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iv) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) it is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) it is not affiliated or associated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized or licensed it to use the MICHELIN mark, (iii) it is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offer of goods or services, or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because it resolves to a parked webpage with no substantive content, (iv) Respondent has configured email servers on the Domain Name, which indicates that it may be using the Domain Name in furtherance of a phishing scheme, and (v) Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complainant neither addressed nor offered evidence specifically bearing upon the Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) factor stated above. Complainants in usTLD cases can search one or more governmental trademark authorities and report negative results to establish a prima facie case as to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i). Complainant here offered no such evidence. Nevertheless, while it would have been preferable for Complainant to have offered evidence bearing specifically upon this element of the case, the evidence that is available is sufficient to establish an inference that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name. The TESS report demonstrating Complainant’s rights in the MICHELIN mark evidences its rights in that mark dating from at least as early as the 2004 filing date, and the information about Complainant submitted as Complaint Annex 3 shows that Complainant was using the mark in connection with automobile tires as early as 1895. Complainant’s mark is famous. Its presence and goodwill in the tire and travel guide industries are well-established and known to people throughout the world. Id. It is virtually inconceivable that any governmental trademark authority would register a trademark identical to <michellin.us> or any other mark identical or similar to the MICHELIN mark in the name of any person or entity other than Complainant or one of its affiliates, or that Respondent could be the owner or beneficiary of a valid common law trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name. Additionally, although directed at another element of the case, the Complaint states, and Complainant Annex 7 shows, that a simple Google search of the word Michelin produced results that relate only to Complainant. On this evidence, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Panel finds that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a valid trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name.
The WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Annex 1 and the information furnished to the Forum by the registrar list “Endywork Mode / Apponline” as the registrant of the Domain Name. These names bear no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no Response has been filed UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name.
Complainant states that Respondent is not affiliated or associated with it and that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Annex 1 contains a screenshot of the web site resolving from the Domain Name. It is a GoDaddy parking page which states that the Domain Name is parked free of charge with the permission of GoDaddy.com. There is a box which the visitor may click if he or she is interested in obtaining the Domain Name. This is not an active use of the Domain Name. As such it is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Morgan Stanley v. Francis Mccarthy / Baltec Marine Llc, FA 1785347 (Forum June 8, 2018) (“both Domain Names resolve to a web site that shows the words, ‘Not Found, The requested URL / was not found on this server.’ ’ Inactive holding of a domain name does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), 3M Company v. Kabir S Rawat, FA 1725052 (Forum May 9, 2017) (holding that “a general offer for sale… provides additional evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests” in a disputed domain name). [i]
Next, by registering the Domain Name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant’s mark, adding an “L” next to the “L” in Complainant’s mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Registering a typosquatted domain name has been held to evidence a lack of rights and legitimate interests in the domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA1503001610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) (“Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark. Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use. As discussed above, the Domain Name resolves to an inactive web site. Passive holding of a domain name is evidence of bad faith. This may not fit within any of the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), failure to make active use of a confusingly similar domain name is evidence of bad faith. Caravan Club v. Mrgsale, FA 95314 (Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent made no use of the domain name or website that connects with the domain name, and that [failure to make an active use] of a domain name permits an inference of registration and use in bad faith).
Second, Respondent registered and is holding the Domain Name, which fully incorporates the MICHELIN mark. As discussed above, however, Respondent has no connection with that mark or affiliation with its owner, the Complainant. The nonexclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering and using a domain name that is confusingly similar to a trademark with which the respondent has no connection is evidence of opportunistic bad faith. Kraft Foods (Norway) v. Wide, D2000-0911 (WIPO Sept. 23, 2000) (“[T]he fact that Respondent chosen [sic] to register a well-known mark to which [it] has no connections or rights indicates that [it] was in bad faith when registering the domain name at issue.”), Google LLC v. Noboru Maruyama / Personal, FA 2001001879162 (Forum Mar. 3, 2020) (“the registration and use of domain name that is confusingly similar to a trademark with which the respondent has no connection has frequently been held to be evidence of bad faith.”).
Next, by registering the Domain Name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant’s mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a typosquatted domain name has been held to be bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) in and of itself. Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).
Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in October 2021 (WHOIS report submitted in Complaint Annex 1 shows the creation date). Complainant has been using the MICHELIN mark to market its tires since at least as early as 1895. It is world-famous (information about Complainant submitted as Complaint Annex 3). Respondent copied that mark exactly into the Domain Name, albeit with a subtle misspelling. Again, in light of the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in the incorporated mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons first set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <michellin.us> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
April 15, 2022
[i] The cases cited in this section were decided under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which does not include usTLD Policy ¶ 4(c)(i). The usTLD Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(ii), (iii) and (iv) are identical to UDRP Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i)(ii) and (iii).
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