DECISION

 

Rush University Medical Center v. Mohammed Chowdhury / 786 Enterprise LLC

Claim Number: FA2206002002039

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Rush University Medical Center (“Complainant”), represented by Jennifer M. Mikulina of McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Illinois, USA.  Respondent is Mohammed Chowdhury / 786 Enterprise LLC (“Respondent”), New York, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <rush.care>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

The Honorable Neil Anthony Brown QC as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on June 27, 2022; the Forum received payment on June 27, 2022.

 

On June 28, 2022, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <rush.care> domain name is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On June 30, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of July 20, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@rush.care.  Also on June 30, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On July 26, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed The Honorable Neil Anthony Brown QC as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant made the following contentions.

 

Complainant, Rush University Medical Center, is an academic health system. Complainant has rights in the RUSH mark through its registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g. Reg. No. 2,857,918, registered on June 29, 2004). See Compl. Ex. D. Respondent’s <rush.care> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s RUSH mark as it incorporates the mark in its entirety while adding the “.care” descriptive generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).

 

Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <rush.care> domain name. Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name, nor has Complainant authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark in the disputed domain name. Respondent does not use the disputed domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, but instead sponsors click-through links and diverts users for its own commercial gain.

 

Respondent registered and uses the <rush.care> domain name in bad faith. Respondent redirects users to a webpage containing click-through links. Additionally, Respondent hosts the parked page with third-party advertisements for commercial gain. Furthermore, Complainant registered and disputed domain name in opportunistic bad faith.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

1.    Complainant is a United States academic health system.

 

2. Complainant has established its rights in the RUSH mark through its registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g. Reg. No. 2,857,918, registered on June 29, 2004).

 

3.  Respondent registered the <rush.care> domain name on May 20, 2015.

 

4. Respondent has used the domain name to sponsor click-through links and divert internet users for its own commercial gain.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The first question that arises is whether Complainant has rights in a trademark or service mark on which it may rely. Complainant submits that it has rights in the RUSH mark through its registration with the USPTO (e.g. Reg. No. 2,857,918, registered on June 29, 2004). See Compl. Ex. D. Registration with the USPTO is generally sufficient in demonstrating rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Nintendo of America Inc. v. lin amy, FA 1818485 (Forum Dec. 24, 2018) ("Complainant’s ownership a USPTO trademark registration for the NINTENDO mark evidences Complainant’s rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). Therefore, as the Panel agrees, it finds Complainant has rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

The next question that arises is whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s RUSH mark. Complainant contends that Respondent’s <rush.care> domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s RUSH mark as it incorporates the mark in its entirety while adding a descriptive gTLD. Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), a domain name is generally considered confusingly similar to the mark it incorporates where it adds a descriptive gTLD. See Altria Group, Inc. and Altria Group Distribution Company v. xiazihong, FA 1732665 (Forum July 1, 2017) (“Appending a top-level domain that describes a complainant’s business adds to confusing similarity.”). The disputed domain name incorporates the mark in its entirety while adding the “care” descriptive gTLD, which relates to Complainant’s business. Therefore, as the Panel agrees, it finds Respondent’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Complainant has thus made out the first of the three elements that it must establish.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

It is now well established that Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has made out a prima facie case that arises from the following considerations:

(a) Respondent has chosen to take Complainant’s RUSH mark and to use it in its domain name adding only a descriptive gTLD to the mark;

(b) Respondent registered the domain name on May 20, 2015;

(c) Respondent has used the domain name to sponsor click-through links and divert internet users for its own commercial gain;

(d) Respondent has engaged in these activities without the consent or approval of Complainant;

(e) Complainant argues that Respondent is not commonly known by the <rush.care> domain name nor has Complainant authorized or licensed Respondent to use its RUSH mark in the disputed domain name. Under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), where a response is lacking, relevant WHOIS information may demonstrate that a Respondent is not commonly known by a disputed domain name, while a lack of evidence demonstrating otherwise may affirm a Complainant’s assertion that it never authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark in the disputed domain name. See SPTC, Inc. and Sotheby’s v. Tony Yeh shiun, FA 1810835 (Forum Nov. 13, 2018) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in the <sothebys.email> domain name where the WHOIS identified Respondent as “Tony Yeh shiun,”  Complainant never authorized or permitted Respondent to use the SOTHEBY’S mark, and Respondent failed to submit a response.). The WHOIS information identifies Respondent as “Mohammed Chowdhury”, and nothing in the record rebuts Complainant’s submission that it never authorized or licensed Respondent to use its RUSH mark in the disputed domain name. See Registrar Verification Email. Therefore, as the Panel agrees, it finds Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii);

(f) Complainant contends that Respondent is not using the <rush.care> domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services, nor any legitimate noncommercial or fair use by sponsoring click-through links at the resolving website. Under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii), using a disputed domain name to host click-through links does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. See Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees). Complainant provides screenshots of the disputed domain name’s resolving website, which displays sponsored click-through links. See Compl. Ex. B. Thus, as the Panel agrees, it finds Respondent does not use the disputed domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services, nor any legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii);

(g) Complainant argues that Respondent is not using the <rush.care> domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services, nor any legitimate noncommercial or fair use by diverting internet users to its resolving webpage. Under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii), using a disputed domain name to divert internet users to a respondent’s webpage does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. Nw. Free Cmty. Access, FA 180704 (Forum Sept. 30, 2003) (“Respondent’s demonstrated intent to divert Internet users seeking Complainant’s website to a website of Respondent and for Respondent’s benefit is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”). The Panel recalls that Respondent’s domain name incorporates Complainant’s mark in its entirety while its resolving webpage hosts click-through links for commercial gain. See Compl. Ex. B. As the Panel agrees, it finds Respondent does not use the disputed domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services, nor any legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).

 

All of these matters go to make out the prima facie case against Respondent.

 

As Respondent has not filed a Response or attempted by any other means to rebut the prima facie case against it, the Panel finds that Respondent does not have a right or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name.

 

Complainant has thus made out the second of the three elements that it must establish.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

It is clear that to establish bad faith for the purposes of the Policy, Complainant must show that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith and has been used in bad faith. It is also clear that the criteria set out in Policy ¶ 4(b) for establishing bad faith are not exclusive, but that Complainants in UDRP proceedings may also rely on conduct that is bad faith within the generally accepted meaning of that expression.

 

Having regard to those principles, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name was registered and used in bad faith. That is so for the following reasons.

 

First, Complainant contends that Respondent registered and uses the <rush.care> domain name in bad faith by redirecting users to its website which contains third-party links and likely creates confusion for users. Under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), using a disputed domain name to redirect internet users to respondent’s website which contains third-party links is evidence of bad faith registration and use. See AltaVista Co. v. Krotov, D2000-1091 (WIPO Oct. 25, 2000) (finding bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) where the respondent’s domain name resolved to a website that offered links to third-party websites that offered services similar to the complainant’s services and merely took advantage of Internet user mistakes). The Panel recalls that Complainant’s RUSH mark is incorporated into the disputed domain name, while the resolving webpage offers click-through links for commercial gain. See Compl. Ex. B. As the Panel agrees, it finds Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).

 

Secondly, Complainant argues that Respondent registered and uses the <rush.care> domain name in bad faith by attracting users for commercial gain. Under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), using a disputed domain name to redirect internet users to respondent’s website for commercial gain is evidence of bad faith registration and use. See DatingDirect.com Ltd. v. Aston, FA 593977 (Forum Dec. 28, 2005) (“the Panel finds the respondent is appropriating the complainant’s mark in a confusingly similar domain name for commercial gain, which is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”). The Panel recalls that the resolving webpage offers click-through links for respondent’s commercial gain. See Compl. Ex. B. Therefore, as the Panel agrees, it finds Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).

 

Thirdly, Complainant contends that Respondent registered and uses the <rush.care> domain name in opportunistic bad faith. Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), where a disputed domain name is connected with well-known products or services, there may be a finding of opportunistic bad faith. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Fu, D2000-1374 (WIPO Dec. 11, 2000) (finding that the ICQ mark is so obviously connected with the complainant and its products that the use of the domain names by the respondent, who has no connection with the complainant, suggests opportunistic bad faith). The Panel recalls that Complainant’s well-known mark is incorporated into the disputed domain name. See Compl. Ex. B. As the Panel agrees, it finds Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

Fourthly, in addition and having regard to the totality of the evidence, the Panel finds that, in view of Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name using the RUSH mark and in view of the conduct that Respondent has engaged in when using the domain name, Respondent registered and used it in bad faith within the generally accepted meaning of that expression.

 

Complainant has thus made out the third of the three elements that it must establish.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <rush.care> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

The Honorable Neil Anthony Brown QC

Panelist

Dated:  July 27, 2022

 

 

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