DECISION

 

Wells Fargo & Company v. Domain Administrator / Wells Fargo Company

Claim Number: FA2206002002105

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Wells Fargo & Company (“Complainant”), represented by Felicia J. Boyd of Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP, Minnesota, USA.  Respondent is Domain Administrator / Wells Fargo Company (“Respondent”), California, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <wellsfargotracer.us>, registered with Tucows Domains Inc..

                                                                 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on June 27, 2022; the Forum received payment on June 27, 2022.

 

On June 28, 2022, Tucows Domains Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <wellsfargotracer.us> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Tucows Domains Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Tucows Domains Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Tucows Domains Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s usTLD Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On June 28, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of July 18, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@wellsfargotracer.us.  Also on June 28, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On July 20, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for the usTLD (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, the Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant offers a wide variety of financial and banking services.  It has rights in the WELLS FARGO mark through its registration of that mark with multiple trademark agencies including the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).  Respondent’s <wellsfargotracer.us> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s WELLS FARGO mark as it incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely adding the generic word “tracer” and the “.us” country-code top-level domain (“ccTLD”).

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.  It is not commonly known by the Domain Name, and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its WELLS FARGO mark.  Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead previously used it for a website which phished for users’ information and currently is making no active use of it.

 

Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith.  Respondent has used the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, endorsement or affiliation of its website and currently is making no active use of it.  Respondent provided false contact information to the registrar and registered the Domain Name with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the WELLS FARGO mark.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name.

 

(1)  the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(2)  the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint.  Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments.  eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).

 

The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The WELLS FARGO mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 1,131,103) on February 19, 1980 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit C).  Complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  Ecolab USA Inc. v. (name redacted), FA 2003001888902 (Forum Apr. 20, 2020) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for ECOLAB is sufficient to demonstrate its rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).

 

Respondent’s <wellsfargotracer.us> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s WELLS FARGO mark.  It incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely omitting a space, and adding the generic word “tracer” and the “.us” ccTLD.  These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  Morgan Stanley v. Eugene Sykorsky / private person, FA 1651901 (Forum Jan. 19, 2016) (concluding that the addition of a generic term and top level domain to a trademark is inconsequential under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis.), Bond & Co. Jewelers, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 937650 (Forum Apr. 30, 2007) (finding that the elimination of spaces between terms and the addition of a gTLD do not establish distinctiveness from the complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)), Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. Henkel, FA 827652 (Forum Dec. 11, 2006) (holding that “it is well established that the top-level domain, here “.us,” is insignificant with regard to UDRP analysis” when determining confusing similarity).  The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.”  Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the WELLS FARGO mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it.  Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).  If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests.  If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety.  At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant.  WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.

 

Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):

 

(i)            The respondent is the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark that is identical to the domain name;

(ii)          Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;

(iii)         The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iv)         The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

 

Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) it has no trademark or intellectual property rights in the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not licensed Respondent to use its mark, (iii) Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name and (iv) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but was previously using it for a phishing scheme and is currently making no active use of it.  These allegations are addressed as follows:

 

Complainant stated that Respondent has no trademark or intellectual property rights in the Domain Name but offered no evidence specifically bearing upon the Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) factor.  Complainants in usTLD cases can search one or more governmental trademark authorities and report negative results to establish a prima facie case as to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i).  Complainant here offered no such evidence.  Nevertheless, while it would have been preferable for Complainant to have offered evidence bearing specifically upon this element, the evidence that is available is sufficient to establish that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name. The USPTO registration certificate demonstrating Complainant’s rights in the WELLS FARGO mark (Complaint Exhibit C) evidences its rights in that mark dating from at least as early as the 1956 first use date shown on that certificate.  Complainant’s presence and goodwill in the financial services and banking industries are well-known throughout the world (list of countries in which Complainant has registered trademarks submitted as Complaint Exhibit D).  It is extremely unlikely that any governmental trademark authority would have registered a trademark identical to <wellsfargotracer.com.us> or any other mark identical or similar to the Domain Name in the name of any person other than Complainant or one of its affiliates, or that Respondent could be the owner or beneficiary of a valid common law trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name.  On this evidence, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Panel finds that Respondent is not the owner or beneficiary of a valid trade or service mark identical to the Domain Name.

 

Complainant states that Respondent has never been a licensee of Complainant.  Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel.  In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.  IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).

 

The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar and the WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit B list “Domain Administrator / Wells Fargo Company” as the registrant of the Domain Name.  The first of these names, Domain Administrator, bears no resemblance to the Domain Name.  Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent.  In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no Response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name.  Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark).  The Panel is satisfied that Respondent Domain Administrator has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

The second of these names is almost identical to the Domain Name and to Complainant’s name.  This is not conclusive, however, because as discussed above, Respondent is not licensed or authorized to use Complainant’s mark, and the evidence before the Panel gives no indication that Respondent used the “Wells Fargo Company.” name for any purpose other than to register the Domain Name.  The Complaint states that the address listed for Respondent in the WHOIS report is in fact the street address of one of its banking and office locations in San Francisco, California.  This demonstrates that Respondent is not doing business under this name.  Registering a domain name in a name that is similar or identical to the domain name is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the respondent “has been commonly known by” it for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  There must be some evidence, independent of the registration, that the respondent used the name in a business or some other undertaking, or that persons have by other means come to associate the respondent with that name.  If a person could acquire rights or legitimate interests in a domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) by the simple expedient of registering it in a similar or identical name, Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) would be completely nullified.  Augusta National, Inc. v. Ryan Carey, FA1758547 (Forum Dec. 21, 2017) (“If a respondent could acquire rights and legitimate interests in a domain name through Policy 4(c)(ii) by the simple expedient of incorporating the complainant’s mark into the name of his business entity, the intent and purpose of the Policy would be completely frustrated.”), Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (finding that, although the respondent listed itself as “Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund” in the WHOIS contact information, it did not provide any affirmative evidence to support this identity; combined with the fact that the complainant claimed it did not authorize the respondent to use the mark, the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name).  The Panel finds that Respondent Wells Fargo Company has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

Complaint Exhibit F is a screenshot of Respondent’s website as of March 16, 2022.  It contains a login box, purportedly for Smarter Mail, inviting the visitor to enter his or her email address and password.  Because of the confusing similarity of the Domain Name to Complainant’s mark, the obvious password solicited here is the user’s passcode for access to his or her accounts at Wells Fargo Bank.  As of this date, Respondent was using the Domain Name to engage in phishing, which is a fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by disguising oneself as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication.  Phishing is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iv) and is indicative of no rights or legitimate interests in a domain name.  Virtu Financial Operating, LLC v. Lester Lomax, FA1409001580464 (Forum Nov. 14, 2014) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) where the respondent was using the disputed domain name to phish for Internet users’ personal information by offering a fake job posting on the resolving website).

 

Complaint Exhibit H is a screenshot of Respondent’s website as of May 31, 2022.  The only substantive content on the website at this time was a message stating that the server’s IP address for the Domain Name could not be found.  This is not an active use of the Domain Name.  As such it is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iv).  Morgan Stanley v. Francis Mccarthy / Baltec Marine Llc, FA 1785347 (Forum June 8, 2018) (“both Domain Names resolve to a web site that shows the words, ‘Not Found, The requested URL / was not found on this server.’  Inactive holding of a domain name does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”). [i]

 

Complainant has made its prima facie case.  On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.

 

Registration or Use in Bad Faith

Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name.  They are as follows:

 

(i)            circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii)          the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or

(iii)         the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv)       by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.

 

The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years.  First, by using the Domain Name to phish for sensitive personal and private information from visitors, Respondent is using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site by Complainant.  Respondent’s website does not attempt to mimic or copy a genuine Complainant website—it displays only the login box described above—but by using the confusingly similar Domain Name to lure Internet traffic to its site, Respondent represents that it is Complainant and is soliciting information which, if given, could permit Respondent to access the visitor’s accounts at Complainant’s bank.  The opportunity for commercial gain is obvious:  Once Respondent obtains a login identity and pass code it is able to enter and raid the banking accounts of Complainant’s customers.  This was Respondent’s intent when it registered the Domain Name and continued to be its intent as it used the Domain Name after registration.  This conduct fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith.  Juno Online Servs., Inc. v. Iza, FA 245960 (Forum May 3, 2004) (finding that a UDRP respondent’s use of a domain name that “is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark, redirects Internet users to a website that imitates Complainant’s … website, and is used to fraudulently acquire personal information from Complainant’s clients” was evidence of bad faith registration and use).

 

Next, as discussed above, the Domain Name presently resolves to an inactive website.  Passive holding of a domain name is evidence of bad faith.  This may not fit within any of the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties.  Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances)Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), failure to make active use of a confusingly similar domain name is evidence of bad faith.  Caravan Club v. Mrgsale, FA 95314 (Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent made no use of the domain name or website that connects with the domain name, and that [failure to make an active use] of a domain name permits an inference of registration and use in bad faith).

 

Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in August 2016 (WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit B shows creation date).  Complainant’s WELLS FARGO mark was registered in 1980 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit C) and in 2016 was well-known throughout the world (list of countries where Complainant has trademark registrations submitted as Complaint Exhibit D).  Respondent copied it verbatim into the Domain Name and used it to seek login information for Complainant’s customers’ accounts.  There is no question that it knew of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name.  Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).

 

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required under the Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <wellsfargotracer.us> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant

 

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist

July 25, 2022

 



[i] The cases cited in this Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) analysis were decided under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which does not include usTLD Policy ¶ 4(c)(i).  The usTLD Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(ii), (iii) and (iv) are identical to UDRP Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i),  (ii) and (iii).

 

 

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