Spacelabs Holdings, Inc. v. Maryann Worsman
Claim Number: FA2208002008466
Complainant is Spacelabs Holdings, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Douglas N. Masters of Loeb & Loeb LLP, Illinois, USA. Respondent is Maryann Worsman (“Respondent”), Washington, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <spacelabshealthcarejobs.com>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on August 15, 2022; the Forum received payment on August 15, 2022.
On August 15, 2022, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <spacelabshealthcarejobs.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On August 22, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of September 12, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@spacelabshealthcarejobs.com. Also on August 22, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On September 22, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant manufactures and distributes acute care patient monitoring systems and other and related products. It has rights in the SPACELABS HEALTHCARE mark based upon its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <spacelabshealthcarejobs.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s SPACELABS HEALTHCARE mark because it incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely adding the descriptive term “jobs” and the “.com” generic top-level domain name (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is using it to pass off as Complainant in furtherance of a phishing scheme. Respondent is not licensed or authorized to use Complainant’s SPACELABS mark and is not commonly known by the Domain Name.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. It had actual knowledge of Complainant and its rights in the SPACELABS HEALTHCARE mark when it registered the Domain Name, and it is using the Domain Name to impersonate Complainant in a fraudulent phishing scheme and to disrupt Complainant’s business.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The SPACELABS HEALTHCARE mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. no. 4,903,660) on February 23, 2016 (USPTO registration certificate included in Amended Complaint Annex 6). Complainant’s registration of its SPACELABS HEALTHCARE mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of ¶ 4(a)(i). Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (stating, “Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”), Haas Automation, Inc. v. Jim Fraser, FA 1627211 (Forum Aug. 4, 2015) (finding that Complainant’s USPTO registrations for the HAAS mark sufficiently demonstrate its rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)).
Respondent’s <spacelabshealthcarejobs.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s SPACELABS mark. It incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely omitting the space between the words and adding a descriptive term and a gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Bond & Co. Jewelers, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 937650 (Forum Apr. 30, 2007) (finding that the elimination of spaces between terms and the addition of a gTLD do not establish distinctiveness from the complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)), The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. George Whitehead, FA 1784412 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“[S]light differences between domain names and registered marks, such as the addition of words that describe the goods or services in connection with the mark and gTLDs, do not distinguish the domain name from the mark incorporated therein per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Names.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Names are identical or confusingly similar to the SPACELABS HEALTHCARE mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) it is using the Domain Name to impersonate Complainant and phish for sensitive private information from individuals seeking employment with Complainant, (ii) Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its mark, and (iii) it has not been commonly known by the Domain Name. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Amended Complaint Annex 8 is a copy of a criminal complaint filed by Complainant with the FBI which contains a copy of an email sent from the email address maryann@spacelabshealthjobs.com seeking, purportedly on behalf of Complainant, to schedule an online job interview with a person for a fake job opening. It is assumed that if any such interview actually occurred the Respondent would solicit personal, private information from the “applicant.” It is clear that by using an email address based upon the Domain Name, Respondent is unquestionably passing off as and impersonating Complainant. Indeed, the email bears the signature of Maryann Worsman, who was formerly Complainant’s HR Director, which underscores Respondent’s intent to impersonate Complainant. Using a confusingly similar domain name to impersonate a complainant and conduct a phishing scheme is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). DaVita Inc. v. Cynthia Rochelo, FA 1738034 (Forum July 20, 2017) (”Passing off in furtherance of a phishing scheme is not considered a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”), Virtu Financial Operating, LLC v. Lester Lomax, FA1409001580464 (Forum Nov. 14, 2014) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) where the respondent was using the disputed domain name to phish for Internet users personal information by offering a fake job posting on the resolving website).
Complainant states that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Maryann Worsman” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that the Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name.
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product of service on your web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use. It is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark in July 2022, when it registered the Domain Name (WHOIS report submitted as Amended Complaint Annex 1 shows creation date). Complainant has been using its mark since 2004 (USPTO registration certificate included in Amended Complaint Annex 6 shows first use that year). More importantly, in order to impersonate Complainant as it did, even to the extent of using the name of its former HR Director to register the Domain name and sign the fraudulent email it sent, Respondent had to have known about Complainant and its mark. While this may not fall within any of the grounds articulated in Policy ¶ 4(b), that paragraph recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldwcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in a mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
As discussed above, Respondent also used the Domain Name to impersonate Complainant and attempt to solicit sensitive private, personal information from third persons. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), phishing, in and of itself, is also evidence of bad faith. Qatalyst Partners LP v. Devimore, FA 1393436 (Forum July 13, 2011) (finding that using the disputed domain name as an e-mail address to pass itself off as the complainant in a phishing scheme is evidence of bad faith registration and use).
Complainant alleges that Respondent’s conduct also falls within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) reads as follows: “you [the respondent] have registered the domain name primarily for the purposes of disrupting the business of a competitor” (emphasis supplied). By using the Domain Name to attract Internet traffic to a web site which passes off as Complainant, Respondent is clearly disrupting the business of Complainant. Dealing with confused, frustrated persons who believed they were applying for employment with a legitimate business when they divulged personal and private information, and managing unfavorable publicity potentially resulting from such episodes is a serious disruption.
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Respondent has ever been a competitor of Complainant. Nor is there any evidence that disrupting Complainant’s business was Respondent’s primary purpose in registering the Domain Name. On the contrary, the evidence strongly suggests that Respondent’s primary motive was not so much to harass or annoy an existing commercial adversary as it was to trade upon Complainant’s goodwill and reputation and profit from information obtained from third parties under false pretenses, which was addressed above. Respondent’s conduct does not fall within the circumstances stated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).
That said, using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a web site which passes off as and disrupts the business of a complainant is still bad faith. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), using a confusingly similar domain name to disrupt the business of a complainant by passing off as and impersonating that complainant is sufficient evidence of bad faith to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Respondent’s primary intent in registering and continuing to use the Domain Name is less important than the effect of his conduct. Respondent knew or should have known the disruptive impact its conduct would have upon Complainant’s business. Respondent went forward with its plans in spite of that and this demonstrates bad faith independently of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Red Wing Shoe Company, Inc. v. wei zhang / Magdalena Jennifer / Mu Yan / Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico, FA1911001873163 (Forum Jan. 3, 2020).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <spacelabshealthcarejobs.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
September 23, 2022
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