Savin Corporation v Ronald Mowbray
Claim Number: FA0201000103869
Complainant is Savin Corporation, Stamford , CT (“Complainant”) represented by David A. Einhorn, of Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C. Respondent is Ronald Mowbray, Clearwater, FL (“Respondent”).
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <savincity.com>, registered with Dotster.
The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge, has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Anne M. Wallace, Q.C., Honorable Paul A. Dorf and Honorable Carolyn M. Johnson as Panelists.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (“the Forum”) electronically on January 14, 2002; the Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on January 18, 2002.
On January 15, 2002, Dotster confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <savincity.com> is registered with Dotster and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Dotster has verified that Respondent is bound by the Dotster registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On January 18, 2002, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of February 7, 2002 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to email@example.com by e-mail.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on February 5, 2002.
On February 19, 2002, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the Forum appointed Anne M. Wallace, Q.C., Honorable Paul A. Dorf and Honorable Carolyn M. Johnson as Panelists.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
Complainant holds United States Trademarks as follows:
§ SAVIN: Registration No. 2,230,303 for facsimile machines
§ SAVIN: Registration No. 1,500,782 for maintenance and repair services for photocopiers and word processors
§ SAVIN: Registration No. 1,174,900 for photocopying machines and parts thereof
§ SAVIN: Registration No. 836,540 for developing liquid for office copiers; photocopy machines and copy paper for photocopy machines
Certified copies of the Certificates of Registration for the above-listed marks were filed in evidence.
Complainant also holds a number of foreign registrations of SAVIN, a list of which was included in evidence.
Respondent’s domain name <savincity.com> is confusingly similar to Complainant’s registered trademark. Savin holds four valid and subsisting federal trademark registrations for the mark SAVIN (Reg. Nos. 2,230,303; 1,174,900; 1,500,782 and 836,540) (the "Savin Marks") in the United States alone. Savin first registered its SAVIN mark in 1968. All of these trademarks were registered prior to registration of Respondent’s domain name and are used in connection with, among other things, business machinery and parts and services used in connection therewith, including photocopier, printer and facsimile machines and parts therefor. Savin also has registered its mark SAVIN as a domain name (<savin.com>) with Network Solutions, Inc. and is using that domain in connection with a web site.
Savin has spent considerable time and money in advertising and marketing its products bearing its well-known marks. Savin markets the products its sells under its SAVIN marks through authorized Savin dealers in various locations across the United States and internationally. These dealers distribute Savin products to retailers and end users.
In an attempt to settle this dispute and to alleviate the confusion caused by Respondent’s registration of the domain name <savincity.com>, Complainant wrote two letters to Respondent and Respondent’s attorney, on July 6, 2001 and July 26, 2001 respectively. Despite Complainant’s belief that it has suffered actual damages in the form of lost sales because of Respondent’s use of the domain name in connection with a Web site that advertised, marketed and sold goods competing with the goods on which Complainant uses its registered trademarks for SAVIN, Complainant was willing to settle this dispute if Respondent simply transferred the domain name <savincity.com> to Complainant.
Instead of agreeing to transfer the domain name, Respondent has demanded that Complainant pay for transfer of the domain name. Respondent offers no legitimate reason for his demand. Rather, he simply states that he does not believe that he should have to transfer the domain name to Complainant without compensation. However, Respondent is not demanding simple reimbursement, which would be the cost of registration. Respondent is suggesting that Complainant pay to Respondent a “fair value.”
Two marks need not be identical to be likely to be confusing. See General Electric Co. v. Pars Int'l Computer, Inc., D2000-0368 (WIPO July 25, 2000) (finding <1-800-ge.com> to be confusingly similar to GE). There is a likelihood of confusion where a Complainant’s mark is contained in a Respondent’s domain name because only "essential" or "virtual" identity is needed to establish confusing similarity under the Policy. See Cellular One Group v. the Design Factory, D2000-1670 (WIPO Jan. 29, 2001) (holding <cellularoneltd.com> confusingly similar to CELLULARONE and CELLONE); see also Heineken Brouwerijen B.V. v. Lott, D2000-1487 (WIPO Jan. 30, 2001) (holding <planetheineken.com> confusingly similar to HEINEKEN).
Use of a complainant’s trademark in connection with a generic term does not avoid the confusing similarity created by the use of complainant’s trademark. See Trump, et al. v. Rafeli, FA 100238 (Nat. Arb Forum Nov. 6, 2001) (finding a likelihood of confusion between TRUMP and <trumpinternational.net>, <trumphouse.net>, <trumpland.net>, <trumpskys.com>, <trumppalace.com>, <trumpair.com> and <trumptown.com>); Trump v. Graham, FA 100177 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 2, 2001) (finding a likelihood of confusion between TRUMP and <trumptrade.com> and <trumpbarter.com>); Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. Nicewarner, FA 99692 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 1, 2001) (finding likelihood of confusion between MARRIOTT and <marriottcorp.com> and <marriottcorps.com>); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. All Phase Builders, FA 99608 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 11, 2001) (finding likelihood of confusion between STATE FARM and <statefarm-claims.com>); Park ‘N Fly Services Corp. v. Level Propane, FA 99656 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 29, 2001) (finding likelihood of confusion between PARK ‘N FLY and <parknflyfree.com> and <parkandflyfree.com>).
Respondent’s domain name contains Complainant’s exact mark. Respondent uses Complainant’s SAVIN mark with the generic term “city” that has no significance in designating the use to which Respondent’s domain name has been, is or will be put. The registration and use of this domain name is likely to cause confusion among consumers familiar with the Savin Marks. Further, Respondent used its domain name in connection with a Web site that advertised, marketed and sold photocopier machines, toner and facsimile machines manufactured and sold by Savin's competitors, namely Xerox, Canon and Panasonic. However, that Web site did not offer Savin products for sale.
Registering a domain name with knowledge that it contains or is confusingly similar to another’s trademark is a factor evidencing lack of a bona fide use. See McNeil Consumer Brands, Inc. v. Meriweb Solutions, D2000-0612 (WIPO Aug. 3, 2000) (listing factors to be evaluated in determining bad faith and stating that registrant’s knowing use of a domain name similar to complainant’s trademark evidences bad faith rather than bona fide use).
Merely using a domain name containing complainant’s mark in competition with Complainant does not establish a bona fide commercial use. See Backstage Fashion, Inc. v. Back Stage, Inc., FA 100135 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 5, 2001) (“[u]sing a domain name identical to Complainant’s service mark with the result of diverting potential customers from Complainant to Respondent is not a bona fide offering of goods”); Park ‘N Fly Services Corp. v. Level Propane, Claim No. FA 99656 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 29, 2001) (holding that use of domain names confusingly similar to complainant’s mark to attract users to respondent’s Web site is not a bona fide use).
Outside of Respondent’s registration and use of the domain name <savincity.com>, Respondent has never used the term or mark SAVIN or the term “savincity”. Respondent holds no trademark registration and has claimed no common law trademark rights to the term SAVINCITY or the terms SAVIN CITY. Other than its registration of the domain name <savincity.com>, Respondent has never used nor made any claim to the term SAVINCITY or the terms SAVIN CITY as a mark or indicator of Respondent’s business. ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(2); ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Moreover, Respondent has never claimed that he was unaware that he had registered a domain name containing Complainant’s SAVIN trademark.
Respondent’s only Web based use of the domain name <savincity.com> had been on a site that advertised, marketed and sold photocopier machines, toner and facsimile machines sold by Complainant’s competitors, namely Xerox, Canon and Panasonic. However, Respondent’s Web site never offered any of Complainant’s products for sale. This use, the only use of <savincity.com> that Respondent possibly could claim as “bona fide,” actually heightened the level of confusion caused and further damaged Complainant. Respondent used the domain name containing Complainant’s exact trademark, SAVIN, to advertise, market and sell the exact goods for which Complainant’s marks are used, except only for those goods sold by Complainant’s direct competitors.
Respondent no longer uses the domain name <savincity.com> in connection with an active Web site, but is holding the domain name pending Complainant’s submission to Respondent’s demand that Complainant purchase the domain name from Respondent. Despite that the domain name <savincity.com> incorporates Complainant’s registered marks, Respondent demands that Complainant pay R. Mowbray a price equivalent to the “fair value” of the domain name.
Respondent does not presently operate nor does it intend to operate in the future any business known as SavinCity.
Using a domain name containing Complainant’s mark to divert customers away from Complainant does not establish a bona fide fair use. See Backstage Fashion, Inc. v. Back Stage, Inc., FA 100135 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 5, 2001) (finding no fair use where respondent’s site used complainant’s mark to attract customers and, thus, divert them away from complainant).
Respondent only registered the domain name on April 30, 2001 and Complainant contacted Respondent regarding the domain name by letter dated July 6, 2001. Respondent had used the domain name in connection with a business to advertise, market and sell products manufactured by Complainant’s competitors. Respondent refused to transfer the domain name to Complainant, despite the fact that the domain name contains Complainant’s registered trademark. Such use does not evidence a fair use of the domain name.
Respondent ceased use of the domain name in connection with a website after only a few months. Respondent is holding the domain name passively at the present time. As explained below, passive holding of a domain name evidences bad faith, not a bona fide use.
Respondent has demanded compensation from the Complainant for the domain name. It is not clear for what value Respondent alleges it should be compensated. As discussed below, this offer to sell the domain name to Complainant for “fair value” is not fair use, but is further evidence of Respondent’s bad faith use of the domain name <savincity.com>.
Failure to make any bona fide use of a registered domain name, that contains another’s trademark, is evidence of bad faith registration and use of that domain name. See McNeil Consumer Brands, D2000-0612 (WIPO Aug. 3, 2000) (listing failure to use domain name as factor evidencing bad faith).
Passive holding of a domain name has been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and bad faith use of that domain name. See Telstra Corporation Ltd. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, D2000-0265 (WIPO Feb. 18, 2000) (stating the concept of a domain name “being used in bad faith” is not limited to positive action; inaction is within the concept and holding bad faith was shown by passive holding of a domain name); see also Trump v. Rafaeli, FA 100238 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 6, 2001) (stating that registration and passive holding support finding of bad faith); Mariott Int’l, Inc. v. Nicewarner, FA 99692 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 1, 2001) (holding that failure to use a domain name with “a Website or in any other way” is bad faith use); Cabela's Inc. v. Cupcake Patrol, FA 95080 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 29, 2000) (finding passive holding of <cabelassucks.com> to constitute bad faith); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Zuzazu, FA 95319 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 5, 2000); Marubeni Corp. v. Eagle Data Ltd., FA 95418 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 2, 2000).
Respondent currently is making no web based or other use of the domain name <savincity.com> and appears to be stockpiling or warehousing that name until it is able to sell it to Respondent. Such passive use of the domain name is evidence of Respondent’s bad faith
Offering a domain name for sale, especially without making some bona fide use of the domain name, is evidence of bad faith registration and use of the domain name. See Trump v. Graham, FA 100177 (Nat. Arb. Forum No. 2, 2001) (finding respondent’s offer to sell the domain name for $7,500 and $3,500 to evidence bad faith registration and use); Junior Players Golf Ass’n, Inc. v. James D. Hansen, FA 99380 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 19, 2001) (stating that holding domain names for a ransom of $60,000 is bad faith use of the domain names).
Respondent no longer uses the domain name <savincity.com> in connection with an active Web site, but is holding the domain name pending its demand that Complainant purchase the domain name from Respondent. Despite that the domain name <savincity.com> incorporates Complainant’s registered marks Respondent demands that Complainant pay R. Mowbray a price equivalent to the “fair value” of the domain name.
Complainant has explained that it is not willing to pay Respondent for the domain name and believes that Respondent’s offer is in bad faith.
Respondent has not used the domain name <savincity.com> for any legitimate business purpose and has never made a legitimate non-commercial use of that domain name. It appears, based on Respondent’s actions, that Respondent is now merely warehousing the domain name <savincity.com> in order to negotiate until Complainant is willing to pay Respondent an amount of money acceptable to Respondent for the transfer of the domain name. Thus, it appears that Respondent’s sole purpose is to offer for sale the domain name, constituting bad faith use of that domain name under the UDRP § 4(b)(i).
Respondent’s only current use of the domain name is to offer it for sale to Complainant, even though it contains Complainant’s registered trademark. Respondent’s use of the domain name containing Complainant’s registered trademark to compete against Complainant and Complainant’s authorized dealers undoubtedly interrupted Complainant’s business by diverting sales away from Complainant and its authorized dealers and thereby causing monetary damages to Complainant. Respondent’s use of the domain name to extort money from Complainant is similarly disrupting to Complainant in that it is necessary that Complainant protect its trademark from use by third-parties. See Electro-Coatings, Inc. v. Precision Nat’l Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. 410, 421 (TTAB 1979) (stating that if a trademark holder permits third parties in the same or related business to use its mark, the legal effect is to abandon the right to exclude others from using the mark). Thus, Complainant has to bring this proceeding against Respondent, pay the amount demanded by Respondent or forfeit its rights in its own trademark.
Respondent’s only prior uses of the domain name <savincity.com> have been to disrupt the business of Complainant and Complainant’s authorized dealers. First, Registrant linked the domain name to a website that advertised, marketed and sold goods directly competitive with the goods advertised, marketed and sold by Complainant and its authorized dealers. This use cost Complainant sales and the real dollar value of those sales and created a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s Savin Marks.
Respondent is stockpiling the domain name to extract from Complainant payment for the transfer of the domain name by refusing to transfer the domain name, while offering to sell it to Complainant. Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business by forcing Complainant to bring this proceeding in order to enforce its trademark right in the Savin Marks and protect itself from infringement and consumers from confusion.
The only other use Respondent made of the domain name <savincity.com> was to offer for sale goods competitive with Complainant’s goods. Such use of the domain name containing Complainant’s trademark also is evidence of bad faith. See Arizona Mail Order, Inc. v. INSS, FA 99757 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 22, 2001) (finding that respondent’s use of a confusingly similar domain name for commercial gain is evidence of bad faith).
Registering and using a domain name that is known to contain another’s trademark evidences bad faith registration of that mark. See Umbers & Toltec Scenic R.R. Comm’n v. Ravin, FA0 99599 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 30, 2001) (holding respondents’ knowledge of complainant’s mark and use of the mark in the railroad business to evidence registrants’ bad faith use of the mark for a domain name offering railroad services); see also Trump v. Graham, FA 100177 (Nat. Arb. Forum No. 2, 2001) (holding respondent’s likely knowledge of the TRUMP mark to evidence bad faith).
Respondent has intentionally caused confusion with the Savin Marks and continues to intentionally use the domain name in bad faith. Respondent, with the intent to operate a business selling goods directly competitive with the goods sold by Complainant and Complainant’s authorized dealers, registered a domain name that incorporates the Savin Marks next to a generic term, “city.” Respondent then used that domain name in connection with a business Web site selling goods directly competitive with the goods sold by Complainant and Complainant’s authorized dealers.
Respondent, as a vendor of the exact types of goods sold by Complainant, undoubtedly was aware of Complainant’s significant market presence in the business machine industry in which Respondent was competing. Respondent nonetheless registered the domain name <savincity.com>, incorporating Complainant’s registered and well-known trademark to label Respondent’s website where it sold goods directly competitive with Complainant’s goods.
Upon receipt of Complainant’s first cease and desist letter dated July 6, 2001, Respondent deactivated his website at the domain name <savincity.com>. Respondent then offered to sell the domain name to Complainant. Complainant has admitted that he has no legitimate or bona fide commercial use or non-commercial use for the name.
Given these circumstances, Respondent has had and has the intent to profit from his registration and use of the domain name <savincity.com> by selling that domain name to Complainant.
Respondent is a “small time internet person.” This was his very first try at opening an on-line business. He signed up with a company call TTA Superstores as an affiliate. He paid them $100.00 to get setup. All of the products come from them and Respondent was using their site. Orders are sent directly to them from the buyer. Respondent had no control over the products or the screens on the website. Respondent can select which product categories he wanted to use and the percentage of profit. So when Respondent started he selected all categories.
When Respondent registered the website domain name he started looking for <savingcity.com> but it was taken. He tried different variations of the name with no success. The selection of the domain name was not intentional to harm Savin Corporation. Respondent didn’t even know who Savin Corporation was at the time. He did not select this name to do any harm to Savin Corporation.
When Respondent received the e-mail and letter from Savin Corporation Attoney’s, Respondent immediately went to a cyber law attorney, David Ellis. Respondent gave him a retainer of $400.00, which was all Respondent had at the time for a few hours of his work. The attorney advised Respondent that it may be best to change the domain name and not to sell competitive products of Savin Corporation. The first thing Respondent did was remove the product categories that were products that Savin Corporation sold. Respondent selected a new domain name of <ifproducts.com>. When Respondent got the new domain name he immediately changed the banner on the website and went into the affiliate tools at <ttasuperstores.com> and tried to change the domain name, but it didn’t work. Respondent wrote five or six emails to try to get the situation resolved. Then Respondent started calling them and it still took three weeks after that. The domain name change took Respondent six weeks before it was complete.
Since Respondent has had the site he has sold only three products, all three purchased by Respondent himself. The traffic on the site was very low, which Respondent argues shows there was no impact on Savin Corporation.
Respondent does not mind turning over the name to Savin. All Respondent wanted from Savin was a mere $350.00 which was his register fee, business cards, advertising and the transfer fees to Savin. Respondent’s attorney advised him that the letter should be open ended as to what Savin might pay. Respondent just wanted to get some of his money back. Respondent does not feel this dollar figure is out of line and it is not taking advantage of Savin.
The Panel finds that:
1. The domain name <savincity.com> is confusingly similar to the Complaint’s SAVIN trademarks;
2. The Respondent has not established any right or legitimate interest in the domain name; and
3. The Respondent acquired and has used the domain name in bad faith.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
Complainant has established rights in the SAVIN trademark. The domain name in question, <savincity.com>, merely adds the generic word, “city” to Complainant’s SAVIN mark. The addition of the generic term is not enough to create a distinct mark capable of overcoming Complainant’s claim of confusing similarity. Cases cited by Complainant on this point support this conclusion. See also Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Ltd. v. Healy/BOSTH, D2001-0026 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2001) finding confusing similarity where the domain name in dispute contains the identical mark of the Complainant Furthermore, Complainant’s mark SAVIN is the dominant element of <savincity.com>. This also supports the claim of confusing similarity. See Westfield Corp. Inc. v. Hobbs, D2000-0227 (WIPO May 18, 2000) finding <westfieldshopping.com> confusingly similar because the WESTFIELD mark was the dominant element. Complainant succeeds on the first element.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
Para. 4(c) of the UDRP sets out three circumstances by which a Respondent can conclusively demonstrate rights to and legitimate interests in the domain name. The second and third circumstances are not applicable here because Respondent has never been commonly known by the domain name, nor has respondent made a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain name. This, then leaves the first of the three circumstances:
“Before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.”
Even if Respondent began using the domain name in connection with offering goods for sale before he became aware of Complainant’s rights, there is still a question of whether the offering of goods for sale was a bona fide offering of goods within the meaning of the policy. Merely using a domain name containing Complainant’s mark in competition with Complainant does not establish a bona fide commercial use. See Backstage Fashion, Inc. v. Backstage, Inc., FA 100135 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 5, 2001). The fact Respondent used the domain name to sell products manufactured by Complainant’s competitors leads to the inference that this was not a bona fide commercial use. The Panel therefore finds that Respondent’s use of the domain name was not for the bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of the Policy.
Finally, under this element, the evidence before the Panel does not establish any other rights or legitimate interests of the Respondent in the domain name.
That being the case, Complainant succeeds on the second element.
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
With respect to this element, the paragraph 4(b) of the Policy reads:
“For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location
On a review of the evidence, none of the first three enumerated circumstances exist in this case, for the following reasons:
1. There is no evidence that the name was acquired primarily for the purpose of sale to Complainant.
2. On the evidence, it does not appear that Respondent registered the domain name with the intent to prevent the owner from reflecting the mark, and in any event there is no pattern.
3. While we may conclude that Respondent is a competitor of Complainant, on the evidence before us, Respondent’s purpose in registration does not appear to have been to disrupt the business of the Complainant.
With respect to the fourth circumstance enumerated above, this Panel finds it difficult to accept that Respondent could register and make any commercial use of the disputed domain name in the manner in which he attempted to use the name without creating a false impression of some association with Complainant. Use of the name was intended to attract customers to Respondent’s site for commercial gain, and use of the domain name <savincity.com> definitely creates a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s mark. On this ground, therefore, the Panel concludes the Respondent acted in bad faith.
The Panel is also entitled to conclude that there is bad faith for some other reason. On our reading of the Policy, each Panel is responsible to determine whether there has been bad faith. The four cited examples are situations where, if the evidence exists, the Panel must find bad faith. This does not, however, preclude the Panel finding that other circumstances amount to bad faith in a particular case. The paragraph says, "in particular but without limitation".
In this case, additional evidence of bad faith can be found in Respondent’s attempt to sell the disputed domain name to Complainant for more than the out-of-pocket expenses. This is especially so after Respondent ceased using the domain name and began to passively hold same.
For these reasons, Complainant succeeds on this element as well.
The Panel finds in favour of the Complainant in this case, and in accordance with Paragraph 4(i) of the Policy, the Panel requires that the registration of the domain name <savincity.com> be transferred to the Complainant.
Anne M. Wallace, Q.C.
Honorable Paul Dorf
Honorable Carolyn Marks Johnson
Dated: March 1, 2002
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