Coors Brewing Company v. Dave Zike a/k/a Handicapping DZ a/k/a Webnamesforsale
Claim Number: FA0202000104202
Complainant is Coors Brewing Company, Golden, CO (“Complainant”) represented by Christopher J. Hussin, of Sheridan Ross P.C. Respondent is Dave Zike a/k/a Handicapping DZ a/k/a Webnamesforsale, Arvada, CO (“Respondent”).
The domain names at issue are <coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com>, registered with Register.com and Namesecure, respectively.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and, to the best of his knowledge, has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Alan L. Limbury as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (“the Forum”) electronically on February 4, 2002; the Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on February 4, 2002. The Complaint named as Respondent “Handicapping DZ (a/k/a Webnamesforsale)”.
On February 4, 2002, Register.com confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <coorsoriginal.com> is registered with Register.com and that Dave Zike is the current registrant of the name. Register.com has verified that Dave Zike is bound by the Register.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On February 6, 2002, Namesecure confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <coorsextragold.com> is registered with Namesecure and that Webnamesforsale is the current registrant of the name. Namesecure has verified that Webnamesforsale is bound by the Namesecure registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the Policy.
On February 6, 2002, at the request of the Forum, Complainant filed an amended Complaint naming as Respondent “Dave Zike a/k/a/ Handicapping DZ a/k/a Webnamesforsale”
On February 6, 2002, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of February 26, 2002 by which Respondent could file a Response to the amended Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to firstname.lastname@example.org and email@example.com by e-mail.
A timely Response was received from “Dave Zike (27 years Coors Employee)” on February 26, 2002. The Exhibit to the Response was received after the deadline but the Panel has decided to admit it because there has been no delay as a result and Complainant is unlikely to have suffered prejudice.
Complainant filed an additional timely submission in accordance with Supplemental Rule # 7 on March 1, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Alan L. Limbury as Panelist.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
The domain names <coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com> incorporate and are identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s ORIGINAL COORS, COORS and COORS EXTRA GOLD trademarks. Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names and he registered and used the disputed domain names in bad faith.
<coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com> are similar to Coors and that is why I reserved them – because I worked for Coors for 27 years. If I, a 27-year employee of Coors, cannot have legitimate free speech rights to an Internet address similar to Coors, then nobody could have legitimate rights except Coors. CoorsOriginal.com and <coorsextragold.com> are merely electronic addresses to Coors and nothing more. <coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com> are not a product, they are not a place and they are not a person.
My response to Complainant’s counsel’s letter of November 20, 2001 is evidence that I do not intend to sell the disputed domain names to Complainant – not to mention sell these Internet addresses to several current and retired Coors employees who have requested me to sell these Internet addresses to them. This would defeat the whole reason I reserved them. When I set up my Registrar accounts to reserve Internet addresses, I reserved generic addresses for websites I would develop and then market. Around the same time, I reserved the disputed domain names as a free speech forum for myself and for current and retired Coors employees. To keep things simple and manageable within the Registrar, I did not set up another cumbersome account. Complainant has provided no evidence that I intended to reserve these Internet addresses for the primary reason to sell to them at an enormous profit.
Furthermore, I made Coors upper management aware I was going to reserve these Internet addresses and they indicated Coors would ‘never have a use for CoorsOriginal.com and CoorsExtraGold.com’ and I said ‘good because I do’. One Coors person I had a conversation like this with was Purvish Katiri, VP of Coors Information Technology.
Just by me reserving the disputed Internet addresses prevents Coors from reserving them which, in itself, probably satisfies some form of ‘bad faith’.
This Panel might look at other recent panel decisions I have located on the web such as: denying Clorox the <clorox.org> Internet address (WIPO D2001-0923), denying Philips Electronics the <philips.ws> Internet address (WIPO DWS2001-0003), denying Novell the <novellpress.com> Internet address (WIPO D2001-1100), denying Alcoholics Anonymous the <alcoholicsanonymous.org> Internet address (WIPO D2001-1124), denying the ‘Beanie Baby’ Mark Holder the <beaniecanada.com> Internet address (WIPO D2001-1366, Jan 26, 2002) where a response was not even submitted, and a panel of 3 arbitrators unanimously denying 3M the <3mtapes.com>, <3madhesives.com> and <3mabrasives.com> Internet addresses (WIPO D2001-0727). Furthermore, four(4) registered United States Marks exist for ‘Novell Press’, <novellpress.com> was offered for sale and <novellpress.com> was apparently used in an quasi-commercial capacity at some point. The <alcoholicsanonymous.org> and <beaniecanada.com> opinions find good grounds for ‘bad faith’ yet strongly suggest UDRP exploits trademark law and UDRP ‘bad faith’ is irrelevant and is a deterrent from the fundamentals of the free world.
There is a striking resemblance between the previously mentioned <novellpress.com>, <3mtapes.com>, <3madhesives.com>, <3mabrasives.com> and <beaniecanada.com> Internet addresses and the <coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com> Internet addresses (i.e. <coorscanada.com>, <coorstapes.com>, <coorspress.com>).
Quite frankly, if a guy who gave 27 years of his life to Coors cannot use current technology (i.e. a website that uses the disputed Internet addresses), then the Policy is not part of the free world.
C. Additional Submission by Complainant
Respondent concedes that the disputed domain names incorporate and are confusingly similar to Coors Brewing Company’s ORIGINAL COORS, COORS, and COORS EXTRA GOLD trademarks.
Respondent’s employment with Complainant does not establish any rights or legitimate interests in domain names which incorporate and are confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademarks. A respondent does not make a legitimate non-commercial, fair use of a domain name where he knew or should have known of the existence of the Complainant’s mark at the time of registration.
By purposely choosing two domain names which indisputably incorporate and are confusingly similar to Complainant’s famous trademarks, Respondent intended misleadingly to divert consumers to get his message, if any, across. Only by reading through the content, if any, of the web sites could the user discover that the domain names are not associated with Complainant. Accordingly, Respondent has not demonstrated rights or legitimate interests.
Respondent’s claims of a First Amendment right to post commentary about Complainant, or a Coors “fan site”, has no relevance to this proceeding. It may well be that the content, if any, posted by Respondent on each web site may be entitled to some First Amendment protection, but it is neither necessary nor appropriate to make such an evaluation here. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Estelauder.com, D 2000-0869 (WIPO Sept. 25, 2000). Paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy requires a determination of whether a respondent has rights or legitimate interests in a particular domain name. A determination “whether respondent has a legitimate or protected interest in the contents of its web sites, or, more generally, in its establishment of fora to air complaints against certain companies” is not pertinent to a Policy proceeding. Id. Moreover, because the domain names at issue merely incorporate trademarks of Complainant, they do not constitute a protectable, communicative message. Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F.Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (D. Colo. 2000). Such use is more akin to source identification than a communicative message and, for that reason, such use is not protected by the First Amendment:
The grant to one person of the exclusive right to use a set of words or symbols in trade can collide with the free speech rights of others. When another’s trademark (or a confusingly similar mark) is used without permission for the purpose of source identification, the trademark law generally prevails over the First Amendment. Free speech rights do not extend to labeling or advertising products in a manner that conflicts with the trademark rights of others. In these circumstances, the exclusive right guaranteed by the trademark law is generally superior to the general free speech rights of others. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id., quoting Yankee Pub. Inc. v. News America Pub, Inc., 809 F.Supp. 267, 275-276 (SDNY 1992) (emphasis added). Further, where a respondent may display the content of his web sites using different domain names which do not merely incorporate the trademarks of another and, thus, has many places to display his message, there is no violation of the First Amendment. Id. citing Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F.Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000). As Respondent has indicated in his Response, he has registered many domain names, and thus, has many places to display any message he may have.
Further, Respondent recognizes that by reserving the disputed domain names, he has prevented Complainant “from reserving them which, in itself, probably satisfies some form of ‘bad faith.’” Respondent’s attempts to argue around this bad faith are misplaced. First, Complainant is unaware of any conversations Respondent may have had with Purvish Katiri. Because Mr. Katiri was only employed by Coors Brewing Company for a very short time, Coors is also unable to verify the accuracy of Respondent’s assertions concerning that conversation. In any event, any such statements by Mr. Katiri would have been in direct violation of Complainant’s brand and trademark policies, under which all trademark issues must be addressed by Coors’ legal department.
While Respondent feels his communication with Complainant, once the dispute arose, indicating that the Internet addresses were not for sale overcomes Complainant’s argument that it was Respondent’s motivation to sell the domain names for valuable consideration in excess of his costs, it is his actions prior to this dispute which are the best evidence of Respondent’s bad faith. Specifically, Respondent claims to have registered numerous other domain names for generic marks around the same time he registered the domain names at issue. Further, he claims to have used the WEBNAMESFORSALE reference in connection with these other registrations to indicate that these other domain names were for sale. Here, Respondent’s listed e-mail address for both registrations at issue was also firstname.lastname@example.org. Respondent changed his e-mail address for both only after this dispute arose. Moreover, Respondent used and continues to use WEBNAMESFORSALE as the registrant name for <coorsextragold.com>.
Finally, Respondent directs the Panel to a number of Policy decisions which Respondent alleges bear a “striking resemblance” to the dispute herein. A thorough review of these decisions shows that is not the case.
Complainant is not trying to preclude Respondent from using web sites and domain names to communicate a message, whether good or bad, about Complainant. Complainant takes issue with Respondent’s assertion that use of Coors’ product name trademarks as domain names is necessary to communicate his message. Rather, the use of these domain names is calculated to cause confusion and divert customers. Only by reading through the content, if any, of the sites, would a consumer be able to discover that Respondent’s domain names are not associated with Complainant. This is exactly the type of confusion the Policy was intended to address.
Complainant is one of the largest brewing companies in the world. It has numerous registered trademarks in the United States, including COORS, COORS ORIGINAL and COORS EXTRA GOLD. It also has numerous trademark registrations in other countries.
Respondent was employed by Complainant for 27 years, first in the warehouse and storerooms as an hourly employee, then as a salaried employee in the purchasing and computer support departments. He is a self-educated computer person. His employment by Complainant ended on November 6, 1999. On November 9, 1999 Respondent registered the disputed domain name <coorsoriginal.com> under the name Handicapping DZ. On January 5, 2000 Respondent registered the disputed domain name <coorsextragold.com> under the name Webnamesforsale. The email addresses for both registrants were email@example.com before this dispute arose.
Complainant has not authorized Respondent to register the disputed domain names, nor otherwise to use any of its trademarks. Complainant did not become aware of the identity of Respondent until after the filing of the initial Complaint.
Complainant has discharged its burden of proof and is entitled to the relief sought.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.” Since this dispute involves domain names registered in the United States, where both parties are based, applicable principles of law include U.S. trademark law.
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
Essential or virtual identity is sufficient for the purposes of the Policy: see The Stanley Works and Stanley Logistics, Inc v. Camp Creek. Co., Inc., D2000‑0113 (WIPO Apr. 13, 2000), Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. S&S Enterprises Ltd., D2000-0802 (WIPO Sept. 9, 2000); Nokia Corp. v. Nokiagirls.com, D2000-0102 (WIPO Apr. 18, 2000) and Blue Sky Software Corp. v. Digital Sierra Inc., D2000-0165 (WIPO Apr. 27, 2000).
For US cases see Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497-98 (2d Cir. 2000) (the differences between the trademark “sporty’s” and the domain name “sportys.com” – specifically, an apostrophe in the trademark and the addition of .com in the domain name – are “inconsequential”, such that the domain name is “indistinguishable” from and “certainly ‘confusingly similar’ to the protected mark”); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (differences between the domain name <moviebuff.com> and the mark “MovieBuff” are “inconsequential”). See also Public Serv. Co. v. Nexus Energy Software, Inc., 36 F.Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 1999) (<energyplace.com> and “Energy Place” are virtually identical); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F.Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D.Minn. 1998) (<post-it.com> and “Post-It” are the same); Interstellar Starship Services Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1331, 1335 (D.Or. 1997)(<epix.com> “is the same mark” as EPIX); Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97-0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (<planned-parenthood.com> and “Planned Parenthood” are essentially identical), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834, 119 S.Ct. 90, 142 L.Ed.2d 71 (1998).
The test of confusing similarity under the Policy, unlike trademark infringement or unfair competition cases, is confined to a comparison of the disputed domain name and the trademark alone, independent of the other marketing and use factors usually considered: Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. In Seo Kim, D2001-1195 (WIPO Nov. 12, 2001); Energy Source Inc. v. Your Energy Source, FA 96364 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2001); Vivendi Universal v. Mr. Jay David Sallen and GO247.COM, INC., D2001-1121 (WIPO Nov. 7, 2001) and the cases there cited. See also the similar approach adopted by the U.S. Federal court in Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4732 (D. Mass. Mar 31, 2000).
Respondent concedes the disputed domain names are similar to Complainant’s marks and says that is why he registered them.
The Panel finds the domain name <coorsoriginal.com> is confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks COORS and ORIGINAL COORS and the domain name <coorsextragold> is identical to Complainant’s mark COORS EXTRA GOLD and confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark COORS.
Complainant has established this element.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
Complainant’s marks are very well known and long established. Respondent, having been a long time employee of Complainant, knew the disputed domain names were similar to Complainant’s trademarks when he registered them, shortly after that employment ended. He registered them under names and with contact information which effectively concealed his identity from Complainant until after these proceedings had been initiated. Complainant asserts it has not authorized Respondent to register the disputed domain names, nor otherwise to use any of its trademarks. Respondent is not known by either of the disputed domain names.
These circumstances are sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing by Complainant of absence of rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain names on the part of Respondent. The evidentiary burden therefore shifts to Respondent to show by concrete evidence that he does have rights or legitimate interests in respect of those names: Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) and the cases there cited.
Respondent says he registered the disputed domain names as a free speech forum for himself and for current and retired Coors employees. He also says he made Coors upper management, in particular Mr. Katiri, aware he was going to reserve those Internet addresses and that they raised no objection.
As to the first of these points, it is beyond the scope of a proceeding under the Policy to consider the boundaries of free speech: Mission KwaSizabantu v. Rost, D2000-0279 (WIPO June 7, 2000). Complainant rightly distinguishes between a domain name and the content of any web site to which that domain name leads. Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain names precludes everyone without the permission of Respondent from exercising the right of free speech at any websites reached by means of the disputed domain names.
The right to freedom of speech is subject to the rights of others under laws such as those of defamation, trademark infringement, misrepresentation and breach of confidence. As stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 572 F.2d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1978): “…a trademark infringement action involves not only the right of the trademark owner to control the reputation of his product, but also the right of the consuming public to be free of confusion”.
The U.S. Constitution does not permit a person to misrepresent his or her identity, to the detriment of the person whose identity is assumed:
“[T]he right to express one’s views is not the same as the right to use another’s name to identify one’s self as the source of those views. One may be perfectly free to express his or her views about the quality or characteristics of the reporting of the New York Times or Time Magazine. That does not, however, translate into a right to identify one’s self as the New York Times or Time Magazine”: Monty & Pat Roberts Inc. v. J. Bartell, D2000-0300 (WIPO June 12, 2000). See also The New York Times Co. v. New York Internet Serv., D2000-1072 (WIPO Dec. 5, 2000) and Women on Waves Found. v. Hoffman, D2000-1608 (WIPO Jan. 29, 2001).
The issue here is whether the disputed domain names themselves signify critical or commentary purposes, as opposed to imitation of the trademark. A domain name for the purpose of criticism or commentary must on its face indicate that any site to which it leads is not that of the trademark holder but is instead a site for the criticism of or commentary on the trademark holder. Otherwise, there is created impermissible initial interest confusion: Dykema Gossett PLLC v DefaultData.com, FA 97031 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 29, 2001) and Robo Enter., Inc. v. Tobiason, FA 95857 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 24, 2000).
Here, Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names will cause initial interest confusion of the type discussed in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (1999), by “capturing initial consumer attention, even though no sale [or other economic benefit] is finally completed [or realized] as a result of the confusion.”
As to the second point, the Panel is prepared to accept that Respondent made known his intentions to colleagues during his employment with Complainant and may have received some encouragement. However, by virtue of his 27 years employment with Complainant, Respondent must be taken to have been aware of Complainant’s brand and trademark policies, which require trademark issues to be addressed by its legal department. The Panel finds that Complainant did not authorize Respondent to register the disputed domain names and that Respondent knew or ought to have known that he did not have Complainant’s authority to do so.
In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reger, FA 95651 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 13, 2000) no legitimate interest was found where a State Farm employee registered <statefarmclaims.com>. In Weekley Homes v. Wilsher Co., FA 95331 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 2, 2000) transfer of <davidweekley.com> was ordered where respondent registered that name while an employee of complainant. Here Respondent had ceased to be an employee of Complainant but this circumstance alone does not give rise to rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names.
The Panel finds that, by registering the disputed domain names, Respondent falsely and misleadingly identified himself as Complainant and any sites to which those names might lead as those of Complainant. Accordingly, Respondent is not making fair use of the Complainant's mark under paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy.
Respondent has no right or legitimate interest in respect of the disputed domain names. Complainant has established this element.
Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out four circumstances in particular which, without limitation, shall be evidence of both bad faith registration and bad faith use.
In SportSoft Golf, Inc. v. Hale Irwin’s Golfers’ Passport, FA 94956 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 11, 2000) a finding of bad faith was made where the respondent “knew or should have known” of the registration and use of the trade mark prior to registering the domain name. Likewise Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. Marriot, FA 94737 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 15, 2000); Canada Inc. v. Ursino, AF-0211 (eResolution July 3, 2000) and Centeon L.L.C./Aventis Behring L.L.C. v. Ebiotech.com, FA 95037 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 20, 2000). Here there is no dispute that Respondent knew of Complainant’s marks. Respondent also knew or ought to have known of Complainant’s brand and trademark policies, which required any trademark issues to be addressed by the legal department. Respondent waited until he had left Complainant’s employment before registering the disputed domain names. When he did register those names, he provided registration information (“webnameforsale”), available to anyone making a Whois search, which was calculated simultaneously to conceal his identity while conveying a willingness to sell those names. Other information provided contributed to the concealment of his identity and impeded contact with him.
Respondent’s claim that the domain name <coorsoriginal.com> was not for sale, made a year later in response to Complainant’s counsel’s letter of demand (addressed to Respondent under one of his aliases, DZ, without knowledge on Complainant’s part that Complainant was writing to a former employee), must be set against the circumstances under which Respondent registered that domain name and maintained the “firstname.lastname@example.org” contact address until after receiving that letter of demand. Likewise, Respondent’s claim that the domain name <coorsextragold.com> was not for sale must be set against its registration in the name Webnamesforsale, also with the “email@example.com” contact address.
Respondent says he registered generic domain names for websites he intended “to develop and then market” and that he decided not to set up another cumbersome Registrar account when he came to register the disputed domain names. This explanation does not affect the natural and logical conclusion that, by registering <coorsoriginal.com> with the “firstname.lastname@example.org” contact address and by registering <coorsextragold.com> in the name Webnamesforsale, also with the “email@example.com” contact address, Respondent intended to convey the message that the disputed domain names were for sale.
Respondent’s claim to have registered the disputed domain names to provide a free speech site must be set against:
· the representations, made upon registration, that the names were for sale;
· the steps taken to conceal his identity; and
· the absence of any evidence that either disputed domain name has ever been used as a free speech site, despite the lapse of time between registration (late 1999 and early 2000) and the initiation of these administrative proceedings in January 2002.
While it is possible that Respondent has formed and may now have the intention to use the disputed domain names as a free speech site, the Panel regards Respondent’s conduct at the time of registration of each of the disputed domain names, including the steps taken to conceal his identity (which were very effective in that regard) as evidencing an intention at that time to sell those names to Complainant at a profit, a transaction Respondent must have known would be likely doomed to failure if Complainant realized who he was. Accordingly the Panel finds Respondent registered the disputed domain names primarily for the purpose of selling them to Complainant for valuable consideration in excess of his documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain names. This is evidence of both bad faith registration and bad faith use.
Complainant has established this element.
The Panel has examined the cases on which Respondent relies. All turned on their own facts and were decided against the complainant because, on the evidence, one or more of the required elements had not been established. In The Clorox Co. v. Marble Solutiohs, D2001-0923 (WIPO Nov. 20, 2001), Novell, Inc. v. Marinelli Co., D2001-1100 (WIPO Nov. 13, 2001) and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Overbey, D2001-0727 (WIPO Oct. 15, 2001) there was insufficient evidence of bad faith, (in the latter case also legitimacy was not negated); in Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Relson Ltd., DWS2001-0003 (WIPO Nov. 15, 2001) complainant relied on bare assertion, not evidence; in Alcoholics Anonymous World Serv., Inc. v. Friends of Bill W and Jimmy K, D2001-1124 (WIPO Dec. 28, 2001) and Tomassini. v. Chan, D2001-1366 (WIPO Jan. 26, 2002) complainant failed to negate legitimacy (in the latter case also failing to produce evidence of bad faith).
Here, on all the material before the Panel, including the material provided by Respondent, the Panel has concluded that Complainant has produced evidence of its trademark registrations; identity/confusing similarity are uncontested; Complainant has demonstrated absence of rights or legitimate interests and has proved bad faith registration and use.
In accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the relief sought by the Complainant is hereby granted.
The disputed domain names, namely <coorsoriginal.com> and <coorsextragold.com>, are ordered transferred to the Complainant
Alan L Limbury, Panelist
Dated: March 15, 2002
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