Super Fun Sports v. Superfun Hendrik
Niefeld
Claim Number: FA0207000117022
1. DECISION
Super
Fun Sports v. Superfun Hendrik Niefeld
Claim
Number: FA0207000117022
2. PARTIES
Complainant
is Super Fun Sports, Chiliwack, BC, CANADA ("Complainant")
represented by Ari Goldberger, ESQ.
Respondent is Superfun Hendrik Niefeld, 71638 Ludwigsburg, GERMANY
("Respondent").
3. REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED
DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <superfun.net>, registered with Network
Solutions, Inc.
4. PANEL
The
undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to
the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this
proceeding.
Tom
Arnold serves as Panelist.
5. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the "Forum")
electronically on July 23, 2002; the Forum received a hard copy of the
Complaint on July 23, 2002.
On
July 26, 2002, Network Solutions, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that
the domain name <superfun.net> is registered with Network
Solutions, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Network Solutions, Inc. has verified that
Respondent is bound by the Network Solutions, Inc. registration agreement and
has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in
accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
"Policy").
On
July 31, 2002, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of
August 20, 2002 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts, and to postmaster@superfun.net by e-mail.
Having
received no Response from Respondent, using the same contact details and
methods as were used for the Commencement Notification, the Forum transmitted
to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On
about August 22, 2002, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute
decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Tom Arnold as sole
Panelist.
Having
reviewed the communications data provided by the Forum in this ¶5 above, the
Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has
discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ
reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to
Respondent." Therefore, the Panel
may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with
the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and
principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any
Response from Respondent.
Respondent
filed a Response which is dated August 6, 2002, but the Panelist has no
knowledge or record reflecting when it was received by the Forum. The Forum
forwarded it on to the Panel. The Panel
has elected to give that Response full consideration as reflected in the
following Decision.
The
Forum has also received and forwarded to the Panel on about August 12, 2002,
its "Complainant's Additional Written Statement in Reply to Respondent's
Response." The Panel has given
full consideration to that paper as well.
6. RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
7. KEY UDRP POLICY SEGMENT
4(a)
I
quote here the UDRP Policy 4(a) which binds the panel.
"a.
Applicable Disputes. You [Domain name registrant, Respondent, Superfun Hendrik
Niefeld] are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the
event that a third party [Complainant, Superfun Sports] asserts to the
applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that
"(i)
your [Respondent's] domain name is identical or confusingly
similar
to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you [Respondent] have no rights
or legitimate interests in respect of
the
domain name; and
(iii) your [Respondent's] domain name has
been registered and is being
used
in bad faith.
In
this administrative proceeding, the Complainant [Super Fun Sports] must
prove
that each of these three elements are present.
I
read the contentions of the parties in light of those requirements, noting
that Complainant has the burden of proof on all
of them or its cause fails.
8. PARTIES CONTENTIONS
A.
Complainant's
Super
Fun Sports, Complainant, has presented its case with much of it supported by an
affidavit of its President, Mr. Brunia, with specific details of dollars, years
or dates, etc.--a much more persuasive and meaningful format for evidence than
merely a set of conclusionary allegations, often as to facts a party obviously
does not know or does not know first hand. Conclusionary allegations or
pleadings without support by well proven basic elemental supporting facts,
particularly when obviously based on hearsay or when about the acts or intent
of another party about which the author does not appear to have first hand
knowledge, are
extremely
low on the scale of effective persuasion, so much so as to be inadmissible in
many courts around the world. On this point (that evidence as distinguished
from mere conclusionary allegations and hopes is important) my compliments to
Complainant's counsel.
Unfortunately
the mostly benign focus of this administrative process upon low cost and fast
track disposition, precluded Complainant from having discovery by which to
develop first hand knowledge he could swear to, as to some of the acts of
Respondent concerning which Complainant has the burden of proof. The unfairness of the bias thereby sometimes
created, is one of the reasons that this process is not final and binding upon
either party; rather, this dispute is subject to a court trial if that process
is timely initiated following the rendering of this decision.
Included
in Complaint's contentions are these.
Complainant
is a Canadian corporation of Chiliwack, British Columbia, one of the best-known
manufacturers of trampolines in the world. It has four employees, has sold
about 5,000 trampolines in Canada and about 1,000 in the United States, over
about 20 years. Annual sales run about
$700,000 Canadian.
As
to Germany: The Brunia affidavit states in ¶10, "We market trampolines to
customers in Germany and our products and brand name are known there. [--To
which I interpolate as I study the submissions critically, but to what extent
and in what parts of Germany?] Counsel's brief is more specific in reciting
"Complainant has also sold over $12,000 worth of trampolines in Germany.
[In
the low-cost-fast-track process of the ICANN Policy, an unchallenged specific
statement consistent with the pattern of other evidence and allegations, is
accepted as adequately proved. In a nation the size of Germany, such a small
sales volume as $12,000 over several years is de minimis for our purposes
here. In a market so unrelated to
Respondent's art (whether or not objectionable to many tastes), $12,000 in
total sales is much more likely not to
have provided to Respondent any awareness of Complainant's rights, than to have
provided such awareness.]
Complainant
has been using the trademarks Super-Fun and Super Fun in connection with the
manufacture and sale of high-quality trampolines since l983, now for nearly twenty years, and on the
company web site since September l997.
On
June 14, l985, Complainant obtained a Canadian trademark registration No. TMA303796
of SUPER FUN, but on February 7, 2001,
the registration was inactivated, or using the idiom of the Canadian law was
"expunged", for failure to renew. Why was it not renewed? --Because the company trademark lawyer
failed to renew the registration through no fault of Complainant. As soon as Complainant learned that the
registration had been inactivated, it re-applied for a Canadian trademark
registration for SUPER FUN on June 21, 2001 (No. 1104155). This application,
again in the Canadian idiom, was "formalized" June 28, 2001. Exhibit 14 shows a large amount of
continuous ongoing use of the company name, Super Fun Sports, in many countries called the "trade
name", and several ongoing trade mark (product brand name) uses of "Super Fun Trampoline" on
invoices, clearly evidencing a lack of abandonment of the trade name (company
name) and also of the trademark (product brand name), even though most of
exhibit four fails to exhibit trademark use of the term as we know those terms
in the United States.
Complainant
also has registrations of many domain names that are highly similar to SUPER
FUN, ranging from <super-fun.com>, and <superfun.com> through
<super-fun.org>, a .biz,
a .us, and .info, again evidencing ongoing interest and use in the
different formats of "SUPER FUN" with or without the space or hyphen
in the middle.
Complainant
has operated a web site utilizing its SUPER FUN trademark since
September
1997, now five years ago; its homepage was attached as Exhibit 6 Complainant's
submission.
On
May 17, 1999, long after Complainant's 1985 trademark registration and
before
it was inactivated, Respondent
registered the disputed domain <superfun.net>. That registration
occurred:
(i) more than 15 years after Complainant
began international use of
its
SUPER FUN trademark [I have no date of first use in Germany];
(ii) more than 14 years after the first
registration of Complainant's
Canadian
trademark;
(iii) almost two years after the
registration of Complainant's
domain name <superfun.com>; and,
(iv) before Complainant's Canadian
trademark registration
was expunged or inactivated, i.e., while
that registration
was
in full force and effect, whereby the Canadian public had constructive
knowledge of the mark under Canadian trademark law.
[A
routine computer search to determine whether a confusingly similar domain name
was already registered, makes it very simple for a person using reasonable
caution, to learn of prior uses before (s)he selects a confusingly similar
name. But query: does mere facility for
such a search itself give rise to a legal duty for such a search under the
UDRP? To say there is such a "duty" would be quite a stretch of any
law that has been presented to me or known to me on this particular point.]
Complainant
asserts in counsel's conclusionary pleading style [there was no reasonable
facility contemplated by the low-cost fast-track UDRP Policy for him to
discovery and check this recitation],
"Respondent also had actual knowledge of Complainant's trademark
rights at the time it registered the Disputed Domain because of Complainant's
active registration and use of <superfun.com>". Complainant's
submission continues with a recitation of more basic elemental evidence as to
why Complainant believes that:
"Prior to attempting a registration of <superfun.net>,
Complainant logically sought to
register the preferred "Dot Com" version and, thus, would have seen
Complainant's registration.
[That
is a good bet. But the expression is ambiguous as to whether there is certain
knowledge of Respondent's knowledge, or just speculation because the
circumstance makes it a logical good bet at least some indeterminate odds.
There is no hard evidence supporting Complainant's conclusion. In context
of the ambiguity of expression and all
else including Respondent’s specific denial of such knowledge and statement of
his reason for using ".net",
I must read "logically sought" to mean, "if logically
careful, reasonably should have sought . . ." In any event I must conclude that Complainant has failed to carry
its burden of proof on this vital point. Did Respondent have actual knowledge
of Complainant's mark when Respondent registered? Good advocacy, using a
sentence structure and word "logically" in a fashion calculated to
mislead, is not a preponderance of the evidence.]
Complainant's
brief continues, "Respondent would
also have learned of Complainant's widespread use of the term SUPER FUN by
conducting a simple search engine inquiry for ‘SUPER FUN.’”
[I
read the word "would" (which I emphasized just above) as
"could"; there is no explicit evidence recitation that such a search
was ever made, and I don't know how Complainant could have truly known of that
fact, one way or the other. My
experience in this area of practice is to the effect that experienced trademark
lawyers when timely consulted almost always perform searches before they let
their clients invest much in any new mark or domain name, but that pro se folks
and non-trademark-experienced lawyers much more commonly do not. And I do not believe I can here legislate a
duty to do a search, like a Google search, to find prior similar domain names
or marks on different registers, even though were I a legislator or Supreme
Court Justice I would vote for that duty to be recited in instructions to all
registrants, whereby the performance of such a search could be a duty imposed
upon applicants to register.]
Complainant
next presents its contentions with respect to SUPERFUN being a
distinctive,
coined work. I can skip that discussion here, because that subject matter is
not really material to the basis of my conclusion.
Complainant
advocates in conclusionary pleading type sentences, unsupported by hard
evidence other than as discussed above, that Respondent "was aware"
and hence that his domain registration was in bad faith. Since I have concluded
that Complainant has not carried its
burden of proof of Respondent's awareness at the time of the registration, I need not go further into that portion of
Complainant's submission.
Complainant
further advocates what when Respondent registered his domain name:
(i)
that Respondent had knowledge of the existence of Complainant's
business and its marks at the time of his
domain name
registration, whereby the registration
was in bad faith;
(ii) that having that knowledge, his use
was also in bad faith;
(iii) that trampolines are sold primarily
to a children's market
[I would interpolate, but are not
nevertheless sold primarily TO
adults? ? ];
(iv) that Respondent's art is hard-core
pornography totally inappropriate
for a children's market [I so find];
(v) that Respondent's art shown on its
web pages reached with
Complainant's
domain name is destructive of
Complainant's good name and market
[If
there was any realistic substantial overlap of market channels of trade and
class of customers, which I question, I would concur];
(vi) that Respondent has intentionally
sought to attract for commercial
gain,
Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the
source, sponsorship, etc.[I'll discuss why I disagree with that, in a moment];
(vii) that Respondent's association
of pornography with Complainant's
trademark establishes bad faith [also
discussed below].
Wherefore,
Complainant asks for transfer of the Respondent's domain to Complainant.
B.
Respondent
Respondent
appears pro se, in English whereas his native language is German.
He
offers to Complainant a link to a domain of his choice on the top left position
of Respondent's page, with notice that the page is not related to Complainant's
page. There is an ambiguity on this
next point, but I think his sentence means that this offer will continue (at
least for a short while) after "any decision which will [be] made in the
[this] proceeding."
As
he expresses it in his First Person:
"I
am an artist. I practice for over six
years diverse non-commercial art projects that concentrate on Internet, video
illustrations and animated media. Since
five years I've been using the artist synonym which is always shown in the
run-up of my projects. [The absence of any supportive dated examples of those
earlier uses, as evidence, is noted.]
"I
decided to register the domain name over 3 years ago [i.e., before the Canadian
trademark was expunged] because I had collected adequate programming knowledge
to run a homepage by myself.
"Concerning my non-commercial intentions
I registered a .net domain name because
as far as I know .net domains shall not represent commercial interests.
"I
have never had the intention to sell or trade domain name. Also when the
Complainant
offered me $800 for the domain name in April 2002, I declined.
"When
I registered the domain name I had no knowledge of the Complainants
company
or trademark. The Complainants Company
Super-Fun is not represented in Europe or Germany. Further on the Super-Fun trademark is not known by European
customers. First time I heard of
Super-Fun was when the
Complainant
was threaten me with legal action after I declined his offer for
sale
domain.
"I
strongly have to defend against the Complainants accusation of seducing
children
to ‘hardcore pornography.’” The relevant picture cannot be seen as
"hardcore
pornographic" because it is shown in an inexplicit way and have a
clear
artistic context. The relevant picture
does not appear under superfun but superfancy.com link is clicked the
browser opens a complete new page and then it takes estimated 15 minutes and
over twenty clicks to go there.[That considerably debilitates the idea of
"intent" specifically to attract children seeking trampolines to his
pornography.] My artwork in generally and the way I represent myself on the
Internet does not appeal to children. So it must be clear than there is not any
relation to Complainants offers.
"Several
international link pages regarding audiovisual sites link my homepage. A lot of crosslink projects and
presentations of my work on other domains are using URL's with superfun.net in
the beginning. A change of my domain
would take me weeks of reprogramming and informing other sites webmasters.
"My
homepage superfun.net contains links to different projects; several work
examples and contact information. Over
the years my homepage superfun.net has become the most important representation
for my artist identity.
"I
request that the Panel issue a decision that the domain-name registration not
be transferred to the Complainant."
C.
Reply by Complainant
Complainant
by way of Reply asserts:
1. Respondent does not dispute that
"superfun" is a coined term that is not
in the dictionary.
2. Respondent does not deny the
existence of the offensive
pornographic
material identified in the Complaint.
He merely
defends
it as an artistic expression.
Complainant has attached a printout of the page, and the Panel can
decide for itself whether or not it would be offensive and harmful to children
seeking out Complainant's trampolines.
3. Although Respondent alleges that
Complainant's brand is not well
known in Germany, it has not contradicted
the evidence
provided by Complainant demonstrating
sales in Germany.
4. Respondent has not challenged
Complainant's trademark rights
which pre-existed the date it registered
the Disputed Domain.
5.
Respondent has not refuted the argument that it could have
learned about Complainant's mark and
products associated
with children by conducting a simple
WHOIS search for the
domain name <superfun.com>.
6. Respondent has tacitly recognized
Complainant's right to the domain
name, offering a link to Complainant's
site on its site.
It
is clear that the Response adds nothing to alter the inevitable finding
of
facts that must be reached. Respondent
registered a domain name
containing
Complainant's unique well known trademark and associated it with
pornography.
Such nefarious use of Complainant's mark cannot establish
Respondent's
legitimate interest and, such use occurring after Respondent
established
its exclusive rights to the trademark SUPERFUN can only lead to
the
conclusion that the Dispute Domain was registered and used in bad faith.
9. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS
Paragraph
15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the
basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy,
these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
I do not construe this to mean that every recitation of a party, no matter how
self-servingly far fetched and outside the knowledge of party reciting the
statement, must be taken as true. And in many instances the swearing match tie
goes to Respondent because Complainant has the burden of proof.
These
low-cost-fast-track process cases take place without discovery that often is
needed, as here. In them very many of
Complainant's or counsel's statements are made in the nature of a hope without
complete knowledge. Complainant’s statements are often drafted as an equivalent
to, as a sort of, a U.S. discovery style request for admission. If Respondent
admits, great, the point is made; if Respondent denies, the decision of course
need not be based upon an assumption that it is true even when the
circumstances make the alleged truth incredible.
That
is the nature of Complainant's evidence that Respondent knew of Complainant and
its products, trademarks and/or trade name. Complainant did not have discovery
of Respondent's knowledge or lack of it. That fact is critical to Complainant's
case in this UDRP process, and Complainant recited or implied the alleged fact
several ways and several times. But Complainant did not get the admission he
could hope for, but rather got an explicit denial in a context where the
circumstantial evidence makes the denial quite credible.
It
is my career-experience that conflicting operations even in the same industry
and the same home geography of the same nation, are more often than not unknown
to actual competitors for years after an operation as small as Complainant's
German operation gets underway. But here we have totally different industries,
with a very modest ($150,000 CA) total worldwide promotional advertising over
what amounts to decades of operation, and only $12,000 in sales over nearly a
two decades in one of the non-Asian world's larger-population countries,
Germany. It would be a rare fluke--a
clearly less than 10% chance--if Respondent really was aware of Complainant's operations
via the natural flow of information in commerce. To conclude Respondent had knowledge at the time of his domain
registration would be a completely "stretch" of what the circumstance
and evidence here really is about natural flow of information with commerce.
Surely
it is correct to observe that a careful, rational and logical person would run
a quick computer check before selecting a new trademark or domain name, and
experienced trademark lawyers very often do that. --Likely do it in a substantial
majority of cases for corporate clients. But my impression is that less than
10% of small businesses, particularly
when operating essentially pro se and alone as Respondent here, ever have
performed such searches before registering their domain name. The domain name
is cheap to register, requires no prior use or commitment, and that is what
these folks are focused upon, getting the domain name registered without legal
expense.
So
both of these realistic possibilities of a source of knowledge prior to Respondent's
registration, must be seen as what lawyers and judges commonly call a
"stretch". Even if you add those two less-than-10% chances together
and get a <20% chance, and then
double it to 40%, you still don't get a
preponderance of the persuasion as against an explicit denial.
I
don't like the sleaze and pornographic aspects of Respondent's operations, but
the porn aspect of them appear not to be flagrantly promoted up front as you
would expect from somebody really focusing on attracting children or
Complainant's potential customer base.
Further,
it is an irresponsible stretch to say there is a likelihood of trademark-style
confusion as to source, origin or sponsorship between these two operations as
far apart as trampolines and the art of paintings, as far apart as Germany and
British Columbia Canada, as far apart as English and German. So far as has been shown the activities
which Complainant complains of as pornography is lawful.
The
ICANN process is a very narrow process adapted for an administration disposal
of many low-value cases, rather than to creative law making. It is in the making of laws on that topic
rather than in this tribunal that the legal appropriateness of this
Respondent's product should be judged as dangerous to children, in context of
the significant likelihood that those children who are interested and equipped
to search the web will find much more flagrant porno sites on the web than
Respondent's, and will find them more easily.
The
constructive notice of the Canadian trademark registration is a teaser, but
doesn't add any weight to Complainant's position, because it is inherently
constructive notice to Canadians. It
simply cannot be extraterritorially constructive notice to Germans who, so far
as we know, have never been to Canada nor paid any attention to what is
registered among trademark registers in the U.S., France or Britain, much less
the industrially smaller and distant country of Canada. Even constructive
notice has some bounds of practical reality and geographical extent of duty,
and constructive notice does not come close in this case to reaching a German
resident, a sole operator, in a different language, in a different industry or
commercial activity, 5,000 or so miles away
on a different continent, from the trademark registrant.
It
is much too far of a stretch, to assert any actual likelihood of any
substantial amount of confusion as to source, origin or sponsorship, begot by
Respondent's domain name.
It
hardly seems worthwhile to write another several developments to the same end
conclusion.
This
finding of failure of Complainant to prove knowledge in Respondent is
completely independent of any application of the factor of temporary lapse of
the subject trademark's registration--the common law mark was still viable.
Without
having to decide any other premise factor, let me assume the correctness of
that one fact, lack of Respondent's awareness of Complainant and its product,
trademark and email addresses, and let us then apply UDRP 4(a).
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove all of three elements in order to obtain the sought order
that a domain name should be cancelled
or transferred. The first of those elements is,
"(i) the domain name registered
by the Respondent is identical
or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which
the Complainant has rights; and"
I
so find. Super fun, Super-fun and Superfun, are all confusingly similar.
The
second one is
"(ii) the Respondent has no
rights or legitimate interests
in respect of the domain name; and"
Respondent
had an activity on or linked to his web site which many of us would think
inappropriate, but so far as has been presented it is not illegal. Respondent's
activity was not sponsored by an intent to attack Complainant or profit from
cybersquatting, but by an intent to do his own thing unrelated to Complainant.
My
conclusion is not really contrary to some of the authorities Complainant has
cited where either an attack upon Complainant or a cybersquatter's desire to
sell his domain name to a trademark owner for an obscene profit, was
involved. If an activity conceived for
the Respondent's own personal interests unrelated to Complainant and
Complainant's activities, has had extensive legislative and other legal
attention and still remains lawful, it has as much legitimacy under the UDRP
Policy as should be required or is required for Respondent in this case.
An
artist of pornographic works is not likely to be focused on taking business
from a trampoline company, or soliciting its customers, or obstructing its use
of such names as it needs to conduct its business. Respondent refused to sell
his domain name for $800, but I find no evidence that he has been interested in
selling his domain name in issue to Complainant for any other price, exorbitant
or not.
For
all the reluctance of judges and persons in business to conclude any activity
that is pornographic is "legitimate", and without officially deciding whether Respondent's work is or
is not pornographic (though I think the sample Complainant provided as
evidence, clearly is), I can not find that for this domain name title purpose
that the Respondent's lawful activity is not "legitimate".
Third, "the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith."
The
"and" in that clause has a legislative history behind it that
precludes me from construing it to mean "or" under UDRP. So this
"one-liner" has two separate requirements, and one of them is
"was it registered in bad faith." Whereas Complainant may disagree as
to whether Respondent was aware, I have no doubt that if Complainant can accept
the premise I find, that Respondent was totally unaware of Complainant or his
trademarks or activities, then that obliterates bad faith in the act of
registration standing alone.
And
indeed I recall no evidence of changes in his practices that would evidence a
new bad faith upon learning of Complainant's claim.
10. DECISION
Complainant's
Complaint is DISMISSED.
Respondent need NOT TRANSFER its domain name to Complainant by
order in this Administrative proceeding.
This
decision is without prejudice to Complainant timely bringing an appropriate
action in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Tom Arnold, Panelist
Dated: September 6, 2002
r:\SUPER FUN.DOC
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page