National Arbitration Forum

 

DECISION

 

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. v. Sussman & Frankel, LLP

Claim Number: FA0809001224754

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Diane Mason, of Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, California, USA.  Respondent is Sussman & Frankel, LLP (“Respondent”), represented by Neil A. Sussman, of Sussman & Frankel, LLP New York, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES

The domain names at issue are <finra-nasd.com>, <finra-nasd.net>, <finra-nasd.org>, <finra-nasd.info>, <nasd-finra.com>, <nasd-finra.net> and <nasd-finra.org>, registered with Godaddy.com, Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Timothy D. O’Leary as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on September 15, 2008; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on September 16, 2008.

 

On September 16, 2008, Godaddy.com, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <finra-nasd.com>, <finra-nasd.net>, <finra-nasd.org>, <finra-nasd.info>, <nasd-finra.com>, <nasd-finra.net> and <nasd-finra.org> domain names are registered with Godaddy.com, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the names.  Godaddy.com, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Godaddy.com, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On September 19, 2008, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of October 9, 2008 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@finra-nasd.com, postmaster@finra-nasd.net, postmaster@finra-nasd.org, postmaster@finra-nasd.info, postmaster@nasd-finra.com, postmaster@nasd-finra.net and postmaster@nasd-finra.org by e-mail.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on September 24, 2008.

 

On October 6, 2008, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Timothy D. O’Leary as Panelist.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

 

I.          Complainant’s Contentions

 

            A.        Identical and/or Confusingly Similar:

 

Respondent’s domain names, <finra-nasd.com>, <finra-nasd.net>, <finra-nasd.org>, <finra-nasd.info>, <nasd-finra.com>, <nasd-finra.net> and <nasd-finra.org>, are confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks NASD and FINRA because (1) the domain names incorporate Complainant’s marks in their entirety; and (2) the domain names are merely combinations of Complainant’s marks NASD and FINRA. 

Complainant FINRA owns the worldwide exclusive rights to the well-known NASD house mark, and the well-known FINRA house mark and corporate name, as well as to numerous trademark registrations and pending applications for registration of marks that are comprised of or include the term NASD or FINRA for use in connection with various goods and services.  Complainant used to be known as the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or NASD, before changing its name, effective July 30, 2007, to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc., or FINRA.  Complainant has used the mark NASD since 1939, and continues to use the mark today.  Complainant has used the mark FINRA since July 2007. 

 

FINRA is a not-for-profit Delaware corporation and a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”) registered with the Securities Exchange Commission as a national securities association pursuant to the Maloney Act of 1938.  As an SRO, FINRA is a part of the Securities Exchange Act’s highly interrelated and comprehensive mechanism for regulating the securities markets. Today, FINRA is the largest non-governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.  All told, FINRA oversees nearly 5,000 brokerage firms, about 173,000 branch offices and more than 676,000 registered securities representatives. FINRA develops rules and regulations, conducts regulatory reviews of members’ business activities, and designs and operates marketplace services and facilities.  FINRA and its affiliates also provide extensive educational products and services, consult with financial market operators in various countries around the world, provide arbitration services, maintain extensive databases of information related to trading of securities and to brokers and brokerage firms, and provide funding to investor education programs. 

 

FINRA is recognized worldwide as the largest and foremost securities industry self-regulatory organization in the world.  FINRA has approximately 3000 employees, has management offices in Washington D.C. and New York, NY, has 15 District Offices around the country, and has an office in London, England.  For nearly 70 years, FINRA used its family of NASD marks and spent millions of dollars to promote its various products and services offered under its NASD marks.  Although the company changed its house mark to FINRA in July 2007, the organization continues to use its NASD mark and the mark remains exclusively associated with FINRA. 

 

Complainant’s FINRA mark and name also are well-known due to Complainant’s prominence and unique position in the securities industry, and due to its substantial efforts to promote the FINRA mark and name.  NASD’s adoption of FINRA in July 2007 was widely covered in the news media, including internationally distributed publications such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post.

 

The NASD and FINRA marks are well-known, and Complainant owns numerous trademark applications and registrations for these marks worldwide.  Complainant has used the NASD mark since 1939 and the FINRA mark since July 2007, and its adoption and use of FINRA was widely publicized by Complainant’s extensive advertising as well as coverage by internationally distributed media.

Respondent’s domain names are confusingly similar to trademarks and service marks in which Complainant has rights. ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(1); ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

For nearly 70 years, Complainant was widely known as NASD, the acronym for its full name, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.  Complainant owns and uses the domain names <nasd.com>, <nasd.net> and <nasd.org>.  These domain names revert to Complainant’s current web site at <finra.org>.  In July of 2007, Complainant changed its name and is now known as FINRA, the acronym for its full name Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.  Notwithstanding the name change to FINRA, Complainant FINRA continues to use the NASD mark and NASD remains exclusively associated with Complainant. 

 

FINRA is Complainant’s housemark.  Complainant also owns and uses the domain names <finra.net> and <finra.org>, which it uses on its website, all of its regulatory, informational and educational materials, and on a wide variety of other items, such as tote bags, pens, caps, umbrellas and so on.

The NASD and FINRA marks are well-known, and Complainant owns numerous trademark applications and registrations for these marks worldwide.  Complainant has used the NASD mark since 1939 and the FINRA mark since July 2007, and its adoption and use of FINRA was widely publicized by Complainant’s extensive advertising as well as coverage by internationally distributed media.

            B.        Rights and Legitimate Interests:

 

Respondent should be considered as having no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain names that are the subject of the Complaint.  ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(2); ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

Respondent’s use of the domain names or a name corresponding to the domain names is not in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services.

Respondent is using the domain names for parked pages. The parked pages all have a series of hyperlinks that redirect Internet users to various third-parties that offer products that may or may not relate to the services and products offered under Complainant’s marks.  Another panel has previously found that such use is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Seiko Kabushiki Kaisha v. CS into Tech, FA 198795 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 6, 2003) (“Diverting customers, who are looking for products relating to the famous SEIKO mark, to a website unrelated to the mark is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), nor does it represent a noncommercial or fair use under Policy 4(c)(iii).”).

Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain names.  The WHOIS domain name registration information lists the registrant of record as “Sussman & Frankel LLP,” which does not relate to the disputed domain names.  There is and can be no evidence that this law firm is commonly known by either FINRA or NASD, or any combination of these marks, as they are owned exclusively by Complainant. Thus, Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). 

Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain names.  Respondent’s use of the domain names exhibit intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

Respondent’s domain names all resolve to parked pages containing a series of hyperlinks that redirect Internet users to various third-parties that offer products and services presumably related to the products and services offered under Complainant’s marks.  This is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Seiko Kabushiki Kaisha v. CS into Tech, FA 198795 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 6, 2003) (“Diverting customers, who are looking for products relating to the famous SEIKO mark, to a website unrelated to the mark is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), nor does it represent a noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”); see also TM Acquisition Corp. v. Sign Guards, FA 132439 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 31, 2002) (finding that the respondent’s diversionary use of the complainant’s marks to send Internet users to a website which displayed a series of links, some of which linked to the complainant’s competitors, was not a bona fide offering of goods or services).

 

Furthermore, Internet users that come across Respondent’s parked pages may believe that Complainant sponsors or is in some way affiliated with the third-party companies.  This could tarnish Complainant’s marks and reputation if the products and services offered are not of the same quality as services and products offered by Complainant.

            C.        Registration and Use in Bad Faith:

 

The domain names should be considered as having been registered and being used in bad faith. ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(3); ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

As discussed above, Respondent’s domain names all resolve to parked pages containing a series of hyperlinks that redirect Internet users to various third-parties that offer products and services presumably related to the products and services offered under Complainant’s marks.  Respondent is engaging in this behavior to attract Internet users to the competing resolving websites for its commercial gain from the click-through fees.  See Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. Domain Manager, FA 201976 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 19, 2003) (“Respondent’s prior use of the domain name is evidence of bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv) because Respondent presumably commercially benefited from the misleading domain name by receiving ‘click-through-fees.’”)

 

Furthermore, Internet users who come across Respondent’s parked pages may believe that Complainant sponsors or is in someway affiliated with the third-party companies listed on the parked pages.  Thus, through use of the disputed domain names, Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s web sites or other online locations, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s marks as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Respondent’s websites or locations or of a product or service on Respondent’s websites or locations.  Such use of a mark is evidence of bad faith.

 

Complainant FINRA has given Respondent ample opportunity to transfer the domain names.  On April 1, 2008 and May 21, 2008, Complainant FINRA sent cease-and-desist letters to Respondent regarding his unauthorized and unlawful use of the domain names. Respondent never responded to Complainant’s letters.  FINRA’s counsel Diane Mason called Neil Sussman of Sussman & Frankel to request that Respondent transfer the domain names.  At Mr. Sussman’s request, this was followed by a letter from counsel for FINRA on September 5, 2008, which set forth FINRA’s position that Respondent’s use of the identified domain names infringed FINRA’s trademark rights.  In response to the letter, Neil Sussman called FINRA’s counsel, Diane Mason, on September 8, 2008 and stated that he was a securities attorney and had a question before responding to the September 5 letter.  He asked if FINRA was interested in purchasing the domain names.  When Diane Mason informed him that FINRA was not interested in purchasing the domain names, Mr. Sussman ended the conversation. 

 

As Neil Sussman of Respondent Sussman & Frankel is reportedly a securities lawyer, Respondent was well aware of Complainant’s rights in its NASD and FINRA marks before acquiring these domain names.  According to WHOIS records, the names were acquired in March and May of 2008, well after Complainant announced and started using the FINRA mark and name, and decades after Complainant started using its well-known NASD mark.

 

I.          Respondent’s Contentions

 

            A.        Identical and/or Confusingly Similar:

 

Complainant bears the burden of proving that the domain names in issue are identical and/or confusingly similar. Complainant makes a number of admissions in its Complaint conceding that the registered names are not identical and/or confusingly similar --- or, at a minimum, create factual issues requiring substantive discovery. First, Complainant concedes that it no longer is known by-”NASD” (“Complainant changes its name and is now known as FINRA”).

 

Second, Complainant concedes that its use of the name “NASD” is merely to “revert to Complainant’s current web site at www.finra.org.” Indeed, Complainant no longer maintains a web site using “NASD” in any form. It merely is a portal to <finra.org>.

 

Third, while Complainant asserts that it “continues to use the NASD mark,” no evidence is introduced to support this assertion that it continues to be in use other than its winding up of use in favor of FINRA

 

Finally, it is evident that Complainant does not seek the transfer of the registered domain names because they are identical and/or confusingly similar; rather, Complainant seeks the transfer because it desires to control and protect an expansive portal to its one domain site.

 

Since, however, the registered domain names in dispute are much more expansive and detailed than the portal which Complainant seeks to maintain factually they do not constitute an identical and/or confusingly similar use. Nor does Respondent seek to mislead the public into believing that it is FINRA and/or affiliated with FINRA.

 

            B.        Rights and Legitimate Interests:

 

Complainant bears the burden of proving that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect to the disputed domain names. A presumption exists that Respondent has the legal right and legitimate interest in the disputed domain names reflected by the fact that these domain names were unregistered and within the public domain for years after FINRA was formed and FINRA never made any effort to register them.

 

Respondent’s legal practice centers around its representation of clients in arbitrations conducted under the auspices of FINRA. During the past 20 years, respondent has appeared in over 500 arbitrations before FINRA and/or its predecessors. The registered domain names are to be used in assisting potential clients of Sussman & Frankel, LLP to learn that the firm arbitrates cases before FINRA.

 

Respondent’s use of the registered domain names is not intended to compete with Complainant or to confuse the public from believing that Sussman & Frankel, LLP is somehow affiliated with FINRA. Rather, the use is to appropriately inform the public of the availability of counsel in matters which are required -- through securities industry arbitration agreements -- to be filed and heard solely before FINRA. Respondent thus has rights and/or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names.

 

            C.        Registration and Use in Bad Faith:

 

Complainant alleges that Respondent registered the domain names in an effort to cybersquat and/or profit from their registration to the detriment of FINRA. In so arguing, Complainant states that Respondent requested payment for the names. Complainant’s argument is a distortion of the truth and reflects the lack of trustworthiness in its arguments.

 

The Complaint alleges that “On April 1, 2008, and May 21, 2008, Complainant FINRA sent cease and desist letters to Respondent regarding his (sic) unauthorized use of the domain names.”  Complainant further alleges that “on August 28, 2008, FINRA’s counsel Diane Mason called Neil Sussman of Sussman & Frankel to request that Respondent transfer the domain names. Complainant then adds that “Neil Sussman called FINRA’s counsel, Diane Mason, on September 8, 2008 and stated that he was securities attorney and . . . asked if FINRA was interested in purchasing the domain names.”  From the foregoing, Complainant suggests that the purpose of Respondent registering the domain names was to profit from them through their sale to FINRA.

 

The events that occurred reveal that Complainant’s deceptive argument is patently false. As Complainant concedes, discussions concerning Respondent’s use of the subject domain names occurred over a five month period. Respondent’s registration of the domain names was to use them in informing the public of their legal services available for arbitrations before FINRA.  The concessions within Complainant’s papers support this. Had Respondent’s motives been in registering the domain names in order to sell them to Complainant, logically Respondent would not have interacted with Complainant over a five month period without making any effort to sell the domain names. Only after repeated threats of a lawsuit did the Respondent seek to recover its costs in legitimately registering the disputed domain names. These actions do not support Complainant’s argument of bad faith.

 

Complainant’s making of this argument further reflects it’s manipulative, and therefore, untrustworthy disposition. The Complaint clearly reflects that Respondent disputed Complainant’s right to the domain names. The August 28, 2008 call in which Respondent disputed Complainant’s claim and requested legal support for it position confirms this, which Complainant attempted to do in its September 5, 2008 letter.  Only after repeated threats of a lawsuit did the topic of Complainant purchasing the domain names to compensate Respondent for its costs in registering the names arise. This conversation was in the form of a settlement negotiation in an effort to avoid a lawsuit and compromise disputed claims. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 4 .8, offers to compromise are inadmissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(2)   the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

FINDINGS

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar:  Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)

 

I find the issues on this element in favor of Complainant.  

 

Complainant provides evidence of the registration of its NASD mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on September 5, 1989 (Reg. No. 1,555,272).  The Panel finds Complainant’s registration of its NASD mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes its rights in the mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. v. Wick, FA 117861 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 16, 2002) (“Under U.S. trademark law, registered marks hold a presumption that they are inherently distinctive [or] have acquired secondary meaning.”); see also Janus Int’l Holding Co. v. Rademacher, D2002-0201 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2002) (“Panel decisions have held that registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive.”).

 

Complainant has applied for, but not yet obtained, a federal registration for its FINRA mark.  The Panel, however, finds registration of a mark is not necessary for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), so long as Complainant can establish common law rights in its mark.  See SeekAmerica Networks Inc. v. Masood, D2000-0131 (WIPO Apr. 13, 2000) (finding that the Rules do not require that the complainant’s trademark or service mark be registered by a government authority or agency for such rights to exist); see also Great Plains Metromall, LLC v. Creach, FA 97044 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 18, 2001) (“The Policy does not require that a trademark be registered by a governmental authority for such rights to exist.”).

 

Complainant states it changed its company name from NASD to FINRA in July 2007, although it continues to use its NASD name for some purposes.  Complainant alleges it has used its FINRA mark to offer its services continuously since July 2007 when its adoption of its FINRA mark was widely published and advertised in the news media.  The Panel finds Respondent has produced sufficient evidence it has acquired common law rights in its FINRA mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Tuxedos By Rose v. Nunez, FA 95248 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 17, 2000) (finding common law rights in a mark where its use was continuous and ongoing, and secondary meaning was established); see also S.A. Bendheim Co., Inc. v. Hollander Glass, FA 142318 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 13, 2003) (holding that the complainant established rights in the descriptive RESTORATION GLASS mark through proof of secondary meaning associated with the mark).

 

Complainant contends Respondent’s disputed domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s NASD and FINRA marks because each combines the two marks with the additions of a hyphen and a generic top-level domain.  The Panel finds these alterations do not sufficiently distinguish between Respondent’s disputed domain names and Complainant’s marks.  Doubling the marks, as Respondent did, does not change the consumer recognition of the marks.  This is especially true when the marks belong to the same people or companies.  In that situation the association and recognition of the marks is even more apparent.  So it is here.  Respondent’s avowed purpose is to use well known recognition of Complainant’s marks in association with each other in order to solicit business in the securities area by letting potential clients know that Respondent arbitrates cases before those well recognized organizations.  Thus, Respondent, by its conduct, acknowledges that the doubling of Complainant’s marks does not change the consumer recognition of Complainant’s marks. 

 

There is a significant likelihood of confusion as to the origin and sponsorship of the site and consumers are likely to be confused into believing FINRA and/or NASD are the sponsor.  Respondent is not FINRA and not NASD and can’t use those marks to develop its securities business.  Thus the Panel finds they are confusingly similar pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Nintendo of Am. Inc. v. Pokemon, D2000-1230 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2000) (finding confusing similarity where respondent combined the complainant’s POKEMON and PIKACHU marks to form the <pokemonpikachu.com> domain name); see also Innomed Techs., Inc. v. DRP Servs., FA 221171 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 18, 2004) (finding that hyphens and top-level domains are irrelevant for purposes of the Policy).

 

Respondent argues that Complainant has abandoned the use of the NASD acronym because of merging NASD with FINRA.  Respondent further states that NASD is not being used as a website because it reverts to Complainant’s website, FINRA.org.  The Panel finds that this conduct does not constitute abandonment of the acronym NASD for the reason that just because Complainant acquires new trademarks does not mean it abandoned old marks and the fact that Complainant did not use NASD as a website is irrelevant.  What is relevant is that NASD is still being used by Complainant.  In addition to Complainant using NASD as a mark, NASD has filed an application for additional registrations in new classes and has filed two new specimens showing use.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

I find the issues on this element in favor of Complainant. 

 

The Panel finds that Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), and then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests.  See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.”).

 

Complainant states Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names.  The WHOIS information lists Respondent as “Sussman & Frankel, LLP,” and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its NASD or FINRA marks.  Thus, the Panel finds Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Gallup, Inc. v. Amish Country Store, FA 96209 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that the respondent does not have rights in a domain name when the respondent is not known by the mark); see also Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., D2000-0020 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interest where the respondent was not commonly known by the mark and never applied for a license or permission from the complainant to use the trademarked name).

 

Complainant contends Respondent is using the disputed domain names to resolve to websites displaying links to third-party websites, some of which compete with Complainant’s business.  The Panel finds Respondent’s uses of the disputed domain names are not uses in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or legitimate noncommercial or fair uses pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Computerized Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Hu, FA 157321 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 23, 2003) (“Respondent’s appropriation of [Complainant’s] SAFLOK mark to market products that compete with Complainant’s goods does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods and services.”); see also Coryn Group, Inc. v. Media Insight, FA 198959 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 5, 2003) (finding that the respondent was not using the domain names for a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the respondent used the names to divert Internet users to a website that offered services that competed with those offered by the complainant under its marks).

 

Furthermore, all of the domain names that Respondent has improperly registered are “parked” sites.  Decisions interpreting the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy have found that use of a disputed domain name for a parked website is not a use in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Extraordinary Things LLC, FA 11 17826 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 23, 2008); see also Persohn v. Lim, FA 874447 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2007) (finding that the respondent was not using a disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use by redirecting Internet users to a commercial search engine website with links to multiple websites that may be of interest to the complainant's customers and presumably earning "click-through fees" in the process).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

I find the issues on this element in favor of Complainant. 

 

Respondent’s disputed domain names resolve to websites displaying links to competing third-party websites.  The Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names in this manner is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).  See Disney Enters., Inc. v. Noel, FA 198805 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 11, 2003) (“Respondent registered a domain name confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark to divert Internet users to a competitor’s website. It is a reasonable inference that Respondent’s purpose of registration and use was to either disrupt or create confusion for Complainant’s business in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) [and] (iv).”); see also S. Exposure v. S. Exposure, Inc., FA 94864 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2000) (finding the respondent acted in bad faith by attracting Internet users to a website that competes with the complainant’s business).

 

Moreover, Complainant contends that Respondent’s registration of multiple domain names incorporating FINRA's marks is evidence that the domain names were registered and are used in bad faith. See Yahoo! Inc. v. Deiana, FA 339579 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 22, 2004). Internet users who come across Respondent’s parked pages may believe that FINRA sponsors or is in someway affiliated with the third-party companies whose products and services are offered via hyperlink.

 

The Panel finds Respondent is attempting to profit from the goodwill Complainant has established in its FINRA and NASD marks, as well as to cause Internet users’ confusion as to Complainant’s affiliation with the disputed domain names.  The Panel finds these actions are evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See Identigene, Inc. v. Genetest Labs, D2000-1100 (WIPO Nov. 30, 2000) (finding bad faith where the respondent’s use of the domain name at issue to resolve to a website where similar services are offered to Internet users is likely to confuse the user into believing that the complainant is the source of or is sponsoring the services offered at the site); see also Luck’s Music Library v. Stellar Artist Mgmt., FA 95650 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent engaged in bad faith use and registration by using domain names that were identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark to redirect users to a website that offered services similar to those offered by the complainant).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <finra-nasd.com>, <finra-nasd.net>, <finra-nasd.org>, <finra-nasd.info>, <nasd-finra.com>, <nasd-finra.net> and <nasd-finra.org> domain names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

Honorable Timothy D. O’Leary, Panelist

Retired Judge
Dated: October 27, 2008

 

 

 

 

National Arbitration Forum


 

 

 

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