national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

March Madness Athletic Association LLC v. Fishbowl

Claim Number: FA0812001237864

 

PARTIES

Complainant is March Madness Athletic Association LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Nathan J. Hole, of Loeb & Loeb LLP, Illinois, USA.  Respondent is Fishbowl (“Respondent”), Virginia, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <mobilemarchmadness.com>, registered with Network Solutions, Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Judge Harold Kalina (Ret.) as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on December 9, 2008; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on December 10, 2008.

 

On December 10, 2008, Network Solutions, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name is registered with Network Solutions, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Network Solutions, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Network Solutions, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On December 10, 2008, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of December 30, 2008 by which Respondent could file a response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@mobilemarchmadness.com by e-mail.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On January 5, 2009, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Harold Kalina (Ret.) as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent."  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A.  Complainant makes the following assertions:

 

1.      Respondent’s <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MARCH MADNESS mark.

 

2.      Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name.

 

3.      Respondent registered and used the <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant, March Madness Athletic Association LLC, has used its MARCH MADNESS mark since at least 1982 in connection with basketball tournaments, most notably the NCAA’s March Madness Men’s Basketball Tournament.  Complainant holds several registrations of its MARCH MADNESS mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), (i.e. Reg. No. 2,425,958 issued February 6, 2001).

 

Respondent’s <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name was registered on December 19, 2007.  The disputed domain name resolves to a website that displays a notice stating that the website is under construction.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)   Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has sufficiently established rights in its MARCH MADNESS mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) because it holds a registration of the mark with the USPTO.  See Innomed Techs., Inc. v. DRP Servs., FA 221171 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 18, 2004) (“Registration of the NASAL-AIRE mark with the USPTO establishes Complainant's rights in the mark.”); see also Janus Int’l Holding Co. v. Rademacher, D2002-0201 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2002) ("Panel decisions have held that registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive.").

 

Respondent’s <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name contains Complainant’s entire mark and merely adds the generic term “mobile” and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com.”  The Panel finds that the additions of the generic term and gTLD do not distinguish the disputed domain name from Complainant’s mark and, accordingly, finds that Respondent’s <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MARCH MADNESS mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Oki Data Ams., Inc. v. ASD, Inc., D2001-0903 (WIPO Nov. 6, 2001) (“[T]he fact that a domain name wholly incorporates a Complainant’s registered mark is sufficient to establish identity [sic] or confusing similarity for purposes of the Policy despite the addition of other words to such marks”); see also Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Ltd. v. Healy/BOSTH, D2001-0026 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2001) (finding confusing similarity where the domain name in dispute contains the identical mark of the complainant combined with a generic word or term); see also Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Inja, Kil, D2000-1409 (WIPO Dec. 9, 2000) (finding that “[n]either the addition of an ordinary descriptive word . . . nor the suffix ‘.com’ detract from the overall impression of the dominant part of the name in each case, namely the trademark SONY” and thus Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) is satisfied).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Initially, Complainant must make a prima facie showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name.  The burden then shifts to Respondent and Respondent must establish that it has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  The Panel finds that Complainant has sufficiently made its prima facie showing under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  See Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires v. Greenpeace Int’l, D2001-0376 (WIPO May 14, 2001) (“Proving that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name requires the Complainant to prove a negative. For the purposes of this sub paragraph, however, it is sufficient for the Complainant to show a prima facie case and the burden of proof is then shifted on to the shoulders of Respondent.  In those circumstances, the common approach is for respondents to seek to bring themselves within one of the examples of paragraph 4(c) or put forward some other reason why they can fairly be said to have a relevant right or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name in question.”); see also G.D. Searle v. Martin Mktg., FA 118277 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 1, 2002) (“Because Complainant’s Submission constitutes a prima facie case under the Policy, the burden effectively shifts to Respondent. Respondent’s failure to respond means that Respondent has not presented any circumstances that would promote its rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).

 

Furthermore, because Respondent has failed to respond to Complainant’s allegations, the Panel may presume that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests.  However, the Panel will still analyze the record under Policy ¶ 4(c).  See Am. Express Co. v. Fang Suhendro, FA 129120 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 30, 2002) (“[B]ased on Respondent's failure to respond, it is presumed that Respondent lacks all rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.”); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“[Rule 14(b)] expressly provide[s] that the Panel ‘shall draw such inferences’ from the Respondent’s failure to comply with the rules ‘as it considers appropriate.”).

 

Respondent’s <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name resolves to a website that displays a notice stating that the website is under construction.  The Panel finds that this constitutes an inactive holding of the disputed domain name and is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Hewlett-Packard Co. & Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co., L.P. v. Shemesh, FA 434145 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 20, 2005) (“The Panel finds that the [inactive] holding of a domain name that is identical to Complainant’s mark is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name pursuant to Policy  ¶ 4(c)(iii).”); see also Bloomberg L.P. v. SC Media Servs. & Info. SRL, FA 296583 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 2, 2004) (“Respondent is wholly appropriating Complainant’s mark and is not using the <bloomberg.ro> domain name in connection with an active website.  The Panel finds that the [inactive] holding of a domain name that is identical to Complainant’s mark is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name pursuant to Policy  ¶ 4(c)(iii).”).

 

Finally, Respondent is listed in the WHOIS information as “Fishbowl,” which does not indicate that it is commonly known by the <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name.  Respondent has not offered any evidence to indicate otherwise.  The Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Tercent Inc. v. Lee Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’ the disputed domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) does not apply); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Onlyne Corp. Services11, Inc., FA 198969 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 17, 2003) (“Given the WHOIS contact information for the disputed domain [name], one can infer that Respondent, Onlyne Corporate Services11, is not commonly known by the name ‘welsfargo’ in any derivation.”).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

The Panel notes that it is not limited to the enumerated Policy ¶ 4(b) factors when making its Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith analysis.  Rather, the Panel may consider the totality of the circumstances.  See Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (“[T]he examples [of bad faith] in Paragraph 4(b) are intended to be illustrative, rather than exclusive.”).

 

Respondent’s confusingly similar <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name incorporates Complainant’s entire mark and resolves to a website that displays a notice that states that the website is under construction.  The Panel finds that this constitutes inactive holding, which is in itself evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See DCI S.A. v. Link Commercial Corp., D2000-1232 (WIPO Dec. 7, 2000) (concluding that the respondent’s inactive holding of the domain name satisfies the requirement of ¶ 4(a)(iii) of the Policy); see also Caravan Club v. Mrgsale, FA 95314 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent made no use of the domain name or website that connects with the domain name, and that inactive holding of a domain name permits an inference of registration and use in bad faith). 

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <mobilemarchmadness.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

Judge Harold Kalina (Ret.), Panelist

Dated:  January 15, 2009

 

 

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