Wells Fargo & Company v. Peter Han
Claim Number: FA0812001238280
Complainant is Wells Fargo & Company (“Complainant”), represented by Deborah
Shinbein, of Faegre & Benson, LLP,
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN
NAME
The domain names at issue are <wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com> and <wellsfargobanks.net>, registered with TLDS, LLC d/b/a SRSplus.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
James A. Carmody, Esq., as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on December 12, 2008; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on December 15, 2008.
On December 15, 2008, TLDS, LLC d/b/a SRSplus confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com> and <wellsfargobanks.net> domain names are registered with TLDS, LLC d/b/a SRSplus and that Respondent is the current registrant of the names. TLDS, LLC d/b/a SRSplus has verified that Respondent is bound by the TLDS, LLC d/b/a SRSplus registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").
On December 16, 2008, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of January 5, 2009 by which Respondent could file a response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com and postmaster@wellsfargobanks.net by e-mail.
Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On January 8, 2009, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed James A. Carmody, Esq., as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent." Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant makes the following assertions:
1. Respondent’s <wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com> and <wellsfargobanks.net> domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s WELLS FARGO mark.
2. Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com> and <wellsfargobanks.net> domain names.
3. Respondent registered and used the <wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com> and <wellsfargobanks.net> domain names in bad faith.
B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Complainant, Wells Fargo & Company, is a nationwide leader in financial services with over 27 million customers. Complainant holds trademark registrations for the WELLS FARGO mark in countries around the world including a number of registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (i.e. Reg. No. 779,187 issued October 27, 1964).
Respondent registered the <wellsfargobanks.net> domain name on March 17, 2008 and the <wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com> domain name on February 29, 2008. Respondent’s disputed domain names resolve to a website displaying links to third-party websites in competition with Complainant.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The Panel finds that Complainant has established rights in
the WELLS FARGO mark for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) through
its trademark registration with the USPTO.
See Men’s Wearhouse, Inc.
v. Wick, FA 117861 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 16, 2002) (“Under
Complainant argues that Respondent’s disputed domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s WELLS FARGO mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Respondent’s disputed domain names contain Complainant’s mark in its entirety, add generic terms with an obvious relationship to Complainant’s business, and add a generic top-level domain (“gTLD”). The Panel finds that generic terms, especially generic terms with an obvious relationship to a complainant’s business operation that are added to a complainant’s registered mark, create a confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and the mark. See Space Imaging LLC v. Brownell, AF-0298 (eResolution Sept. 22, 2000) (finding confusing similarity where the respondent’s domain name combines the complainant’s mark with a generic term that has an obvious relationship to the complainant’s business); see also Christie’s Inc. v. Tiffany’s Jewelry Auction, Inc., D2001-0075 (WIPO Mar. 6, 2001) (finding that the domain name <christiesauction.com> is confusingly similar to the complainant's mark since it merely adds the word “auction” used in its generic sense). In addition, the Panel finds that the addition of a gTLD is irrelevant in distinguishing a disputed domain name from a registered mark. See Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (finding that the top level of the domain name such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar); see also Busy Body, Inc. v. Fitness Outlet Inc., D2000-0127 (WIPO Apr. 22, 2000) ("[T]he addition of the generic top-level domain (gTLD) name ‘.com’ is . . . without legal significance since use of a gTLD is required of domain name registrants . . . ."). Therefore, Respondent’s disputed domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s WELLS FARGO mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)
has been satisfied.
Complainant asserts that Respondent lacks all rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names. If Complainant makes a prima facie case in support of its allegations, the burden shifts to Respondent to prove that rights and legitimate interests exist pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). The Panel finds that Complainant has establised a prima facie case. See Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires v. Greenpeace Int’l, D2001-0376 (WIPO May 14, 2001) (“Proving that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name requires the Complainant to prove a negative. For the purposes of this sub paragraph, however, it is sufficient for the Complainant to show a prima facie case and the burden of proof is then shifted on to the shoulders of Respondent. In those circumstances, the common approach is for respondents to seek to bring themselves within one of the examples of paragraph 4(c) or put forward some other reason why they can fairly be said to have a relevant right or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name in question.”); see also Clerical Med. Inv. Group Ltd. v. Clericalmedical.com, D2000-1228 (WIPO Nov. 28, 2000) (finding that, under certain circumstances, the mere assertion by the complainant that the respondent has no right or legitimate interest is sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the respondent to demonstrate that such a right or legitimate interest does exist).
By failing to respond to the Complaint, the Panel may assume that Respondent fails to meet its burden of establishing rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names. See Broadcom Corp. v. Ibecom PLC, FA 361190 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 22, 2004) (“Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint functions as an implicit admission that [Respondent] lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. It also allows the Panel to accept all reasonable allegations set forth…as true.”); see also Law Soc’y of Hong Kong v. Domain Strategy, Inc., HK-0200015 (ADNDRC Feb. 12, 2003) (“A respondent is not obligated to participate in a domain name dispute . . . but the failure to participate leaves a respondent vulnerable to the inferences that flow naturally from the assertions of the complainant and the tribunal will accept as established assertions by the complainant that are not unreasonable.”). However, the Panel will examine the evidence on record against the applicable Policy ¶ 4(c) elements before making a final determination with regards to Respondent’s rights and legitimate interests.
Complainant contends that Respondent is neither commonly
known by, nor licensed to register the disputed domain names.
Respondent’s WHOIS information identifies Respondent as “Peter
Han.” The Panel finds that Respondent’s
failure to respond to the Complaint and the WHOIS information demonstrate that
Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names. Therefore, pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii),
Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain
names. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cimock, FA 126829
(Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 13, 2003) (“Due to the fame of
Complainant’s mark there must be strong evidence that Respondent is commonly
known by the disputed domain name in order to find that Respondent has rights
or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶
4(c)(ii). However, there is no evidence
on record, and Respondent has not come forward with any proof to establish that
it is commonly known as CELEBREXRX or <celebrexrx.com>.”); see also Tercent Inc. v. Lee Yi,
FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s
WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’ the disputed
domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii)
does not apply).
Respondent is using the disputed domain names to display links
advertising third-party websites, some of which are in competition with
Complainant. The Panel infers that
Respondent is using the disputed domain names to earn click-through fees, and
thus finds that Respondent has not made a bona
fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i)
or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Lin
Shun Shing, FA 205699 (Nat. Arb. Forum
Dec. 8, 2003) (finding that using a domain name to direct Internet traffic to a
website featuring pop-up advertisements and links to various third-party
websites is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under
Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶
4(c)(iii) because the registrant presumably receives compensation for each
misdirected Internet user); see
also Coryn
Group, Inc. v. Media Insight, FA
198959 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 5, 2003) (finding that the respondent was not
using the domain names for a bona fide offering of goods or services nor
a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the respondent used the names to
divert Internet users to a website that offered services that competed with
those offered by the complainant under its marks).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.
Respondent is using the disputed domain names to intentionally divert Internet users to the associated website, which displays third-party links to competing websites. In cases such as this, the Panel may assume that Respondent is collecting click-through fees and attempting to profit by creating a likelihood of confusion between Complainant’s mark and the disputed domain names. The Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. Domain Manager, FA 201976 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 19, 2003) (“Respondent's prior use of the <mailonsunday.com> domain name is evidence of bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the domain name provided links to Complainant's competitors and Respondent presumably commercially benefited from the misleading domain name by receiving ‘click-through-fees.’”); see also Kmart v. Khan, FA 127708 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 22, 2002) (finding that if the respondent profits from its diversionary use of the complainant's mark when the domain name resolves to commercial websites and the respondent fails to contest the complaint, it may be concluded that the respondent is using the domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)).
In addition, the Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to
disrupt the business of Complainant by offering links to competitors is further
evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). See Travant Solutions, Inc. v. Cole, FA 203177
(Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 6, 2003)
(“Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith, pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), because it is operating on behalf of a competitor of
Complainant . . .”); see also Disney Enters., Inc. v. Noel, FA 198805 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Nov. 11, 2003) (“Respondent registered a domain name confusingly similar
to Complainant's mark to divert Internet users to a competitor's website. It is
a reasonable inference that Respondent's purpose of registration and use was to
either disrupt or create confusion for Complainant's business in bad faith
pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) [and] (iv).”).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <wellsfargoinvestmentbank.com> and <wellsfargobanks.net> domain names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
James A. Carmody, Esq., Panelist
Dated: January 22, 2009
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page
National
Arbitration Forum