national arbitration forum




Morgan Stanley v. che lynum

Claim Number: FA0901001244381



Complainant is Morgan Stanley (“Complainant”), represented by Baila H. Celedonia, of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., New York, USA.  Respondent is che lynum (“Respondent”), Arizona, USA.



The domain name at issue is <>, registered with, Inc.



The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and, to the best of his knowledge, has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.


The Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.



Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on January 23, 2009; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on January 26, 2009.


On January 26, 2009,, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <> domain name is registered with, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name., Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").


On January 30, 2009, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of February 19, 2009 by which Respondent could file a response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to by e-mail.


Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.


On February 25, 2009, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed the Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.


Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent."  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.



Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.



A.  Complainant makes the following assertions:


1.      Respondent’s <> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark.


2.      Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <> domain name.


3.      Respondent registered and used the <> domain name in bad faith.


B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.



Complainant offers financial and investment services under the MORGAN STANLEY mark, which Complainant registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on August 11, 1992 (Reg. No. 1,707,196).  Complainant offers a wide range of financial and investment services, including loan modifications, to clients in 37 countries, and has used the MORGAN STANLEY mark continuously in commerce since at least as early as 1935.


Respondent registered the <> domain name on November 21, 2008.  The disputed domain name resolves to a website that advertises Respondent’s loan modification services.



Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."


In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).


Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:


(1)   the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)   Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.


Identical and/or Confusingly Similar


Complainant has established rights in the MORGAN STANLEY mark through its federal trademark registration pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. v. Wick, FA 117861 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 16, 2002) (“Under U.S. trademark law, registered marks hold a presumption that they are inherently distinctive [or] have acquired secondary meaning.”); see also Innomed Techs., Inc. v. DRP Servs., FA 221171 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 18, 2004) (“Registration of the NASAL-AIRE mark with the USPTO establishes Complainant's rights in the mark.”).


Complainant contends that Respondent’s <> domain name is confusingly similar to its mark.  Respondent’s domain name contains Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark in its entirety and adds the descriptive term “loan modification” and the generic top-level domain “.com.”  The domain name also lacks the spaces between the terms of the mark.  The Panel finds that adding a term that describes a complainant’s goods and services does not sufficiently distinguish Respondent’s disputed domain name from Complainant’s mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), nor does adding a generic top-level domain.  See Gillette Co. v. RFK Assocs., FA 492867 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 28, 2005) (finding that the additions of the term “batteries,” which described the complainant’s products, and the generic top-level domain “.com” were insufficient to distinguish the respondent’s <> from the complainant’s DURACELL mark); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., FA 153545 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (“The addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.”).  The Panel also finds that the removal of spaces from a mark also fails to distinguish a domain name.  See Bond & Co. Jewelers, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 937650 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 30, 2007) (finding that the elimination of spaces between terms and the addition of a gTLD do not establish distinctiveness from the complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)).  Because the changes made to Complainant’s mark are inconsequential under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).


The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.


Rights or Legitimate Interests


Complainant contends that Respondent lacks all rights and legitimate interests in the <> domain name.  In instances such as this where Complainant has established a prima facie case against Respondent, the burden of proof shifts from Complainant to Respondent to bring forth its evidence of rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  The Panel finds that Complainant has carried its burden of proof and established a prima facie case against Respondent.  See Document Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Elec. Commc’ns Inc., D2000-0270 (WIPO June 6, 2000) (“Although Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant prove the presence of this element (along with the other two), once a Complainant makes out a prima facie showing, the burden of production on this factor shifts to the Respondent to rebut the showing by providing concrete evidence that it has rights to or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.”); see also Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. D3M Virtual Reality Inc., AF-0336 (eResolution Sept. 23, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where no such right or interest was immediately apparent to the panel and the respondent did not come forward to suggest any right or interest it may have possessed).


Respondent is not commonly known by the <> domain name.  The WHOIS information for the disputed domain name lists the registrant as “che lynum.”  Moreover, Complainant contends that it has not licensed the MORGAN STANLEY mark for Respondent’s use and that no other evidence exists that Respondent is commonly known by the <> domain name.  As a result, the Panel finds that Respondent has not established rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Coppertown Drive-Thru Sys., LLC v. Snowden, FA 715089 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 17, 2006) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <> domain name where there was no evidence in the record, including the WHOIS information, suggesting that the respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain name); see also Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Paik, FA 206396 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 22, 2003) (“Respondent has registered the domain name under the name ‘Ilyoup Paik a/k/a David Sanders.’  Given the WHOIS domain name registration information, Respondent is not commonly known by the [<>] domain name.”).


Respondent is using the <> domain name to redirect Internet users to a website that advertises Respondent’s own loan modification services, in direct competition with Complainant’s own line of services.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s use is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Computerized Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Hu, FA 157321 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 23, 2003) (“Respondent’s appropriation of [Complainant’s] SAFLOK mark to market products that compete with Complainant’s goods does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods and services.”); see also Coryn Group, Inc. v. Media Insight, FA 198959 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 5, 2003) (finding that the respondent was not using the domain names for a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the respondent used the names to divert Internet users to a website that offered services that competed with those offered by the complainant under its marks).


The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.


Registration and Use in Bad Faith


Complainant has shown that the <> domain name redirects Internet users to a website advertising services that directly compete with Complainant’s own services.  Complainant contends that Respondent is intentionally diverting Internet visitors searching for Complainant’s website to Respondent’s own website.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s use is a disruption of Complainant’s business, and is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).  See Instron Corp. v. Kaner, FA 768859 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 21, 2006) (finding that the respondent registered and used the disputed domain names in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) by using the disputed domain names to operate websites that compete with the complainant’s business); see also Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. MCM Tours, Inc., FA 444510 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 6, 2005) (“The Respondent is a travel agency and thus operates in the same business as the Complainant. The parties can therefore be considered as competitors. The Panel thus finds that the Respondent registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor, which constitutes evidence of registration and use in bad faith under Policy 4(b)(iii).”).


Complainant also contends that Respondent is gaining commercially from the sales of loan modification services on the website that resolves from the disputed domain name.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name for commercial gain is further evidence of Respondent’s bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See Busy Body, Inc. v. Fitness Outlet, Inc., D2000-0127 (WIPO Apr. 22, 2000) (finding bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the respondent and the complainant were in the same line of business and the respondent was using a domain name confusingly similar to the complainant’s FITNESS WAREHOUSE mark to attract Internet users to its <> domain name); see also TM Acquisition Corp. v. Carroll, FA 97035 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 14, 2001) (finding bad faith where the respondent used the domain name, for commercial gain, to intentionally attract users to a direct competitor of the complainant).


The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.



Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.


Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.



The Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.), Panelist

Dated:  March 11, 2009



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