national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

Google Inc. v. Henry Brito

Claim Number: FA0912001297484

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Google Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Meredith M. Pavia, California, USA.  Respondent is Henry Brito (“Respondent”), Colorado, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <googleos.info>, registered with Name.com LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that she has acted independently and impartially and that to the best of her knowledge she has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding. Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson sits as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically December 3, 2009; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint December 4, 2009.

 

On December 4, 2009, Name.com LLC confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <googleos.info> domain name is registered with Name.com LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Name.com LLC verified that Respondent is bound by the Name.com LLC registration agreement and thereby has agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On December 14, 2009, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of January 4, 2010, by which Respondent could file a response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@googleos.info by e-mail.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On January 11, 2010, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson to sit as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent."  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A.  Complainant makes the following assertions:

 

1.      The domain name that Respondent registered, <googleos.info>, is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.

 

2.      Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in the <googleos.info> domain name.

 

3.      Respondent registered and used the <googleos.info> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant, Google Inc., provides search-engine services.  Complainant was created in 1997 and has offered these services since that time.  Complainant operates its search-engine services through its <google.com> domain name.  Complainant holds numerous trademark registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for its GOOGLE mark (e.g., Reg. No. 2554518 issued April 2, 2002).

 

Respondent registered the <googleos.info> domain name December 10, 2008.  The disputed domain name formerly resolved to a website purporting to collect domain names relating to Complainant for resale.  Currently, the disputed domain name fails to resolve to an active website.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Given Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and will draw such inferences as the Panel considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires Complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)   Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical to and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant holds numerous trademark registrations with the USPTO for its GOOGLE mark (e.g., Reg. No. 2554518 issued April 2, 2002).  Previous panels have found a trademark registration with a federal trademark authority is sufficient to establish rights in a complainant’s mark.  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bonds, FA 873143 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 16, 2007) (finding that a trademark registration adequately demonstrates a complainant’s rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)); see also Morgan Stanley v. Fitz-James, FA 571918 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 29, 2005) (finding from a preponderance of the evidence that the complainant had registered its mark with national trademark authorities, the Panel determined that “such registrations present a prima facie case of Complainant’s rights in the mark for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).  Therefore, the Panel finds that Complainant established rights in its GOOGLE mark through its trademark registrations with the USPTO pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Complainant contends Respondent’s <googleos.info> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.  The disputed domain name combines the two letters “os,” which reference the abbreviation for Complainant’s new operating system, and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.info” with Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.  The Panel finds that the addition of two letters to Complainant’s mark is insufficient to adequately distinguish the disputed domain name from the mark and the addition of a gTLD is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis.  See Kelson Physician Partners, Inc. v. Mason, CPR003 (CPR 2000) (finding that <kelsonmd.com> is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s federally registered service mark, KELSON); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. iDomainNames.com, FA 93766 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 24, 2000) (finding that the respondent’s domain name <go2AOL.com> was confusingly similar to the complainant’s AOL mark); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., FA 153545 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (“The addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.”). 

 

Thus, the Panel finds that Respondent’s <googleos.info> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant satisfied the elements of ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Rights to or Legitimate Interests

 

Complainant alleges that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <googleos.info> domain name.  Past panels have found that when a complainant makes a prima facie case in support of its allegations, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove that it does have rights or legitimate interests pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  The Panel finds that Complainant made a prima facie case and given Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint, the Panel may assume that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the <googleos.info> domain name.  However, the Panel still examines the record to determine whether Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c).  See Domtar, Inc. v. Theriault., FA 1089426 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 4, 2008) (“It is well established that, once a complainant has made out a prima facie case in support of its allegations, the burden shifts to respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests pursuant to paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.”); see also Desotec N.V. v. Jacobi Carbons AB, D2000-1398 (WIPO Dec. 21, 2000) (finding that failing to respond allows a presumption that the complainant’s allegations are true unless clearly contradicted by the evidence).

 

The WHOIS information identifies the domain name registrant as “Henry Brito,” which Complainant contends is not similar to the disputed domain name.  Complainant asserts that Respondent is not affiliated with Complainant and that Respondent is not licensed by Complainant to use its GOOGLE mark.  Complainant alleges that Respondent is not an authorized promoter of Complainant’s search-engine services.  The Panel finds no evidence in the record, and no evidence submitted by Respondent, demonstrating that Respondent is commonly known by the <googleos.info> domain name.  Therefore, the Panel find that Respondent does not have rights to or legitimate interests in the <googleos.info> domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Reese v. Morgan, FA 917029 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 5, 2007) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <lilpunk.com> domain name as there was no evidence in the record showing that the respondent was commonly known by that domain name, including the WHOIS information as well as the complainant’s assertion that it did not authorize or license the respondent’s use of its mark in a domain name); see also St. Lawrence Univ. v. Nextnet Tech, FA 881234 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 21, 2007) (concluding a respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name where there was no evidence in the record indicating that the respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain name).

 

Complainant also alleges that Respondent formerly utilized the <googleos.info> domain name to resolve to a website collecting and selling domain names related to Complainant.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the confusingly similar disputed domain name for this purpose is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Bank of Am. Corp. v. Nw. Free Cmty. Access, FA 180704 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 30, 2003) (“Respondent’s demonstrated intent to divert Internet users seeking Complainant’s website to a website of Respondent and for Respondent’s benefit is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”); see also Summit Group, LLC v. LSO, Ltd., FA 758981 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 14, 2006) (finding that the respondent’s use of the complainant’s LIFESTYLE LOUNGE mark to redirect Internet users to respondent’s own website for commercial gain does not constitute either a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).

 

Currently, Respondent is not making an active use of the <googleos.info> domain name.  The resolving website does not display any information and is not in use.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s failure to actively use a confusingly similar disputed domain name also does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the <googleos.info> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Melbourne IT Ltd. v. Stafford, D2000-1167 (WIPO Oct. 16, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name where there is no proof that the respondent made preparations to use the domain name or one like it in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services before notice of the domain name dispute, the domain name did not resolve to a website, and the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name); see also Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Malgioglio, D2000-1602 (WIPO Feb. 19, 2001) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name <solgarvitamins.com> where the respondent merely passively held the domain name).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant satisfied the elements of ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Respondent formerly used the <googleos.info> domain name to operate a website that collected and sold domain names relating to Complainant.  Respondent presumably received some commercial benefit from the sale of the domain names and also from Internet users attracted to the website because of the domain name’s confusing similarity to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s prior use of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bonds, FA 873143 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 16, 2007) (“The Panel finds such to use constitute bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), because [r]espondent is taking advantage of the confusing similarity between the <metropolitanlife.us> domain name and Complainant’s METLIFE mark in order to profit from the goodwill associated with the mark.”); see also MySpace, Inc. v. Myspace Bot, FA 672161 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 19, 2006) (holding that the respondent registered and used the <myspacebot.com> domain name in bad faith by diverting Internet users seeking the complainant’s website to its own website for commercial gain because the respondent likely profited from this diversion scheme).

 

Respondent does not currently use the <googleos.info> domain name.  The Panel finds as well that the failure of the disputed domain name to resolve to an active website also constitutes evidence that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See DCI S.A. v. Link Commercial Corp., D2000-1232 (WIPO Dec. 7, 2000) (concluding that the respondent’s [failure to make an active use] of the domain name satisfies the requirement of ¶ 4(a)(iii) of the Policy); see also Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires v. Greenpeace Int’l, D2001-0376 (WIPO May 14, 2001) (holding that, despite the respondent’s decision to passively hold the disputed domain name, “Respondent has made its intention clear and the continuing threat hanging over the Complainant’s head constitutes bad faith use”). 

 

The Panel finds that Complainant satisfied the elements of ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <googleos.info> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson, Panelist

Dated: January 25, 2010.

 

 

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