Julie Mazzuca d/b/a Meth Lab
Cleanup LLC v. Laura Spaulding d/b/a Spaulding Decon
Claim Number: FA1001001301289
PARTIES
Complainant is Julie Mazzuca d/b/a Meth Lab
Cleanup LLC (“Complainant”),
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <meth-labcleanup.com>, registered
with Godaddy.com,
Inc.
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially
and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist
in this proceeding.
The Honourable Neil Anthony Brown QC as
Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum
electronically on January 4, 2010. With its Complaint, Complainant also chose to
proceed entirely electronically under the new Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (“Rules”) and the new Forum’s Supplemental Rules for
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“Supplemental Rules”) by
submitted an “opt-in” form available on the Forum’s website.
On January 5, 2010, Godaddy.com, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the
National Arbitration Forum that the <meth-labcleanup.com> domain name is
registered with Godaddy.com, Inc. and
that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Godaddy.com,
Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Godaddy.com, Inc. registration agreement and
has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in
accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
“Policy”).
On January 13, 2010, a Written
Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of January 8, 2010 by which
Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to
Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on
Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts,
and to postmaster@meth-labcleanup.com by
e-mail.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on February 2, 2010.
Respondent chose to opt-in to the electronic process with its
submission and submitted its Response in electronic copy only.
On February 11, 2010, pursuant to Complainant’s
request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National
Arbitration Forum appointed The Honourable Neil Anthony Brown QC as Panelist.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from
Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
Complainant alleges that the domain name <meth-labcleanup.com> should no longer be registered with Respondent but that it should be transferred to Complainant.
It contends that this should be done because, within the meaning of paragraph 4 of the Policy, the domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s registered service marks for METH LAB CLEANUP, Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name and it has been registered and subsequently used in bad faith. Complainant maintains that it can prove all three of these requirements and that the appropriate remedy is to transfer the domain name to Complainant.
In support of its case on the first of these three elements, Complainant relies on the registered METH LAB CLEANUP service marks to which reference has already been made (“the METH LAB CLEANUP marks”) and says that the domain name is identical and confusingly similar to the service marks.
Complainant then contends, to establish the second element, that Respondent:
(a) is and has been well aware of the Complainant’s brand name and services offered and if its website;
(b) has engaged in copyright and trademark infringement;
(c) has plagiarized text from the Complainant’s website and used it on the Respondent’s website, to which the disputed domain name resolves;
(d) is not commonly known by the domain name;
(e) has been using the domain name to mislead consumers: and
(f) has been making illegitimate use of the domain name to divert consumers from the Complainant by attempting to mislead them.
Finally, Complainant contends that the domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith. It contends that this is so because Respondent:
(a) has registered the disputed domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of Meth Lab Cleanup LLC;
(b) has intentionally attempted to attract for commercial gain internet users to the Respondent’s websites by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent’s website or location or of a service on the Respondent’s website or location; and
(c) has engaged in trademark dilution , unfair competition and false advertising by registering the domain name and creating the website to which it resolves, utilizing a toll free telephone number and advertising on health department postings in mutually competitive states and transacting business in states also served by Meth Lab Cleanup LLC.
B. Respondent
Respondent submits that:
(a) the registrant of the disputed domain name is
Spaulding Decon, LLC.
(b) the Complainant’s service marks are all for METH
LAB CLEANUP LLC and not for METH LAB CLEANUP , as the Complainant claims;
(c) the
disputed domain name is neither identical or confusingly similar to the service
marks METH LAB CLEANUP LLC, the parties respective domain names are not
confusing and there is no evidence that any consumer has actually been
confused;
(d) on or about December 7, 2006 it contracted the
Complainant to provide training and certification in clandestine drug lab
decontamination, but it was not aware of the Complainant’s brand name, services
or whether its website was properly registered or protected;
(e) the
allegations by the Complainant of copyright and trademark infringement are
irrelevant to the present proceedings and in any event part of the
consideration for which the Respondent paid the Complainant was a licence to
use any and all of the materials and marks found on the Complainant’s website;
(f) the
registration of the domain name does not infringe any of the rights of the
Complainant and no language from the Complainant’s website has been wrongfully
plagiarized;
(g) the
history of the involvement of the Respondent’s web hosting provider, Go Daddy.com,
are irrelevant to the present proceeding, have been used by the Complainant to inflame the Panel and have
been a frivolous and unsuccessful attempt by the Complainant to shut down the
Respondent’s website resulting in damage to the Respondent;
(h) it
has a right or legitimate interest in the domain name because it registered it
properly, has not intentionally mislead consumers that they are in contact with
the Complainant and has been using it in accordance with the licence granted by
the Complainant as part of the payment by the Respondent for the training
seminar;
(i) it
has not attempted to attract customers with the intent to create confusion with
the Complainant’s business;
(j) it
has not engaged in trademark dilution, unfair competition or false advertising;
(k) the
Complainant has not proved the three elements required to be proved under
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“the Policy”);
(l) an order should not be made in these proceedings while
litigation between the parties is pending in
FINDINGS
Complainant does business via Meth Lab Cleanup, LLC, a company
incorporated in the State of
Respondent does business via Spaulding Decon, LLC, a company
incorporated in the State of
The Complainant is the registered owner of three service marks
registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for
METH LAB CLEAN UP LLC.
The disputed domain name <meth-labcleanup.com>
was registered by the Respondent with Godaddy.com,
Inc. on January 23, 2009 and the Respondent is the current registrant of
that domain name.
Complainant is also the registrant of a
domain name, namely <methlabcleanup.com> which resolves to the Complainant’s website.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove
each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name
should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the Respondent
is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
Complainant has rights;
(2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.
The Panel finds that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the service marks relied on by the Complainant. That is so for the following reasons.
Complainant has provided evidence of the registration of
its METH LAB CLEANUP LLC mark with the USPTO (e.g., Reg. No. 3,662,396 filed September 4, 2007; issued August 4,
2009 and two other service marks for METH LAB CLEANUP LLC, particulars of which
have already been given). Complainant’s
registration of its METH LAB CLEANUP LLC marks is sufficient to establish
Complainant’s rights under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
See Expedia, Inc.
v. Tan, FA 991075 (Nat. Arb. Forum
June 29, 2007) (“As the [complainant’s] mark is registered with the
USPTO, [the] complainant has met the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a) (i).”); see also Miller Brewing
The Respondent has contended that the domain name cannot be identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant’s service marks for they are for METH LAB CLEANUP LLC and not METH LAB CLEANUP as claimed by the Complainant. However, although the Complainant referred to the service marks in the body of the Complaint as METH LAB CLEANUP and not METH LAB CLEANUP LLC, it annexed to the Complaint copies of the registration certificates from the USPTO and the precise terms of the service marks are clear from that evidence. That being so, the Panel finds that the mere addition of the letters “LLC” does not detract from the confusing similarity otherwise present. Clearly an objective bystander would conclude that the domain name was reflecting the substance of the service marks, making the former confusingly similar to the latter.
The Panel also finds that the
relevant date of Complainant’s rights in its METH LAB CLEANUP LLC mark is the
date of filing, which is a date prior to the registration of the domain
name. See Phoenix Mortgage Corp. v. Toggas, D2001-0101 (WIPO Mar.
30, 2001) (“The effective date of Complainant's federal rights is . . . the
filing date of its issued registration. Although it might be possible to
establish rights prior to that date based on use, Complainant has submitted
insufficient evidence to prove common law rights before the filing date of its
federal registration.”); see also Hershey Co. v. Reaves, FA 967818
(Nat. Arb. Forum June 8, 2007) (finding that the complainant’s rights in the
KISSES trademark through registration of the mark with the USPTO “date back to the filing date of the
trademark application and predate [the] respondent’s registration”).
The disputed domain name also adds
a hyphen and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com” to the substance of
the service mark. The Pane finds, as have many previous UDRP panels, that these
alterations do not overcome a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶
4(a) (i). Accordingly, the Panel finds
Respondent’s <meth-labcleanup.com> domain name is confusingly
similar to Complainant’s METH LAB CLEANUP LLC marks under Policy ¶
4(a)(i). See Health Devices Corp. v.
The Panel therefore
finds that the Complainant has made out the first of the three elements that it
must establish.
Under paragraph Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the Complainant has the burden of establishing that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name.
But by virtue of Policy ¶ 4(c), it is open to a respondent to establish its rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, among other circumstances, by showing any of the following elements:
(i) before any notice to you [Respondent] of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you [Respondent] (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you [Respondent] are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Thus, if Respondent proves any of these elements or indeed anything else that shows that it has a right or interest in the disputed domain name, the Complainant will have failed to discharge its onus and the Complaint will fail.
It is now generally accepted that the
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks
rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy and then the burden shifts to the
Respondent to show that it does have such rights or legitimate interests. See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Nat. Arb. Forum
Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie
case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed
domain name under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy before the burden shifts to
the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a
domain name).
The Panel finds that the Complainant
has made out a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights and
legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. That prima facie case arises from the following circumstances: the
domain name incorporates the whole of the METH LAB CLEANUP LLC service mark
except that the letters “LLC” have been omitted and, although the service marks were registered on August 4, 2009 and
the domain name was registered prior to that date, namely on January 23, 2009, the
service marks were applied for on September 4, 2007 and the Complainant had
been using them since 2003.
That being so, the burden of proof then shifts to the Respondent to show on the balance of probabilities that it has a right or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name.
The Respondent seeks to do this by submitting essentially that on or about December 7, 2006 it contracted the Complainant to provide training and certification in clandestine drug lab decontamination and that part of the consideration for which the Respondent paid the Complainant for this training and certification was a licence to use any and all of the materials and marks found on the Complainant’s website. The licence is said by the Respondent to come from the fact that a few days after the training course, the Complainant wrote to the Respondent by email and apparently also to other participants in the course and said “Please use any information off our website you need.” It appears that the Complainant was giving advice to students of the course as to what they might include in their promotional brochures when they started business in the discipline in which they had just been trained. The context of the email in which this offer to take information from the Complainant’s website was made is that the Complainant recited that it could not find its own brochure, but that if the students looked at the Complainant’s website they would find “info from the safety page, the indicator page, solutions, company etc. It’s the same stuff, I just wish I had one to show you.”
The Respondent draws the conclusion from those words that they created a licence “to use any and all materials and marks found on Complainant’s website.” (emphasis added).The Respondent is thus submitting that the words created a licence to use everything on the website including the Complainant’s name, service marks and domain name. It is here that the Respondent’s argument meets some difficulty. In the first place, the context makes it clear that the Complainant’s offer, presumably designed to help its students, meant that they could use information on the website of a factual and technical nature to show potential customers that they were competent and qualified and to demonstrate what work was involved in cleaning up crime sites. Secondly, although the offer went as far as “company etc.”, it is drawing a long bow to conclude that the Complainant was inviting students to use the Complainant’s own company details for their, the students’, own business. When it used the expression “company, etc.” it clearly meant “your company” not “our company.”
The Panel therefore doubts that the email created a licence at all and is also of the view that the email was intended to be more of a personal gesture rather than a legal entitlement. If, contrary to that view, the email created a licence, the licence did not in the Panel’s view extend as far as company or related information or intellectual property and gave no right to the Respondent to use that information. It is inherently unlikely that any business in the position of the Complainant would do such a thing and the Panel would need overwhelming evidence to convince it that the Complainant would allow a student or anyone else to use its company name and service marks to create and register a domain name in direct competition with the Complainant.
The email and the facts surrounding it therefore gave the Respondent no right to use the Complainant’s name as a domain name.
The alleged licence cannot therefore give rise to a right or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name.
The Respondent also relies on the argument that it has a right or legitimate interest in the domain name because, taking several submissions together, it registered the domain name properly, has not intentionally mislead consumers that they are in contact with the Complainant and has not attempted to attract customers with the intent to create confusion with the Complainant’s business.
Here it must be said that the UDRP
process is widely accepted to be an unsatisfactory means of resolving disputed
questions of fact, as they do not have the advantage of discovery,
interrogatories, examination and cross examination of witnesses or any of the
other means open to a Court to resolve such difficult issues. A panel must
therefore be cautious about reaching firm conclusions on such issues,
especially when, as in this case, there are court proceedings already pending
in
In the present case, there are several disputed questions of fact and the matters for decision are certainly not free from doubt. There are, however, two features of the evidence that tilt the scales in favour of the Complainant and enable the Panel to reach a conclusion on these issues on the balance of probabilities.
The first is that, so far as the evidence goes, the parties came together because the Respondent enrolled in the Complainant’s course. The application form filled in and signed by the Respondent for the course is in evidence. That form carries the name of the Complainant six times and is signed by the Respondent, so there is no doubt that the name of the Complainant was brought very clearly to the Respondent’s notice. Moreover, the Respondent knew the Complainant’s email address which incorporated the domain name, for it appeared twice on the email containing the offer to use information on the website. The Panel can only conclude that the Respondent knew of the Complainant’s domain name, which was virtually the same as its company name and decided to register its own domain name as a copy of the Complainant’s, adding only a hyphen in the name. The conclusion must, on the balance of probabilities, be that the Respondent intended to copy the Complainant’s domain name, use it for commercial purposes and to do so either knowing that this would cause confusion in at least some minds or recklessly as to whether it would or not. Those conclusions negate any claim that the Respondent has a right or legitimate interest in the domain name, for right and legitimacy cannot come from conduct of that sort.
The second feature that tilts the scales in favour of the Complainant is that the very terms of the domain name call for an explanation from the Respondent as to why it registered this particular domain name rather than some other form of words. Clearly, the Respondent knew that the domain name was virtually identical to the Complainant’s name, service marks and domain name and yet it went ahead and registered <meth-labcleanup.com>. Doing so raises the immediate suspicion that it was an attempt to copy the Complainant’s name, service marks and domain name and to trade on it. The absence of an explanation in the Response as to why this particular domain name was registered tends to confirm that suspicion rather than dispel it.
The Panel adds for
completeness that there is no evidence that brings the case within any of the
provisions of Policy ¶ 4(c) that might otherwise give rise to a right or
legitimate interest. In that regard Complainant
contends that Respondent’s previous use of the disputed domain name attempted
to pass itself off as Complainant is evidence that Respondent lacks rights and
legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Complainant alleges that Respondent’s
disputed domain name previously contained copyrighted material from
Complainant’s website and that Respondent’s disputed domain name was
temporarily shut down by the registrar until the copyrighted material was
removed from Respondent’s website. On
those matters the Panel find that Respondent’s previous attempt to pass itself off as Complainant is neither a bona fide
offering of goods and services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c) (i) nor a legitimate noncommercial
or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c) (iii).
See Am. Int’l Group, Inc. v. Busby, FA 156251 (Nat. Arb.
Forum May 30, 2003) (finding that the respondent attempts to pass itself off as
the complainant online, which is blatant unauthorized use of the complainant’s
mark and is evidence that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests
in the disputed domain name); see also
Mortgage Research Center LLC v. Miranda, FA 993017 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 9, 2007) (“Because [the] respondent in
this case is also attempting to pass itself off as [the] complainant,
presumably for financial gain, the Panel finds the respondent is not using the
<mortgageresearchcenter.org> domain name for a bona fide offering
of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c) (i), or a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c) (iii).”).
Complainant contends that Respondent is not
commonly known by the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c) (ii). The WHOIS information indicates the
registrant is “Spaulding Decon.” The
Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name
under Policy ¶ 4(c) (ii). See M.
Shanken Commc’ns v. WORLDTRAVELERSONLINE.COM, FA 740335 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the
<cigaraficionada.com> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c) (ii) based on the
WHOIS information and other evidence in the record); see also Instron Corp. v. Kaner, FA 768859 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 21, 2006) (finding
that the respondent was not commonly known by the <shoredurometer.com>
and <shoredurometers.com> domain names because the WHOIS information
listed Andrew Kaner c/o Electromatic a/k/a Electromatic Equip't as the
registrant of the disputed domain names and there was no other evidence in the
record to suggest that the respondent was commonly known by the domain names in
dispute).
Complainant also contends that Respondent is currently using the disputed domain name to divert Internet users seeking Complainant’s website to Respondent’s commercial website offering crime scene clean-up services in direct competition with Complainant. The Panel finds Respondent’s current use of the disputed domain name is further evidence that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a) (ii). See Bank of Am. Corp. v. Nw. Free Cmty. Access, FA 180704 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 30, 2003) (“Respondent’s demonstrated intent to divert Internet users seeking Complainant’s website to a website of Respondent and for Respondent’s benefit is not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c) (i) and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c) (iii).”); see also Summit Group, LLC v. LSO, Ltd., FA 758981 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 14, 2006) (finding that the respondent’s use of the complainant’s LIFESTYLE LOUNGE mark to redirect Internet users to respondent’s own website for commercial gain does not constitute either a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).
For all of these
reasons the Panel finds that the Respondent has not rebutted the prima facie case and the Complainant has
therefore made out the second of the three elements that it must establish.
Complainant must prove on the balance of probabilities both that the domain name was registered in bad faith and that it is being used in bad faith: Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000‑0003.
Further guidance on how to implement this requirement is to be found in paragraph 4(b) of the Policy, which sets out four circumstances, any one of which shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith, although other circumstances may also be relied on, as the four circumstances are not exclusive. The four specified circumstances are:
“(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out‑of‑pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, internet users to respondent’s website or other on‑line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the respondent’s website or location or of a product or service on the site or location.”
The Complainant relies, to prove this element, on Policy ¶ 4(b) (iii) and (iv).
The Complainant contends that Respondent’s
disputed domain name offers clandestine drug lab decontamination services that
directly compete with Complainant. In support of this contention Complainant
exhibits at attachment 6 what purports to be a page of Respondent’s principal website
at <spauldingdecon.com> and on which appears a reference to <meth-labcleanup.com>, which is
the website to which the disputed domain name resolves.
Although Respondent seems to provide a wider
range of services than Complainant, the establishment of the website at <meth-labcleanup.com> offering
services in competition with Complainant is likely to divert potential
customers of Complainant to Respondent. There is nothing inappropriate in the
competition except that it is being generated by the use of the disputed domain
name which is confusingly similar to Complainant’s service marks.
In
the light of that evidence, the Panel finds on the balance of probabilities
that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name in this manner constitutes a
disruption of Complainant’s business and is therefore evidence of bad faith registration
and use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(b) (iii). See Surface Prot. Indus., Inc. v. Webposters, D2000-1613 (WIPO Feb. 5,
2001) (finding that, given the competitive relationship between the complainant
and the respondent, the respondent likely registered the contested domain name
with the intent to disrupt the complainant's business and create user
confusion); see also DatingDirect.com Ltd. v. Aston, FA
593977 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 28, 2005) (“Respondent is appropriating
Complainant’s mark to divert Complainant’s customers to Respondent’s competing
business. The Panel finds this diversion
is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).”).
Complainant also contends that Respondent is using the disputed domain name to attempt to attract intentionally, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s commercial website. In the light of the conclusions already reached, the Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b) (iv). See TM Acquisition Corp. v. Carroll, FA 97035 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 14, 2001) (finding bad faith where the respondent used the domain name, for commercial gain, to intentionally attract users to a direct competitor of the complainant); see also Busy Body, Inc. v. Fitness Outlet, Inc., D2000-0127 (WIPO Apr. 22, 2000) (finding bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the respondent and the complainant were in the same line of business and the respondent was using a domain name confusingly similar to the complainant’s FITNESS WAREHOUSE mark to attract Internet users to its <efitnesswarehouse.com> domain name).
Moreover, in the absence of any explanation in the Response as to why Respondent chose a domain name virtually identical to Complainant’s name, service marks and domain name, the Panel concludes that it was probably registered to give the false impression that it was associated with Complainant’s business and that it has been used for the same purpose, both of which constitute bad faith.
Complainant has therefore made out the third of the three elements that it must establish.
Other matters have been canvassed in this proceeding which, in the opinion of the Panel are not
relevant to the issues arising under the UDRP in the present proceeding. The
Panel expressly refrains from reaching any conclusion on those matters that are
properly the province of the distinguished judicial authorities before whom
other proceedings may come.
DECISION
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy,
the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <meth-labcleanup.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED
from Respondent to Complainant.
The Honourable Neil Anthony Brown QC
Panelist
Dated: March 1, 2010
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