National Arbitration Forum

 

DECISION

 

Center for the Study of Psychiatry, Inc. d/b/a International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc. v. Peter Breggin

Claim Number: FA1007001334307

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Center for the Study of Psychiatry, Inc. d/b/a International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Shawn G. Rice, of Rice & Bohrofen, s.c., Wisconsin, USA.  Respondent is Peter Breggin (“Respondent”), represented by Jeffrey B. Scheer, of Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen, Fetter & Burnstein, P.C., New York, USA. 

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <icspp.org>, registered with Network Solutions LLC (R63-LROR).

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Luiz Edgard Montaury Pimenta as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on July 8, 2010.

 

On July 9, 2010, Network Solutions LLC (R63-LROR) confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <icspp.org> domain name is registered with Network Solutions LLC (R63-LROR) and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Network Solutions LLC (R63-LROR) has verified that Respondent is bound by the Network Solutions LLC (R63-LROR) registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On July 16, 2010, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of August 5, 2010 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@icspp.org.  Also on July 16, 2010, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the email addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on August 5, 2010.

 

Complainant’s Additional Submission was received on August 10, 2010 in compliance with Supplemental Rule 7.

 

Respondent’s Additional Submission was received on August 16, 2010 in compliance with Supplemental Rule 7.

 

On August 17, 2010, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Luiz Edgard Montaury Pimenta as Panelist.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

 

Complainant argues that Respondent was appointed/elected by Complainant as one of its directors and at all relevant times was acting on behalf of Complainant as its agent when he, through his wife, registered the disputed domain name.  Complainant further argues that neither Respondent nor his wife have any personal rights to the <icspp.org> domain name.  Complainant asserts that it directed Respondent to register the disputed domain name in Complainant’s name and reimbursed Respondent for the costs of registering and maintaining the disputed domain name, except for costs which were expressly donated to Complainant as a charitable tax-deductible gift.  Complainant contends that Respondent’s wife acknowledged in writing that the website hosting, website, and list serve belong to Complainant. 

 

Complainant argues that since the time of the disputed domain name’s registration, Respondent has left Complainant but continues to maintain use and control of <icspp.org> without authorization.  Complainant asserts that when Respondent left Complainant, his rights to the disputed domain name, if any, were terminated and his professional interests in the domain name were eliminated.

 

Complainant argues that Respondent uses the disputed domain to redirect traffic away from Complainant’s website to his own website.

 

Complainant argues that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith because Respondent lacked any individual right to the trademark represented by the domain name. Complainant argues that Respondent acted contrary to Respondent’s instruction when he registered the disputed domain name. Complainant argues that the disputed domain name is being used in bad faith because Respondents is intentionally attempting to attract internet users to his site that are intending to reach Complainant’s website. Complainant further argues that Respondent, by using the disputed domain name, intends to disrupt the business of Respondent.

 

 

B. Respondent

 

Respondent argues that it has a stronger association with the ICSPP mark than does Complainant as ICSPP is Respondent’s brand and Complainant’s success is based on Respondent’s accomplishments, admiration, and good will that he has generated over five decades.  Respondent asserts that from 1971-2002, Complainant never had an office, an address, or a phone number separate from Respondent’s home office, address, and phone number.  Respondent further asserts that the disputed domain name was originally embedded in Respondent’s professional website, <breggin.com>.  Respondent contends that most of Complainant’s publicity and a vast majority of its activities were handled by Respondent and his wife and that Respondent’s career and professional and public identity are closely associated with the ICSPP mark.  Respondent contends that since 2002, Complainant has tried unsuccessfully to build a separate identity from Respondent and has been unable to establish itself independent of Respondent.  Respondent further contends that any continued good name and public recognition depend upon the reputation, good will, achievements and identity of Respondent. 

 

Respondent asserts that at no time from the registration of the disputed domain name in 1997 until Respondent separated from Complainant in April 2010, did Complainant ever request that Respondent transfer ownership of the disputed domain name from Respondent to Complainant.  Respondent further asserts that Complainant’s leadership has always been aware that Respondent was providing the organization with only limited technical access to the disputed domain name while Respondent maintained control and ownership of the disputed domain name.

 

Respondent asserts that web searches using the Google search engine reveal that Respondent’s name is more closely associated with Complainant than any other of its members.

 

Respondent alleges that Complainant’s recent leadership has drastically diminished the value of the disputed domain name and that Respondent’s personal website received in the past year an average of 10 times more visits per month that the disputed domain name.

 

Respondent alleges that at no time he was a mere registrant, employee or agent of Complainant and that he was at all times form 1971 until 2002 the unpaid, volunteer founder and the International Director of CSP, and contributed with many expenses related to Complainant’s operational costs. Respondent alleges that at no time Complainant “directed” him to register the disputed domain name and that he always owned, registered and controlled the disputed domain name. Respondent asserts that no request was ever made until now to transfer control or ownership of the disputed domain name from Respondent to Complainant. Respondent alleges that he lent use of the disputed domain name to Complainant free of charge from 2002-2010. In the process, he allowed Complainant to have technical access to the site (under Respondent’s supervision), but Respondent claims he never gave ownership, registration or control of the disputed domain name to Complainant. Respondent argues that Complainant recognized and confirmed Respondent’s ownership and control of the disputed domain name by accepting this subordinate relationship.

 

Respondent also alleges he had a good faith agreement with Complainant ad that such agreement was violated through personal and professional attacks on Respondent. Respondent claims that Complainant’s current leaders have failed to maintain its effectiveness and ethical status.

 

Respondent alleges that Complainant has not formally adopted, with any federal or state agency, the assumed names of either “The International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology” or “ICSPP”. Respondent does not contest that Complainant routinely used the name “The International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology” since late 1998. However, Respondent rejects that Complainant has ever trademarked “The International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology” or the acronym “ICSPP”. Respondent also contends that Complainant’s use of the name and acronym are largely and predominantly associated with and completely benefit from the life work and professional and public identity and good will of Respondent.

 

Respondent alleges that the acronym ICSPP is in the public domain, and would, therefore, be difficult to trademark with federal or state authorities. Respondent alleges that a number of organizations use the same acronym ICSPP, including the “International Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners”; the “Interstate Compact for Supervision of parolees and Probationers”; and “Integrated care and Support Pathways Planning”, all active in related human service fields to Complainant. Respondent also informs there is another organization using the acronym ICSPP: “I Can’t Sleep Productions and Publications”.

 

Respondent agrees that the disputed domain name is currently directed to his own website named “Independent Counselors, Social Workers, Psychologists, Psychiatrists and Educators” and disagrees there is any confusion between his website and Complainant’s website. Respondent claims he has displayed disclaimers informing he was no longer linked with Complainant.

 

C. Additional Submissions

 

Complainant argues in its Additional Submission that simply because Respondent is akin to a celebrity founder (i.e. Bill Gates as the founder of Microsoft), the disputed domain name and mark remain with the entity and not the individual. Complainant argues that Respondent’s allegations of being closely related to Complainant’s name and trademark are irrelevant.

 

Complainant also asserts in its Additional Submission that Complainant permitted Respondent and his wife to maintain the website hosted at the disputed domain name and that Respondent never informed that he considered such domain name as of his own ownership and control. Complainant argues that, as such ownership and control was never asserted by Respondent, Complainant did not object to it. Complainant also contends that Respondent did not object to Complainant’s use of the domain name until recently.

 

Complainant asserts in its Additional Submission that although Respondent tries to deny that he was ever an agent of Complainant, he concedes that he served as its officer in the position of International Director and Complainant contends that as an officer Respondent has certain fiduciary duties related to Complainant. 

 

Complainant asserts in its Additional Submission that it has not officially registered its d/b/a/ with federal or state authorities. Complainant argues, however, that it routinely calls itself the International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc. when dealing with the general public.

 

Complainant asserts in its Additional Submission that Respondent is using a URL that hosted Complainant’s website for over a decade to host the website for another organization with the same initials, what would probably bring confusion among consumers. Complainant argues that since Respondent is using a another domain name, <empathictherapy.or>, to host his new organization, there is no legitimate reason for him to be using the disputed domain name. Complainant contends that even if Respondent currently holds disclaimers on the website hosted under the disputed domain name, these disclaimers could be removed at any time.

 

Complainant asserts in its Additional Submission that it did not seek to obtain ownership of the disputed domain name prior to this complaint because it thought that it already owned the domain name.

 

Respondent asserts in its Additional Submission that he founded Complainant in 1971 but that there was never any intention or effort to brand the organization as an entity separated from his identity and reform work. The intention was to brand Respondent as a valid reformer with the support of well-known public figures. Respondent informs about his remarkable professional achievements and claims that he was never merely “a founder” or “a member” of Complainant, but that he “was” the Complainant.

 

Respondent, in its Additional Submission, reinforces the allegations brought in his Response.

 

FINDINGS

 

Complainant, Center for the Study of Psychiatry, Inc. is a non-profit organization founded in 1971. Complainant has been doing business as “International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc” and has been using the acronym “ICSPP” since at least 1998.

 

Respondent, Peter Breggin, was one of Respondent’s founders and significant contributor through many years, serving as a member and director of Respondent.

 

Dr. Breggin separated from the Respondent on April, 2010.

 

The disputed domain name was registered on October 13, 1997.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(2)   the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Preliminary Issue:  Business/Contractual Dispute Outside the Scope of the UDRP

 

In the present case, both parties allege having rights and legitimate interests over the disputed domain name. Not only that, but both parties also allege having rights to the trademark in which the Complainant is based. The parties assert they have had a business/contractual relationship during many years.

 

In one side, Complainant argues that Respondent acted under its orders when he registered the disputed domain name, which Respondent denies. Respondent alleges he was never directed by Complainant to act in such way, and that Complainant was aware at all times that the disputed domain name was owned and controlled by Respondent and never, until recently, opposed to such situation.

 

In this instance, the Panel finds that this is a business, civil and/or contractual dispute between two entities that falls outside the scope of the UDRP.  In Love v. Barnett, FA 944826 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 14, 2007), the panel stated:

 

A dispute, such as the present one, between parties who each have at least a prima facie case for rights in the disputed domain names is outside the scope of the Policy … the present case appears to hinge mostly on a business or civil dispute between the parties, with possible causes of action for breach of contract or fiduciary duty.  Thus, the majority holds that the subject matter is outside the scope of the UDRP and dismisses the Complaint.

 

According to the panel in Love, complex cases such as the one presented here may be better decided by the courts than by a UDRP panel:

 

When the parties differ markedly with respect to the basic facts, and there is no clear and conclusive written evidence, it is difficult for a Panel operating under the Rules to determine which presentation of the facts is more credible.  National courts are better equipped to take evidence and to evaluate its credibility.

 

 

Despite allegations of the parties that implicate other legal issues, the straightforward question here is if the Panel can procede to a determination under the UDRP without being clouded by the tangential issues.  The Panel finds that there is sufficient evidence for it to properly decide the dispute under the UDRP, as outlined below.  See Weber-Stephen Prod. Co. v. Armitage Hardware, D2000-0187 (WIPO May 11, 2000) (“Like any other tribunal, however, this Panel can determine whether it has jurisdiction only from the facts and arguments presented to it. In this case, Complainant did allege bad-faith use and registration of the domain name at issue.  Had Complainant proved those allegations, there would be no proper question as to this Panel’s jurisdiction.”); see also Draw-Tite, Inc. v. Plattsburgh Spring Inc., D2000-0017 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (“This Panel well recognizes that its jurisdiction is limited to providing a remedy in cases of ‘the abusive registration of domain names,’ or ‘Cybersquatting’ ... Like any other tribunal, however, this Panel can determine whether it has jurisdiction only from the facts and arguments presented to it. In this case, Complainant did allege bad-faith use and registration of the domain name at issue. Had Complainant proved those allegations, there would be no proper question as to this Panel’s jurisdiction.”).  Therefore, the Panel will procede with a traditional UDRP analysis.

 

As outlined below, Complainant fails to make the necessary showing to prevail in this UDRP complaint.  The Panel stresses that this in no way should reflect on the merits of possible future proceedings between the parties before another forum, if they should exist, , involving additional evidence, different claims and other factors of proof. The Panel finds that a possible future claim does not mean that this Panel should refrain from ruling on the merits of the case in relation to the issue that is under the Policy.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant asserts common law rights in its ICSPP mark.  Complainant indicates that the ICSPP mark is an acronym for the International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc. which Complainant indicates has been doing business since at least 1997 and using the ICSPP mark since at least 1998.  Complainant further asserts that Complainant has invested heavily in popular recognition of its ICSPP mark including in online and print resources and materials. 

 

Respondent on the other hand, argues that Complainant does not have rights in the ICSPP mark as the public generally associates this mark with Respondent and not with Complainant, thereby preventing Complainant from establishing secondary meaning in the mark.  Respondent contends that from 1971-2002 the International Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc. never had an office, an address, or a phone number separate from Respondent’s home office, address, and phone number.  Respondent further contends that the ICSPP website was embedded in Respondent’s personal website resolving from the <breggin.com> domain name.  Respondent asserts that all inquiries to the organization, most of its publicity and a vast majority of its activities were handled by Respondent and his wife.  Respondent submits evidence that his career and professional and public identity are closely associated with the ICSPP mark.

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has provided sufficient evidence of the secondary meaning associated with the ICSPP mark in order to establish common law rights in the mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Stellar Call Ctrs. Pty Ltd. v. Bahr, FA 595972 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 19, 2005) (finding that the complainant established common law rights in the STELLAR CALL CENTRES mark because the complainant demonstrated that its mark had acquired secondary meaning); see also George Weston Bakeries Inc. v. McBroom, FA 933276 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 25, 2007) (finding that the complainant could establish common law rights in its GW BAKERIES mark through consistent and continuous use of the mark, which helped the mark become distinctive and generate “significant goodwill”).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent’s <icspp.org> domain name is identical to Complainant’s ICSPP mark.  Complainant contends that Respondent’s disputed domain name incorporates Complainant’s mark in its entirety and merely adds the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.org.”  The Panel finds that the mere addition of a gTLD is not sufficient to distinguish a disputed domain name from a mark and renders the disputed domain name identical to Complainant’s mark.  See Sea World, Inc. v. JMXTRADE.com, FA 872052 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 12, 2007) (“[Since] [t]he top-level gTLD is merely a functional element required of every domain name, the <shamu.org> domain name is identical to the SHAMU mark under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Goktas, D2000-1638 (WIPO Feb. 8, 2001) (finding that the domain name <philips.org> is identical to the complainant’s PHILIPS mark).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has met the first element of the Policy.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

A complainant is required to make out an initial prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests. Once such prima facie case is made, respondent carries the burden of demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. If the respondent fails to do so, a complainant is deemed to have satisfied paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy. See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.”).

 

Complainant asserts that prior to notice of this dispute, Respondent was not known as or affiliated with any entity utilizing ICSPP’s initials other than Complainant.  Additionally, the WHOIS information indicates the registrant of the disputed domain name is “Peter Breggin.”  Complainant argues that Respondent was acting on behalf of Complainant when he, through his wife, registered the disputed domain name and that neither Respondent nor his wife had any personal rights in the disputed domain name.  Complainant further argues that it directed Respondent to register the disputed domain name and reimbursed Respondent for the costs of registering and maintaining the disputed domain names and that Respondent’s wife acknowledged in writing that neither she nor Respondent had any rights in the disputed domain name.  The Panel holds that Complainant has not established a prima facie case in support of its arguments that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  See Terminal Supply, Inc. v. HI-LINE ELECTRIC, FA 746752 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 24, 2006) (holding that the complainant did not satisfactorily meet its burden and as a result found that the respondent had rights and legitimate interests in the domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Workshop Way, Inc. v. Harnage, FA 739879 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 9, 2006) (finding that the respondent overcame the complainant’s burden by showing it was making a bona fide offering of goods or services at the disputed domain name).

 

Respondent alleges that he is more commonly associated with the ICSPP mark and <icspp.org> domain name than Complainant.  Respondent argues that an Internet search performed using the Google search engine using the combined terms “Peter R. Breggin” and “ICCSP” found 22,000 results while a search using the combined terms “Toby Watson” (Complainant’s current Executive Director) and “ICCSP” yielded only 364 results.  Respondent argues that at no time did Complainant “direct” Respondent to register the <icspp.org> domain name.  Respondent contends that he, working with his wife, created the disputed domain name and that Respondent has always owned, registered and controlled the disputed domain name.  Respondent asserts that he personally paid for the registration costs associated with the disputed domain name and absorbed all other costs and expense associated with the disputed domain name until 2002.  Respondent alleges that from 2002-2010, Respondent lent the use of the disputed domain name to Complainant free of charge but never gave ownership, registration or control of the disputed domain name to Complainant. Respondent indicates that he continued to register and pay for the disputed domain name until the present time.  The Panel finds that such evidence is sufficient to determine that Respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).   Also, the Panel finds that, with respect to paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy, there is enough evidence that Respondent, before any notice of the dispute, used the disputed domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. See Am. Credit Union Buyers Ass’n v. Acuba Ltd., FA 164306 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 16, 2003) (finding that complainant’s allegations that “[n]o evidence indicates that Respondent has been known . . . by the Domain Name” did not acknowledge or address evidence that respondent was known by the disputed domain name, having registered <acuba.com> under the name Acuba Limited, and, therefore, were not a prima facie showing under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has failed to meet the second element of the Policy.

 

The Panel could have declined to analyze bad faith under the Policy, but it has decided to also analyze this last element.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

 

The Panel finds that Complainant failed to meet the burden of proof of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. v. Samjo CellTech.Ltd, FA 406512 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 9, 2005) (finding that the complainant failed to establish that the respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith because mere assertions of bad faith are insufficient for a complainant to establish Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii); see also Graman USA Inc. v. Shenzhen Graman Indus. Co., FA 133676 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2003) (finding that general allegations of bad faith without supporting facts or specific examples do not supply a sufficient basis upon which the panel may conclude that the respondent acted in bad faith).

 

As the Panel has concluded,  Respondent has shown rights or legitimate interests in the <icspp.org> domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), which leads the Panel to also find that Respondent did not register or use the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Skunkworx Custom Cycle, D2004-0824 (WIPO Jan. 18, 2005) (finding that the issue of bad faith registration and use was moot once the panel found the respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name); see also Vanguard Group Inc. v. Investors Fast Track, FA 863257 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 18, 2007) (“Because Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, his registration is not in bad faith.”).

 

The Panel further finds that Respondent has not registered or used the <icspp.org> domain name in bad faith if it finds that Respondent has not violated any of the factors listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) or engaged in any other conduct that would constitute bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Societe des Produits Nestle S.A. v. Pro Fiducia Treuhand AG, D2001-0916 (WIPO Oct. 12, 2001) (finding that where the respondent has not attempted to sell the domain name for profit, has not engaged in a pattern of conduct depriving others of the ability to obtain domain names corresponding to their trademarks, is not a competitor of the complainant seeking to disrupt the complainant's business, and is not using the domain name to divert Internet users for commercial gain, lack of bona fide use on its own is insufficient to establish bad faith); see also Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. v. Samjo CellTech.Ltd, FA 406512 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 9, 2005) (finding that the complainant failed to establish that respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith because mere assertions of bad faith are insufficient for a complainant to establish UDRP ¶ 4(a)(iii))

 

The Panel finds that based on Respondent’s argument that it acted on behalf of Complainant as a former employee when it registered the <icspp.org> domain name, Respondent did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith and that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) requires that Complainant establish both registration and use in bad faith.  See YourTurf, Inc. v. Your Turf, FA 462460 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 30, 2005) (where it was undisputed that respondent had acted on behalf of the complainant in registering the disputed domain name, the panel refused to find bad faith because “To be a violation of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), a respondent must register and use a domain name in bad faith.”)

 

Complainant has alleged that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith because Respondent is intentionally attempting to attract Internet users to the disputed domain name for Respondent’s own commercial gain.  Complainant argues that the disputed domain name currently resolves to Respondent’s personal website which may result in Internet users’ confusion as to Complainant’s sponsorship of or affiliation with Respondent’s competing website.  Respondent, on the other hand, has shown sufficient evidence that the registrations of the disputed domain name was not made in bad faith. Respondent has also shown that its own website has ten times more average traffic than the disputed domain name, for which the Panel finds that the disputed domain name is not being used in bad faith.

 

Further, the Panel finds that Complainant was aware at all times of Respondent’s ownership and control of the disputed domain name and never, until recently, has opposed such situation. Complainant’s assertions that it did not seek to obtain ownership of the disputed domain name prior to this complaint because it thought that it already owned the domain name are groundless. The Panel finds that Complainant’s lack of action against any supposedly abusive behavior of Respondent demonstrates that Complainant did not oppose such behavior and that Respondent was not acting in bad faith when it registered and used the disputed domain name.

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has failed to meet the third element of the Policy.

 

As outlined above, Complainant fails to meet the criteria to prevail in this proceeding.  The Panel stresses that this in no way reflects on the merits of future proceedings, if any, between the parties, involving additional evidence, different claims and other factors of proof.

 

DECISION

Complainant having failed to establish all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be DENIED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <icspp.org> domain name REMAIN with Respondent.

 

 

Luiz Edgard Montaury Pimenta, Panelist
Dated: September 2, 2010

 

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