national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

Google Inc. v. Robert Cazacu

Claim Number: FA1012001363470

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Google Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Meredith M. Pavia, California, USA.  Respondent is Robert Cazacu (“Respondent”), Maryland, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <googleshopper.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and, to the best of his knowledge, has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

The Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on December 14, 2010; the National Arbitration Forum received payment on December 14, 2010.

 

On December 15, 2010, GoDaddy.com confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <googleshopper.com> domain name is registered with GoDaddy.com and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  GoDaddy.com has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On December 15, 2010, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of January 4, 2011 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@googleshopper.com.  Also on December 15, 2010, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the email addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On January 10, 2011, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed the Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A.  Complainant makes the following assertions:

 

1.      Respondent’s <googleshopper.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.

 

2.      Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <googleshopper.com> domain name.

 

3.      Respondent registered and used the <googleshopper.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant, Google Inc., operates an Internet search service and has its primary website located at <google.com>.  Complainant owns multiple trademark registrations for its GOOGLE mark (e.g., Reg. No. 2,806,075 issued January 20, 2004) with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).

 

Respondent, Robert Cazacu, registered the disputed domain name on September 8, 2006.  The disputed domain name resolves to a parked website from which Respondent presumably receives income. 

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)   Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant claims rights in its GOOGLE mark based on its registration of the mark with the USPTO (e.g., Reg. No. 2,806,075 issued January 20, 2004).  The Panel finds that trademark registrations with a federal trademark authority, such as the USPTO, are evidence of Complainant’s rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Microsoft Corp. v. Burkes, FA 652743 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 17, 2006) (“Complainant has established rights in the MICROSOFT mark through registration of the mark with the USPTO.”); see also Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Santos, FA 565685 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 21, 2005) (finding trademark registration with the USPTO was adequate to establish rights pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). 

 

Complainant also asserts that Respondent’s <googleshopper.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.  The disputed domain name contains Complainant’s entire mark and adds the generic term “shopper” and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com.”  The Panel finds that these two additions are insufficient to avoid a finding of confusing similarity.  See Google Inc. v. Xtraplus Corp., D2001-0125 (WIPO Apr. 16, 2001) (finding that the respondent’s domain names were confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark where the respondent merely added common terms such as “buy” or “gear” to the end); see also Reese v. Morgan, FA 917029 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 5, 2007) (finding that the mere addition of the generic top-level domain “.com” is insufficient to differentiate a disputed domain name from a mark).  Therefore, pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), the Panel finds that Respondent’s <googleshopper.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. 

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied. 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Complainant argues that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  Once Complainant makes a prima facie case in support of its allegations, the burden shifts to Respondent to prove it has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  Based on the arguments made in the Complaint, the Panel finds that Complainant has established a prima facie case in support of its contentions and Respondent has failed to submit a Response to these proceedings.  See Intel Corp. v. Macare, FA 660685 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 26, 2006) (finding the “complainant must first make a prima facie case that [the] respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), and then the burden shifts to [the] respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests.”); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (finding that if the complainant satisfies its prima facie burden, “then the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names.”).  However, the Panel will still examine the record in its entirety to make a complete determination as to Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. 

 

Complainant argues that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name or any other name containing Complainant’s GOOGLE mark.  The WHOIS information for the disputed domain name indicates that the registrant of the domain name is “Robert Cazacu.”  Complainant states that it has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use any of its marks in any way.  There does not appear to be any other evidence in the record that would support a finding that Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name.  Therefore, the Panel concludes that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Braun Corp. v. Loney, FA 699652 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 7, 2006) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain names where the WHOIS information, as well as all other information in the record, gave no indication that the respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain names, and the complainant had not authorized the respondent to register a domain name containing its registered mark); see also Reese v. Morgan, FA 917029 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 5, 2007) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <lilpunk.com> domain name as there was no evidence in the record showing that the respondent was commonly known by that domain name, including the WHOIS information as well as the complainant’s assertion that it did not authorize or license the respondent’s use of its mark in a domain name). 

 

Respondent’s disputed domain name currently resolves to a parked website.  Complainant argues that a parked website has no active content and instead is a page that has been monetized with click-through ads.  Complainant asserts that this use supports a finding that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to feature a parked website is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See Royal Bank of Scotland Grp plc et al. v. Demand Domains, FA 714952 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 2, 2006) (finding that the operation of a commercial web directory displaying various links to third-party websites was not a use in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii), as the respondent presumably earned “click-through” fees for each consumer it redirected to other websites); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Lin Shun Shing, FA 205699 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 8, 2003) (finding that using a domain name to direct Internet traffic to a website featuring pop-up advertisements and links to various third-party websites is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) because the registrant presumably receives compensation for each misdirected Internet user).

 

Complainant submits evidence that Respondent offered to sell the disputed domain name to Complainant for the amount of $500,000.  Complainant asserts, and the Panel agrees, that this amount greatly exceeds any related registration fees.  Therefore, the Panel concludes that Respondent’s offer to sell the disputed domain name is further evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  See

Reese v. Morgan, FA 917029 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 5, 2007) (finding that the respondent’s willingness to sell a contested domain name for more than its out-of-pocket costs provided additional evidence that Respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the contested domain name); see also George Weston Bakeries Inc. v. McBroom, FA 933276 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 25, 2007) (holding that where a respondent makes a “disproportionate” offer to sell its domain name registration to the complainant for more than its out-of-pocket registration costs, there is additional evidence that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

The Panel finds that Respondent’s offer to sell the disputed domain name to Complainant for the amount of $500,000, an amount in excess of Respondent’s out-of-pocket costs associated with registering the disputed domain name is evidence of Respondent’s bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i).  See Campmor, Inc. v. GearPro.com, FA 197972 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 5, 2003) (“Respondent registered the disputed domain name and offered to sell it to Complainant for $10,600. This demonstrates bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i).”); see also Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. AchievementTec, Inc., FA 192316 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 15, 2003) (finding the respondent’s offer to sell the domain name for $2,000 sufficient evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i)).

 

Complainant argues that because Respondent’s disputed domain name resolves to a parked website containing click-through ads, Respondent has demonstrated bad faith registration and use.  The Panel concludes that Respondent likely profits from the receipt of these click-through fees.  Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in an attempt to intentionally attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s website.  Respondent has created a likelihood of confusion as to Complainant’s affiliation with the disputed domain name through the use of the confusingly similar <googleshopper.com> domain name.  The Panel finds this to be sufficient evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See Reese v. Morgan, FA 917029 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 5, 2007) (holding that the respondent was taking advantage of the confusing similarity between the <lilpunk.com> domain name and the complainant’s LIL PUNK mark by using the contested domain name to maintain a website with various links to third-party websites unrelated to Complainant, and that such use for the respondent’s own commercial gain demonstrated bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)); see also Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Fees, FA 937704 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 25, 2007) (holding that the use of a confusingly similar domain name to display links to various third-party websites demonstrated bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <googleshopper.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

The Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.), Panelist

Dated:  January 17, 2011

 

 

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