national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

Motion Recruitment Partners, Inc. v. ANDREW JOHNSON d/b/a Jobsping / admin admin

Claim Number: FA1103001375976

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Motion Recruitment Partners, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Sean Ploen of Ploen Law Firm, PC, Minnesota, USA.  Respondent is ANDREW JOHNSON d/b/a Jobsping / admin admin (“Respondent”), represented by Howard Neu of Law Office of Howard Neu, P.A., Florida, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <jobsping.com> (the “Domain Name”), registered with eNom, Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned Panelists certify that each has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Karl Fink, Christopher Gibson and David Safran as Panelists, with Mr. Gibson serving as Chair.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on March 3, 2011; the National Arbitration Forum received payment on March 3, 2011.

 

On March 7, 2011, eNom, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <jobsping.com> domain name is registered with eNom, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  eNom, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the eNom, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On March 10, 2011, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of March 30, 2011 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@jobsping.com.  Also on March 10, 2011, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the email addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on March 28, 2011.

 

Complainant’s Additional Submission was received on April 1, 2011, and deemed compliant with Supplemental Rule 7.  Respondent’s Additional Submission was received on April 4, 2011, and deemed compliant with Supplemental Rule 7.

 

On April 11, 2011, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Karl Fink, Christopher Gibson and David Safran as Panelists.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant states that it provides job recruiting and employment placement services for companies located across the United States.  Complainant’s principal offices are located in Boston, Massachusetts, and it operates subsidiary offices in several locations including Illinois, California, New York, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia.

 

Complainant contends that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights.  Complainant states that it owns both common law and registered rights in its trademarks JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS, including U.S. Patent and Trademark Office registration nos. 3,883,524 (dated November 30, 2010) and 3,887,597 (dated December 7, 2010). In connection with providing employment recruiting and placement services, Complainant states that it has used the trademarks JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS openly, widely and continuously in commerce since at least March 2, 2009.  Complainant operates two websites, using the domain names <jobspringpartners.com> and <motionrecruitment.com>.

 

Complainant contends that the Domain Name, <jobsping.com>, is virtually identical to Complainant’s well-known and distinctive JOBSPRING trademark; the Domain Name also is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark, JOBSPRING PARTNERS. Moreover, the Domain Name is being used by Respondent to promote services competitive with those offered by Complainant. By removing a single letter from Complainant’s trademark to create a confusingly similar Domain Name, then using that Domain Name to promote services competitive with those of Complainant, the Respondent has created an improper and unauthorized association between Complainant and Respondent and also has caused confusion as to the source of the services being advertised using the Domain Name.

 

Complainant urges that Respondent should be considered as having no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name. On information and belief, Respondent does not possess any trademark rights, other rights, or legitimate interest in respect of the Domain Name. Complainant has not authorized Respondent or any other entity to use the trademarks JOBSPRING or JOBSPRING PARTNERS as a trademark or trade name in connection with providing employment recruiting and placement services. Third parties have complained, stating that Respondent harvests personal information from site visitors and then uses such information to conduct unauthorized and unwanted e-mail campaigns. It is clear that consumers have been confused into believing that Complainant is associated with the Respondent.

 

Complaint also asserts that the Domain Name should be considered as having been registered and being used in bad faith. In using the Domain Name to promote itself as the source of services similar or identical to those offered by Complainant, Respondent intentionally has attempted to attract, for its own commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Respondent’s website. In short, Respondent is trying to disrupt the business of a competitor and create confusion in the marketplace.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent Andrew Johnson contends he is the sole owner of the Domain Name, <jobsping.com>, which was registered on November 24th, 2010, in good faith, after having performed a trademark search with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and finding no registered trademark for the name.  Respondent explains that he had no desire to register a domain name which could be remotely confused with another’s trademark. At the time of registration of the Domain Name, there was no registered trademark for that name, or any other similarly confusing name.  Complainant’s marks were registered on November 30th, 2010, and December 7th, 2010, after the Domain Name was registered.  It was therefore impossible to have registered the Domain Name in bad faith before the trademarks were acquired by Complainant.

 

Respondent highlights that Complainant’s trademark filing for “JobSpring” covers the following:

 

"Employment placement services in the fields of information technology, software development and network infrastructure; recruitment of professional personnel in the fields of information technology, software development and network infrastructure; employment recruiting services in the fields of information technology, software development and network infrastructure. 

 

The Domain Name, on the other hand, is linked to a job search engine which, just like <google.com> or <yahoo.com>, enables users to visit it in order to search the web for job postings for a vast number of job websites.  Respondent’s site at <JobsPing.com> is not an employment placement service and therefore, cannot be confused with the trademark “JOBSPRING.” Respondent receives its users through paid national advertising campaigns, not by confusing or convincing users that they are associated with Complainant. The term "Jobs Ping" refers to the word "Ping" not "Spring", as the user pings on various job categories on the <JobsPing.com> home page, which acts as a search engine for jobs in a wide variety of categories. A review of the home pages of the Complainant’s website and the site linked to the Domain Name shows that there can be no confusion with the Respondent’s website.

 

Regarding Complainant’s allegation that Respondent’s website "harvests personal information from site visitors and then uses such information to conduct unauthorized and unwanted email campaigns," Respondent states this claim is false and unsubstantiated. The email campaigns run by Respondent are with user consent and in accordance with the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.  Respondent openly collects user feedback and has received complaints from only a small fraction (1%) of all users. None of these complaints has indicated that there was confusion with Complainant, nor did they even mention the Complainant.

 

Respondent argues that Complainant is unable to show evidence of “bad faith” registration and use, a required element under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy. Previous panels have held that a complainant is required to prove not only that a domain name has been registered in bad faith, but that it is also being used in bad faith.  In the instant case, the Domain Name could not have been registered in bad faith, because Complainant did not have a registered trademark at the time that the Domain Name was registered by Respondent. In addition, Complainant has not alleged that it had a common law trademark rights prior to the registration of the subject Domain Name, nor that it had any “secondary meaning” as that term has been defined. 

 

Further, the Domain Name is not being used in bad faith as it is operating as a search engine for anyone to find a job in whatever field he wishes. There is no evidence offered by Complainant that Respondent has used Complainant’s trademark to confuse users or to profit therefrom. It is being used solely as a descriptive phrase to demonstrate how easy it is for a user to find a job of his or her choice in whatever field of endeavor they are seeking. 

 

Finally, no evidence has been presented that Respondent engages in a pattern of registering the trademarks of others as domain names.  Nor can the Complainant show that Respondent intentionally attempted to create a likelihood of confusion with Complainants’ mark. 

 

Respondent respectfully requests that the complaint be denied and that the Complainant be found guilty of Reverse Domain Hijacking.

 

C. Complainant’s Additional Submission

Complainant’s responds to Respondent’s argument that “the domain could not have been registered in Bad Faith…because Complainant did not have a Registered Trademark at the time that the domain <JobsPing.com> was registered by Respondent.”  According to Complainant, it is well settled that the term “trademark or service mark” as used in ¶ 4(a)(i) of the Policy encompasses both registered and common law trademarks. As the following timeline establishes, Respondent’s registration of the Domain Name was made in bad faith more than one year after Complainant established statutory and common law rights in the JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS trademarks:

 

DATE ACTION

 

February 18, 2009 Complainant files U.S. trademark application serial no. 77/672629 for the mark JOBSPRING PARTNERS, establishing initial statutory rights in the trademark.

 

March 2, 2009 Complainant commences widespread use in commerce of JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS trademarks, establishing common law trademark rights in the trademarks.

 

September 8, 2009 Complainant files U.S. trademark application serial no. 77/821628 for the mark JOBSPRING, establishing initial statutory rights in the trademark.

 

November 24, 2010 Respondent registers the Domain Name, after allegedly having “performed a trademark search with the United States Patent and Trademark Office and finding no Registered Trademark for the name.”

 

November 30, 2010 Complainant receives U.S. trademark registration no. 3883524 for the mark JOBSPRING PARTNERS.

 

December 7, 2010 Complainant receives U.S. trademark registration no. 3887597 for the mark JOBSPRING.

 

Complainant’s registrations for the JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS marks entitle it to certain strong presumptions in its favor. Here, Respondent does not deny the validity of Complainant’s trademark registrations and does not contest the distinctiveness of the JOBSPRING mark. Instead, Respondent simply argues that the term “jobsping,” as used in the Domain Name, has a descriptive meaning. Complainant contends that Respondent’s explanation of the Domain Name is implausible, but more significantly, it is irrelevant. The question is whether the Domain Name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s protected mark. By simply removing a single letter from Complainant’s distinctive JOBSPRING mark, Respondent’s Domain Name attempts to take advantage of an error made by computer users seeking Complainant’s well-known JOBSPRING services. In similar situations where domain name registrants have simply subtracted a letter from a distinctive trademark to capitalize upon such user errors, Panels routinely have ordered the transfer of the challenged domain name.

 

Further, Complainant urges that Respondent’s actual use of the Domain Name evidences bad faith.  In conjunction with providing its employment placement services under the JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS marks, Complainant has at all times operated a website whose most prominent feature is a search screen from which users may search job listings in various geographic locations by means of user-entered keywords. The results of such searches consist of links to jobs that third parties have contracted with Complainant to fill. Respondent’s bad faith is demonstrated by the fact that it registered the Domain Name after Complainant had obtained common law and statutory trademark rights in the JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS marks, then elected to use that Domain Name to conduct activities essentially identical to and highly competitive with those of Complainant. At the website operated by Respondent, the most prominent feature – indeed, the only feature – is a search screen from which users may search job listings in various geographic locations by means of user-entered keywords. The results of those searches consist of links to jobs posted on third-party websites. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion, the two sites thus offer highly similar features and directly competitive services, and such activities demonstrate the requisite bad faith. The bad faith nature of Respondent's activities is further emphasized by the fact that if a user enters “jobspring" as a keyword in the search box located on the site linked to the Domain Name, thousands of Complainant's own JOBSPRING job listings are displayed on Respondent's site. Simply put, Respondent's registration and use of the Domain Name are intended to create and to capitalize on consumer confusion and to injure the Complainant. Thus, Complainant respectfully requests that the Panel end this abusive and unfair practice by ordering the transfer of the Domain Name to Complainant.

 

C. Respondent’s Additional Submissions

Respondent reiterates that Complainant did not possess a registered trademark at the time that Respondent registered the Domain Name. While Complainant argues that it maintained a common law trademark, Respondent contends that to establish common law rights in a trademark, it is necessary for a complainant to demonstrate that the putative mark has acquired secondary meaning and goodwill through use in commerce.  However, just because Complainant filed an application for a registered trademark before the Domain Name was registered by Respondent, does not demonstrate consistent and continuous use of the mark, which helped the mark become distinctive and generate significant goodwill.  Therefore, Complainant is unable to demonstrate that it maintained a common law trademark for JobSpring and the Complaint is therefore deficient on its face to show bad faith.

 

In addition, the Domain Name is not confusingly similar to Complainant’s Mark. Because of the state of the world economy, the number of websites facilitating those who are looking for jobs has grown considerably. Monster.com, of course, is the “monster” of all jobs related websites. But there are also a wide range of easy-to-use job websites listing positions available in the United States and elsewhere, with some, such as the Complainant’s website, offering more specialized job information.  One can explore job openings in a specific industry or by location, both domestic and international.

 

While Complainant’s site specializes in technology jobs, Respondent’s site is an online application search engine for any type of job anywhere. All of the cases cited by Complainant for the omission of one letter either actually traded on that complainant’s trademark or were not even being used for legitimate business purposes by the respondents.  However, in the instant case, Respondent not only has a legitimate business interest, but <Quantcast.com> shows that it is ranked 3,329th while reaching over 610,000 people monthly, while Complainant’s site ranked 890,756 in viewers.

 

Respondent states the Domain Name is not being used in bad faith. Nowhere on its website does Respondent utilize or show the Complainant’s word mark for JobSpring.  There is absolutely no similarity between the two websites and they are being used in two different ways.  For Complainant to allege that the Domain Name is being used in bad faith is simply a stretch that cannot be justified.  The biggest stretch is complaining that if one types in “JobSpring” in the search box on <JobsPing.com>, that “thousands of Complainant’s own JOBSPRING job listings are displayed.” Respondent observes that “[w]ell, of COURSE they are.  That’s what a good search engine does.”

 

In sum, because Complainant is attempting to obtain Respondent’s Domain Name which has a more successful website, is unable to show that Complainant had common law rights in its name at the time that Respondent registered the Domain Name; and is unable to show that the Respondent has registered or is using the Domain Name in bad faith, Complainant should be found guilty of Reverse Domain Hijacking.           

 

FINDINGS

Complainant provides job recruiting and employment placement services for companies located across the US. The Complainant filed an application for its JOBSPRING PARTNERS mark on February 18, 2009 and received U.S. trademark registration no. 3883524 for the mark on November 30, 2010. Complainant filed an application for its JOBSPRING mark on September 8, 2009 and received U.S. trademark registration no. 3887597 for the mark on December 7, 2010. Complainant operates two websites, using the domain names <jobspringpartners.com> and <motionrecruitment.com>.

 

Respondent registered the Domain Name on November 24, 2010, and it is linked to a job search engine enabling users to search the web for job postings on a wide variety of job-related websites, including listings on Complainant’s website.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The Panel finds that Complainant’s ownership of federal trademark registrations for its JOBSPRING and JOBSPRING PARTNERS marks satisfies the threshold requirement of having trademark rights.  See e.g., Intel Corp. v. Macare, FA 660685 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 26, 2006) (finding that the complainant had established rights in the PENTIUM, CENTRINO and INTEL INSIDE marks by registering the marks with the USPTO); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bonds, FA 873143 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 16, 2007) (finding that a trademark registration adequately demonstrates a complainant’s rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)).

 

The Panel also determines that the Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s JOBSPRING mark. The Domain Name differs from the JOBSPRING mark merely by the omission in the Domain Name of the letter “r”. The threshold test for confusing similarity under the UDRP involves a comparison between the trademark and the domain name to determine likelihood of Internet user confusion. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition, at para. 1.2 ("WIPO Overview 2.0"). Thus, application of the confusing similarity test under the UDRP typically involves a straightforward visual or aural comparison of the trademark with the string in the domain name. However, some UDRP panels have additionally required that, for a domain name to be regarded as confusingly similar to a complainant's mark, there must be a risk that Internet users may actually believe there is a real connection between the domain name and the complainant and/or its goods and services. Such panels would typically assess this risk having regard to such factors as the overall impression created by the domain name, the distinguishing value (if any) of any terms, letters or numbers in the domain name omitted from, additional to, the relied-upon mark, and whether an Internet user unfamiliar with any meaning of the domain name seeking the complainant's goods or services on the web would necessarily comprehend such distinguishing value. WIPO Overview 2.0, at para. 1.2.

 

The Panel finds that under any of these possible methods of analysis for confusing similarity, the Domain Name <jobsping.com> and the Complainant’s trademark JOBSPRING are confusingly similar. All of these factors weigh heavily in favor of a finding of confusing similarity including the visual and aural comparison of these two strings (excluding “.com”), the omission of the “r” which does not add significant distinguishing value to the Domain Name, the overall impression created by the Domain Name as compared to the JOBSPRING mark, and the use by the Complainant and Respondent of their respective terms in a closely competitive commercial context,. See The Big Green Egg, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, FA 1228170 (Nat. Arb. Forum, Oct. 21, 2008) (transferring the domain <bigreenegg.com> to complainant possessing trademark rights in BIG GREEN EGG mark and stating that a “one-letter difference does not sufficiently distinguish a disputed domain name”).

 

Therefore, the Panel concludes that Respondent’s Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s JOBSPRING trademark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

The Panel is reminded that Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), and then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name).

 

Complainant has indicated that Respondent does not possess any trademark rights, other rights, or legitimate interest in the Domain Name. Complainant has not authorized Respondent or any other entity to use the trademarks JOBSPRING or JOBSPRING PARTNERS as a trademark or trade name in connection with providing employment recruiting and placement services.  Complainant further highlights that Respondent uses the Domain Name to conduct commercial activities essentially identical to and highly competitive with those of Complainant; that it is clear that consumers have been confused into believing that Complainant is associated with the Respondent; and that Respondent is trying to disrupt the business of a competitor and create confusion in the marketplace.

 

In this case, the Panel finds that Complainant has made a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Names within the meaning of Paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy. It is clear that Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the Domain Name.  Further, Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, nor does Respondent have any trademark or trade name rights, having commenced using the Domain Name only approximately four months before this case was filed. See e.g., Braun Corp. v. Loney, FA 699652 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 7, 2006) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain names where the WHOIS information, as well as all other information in the record, gave no indication that the respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain names, and the complainant had not authorized the respondent to register a domain name containing its registered mark). Furthermore, the Panel agrees with Complainant that the Respondent is using the Domain Name in connection with a website that provides services which are commercially competitive with own Complainant’s services.

 

Accordingly, once Complainant established its prima facie case, the burden is on Respondent to prove it has a right or legitimate interest in the Domain Name.  Respondents’ brief period of use of the Domain Name prior to receiving Complainant’s objections, when viewed in light of the circumstances discussed above, convinces the Panel that Respondent has not met its burden.  By directing Internet users to a website that provides services competing with Complainant’s business, the Panel finds that Respondent has failed to demonstrate a bona fide offering of goods or services and, therefore, has failed to demonstrate any right or legitimate interests with respect to the Domain Name.  See  Expedia, Inc. v. Compaid, FA 520654 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 30, 2005) (finding that respondent’s use of the <expediate.com> domain name to redirect Internet users to a website featuring links to travel services that competed with the complainant was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)); see also Carey Int’l, Inc. v. Kogan, FA 486191 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 29, 2005) (holding that the respondent’s use of disputed domain names to market competing limousine services was not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i)).

 

The Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Complainant alleges that Respondent has registered and used the Domain Name in bad faith because Respondent is trying to disrupt the business of a competitor and create confusion in the marketplace.  In particular, the Domain Name is linked to a website that offers similar features and directly competitive services to those offered by Complainant. Complainant contends that Respondent is intentionally attempting to attract Internet users looking for, and intending to find, Complainant’s job search business, to Respondent’s own website for commercial gain. 

 

Respondent has asserted that he registered the Domain Name in good faith after having performed a trademark search with the USPTO and finding no registered trademark for the name. Moreover, he alleges the Domain Name is being used solely as a descriptive phrase to demonstrate how easy it is for a user to find a job. The Respondent also disputes the allegation that he harvests personal information from site visitors and uses the information to conduct unauthorized e-mail campaigns, contending that he acts in compliance with the CAN-SPAM Act.

 

The Panel need not resolve the issue concerning the alleged gathering of personal information for e-mail campaigns. Instead, the Panel finds that Respondent has exhibited conduct that fits into bad faith registration and use by the opportunistic and intentional registration of the Domain Name, which is almost identical to Complainant’s JOBSPRING trademark, and the use of the Domain Name in connection with a website offering closely competitive services. The Panel finds the Respondent’s statement about having conducted a trademark search and finding no existing registrations to be disingenuous, since the search would have revealed the existence of Complainant’s JOBSPRING applications and the fact that one was approved and about to register (and did so only one week after the Domain Name was registered by Respondent). In fact, the timing of the Domain Name registration itself appears somewhat suspicious, particularly because Complainant had been operating its closely related business and using its JOBSPRING mark for more than a year by the time the Domain Name registration was made. Moreover, the Panel does not consider the term “jobs ping” to be generically descriptive of job search services, as Respondent claims; instead, the Domain Name appears to be a common typing error for Complainant’s JOBSPRING mark.

Respondent’s conduct falls within paragraph 4(b) of the Policy (“by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your website…by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your website or location or of a product or service on your website or location.”). See Surface Prot. Indus., Inc. v. Webposters, D2000-1613 (WIPO Feb. 5, 2001) (finding that, given the competitive relationship between the complainant and the respondent, the respondent likely registered the contested domain name with the intent to disrupt the complainant's business and create user confusion); see also Jerie v. Burian, FA 795430 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 30, 2006) (concluding that the respondent registered and used the <sportlivescore.com> domain name in order to disrupt the complainant’s business under the LIVESCORE mark because the respondent was maintaining a website in direct competition with the complainant); Identigene, Inc. v. Genetest Labs., D2000-1100 (WIPO Nov. 30, 2000) (finding bad faith where the respondent's use of the domain name at issue to resolve to a website where similar services are offered to Internet users is likely to confuse the user into believing that the complainant is the source of or is sponsoring the services offered at the site).

 

For all of the above reasons, the Panel finds that the Domain Name was been registered and has been used in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iii) and (iv).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <jobsping.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Karl Fink, Christopher Gibson and David Safran

Panelists

 

Dated:  May 5, 2011

 

 

 

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