Google Inc. v. hejie / jerry jerry
Claim Number: FA1201001422208
Complainant is Google Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Karen A. Webb of Fenwick & West, LLP, California, USA. Respondent is hejie / jerry jerry (“Respondent”), China.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <google-ipad.com>, registered with Jiangsu Bangning Science & Technology Co. Ltd.
The undersigned certifies he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Houston Putnam Lowry, Chartered Arbitrator, as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on January 3, 2012; the National Arbitration Forum received payment on January 3, 2012. The Complaint was submitted in both English and Chinese.
On January 4, 2012, Jiangsu Bangning Science & Technology Co. Ltd. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <google-ipad.com> domain name is registered with Jiangsu Bangning Science & Technology Co. Ltd. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Jiangsu Bangning Science & Technology Co. Ltd. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Jiangsu Bangning Science & Technology Co. Ltd. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On January 18, 2012, the Forum served the Chinese language Complaint and all Annexes, including a Chinese language Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of February 7, 2012 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@google-ipad.com. Also on January 18, 2012, the Chinese language Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the email addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On February 9, 2012, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Houston Putnam Lowry, Chartered Arbitrator, as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a), the Panel determines that the language requirement has been satisfied through the Chinese language Complaint and Commencement Notification and, absent a Response, determines that the remainder of the proceedings may be conducted in English
Complainant requests the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant makes the following assertions:
Complainant, Its Business and Its Mark
1. Google is a Delaware corporation located in Mountain View, California.
2. The GOOGLE name was created in 1997 by Stanford Ph.D. candidates Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Since that time, Google has become one of the largest, most highly recognized, and widely used Internet search services in the world. Google’s primary website is located at www.google.com.
3. Currently, the GOOGLE search engine maintains one of the largest collections of searchable documents in the world. The GOOGLE search engine provides an easy-to-use interface, advanced search technology, and a comprehensive array of search tools, and allows Internet users to search for and find a wide variety of content in many different languages.
4. Google was found to be one of the top ten Best Global Brands in each of the last three years. Additionally, Google’s website is one of the most popular destinations on the Internet. For example, comScore and Bloomberg.com have ranked Google as the most visited group of websites in the world.
5. Google has consistently been honored for its technology and its services, and has received numerous industry awards dating from 1998.
6. Google also offers co-branded web search solutions and has hundreds of thousands of publishers in its content network.
7. In addition to being accessible from desktop PCs, Google’s adaptable, highly scalable search technology can also be accessed from most mobile and wireless platforms.
8. Google also offers a wide range of other products and services besides search. A full list of available products and services can be found at http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/.
9. The GOOGLE Mark identifies Google’s award-winning, proprietary, and unique search services, search engine technology, and associated products and services. The GOOGLE Mark has been widely promoted among members of the general consuming public since 1997, and has exclusively identified Google. As a result, the GOOGLE Mark and name symbolize the tremendous goodwill associated with Google and are property rights of incalculable value. Due to widespread and substantial international use, this mark and name have become famous.
10. Google owns numerous United States and foreign registrations for the GOOGLE Mark (the “Registrations”). Each Registration remains valid and in full force.
Registrant, Its Activities and Its Registration of the Domain Name
11. Registrant lists an incomplete address in Haidian, Beijing, China.
12. Registrant registered the Domain Name on April 14, 2011.
13. The Domain Name currently resolves to a retail website that sells products that are not Google’s and makes unauthorized use of Complainant’s GOOGLE Logo.
Legal Grounds
14. This Complaint is based on the following legal grounds.
Likelihood of Confusion—ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(1); ICANN Policy ¶4(a)(i).
15. Google has used the GOOGLE Mark continuously since well prior to April 11, 2011, the registration date for the Domain Name. Google owns U.S. registrations issued prior to, or resulting from applications filed prior to, April 11, 2011. Each remains valid and in full force. Thus, Complainant has rights in the GOOGLE Mark that predate the registration date of the Domain Name. See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Smith Smithers, FA0610000826563 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (“Although [r]espondent’s registration of the [disputed domain names] predate [sic] Complainant’s USPTO registration, Complainant’s filing date of September 16, 1998 predates [r]espondent’s registration [which] sufficiently establishes rights in the GOOGLE Mark”) (re googlevideo.com, googlevideos.com, googlemovie.com, googlemovies.com, googleforums.com and googlewebmaster.com domain names).
16. A domain name is “nearly identical or confusingly similar” to a complainant’s mark when it “fully incorporate[s] said mark.” PepsiCo. Inc. v. PEPSI SRL, D2003-0696 (WIPO Oct. 28, 2003) (holding pepsiadventure.net, pepsitennis.com, and others confusingly similar to complainant’s PEPSI mark since they “incorporate[ed the] trademark in its entirety”). Here, the Domain Name incorporates the famous GOOGLE Mark in its entirety, and is confusingly similar to it.
17. A domain name registrant may not avoid a confusing similarity claim by simply adding a competitor’s mark or non-distinctive term to another’s mark. See Microsoft Corporation v. Adam Jordan Associate FA1102001375214 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 11, 2011) (holding that the addition of a competitor’s mark or descriptive term to Complainant’s mark does not sufficiently distinguish the disputed domain names from Complainant’s mark) (re google-bing.com, microsoft-bing.com, and search-bing.com).
18. Here, the Domain Name merely adds “iPad,” a mark owned by a third party, to the GOOGLE Mark. The addition of iPad to the GOOGLE Mark does not distinguish the domain and users seeing the combination of Google and iPad in the Domain Name are even more likely to believe that Google is associated with the Domain Name. See Google Inc. v. power sky a/k/a wanglun FA1109001407268 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 27, 2011) (finding that the addition of “Baidu” to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark in the googlebaidu.com domain name fails to distinguish the disputed domain name from the GOOGLE mark).
19. As such, the Domain Name is nearly identical, and certainly confusingly similar, to the GOOGLE Mark.
No Rights or Legitimate Interests—ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(2); ICANN Policy ¶4(a)(ii).
20. As Panels have noted, any “[r]espondent would be hard pressed to show that it had rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because Complainant’s [GOOGLE] mark is so well known.” Google Inc. v. Mikel M Frieje, FA011000102609 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 11, 2002) (re googlesex.com domain name). Registrant has not been authorized by Complainant to register or use the Domain Name.
21. The Domain Name currently resolves to a website that features tablet computers for sale. Not only is Registrant using Complainant’s GOOGLE mark and logo, it is using them in conjunction with the sale of tablet computers such that consumers would believe Complainant is affiliated with or sponsoring such tablet computers. Such use is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the Domain Name. See, MySpace, Inc. v. Myspace Bot, FA 672161 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 19, 2006) (holding use of the disputed domain name to redirect Internet users seeking Complainant’s website to its own website for commercial gain does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶4(c)(i) or legitimate fair use pursuant to Policy ¶4(c)(iii); see also, Bank of Am. Corp. v. Nw. Free Cmty. Access, FA 180704 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 30, 2003) (“Respondent’s demonstrated intent to divert Internet users seeking Complainant’s website to a website of Respondent and for Respondent’s benefit” is not a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate fair use, under the Policy).
22. On information and belief, Registrant is not commonly known by the name or nickname of the Domain Name, or any name containing Complainant’s GOOGLE Mark. Registrant’s WHOIS information in connection with the Domain Name makes no mention of the Domain Name or the Mark as Registrant’s name or nickname. See, Popular Enterprises, LLC v. Sung-a Jang, FA0610000811921 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 16, 2006) (“[r]espondent’s WHOIS information does not suggest that [r]espondent is commonly known by the <ntester.com> domain name”). Registrant’s name is hejie aka jerry jerry.
23. Complainant has not authorized or licensed Registrant to use any of its trademarks in any way. Unlicensed, unauthorized use of domains incorporating complainant’s trademark is strong evidence that Registrant has no rights or legitimate interests. See, e.g., Time Warner Inc. v. MLM Capital LLC d/b/a Domains, FA0709001076561 (Oct. 26, 2007).
24. Thus, Registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Bad Faith—ICANN Rule 3(b)(ix)(3); ICANN Policy ¶4(a)(iii).
25. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Registrant registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith. First, the fame and unique qualities of the GOOGLE Mark make it extremely unlikely that the Registrant created the Domain Name independently. See, e.g., The J. Jill Group, Inc. v. John Zuccarini d/b/a RaveClub Berlin, FA0205000112627 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 1, 2002) (“Because of the famous and distinct nature of Complainant’s mark and Complainant’s J. JILL listing on the Principal Register of the USPTO, [r]espondent is thought to have been on notice as to the existence of Complainant’s mark at the time [r]espondent registered the infringing <jjilll.com> domain name. Thus, [r]espondent’s registration despite this notice is evidence of bad faith registration”). Even constructive knowledge of a famous mark like GOOGLE is sufficient. Google v. Abercrombie 1, FA0111000101579 ( Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 10, 2001) (“because of the famous and distinctive nature of Complainant’s GOOGLE Mark, [r]espondent is thought to have been on notice of the existence of Complainant’s mark at the time [r]espondent registered the infringing google-ipad.com”) (re googld.com domain name).
26. Second, Respondent’s current use of the Domain Name to resolve to a website that offers products for sale constitutes bad faith use and registration. Moreover, Registrant’s offering appears to be a retail page misleading unsuspecting consumers into thinking they are purchasing a tablet computer affiliated with Complainant. Registrant perpetuates that notion by using Complainant’s GOOGLE logo. See, MySpace, Inc. v. Myspace Bot, FA 672161 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 19, 2006) (holding that the respondent registered and used the <myspacebot.com> domain name in bad faith by diverting Internet users seeking the complainant’s website to its own website for commercial gain because the respondent likely profited from this diversion scheme); see also, Perot Sys. Corp. v. Perot.net, FA 95312 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug 29, 2000) (finding bad faith where the domain name in question was obviously connected with the complainant’s well-known marks, thus creating a likelihood of confusion strictly for commercial gain).
27. Third, Registrant’s bad faith is underscored by prominent use of Complainant’s GOOGLE logo on the website at the Domain Name. Such blatant use of the GOOGLE logo increases the likelihood of confusion and is further evidence that Registrant is trying to improperly benefit from a perceived association with Complainant.
28. Finally, Registrant has failed to include complete contact information in its WHOIS record, which is a violation of Paragraph 2 of the ICANN Policy and further indicates bad faith registration and use. See, e.g., Group Kaitu, LLC , Darkside Productions, Inc. v. NetDirect, D2011-0220 (WIPO March 25, 2011) (“Respondent’s providing of false and incomplete WhoIs contact information also supports a determination of bad faith registration and use.”); Francesco Totti v. Jello Master, D2002-0134 (WIPO April 4, 2002) (bad faith use and registration found from “incomplete address by the Respondent to the Registrar.”).
29. As shown above, Registrant has registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith.
B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Complainant Google Inc. is the owner of trademark registrations for the GOOGLE mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 2,806,075 registered January 20, 2004) and China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce (e.g., Reg. No. 915,929 registered December 1, 2000). The mark is used in connection with an Internet search engine and related goods and services.
Respondent hejie / jerry jerry registered the disputed domain name on April 14, 2011. The <google-ipad.com> domain name resolves to a website which features tablet computers for sale.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires Complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant contends it has rights in the GOOGLE mark. Complainant has provided the Panel with evidence of its trademark registrations for the GOOGLE mark with the USPTO (e.g., Reg. No. 2,806,075 registered January 20, 2004). and the SAIC (e.g., Reg. No. 915,929 registered December 1, 2000). Panels have found that where a complainant registers a mark with a federal trademark authority, the complainant has rights in that mark. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bonds, FA 873143 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 16, 2007) (finding that a trademark registration adequately demonstrates a complainant’s rights in a mark under Policy ¶4(a)(i)); see also Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (finding that the complainant’s federal trademark registrations for the CHEAPTICKETS and CHEAPTICKETS.COM marks were adequate to establish its rights in the mark pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(i)). Therefore, the Panel finds Complainant has rights in the GOOGLE mark pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(i).
Complainant contends the <google-ipad.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the GOOGLE mark. The Panel finds Respondent’s addition of a hyphen following Complainant’s mark fails to distinguish the disputed domain name from the GOOGLE mark. See Health Devices Corp. v. Aspen S T C, FA 158254 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 1, 2003) (“[T]he addition of punctuation marks such as hyphens is irrelevant in the determination of confusing similarity pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(i).”); see also Teleplace, Inc. v. De Oliveira, FA 95835 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that the domain names <teleplace.org>, <tele-place.com>, and <theteleplace.com> are confusingly similar to the complainant’s TELEPLACE trademark). The Panel also finds Respondent’s addition of the term “ipad” (even though it is not a generic term) does not adequately differentiate the disputed domain name from Complainant’s mark. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Shanghaihangwei Packing Material Co. Ltd., D2001-0443 (WIPO May 22, 2001) (finding the <ouricq.com> domain name to be confusingly similar to the complainant’s ICQ mark); see also Am. Express Co. v. MustNeed.com, FA 257901 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 7, 2004) (finding the respondent’s <amextravel.com> domain name confusingly similar to Complainant’s AMEX mark because the “mere addition of a generic or descriptive word to a registered mark does not negate” a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶4(a)(i)). Finally, the Panel finds that Respondent’s addition of the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com” is irrelevant to the determination of whether the domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s mark. See Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶4(a)(i) analysis); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., FA 153545 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (“The addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.”). Therefore, the Panel finds the <google-ipad.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the GOOGLE mark pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(i).
The Panel finds Policy ¶4(a)(i) satisfied.
Complainant argues Respondent does not have rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Panel finds Complainant has made a prima facie case in support of this finding and thus that the burden shifts now to Respondent to dispute these claims. See Domtar, Inc. v. Theriault, FA 1089426 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 4, 2008) (“It is well established that, once a complainant has made out a prima facie case in support of its allegations, the burden shifts to respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests pursuant to paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.”); see also Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Admin, Domain, FA 873137 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 13, 2007) (finding that once a prima facie case has been established by the complainant, the burden then shifts to the respondent to demonstrate its rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶4(c)). Respondent has provided no information to the Panel to consider.
Therefore, the Panel will make all inferences which are reasonable from the information available. See Do the Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (“Failure of a respondent to come forward to [contest complainant’s allegations] is tantamount to admitting the truth of complainant’s assertions in this regard.”); see also Am. Express Co. v. Fang Suhendro, FA 129120 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 30, 2002) (“[B]ased on Respondent's failure to respond, it is presumed that Respondent lacks all rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.”). The Panel will still review the record according to the Policy ¶4(c) factors for information suggesting Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
Complainant argues Respondent is not commonly known by the <google-ipad.com> domain name. Complainant has not licensed or authorized to use the GOOGLE mark in any way. The WHOIS record for the <google-ipad.com> domain name lists “hejie / jerry jerry” as the domain name registrant. The Panel finds Respondent’s lack of rights and legitimate interests is clear because Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶4(c)(ii). See Tercent Inc. v. Lee Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’ the disputed domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶4(c)(ii) does not apply); see also M. Shanken Commc’ns v. WORLDTRAVELERSONLINE.COM, FA 740335 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <cigaraficionada.com> domain name under Policy ¶4(c)(ii) based on the WHOIS information and other evidence in the record).
Complainant asserts Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial use. The <google-ipad.com> domain name is used by Respondent to sell tablet computers. The Panels in Imation Corp. v. Streut, FA 125759 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 8, 2002), and Golden Bear Int’l, Inc. v. Kangdeock-ho, FA 190644 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 17, 2003), held that the use of a disputed domain name to operate a business which is unrelated to the complainant is not a protected use. The Panel finds the disputed domain name is neither a Policy ¶4(c)(i) bona fide offering of goods or services nor a Policy ¶4(c)(iii) legitimate noncommercial or fair use.
The Panel finds Policy ¶4(a)(ii) satisfied.
Complainant claims the <google-ipad.com> domain name was registered and is used to take commercial advantage of Internet users’ mistakes as to the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the <google-ipad.com> domain name. The disputed domain name is confusingly similar and related to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark, which ensures that some Internet users searching for Complainant will arrive at Respondent’s website instead. Once there, as the content of the disputed domain name’s resolving website is unrelated to the services which Complainant provides, the Internet users will become confused as to whether the disputed domain name is operated or affiliated with Complainant. The Panel finds Respondent will ultimately benefit when Internet users, relying on Complainant’s goodwill in the GOOGLE mark and the presumption Complainant is the source of the <google-ipad.com> domain name, make purchases of the tablet computers being sold at the disputed domain name. Therefore, The Panel finds Respondent’s registration and use of the <google-ipad.com> domain name was done in bad faith because Respondent intended to take commercial advantage of Internet users’ mistakes regarding confusion Respondent created over the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the disputed domain name under Policy ¶4(b)(iv). See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bonds, FA 873143 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 16, 2007) (“The Panel finds such use to constitute bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv), because [r]espondent is taking advantage of the confusing similarity between the <metropolitanlife.us> domain name and Complainant’s METLIFE mark in order to profit from the goodwill associated with the mark.”); see also DatingDirect.com Ltd. v. Aston, FA 593977 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 28, 2005) (“the Panel finds the respondent is appropriating the complainant’s mark in a confusingly similar domain name for commercial gain, which is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv).”).
Complainant alleges Respondent must have had constructive and/or actual notice of Complainant's rights in the GOOGLE mark prior to registration of the domain names because of the fame and unique qualities of the mark. The Panel concludes Respondent had actual notice of Complainant's mark because of its notoriety and registered the disputed domain names in bad faith under Policy ¶4(a)(iii). See BMC Software, Inc. v. Dominic Anschutz, FA 1340892 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 6, 2010) (determining that constructive notice will usually not support a finding of bad faith); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. Butler, FA 744444 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 17, 2006) (finding bad faith where the respondent was "well-aware of the complainant's YAHOO! mark at the time of registration)."
The Panel finds Policy ¶4(a)(iii) satisfied.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered the <google-ipad.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Houston Putnam Lowry, Chartered Arbitrator, Panelist
Dated: February 10, 2012
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