i.

ii.

iii.

Although the Complainant’s trademark SHOEDAZZLE was not registered until after the registration of the Disputed Domain Name(s) shodazzle.com, and shoedazzzle.com, the Complainant’s first use in commerce October 1, 2008, registration of Complainant’s primary website(s) June 4, 2008, and press releases of the brand prior to the registration of the Disputed Domain Name(s) should be considered in determining prior rights.  The Panel should refer to the passage in paragraph 1.4 of the WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions (accessible on the WIPO website), which reads:

“1.4 Does the complainant have UDRP-relevant trademark rights in a mark that was registered, or in which the complainant acquired unregistered rights, after the disputed domain name was registered? The consensus view is that the registration of a domain name before a complainant acquires trademark rights in a name does not prevent a finding of identity or confusing similarity. The UDRP makes no specific reference to the date of which the owner of the trade or service mark acquired rights……”, see Madrid 2012, S.A. v. Scott Martin-MadridMan Websites, WIPO Case No. D2003-0598, <2m12.com> inter alia; Esquire Innovations, Inc. v. Iscrub.com c/o Whois Identity Shield; and Vertical Axis, Inc, Domain Adminstrator, WIPO Case No. D2007-0856, <iscrub.com>.

In addition to the above, although the Complainant did not have a registered trademark or service mark matching the Disputed Domain Name(s) at the time of creation, this fact standing alone is not fatal to a finding of identity or confusing similarity under the Policy. According to paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy, common law rights are sufficient to support a domain name complaint. To establish common law rights in a mark, a complainant must show that its mark has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., that the public associates the asserted mark with complainant's goods and services. See First Place Financial Corp. v. Michele Dinoia c/o SZK.com, FA 506772 (Nat. Arb. Forum August 22, 2005). ICANN Panels have found relevant evidence of secondary meaning to include "length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition". Candy Direct, Inc. v. italldirect2u.com, FA 514784 (Nat. Arb. Forum August 22, 2005). It is well settled that the term "trademark or service mark" as used in Paragraph 4(a)(i) encompasses both registered marks and common law marks. See also, e.g., The British Broadcasting Corporation v. Jaime Renteria, WIPO Case No. D2000 0050; United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Domains for Sale Inc. WIPO Case No. D2002 0005, The Professional Golfers' Association of America v. Golf Fitness Inc., a/k/a Golf Fitness Association, WIPO Case No. D2001 0218.

To further stress, the Complainant has established its rights in the mark(s), SHOEDAZZLE, under Policy ¶4(a)(i), dating back to June 11, 2009, the filing date of the trademark registrations. See Expedia, Inc. v. Tan, FA 991075 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 29, 2007) (“As the [complainant’s] mark is registered with the USPTO, [the] complainant has met the requirements of Policy ¶4(a)(i).”); see also Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Fees, FA 937704 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 25, 2007) (finding that it is irrelevant whether the complainant has registered its trademark in the country of the respondent’s residence); see also Hershey Co. v. Reaves, FA 967818 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 8, 2007) (finding that the complainant’s rights in the KISSES trademark through registration of the mark with the USPTO “date back to the filing date of the trademark application and predate [the] respondent’s registration”) See also Quibids Holdings LLC v. Above.com Domain Privacy, FA1201001426801 (Nat. Arb. Forum March 13, 2012).

iv.

In summary, by virtue of its federal trademark and/or service mark registration(s), Complainant is the owner of the Complainant's Mark(s). See, e.g., United Way of America v. Alex Zingaus, NAF Claim No. FA0707001036202 ("Panels have long recognized Complainant's registration of a mark with a trademark authority is sufficient to confer rights in the mark pursuant to Policy 4(a)(i)").  As in other cases, it is also important to note that it is irrelevant for the purposes of Policy ¶4(a)(i) whether Complainant registered the mark in the country where Respondent operates or resides. See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001) (finding that the Policy does not require that a mark be registered in the country in which a respondent operates, it being sufficient that a complainant can demonstrate rights in a mark in some jurisdiction).

v.

When comparing the Disputed Domain Name(s) to the Complainant's Mark(s), the relevant comparison to be made is between only the second-level portion of the Disputed Domain Name(s) and the Complainant's Mark(s). See Rollerblade, Inc. v. Mc Crady, WIPO Case No.D2000-0429 (finding that the top-level domain, such as ".net" or ".com", does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., NAF Claim No. FA0304000153545 ("[t]he addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.")

vi.

The Disputed Domain Name(s) (is/are) confusingly similar to Complainant's Mark(s) because (it/they) differ(s) by only a single character from Complainant's Mark(s), or because it differs by only the juxtaposition of two characters when compared to Complainant's Mark(s). For clarification, the Disputed Domain Name(s) contain(s) either:

[i.] the addition of one extra character, or...
[ii.] the removal of one character, or...
[iii.] one character which is incorrect, or...
[iv.] two juxtaposed characters

as compared to Complainant's Mark(s).

vii.

viii.

The Disputed Domain Name(s) (is/are), simply put, a classic example of "typosquatting". The practice of typosquatting is designed to take advantage of Internet users' typographical errors, which means the names must be confusingly similar by design. See Reuters Ltd. v. Global Net 2000, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0441 (finding that a domain name which differs by only one letter from a trademark has a greater tendency to be confusingly similar to the trademark where the trademark is highly distinctive); Caterpillar Inc. v. Center for Ban on Drugs, NAF Claim No. FA0603000661437 ("the omission of a single letter from Complainant's mark does not adequately distinguish the Disputed Domain Name from the mark"); and Victoria's Secret v. Zuccarini, NAF Claim No. FA0010000095762 (finding that, by misspelling words and adding letters to words, a respondent does not create a distinct mark but nevertheless renders the domain name confusingly similar to the complainant's marks).

Previous panels have found a disputed domain name, which differs from a mark only for a simple misspelling such as the addition or omission of one letter to constitute typosquatting.  The Panel should find the Disputed Domain Name(s) in this case to be examples of typosquatting and considers this to be additional evidence that they are confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(i).  See Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. Party Night, Inc., FA 114546 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 23, 2002) (finding that the <neimanmacus.com> domain name was a simple misspelling of the complainant’s NEIMAN MARCUS mark and was a classic example of typosquatting, which was evidence that the domain name was confusingly similar to the mark); see also Guinness UDV N. Am., Inc. v. Dallas Internet Servs., D2001-1055 (WIPO Dec. 12, 2001) (finding the <smirnof.com> domain name confusingly similar to the complainant’s SMIRNOFF mark because merely removing the letter “f” from the mark was insignificant; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Try Harder & Co., FA 94730 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 15, 2000) (finding that the domain name <statfarm.com> is confusingly similar to the complainant’s STATE FARM mark). See also Cybertania Inc v. The Domain Queue c/o Domain Admin; NAF Claim Number : FA0904001258292 (finding that the domain name <myfeecams.com > is confusingly similar to FA0904001258292the complainant’s MYFREECAMS.COM mark) and Cybertania, Inc v. Domain Drop S.A., NAF Claim Number:  FA0712001118626 (finding that the domain name < feepaysite.com > is confusingly similar to the complainant’s MYFREEPAYSITE.COM mark).

i.

ii.

iii.

Respondent has not been commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name(s). See Policy, ¶4(c)(ii). Where, as here, "the WHOIS information suggests Respondent is known as" an entity other than the trademark associated with Complainant, and Complainant has not "licensed, authorized, or permitted Respondent to register domain names incorporating Complainant's... mark," a Panel should find that the Respondent is not commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name. United Way of America v. Alex Zingaus, NAF Claim No. FA0707001036202.

Respondent is not sponsored by or legitimately affiliated with Complainant in any way.

Complainant has not given Respondent permission to use Complainant's Mark in a domain name.

iv.

A "Cease and Desist" letter was sent to the Respondent. The letter informed the Respondent that it was infringing on Complainant's IP rights and allowed the Respondent the opportunity to respond if they have any IP rights. The Respondent was provided with the information of the Complainant's trademark(s), hence showing proof that the Complainant has rights to the brand(s). To date, no reply has been received from Respondent. The Respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the Complaint to be deemed true. See also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, WIPO Case No. D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000("In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint."). Also in WIPO case ACCOR v. Pham Manh Ha, Case No. D2007-1855, the panel found that the evidentiary burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to show by concrete evidence that it does have rights or legitimate interests in that name.

v.

vi.

Respondent has ignored Complainant's attempts to resolve the dispute outside of this administrative proceeding. Complainant notes that if the owner of the Disputed Domain Name(s) fails to respond to this Complaint, it is presumed that the owner has no rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name(s). See Mattel, Inc. v. Rave Club Berlin, FA106115 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 8, 2002), citing Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Greenhouse Agency Ltd., D2000-1221 (WIPO Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that Respondents' failure to respond can be construed as an admission that they have no legitimate interest in the domain names). Further, Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) states that when "the complainant has made a prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to show by providing concrete evidence that it has rights to or legitimate interest in the domain name at issue."

Respondent is using (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to redirect unsuspecting Internet users to a website featuring generic links to third-party websites, some of which directly compete with Complainant's business. Presumably, Respondent receives pay-per-click fees from these linked websites. As such, Respondent is not using the Disputed Domain Name(s) to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services as allowed under Policy; 4(c)(i), nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as allowed under Policy; 4(c)(iii). See 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24HourNames.com-Quality Domains For Sale, FA 187429 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sep. 26, 2003) (holding that Respondent's use of the 24hrsfitness.comgt, 24-hourfitness.com.gt and 24hoursfitness.com.gt, domain names to redirect Internet users to a website featuring advertisements and links to Complainant's competitors could not be considered a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use); see also Computer Doctor Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Computer Doctor, FA 95396 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 8, 2000) (finding that the respondent's website, which is blank but for links to other websites, is not a legitimate use of the domain names).

vii.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was October 6, 2009, which is significantly after Complainant's first use in commerce, October 1, 2008, as specified in their relevant registration with the USPTO.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was October 6, 2009, which is after Complainant's trademark filing date as specified in their relevant registration with the USPTO on June 11, 2009.

viii.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was October 6, 2009, which is significantly after Complainant's registration of shoedazzle.com on June 4, 2008.

i.

Respondent's typosquatting behavior is, in and of itself, evidence of bad faith. See Canadian Tire Corp. v. domain adm'r no.valid.email@worldnic.net 1111111111, D2003-0232 (WIPO May 22, 2003) (finding the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith because the respondent created a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent's web site or location'.. . through Respondent's persistent practice of 'typosquatting'"); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Baseball League, Inc. v. Zuccarini, D2002-1011 (WIPO Jan. 21, 2003) ("Typosquatting ... is the intentional misspelling of words with [the] intent to intercept and siphon off traffic from its intended destination, by preying on Internauts who make common typing errors. Typosquatting is inherently parasitic and of itself evidence of bad faith.").

ii.

Respondent is using (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to redirect Internet users to Complainant's own website through Complainant's affiliate program, which is in direct violation of the affiliate agreement which governs Respondent's relationship as an affiliate of Complainant. As a member of Complainant's affiliate program, Respondent was aware of Complainant's rights in Complainant's Mark(s) when registering the Disputed Domain Name(s). By registering confusingly similar domain names while a member of this affiliate program, Respondent has attempted to opportunistically benefit from its registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name(s) at Complainant's expense. Respondent's registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name(s) while a member of Complainant's affiliate program constitutes additional evidence of bad faith under Policy 4(a)(iii). See Cricket Communc'ns, Inc. v. Oliver, FA 954005 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 29, 2007) (finding bad faith registration and use where the respondent registered domain names containing the complainant's mark after enrolling in the complainant's affiliate program); see also Deluxe Corp. v. Dallas Internet, FA 105216 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 10, 2002) (finding the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy 4(b)(iv) by redirecting its users to the complainant's domain name, thus receiving a commission from the complainant through its affiliate program).

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

Respondent’s bad faith is further shown by the Respondent using the Disputed Domain Name(s) website in connection with generating revenue as a “click through” website, by using the Complainant’s registered trademark(s) and providing links to the services and products offered by the Complainant to take advantage of Complainant’s well known mark to achieve a wrongful competitive advantage and commercially gain. In WIPO Decision D2008-1470, AIDA Cruises German Branch of Societá di Crociere Mercurio S.r.l., v. Caribbean Online International Ltd. / Belgium Domains “the Panel finds that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name for the purposes of commercial gain by offering links to other companies’ websites related to cruises and travels, in the form of a “clickthrough” website. In similar cases, many prior panel decisions have recognised [sic] that the registration of domain names to be used in a “click-through” website has to be considered as an evidence of bad faith (see, e.g. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. v. Digi Real Estate Foundation., WIPO Case No. D2007-0440; Early Times Distillers Company v. IP Admin / DNAV ASSOCS, WIPO Case No. D2007-1812; HBOS Plc v. Whois Protection, WIPO Case No. D2007-1605)”.

To further stress the above, Respondent’s setting up of a “click through” website for which it likely receives revenue for each misdirected Internet user obviously demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith.  The Respondent has registered and used the Disputed Domain Name(s) in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv) by using the Disputed Domain Name(s) to attract and mislead consumers for its own profit.  See Univ. of Houston Sys. v. Salvia Corp., FA 637920 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 21, 2006) (“Respondent is using the disputed domain name to operate a website which features links to competing and non-competing commercial websites from which Respondent presumably receives referral fees.  Such use for Respondent’s own commercial gain is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv).”); see also Zee TV USA, Inc. v. Siddiqi, FA 721969 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2006) (finding that the respondent engaged in bad faith registration and use by using a domain name that was confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark to offer links to third-party websites that offered services similar to those offered by the complainant). See also Meadowbrook, L.L.C. d/b/a The Land of Nod v. Venkateshwara Distributor Private Limited, Claim Number: FA1112001419361 and Charlotte Russe Merchandising, Inc. v. Private Registrations Aktien Gesellschaft / Domain Admin, Claim Number: FA1204001439309, where the same behavior of bad faith is demonstrated and agreed by the panel, pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv).

In addition to the above, the Respondent’s advertised pay-per-click links displayed on the resolving websites promotes products that compete with Complainant. These links therefore divert potential customers away from Complainant to third-party websites, which disrupts Complainant’s business. The Panel should find that this effort to divert consumers and disrupt Complainant’s business is evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶4(b)(iii). See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assoc., FA 914854 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 10, 2007) (holding that where the respondent’s website featured hyperlinks to competing websites and included a link to the complainant’s website, the respondent’s use of the <redeemaamiles.com> domain name constituted disruption under Policy ¶4(b)(iii)).

Respondent has caused the website(s) reachable by (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to display Complainant's Mark(s) spelled correctly (even though the domain name(s) (is/are) a misspelled version of the same mark(s)). This serves as further evidence of bad faith intent because it removes any doubt as to whether or not the misspelling was intentionally designed to improperly capitalize on Complainant's famous Mark(s).

Respondent has caused the websites reachable by (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to display content and/or keywords directly related to Complainant's business. This serves as further evidence of bad faith intent because it removes any doubt as to whether or not the misspelling was intentionally designed to improperly capitalize on Complainant's famous Mark and its related business.

vii.

Respondent's use of apparently falsified and/or incomplete WHOIS contact information demonstrates a desire to avoid being held accountable, which serves as further evidence of bad faith intent. See, e.g., Time Warner Inc. v. AOLMEMBERS.COM et al., NAF Claim No. FA0701000881337 ("fictitious or false WHOIS information about both the registrant's name and physical address... raises the presumption of bad faith registration and use").