national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

Frederick's of Hollywood Group Inc v. www.jinmi.com / hu weisheng

Claim Number: FA1304001493277

PARTIES

Complainant is Frederick's of Hollywood Group Inc (“Complainant”), represented by CitizenHawk, Inc., California, USA.  Respondent is www.jinmi.com / hu weisheng (“Respondent”), China.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <fredericsk.com>, registered with 1 MORE NAME, LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Houston Putnam Lowry, Chartered Arbitrator, as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on April 5, 2013; the National Arbitration Forum received payment on April 5, 2013.

 

On May 7, 2013, 1 MORE NAME, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <fredericsk.com> domain name is registered with 1 MORE NAME, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  1 MORE NAME, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the 1 MORE NAME, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On May 14, 2013, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of June 3, 2013 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@fredericsk.com.  Also on May 14, 2013, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On June 7, 2013, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Houston Putnam Lowry, Chartered Arbitrator, as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

  1. Complainant

Complainant’s Mark: FREDERICKS

[i.] FREDERICK'S - for women's and girls' dresses, brassieres, corsets, girdles, foundation garments, slips, panties, garter belts, slippers, hosiery, nightgowns, pajamas, robes, chemises, men's under shorts, and pajamas (U.S. Reg. No. 664,746);

[ii.] FREDERICK'S OF HOLLYWOOD - for retail store and mail order services in the fields of clothing, personal items, cosmetics and toiletries (U.S. Reg. No. 1,627,771);

[iii.] FREDERICKS.COM - for computerized online retail store services featuring clothing, lingerie, undergarments, accessories for men and women, hairpieces and wigs, loungewear, active wear, hosiery, slippers, shoes, boots, swimwear and beachwear (U.S. Reg. No. 2,403,596);

[iv.] FREDERICK'S - for retail store and mail order services in the fields of clothing, personal items, cosmetics and toiletries (U.S. Reg. No. 1,051,548); and

Complainant is the owner of a federal trademark registration in the United States that consist of the word FREDERICKS and FREDERICKS OF HOLLYWOOD. The registration is referred to hereafter as the "Complainant's Mark(s)."

FACTUAL AND LEGAL GROUNDS
This Complaint is based on the following factual and legal grounds:

Complainant Frederick's of Hollywood Group Inc. (Frederick's) is a publicly traded corporation (NYSE AMEX: FOH) with its principal place of business in New York, New York. Frederick's was founded in 1946 by Frederick Mellinger who set out to create lingerie that made women feel beautiful and embodied the glamorous Hollywood lifestyle. More than sixty years later, Frederick's is still a leading trendsetter in intimate apparel and has earned a renowned reputation for flattering women of all sizes with its signature styles.

Complainant primarily sells women's intimate apparel and related products through 117 specialty retail stores nationwide as of April 28, 2012.  Direct sales are also made through the company’s world-famous catalog and online shop at www.fredericks.com and WWW.FREDERICKSOFHOLLYWOOD.COM. The websites were launched in 1995 and 1996, and have been very well-received, with more than a million visitors per month. The combined revenue of the company’s successful stores and direct sales for the first quarter of 2012 exceeded $30 million.

In addition, Frederick’s selectively licenses the right to use the Frederick’s of Hollywood® brand and logo on specified categories of products manufactured and sold by other companies, featuring licensed merchandise categories which include sexy costumes, jewelry and accessories. The signing of a license agreement with a subsidiary of Emirates Associated Business Group (“EABG”) has provided for EABG to build and operate Frederick’s of Hollywood retail stores in the Middle East, and the flagship store in Abu Dhabi opened in July 201, with a second store opened in the UAE in 2012.

Frederick's has continuously used the Marks since 1946 in connection with the sale of women's clothing, lingerie and undergarments. Frederick's owns the Marks for which it has obtained federal trademark registrations. The federal mark registrations have not been abandoned, cancelled or revoked.

Furthermore, Frederick's has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in advertisement and promotion of the Marks in media and on the Internet. Based on its federal trademark registrations and extensive use, Frederick's owns the exclusive right to use the Marks in connection with the sale of intimate apparel via retail stores and online stores.

[a.]

The Disputed Domain Name(s) are nearly identical and confusingly similar to Complainant's Marks.

i.

By virtue of its federal trademark and/or service mark registration(s), Complainant is the owner of the Complainant's Mark(s). See, e.g., United Way of America v. Alex Zingaus, NAF Claim No. FA0707001036202 ("Panels have long recognized Complainant's registration of a mark with a trademark authority is sufficient to confer rights in the mark pursuant to Policy 4(a)(i)"). As in other cases, it is also important to note that it is irrelevant for the purposes of Policy ¶4(a)(i) whether Complainant registered the mark in the country where Respondent operates or resides. See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001) (finding that the Policy does not require that a mark be registered in the country in which a respondent operates, it being sufficient that a complainant can demonstrate rights in a mark in some jurisdiction).

ii.

When comparing the Disputed Domain Name(s) to the Complainant's Mark(s), the relevant comparison to be made is between only the second-level portion of the Disputed Domain Name(s) and the Complainant's Mark(s). See Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, WIPO Case No.D2000-0429 (finding that the top-level domain, such as ".net" or ".com", does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., NAF Claim No. FA0304000153545 ("[t]he addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.")

iii.

The Disputed Domain Name(s) (is/are) confusingly similar to Complainant's Mark(s) because (it/they) differ(s) by only a single character from Complainant's Mark(s), or because it differs by only the juxtaposition of two characters when compared to Complainant's Mark(s). For clarification, the Disputed Domain Name(s) contain(s) either:

[ii.] one character which is incorrect, or...
[iii.] two juxtaposed characters

as compared to Complainant's Mark(s).

iv.

The Disputed Domain Name(s) (is/are), simply put, a classic example of "typosquatting". The practice of typosquatting is designed to take advantage of Internet users' typographical errors, which means the names must be confusingly similar by design. See Reuters Ltd. v. Global Net 2000, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0441 (finding that a domain name which differs by only one letter from a trademark has a greater tendency to be confusingly similar to the trademark where the trademark is highly distinctive); Caterpillar Inc. v. Center for Ban on Drugs, NAF Claim No. FA0603000661437 ("the omission of a single letter from Complainant's mark does not adequately distinguish the Disputed Domain Name from the mark"); and Victoria's Secret v. Zuccarini, NAF Claim No. FA0010000095762 (finding that, by misspelling words and adding letters to words, a respondent does not create a distinct mark but nevertheless renders the domain name confusingly similar to the complainant's marks).

 

 

[b.]

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name(s) for the following reasons:

i.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ii.

iii.

Respondent has not been commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name(s). Upon information and belief, at the time Respondent registered the Domain Name(s), it had no trademark or intellectual property rights in the Domain Name(s). See Policy, ¶4(c)(ii). See WHOIS record for the Disputed Domain Name(s). Where, as here, "the WHOIS information suggests Respondent is known as" an entity other than the trademark associated with Complainant, and Complainant has not "licensed, authorized, or permitted Respondent to register domain names incorporating Complainant's... mark," a Panel should find that the Respondent is not commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name. United Way of America v. Alex Zingaus, NAF Claim No. FA0707001036202. See also RMO, Inc. v. Burbridge, FA 96949 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 16, 2001) (interpreting Policy ,-r 4(c)(ii) "to require a showing that one has been commonly known by the domain name prior to registration of the domain name to prevail"); See also Gallup Inc. v. Amish Country Store, FA 96209 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that when a respondent was not known by a mark it did not have rights in a domain name incorporating that mark).

 

Respondent is not sponsored by or legitimately affiliated with Complainant in any way.

 

Complainant has not given Respondent permission to use Complainant's Mark in a domain name. See Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., D2000-0020(WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (finding that a respondent had no rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name where it was not commonly known by the mark and never applied for a license or permission to use the mark).

 

iv.

A "Cease and Desist" letter was sent to the Respondent on January 14, 2013 and May 10, 2013. The letter informed the Respondent that it was infringing on Complainant's IP rights and allowed the Respondent the opportunity to respond if they have any IP rights. The Respondent was provided with the information of the Complainant's trademark(s), hence showing proof that the Complainant has rights to the brand(s). To date, no reply has been received from Respondent. The Respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the Complaint to be deemed true. See also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, WIPO Case No. D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000("In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint."). Also in WIPO case ACCOR v. Pham Manh Ha, Case No. D2007-1855, the panel found that the evidentiary burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to show by concrete evidence that it does have rights or legitimate interests in that name.

v.

Respondent has ignored Complainant's attempts to resolve the dispute outside of this administrative proceeding. Complainant notes that if the owner of the Disputed Domain Name(s) fails to respond to this Complaint, it is presumed that the owner has no rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name(s). See Mattel, Inc. v. Rave Club Berlin, FA106115 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 8, 2002), citing Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Greenhouse Agency Ltd., D2000-1221 (WIPO Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that Respondents' failure to respond can be construed as an admission that they have no legitimate interest in the domain names). Further, Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) states that when "the complainant has made a prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to show by providing concrete evidence that it has rights to or legitimate interest in the domain name at issue."

vi.

Respondent is using (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to redirect unsuspecting Internet users to a website featuring generic links to third-party websites, some of which directly compete with Complainant's business. Presumably, Respondent receives pay-per-click fees from these linked websites. As such, Respondent is not using the Disputed Domain Name(s) to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services as allowed under Policy; 4(c)(i), nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as allowed under Policy; 4(c)(iii). See 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24HourNames.com-Quality Domains For Sale, FA 187429 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sep. 26, 2003) (holding that Respondent's use of the 24hrsfitness.comgt, 24-hourfitness.com.gt and 24hoursfitness.com.gt, domain names to redirect Internet users to a website featuring advertisements and links to Complainant's competitors could not be considered a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use); see also Computer Doctor Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Computer Doctor, FA 95396 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 8, 2000) (finding that the respondent's website, which is blank but for links to other websites, is not a legitimate use of the domain names).

vii.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was April 4, 2012, which is significantly after Complainant's first use in commerce, March 31, 1946, as specified in their relevant registration with the USPTO.

viii.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s), was April 4, 2012, which is significantly after Complainant's registration of their relevant Marks with the USPTO on July 22, 1958.

ix.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was April 4, 2012, which is significantly after Complainant's registration of FREDERICKS.COM on August 10, 1995.

[c.]

The Domain Name(s) should be considered as having been registered and being used in bad faith for the following reasons:

i.

Respondent's typosquatting behavior is, in and of itself, evidence of bad faith. See Canadian Tire Corp. v. domain adm'r no.valid.email@worldnic.net 1111111111, D2003-0232 (WIPO May 22, 2003) (finding the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith because the respondent created a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent's web site or location'.. . through Respondent's persistent practice of 'typosquatting'"); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Baseball League, Inc. v. Zuccarini, D2002-1011 (WIPO Jan. 21, 2003) ("Typosquatting ... is the intentional misspelling of words with [the] intent to intercept and siphon off traffic from its intended destination, by preying on Internauts who make common typing errors. Typosquatting is inherently parasitic and of itself evidence of bad faith.").

 

ii.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

iii.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

iv.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

v.

Respondent's bad faith is further shown by the Respondent using the Disputed Domain Name(s) website in connection with generating revenue as a "click through" website by using the Complainant's registered trademark(s) and providing links to the services and products offered by the Complainant to take advantage of Complainant's well known mark to achieve a wrongful competitive advantage and commercial gain. In WIPO Decision D2008-1470, AIDA Cruises German Branch of Societa di Crociere Mercurio S.r.l., v. Caribbean Online International Ltd. / Belgium Domains "the Panel finds that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name for the purposes of commercial gain by offering links to other companies' websites related to cruises and travels, in the form of a "clickthrough" website. In similar cases, many prior panel decisions have recognised [sic] that the registration of domain names to be used in a "click-through" website has to be considered as an evidence of bad faith (see, e.g. Abercrombie &amp; Fitch Trading Co. v. Digi Real Estate Foundation., WIPO Case No. D2007-0440; Early Times Distillers Company v. IP Admin / DNAV ASSOCS, WIPO Case No. D2007-1812; HBOS Plc v. Whois Protection, WIPO Case No. D2007-1605)".

 

To further stress the above, Respondent’s setting up of a “click through” website for which it likely receives revenue for each misdirected Internet user obviously demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith.  The Respondent has registered and used the Disputed Domain Name(s) in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv) by using the Disputed Domain Name(s) to attract and mislead consumers for its own profit.  See Univ. of Houston Sys. v. Salvia Corp., FA 637920 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 21, 2006) (“Respondent is using the disputed domain name to operate a website which features links to competing and non-competing commercial websites from which Respondent presumably receives referral fees.  Such use for Respondent’s own commercial gain is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv).”); see also Zee TV USA, Inc. v. Siddiqi, FA 721969 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2006) (finding that the respondent engaged in bad faith registration and use by using a domain name that was confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark to offer links to third-party websites that offered services similar to those offered by the complainant). See also Meadowbrook, L.L.C. d/b/a The Land of Nod v. Venkateshwara Distributor Private Limited, Claim Number: FA1112001419361 and Charlotte Russe Merchandising, Inc. v. Private Registrations Aktien Gesellschaft / Domain Admin, Claim Number: FA1204001439309, where the same behavior of bad faith is demonstrated and agreed by the panel, pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv).

In addition to the above, the Respondent’s advertised pay-per-click links displayed on the resolving websites promotes products that compete with Complainant. These links therefore divert potential customers away from Complainant to third-party websites, which disrupts Complainant’s business. The Panel should find that this effort to divert consumers and disrupt Complainant’s business is evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶4(b)(iii). See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assoc., FA 914854 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 10, 2007) (holding that where the respondent’s website featured hyperlinks to competing websites and included a link to the complainant’s website, the respondent’s use of the <redeemaamiles.com> domain name constituted disruption under Policy ¶4(b)(iii)).

 

Respondent has caused the website(s) reachable by (some or all of) the Disputed Domain
Name(s) to display Complainant's Mark(s) spelled correctly (even though the domain
name(s) is a misspelled version of the same mark(s)). This serves as further evidence of bad faith intent because it removes any doubt as to whether or not the misspelling was intentionally designed to improperly capitalize on Complainant's famous Mark(s).

 

vi.

Respondent holds registrations on other domain names that appear to be straightforward examples of typosquatting. Although those names are not directly involved in this complaint, they serve as further evidence of bad faith intent on the part of Respondent. See Policy, 4(b)(ii) and Time Warner Inc. v. Zone MP3, NAF Claim No. FA0706001008035 (typosquattingcombined with registration of as few as four domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to "protected marks" is sufficient to establish a pattern leading to bad faith). See also Citigroup Inc. v. Digi Real Estate Foundation, NAF Claim No. FA0704000964679.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

(1)          the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)          Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)          the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires Complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:

 

(1)          the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)          Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)          the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

Complainant claims it is a leading retailer in intimate apparel and has widely known signature styles. Complainant owns trademark registrations with the United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for the FREDERICK’S mark (e.g., Reg. No. 664,746, registered July 22, 1958), for the FREDERICK’S OF HOLLYWOOD mark (Reg. No. 1,627,771, registered December 11, 1990), and for the FREDERICKS.COM mark (Reg. No. 2,403,596, registered November 14, 2000). Complainant is not required to registered its mark in Respondent’s home country to prove its rights under Policy ¶4(a)(i). See Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Fees, FA 937704 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 25, 2007) (finding that it is irrelevant whether the complainant has registered its trademark in the country of the respondent’s residence). Complainant’s registration of the FREDERICK’S, FREDERICK’S OF HOLLYWOOD, and FREDERICKS.COM mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes Complainant’s rights in the marks pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(i). See Paisley Park Enters. v. Lawson, FA 384834 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 1, 2005) (concluding that the complainant had established rights in the PAISLEY PARK mark under Policy ¶4(a)(i) through registration of the mark with the USPTO).  Complainant merely needs to have rights to its marks, not necessarily rights to its marks in Respondent’s country.

 

Complainant claims the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it differs by only a single character from Complainant’s mark. Respondent’s <fredericsk.com> domain name includes Complainant’s FREDERICKS.COM mark in its entirety, and transposes the letters “k” and “s.” Respondent’s transposition of letters in this mark does not sufficiently differentiate the mark from the disputed domain name under Policy ¶4(a)(i). See Google Inc. v. Jon G., FA 106084 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 26, 2002) (finding <googel.com> to be confusingly similar to the complainant’s GOOGLE mark and noting that “[t]he transposition of two letters does not create a distinct mark capable of overcoming a claim of confusing similarity, as the result reflects a very probable typographical error”). Respondent’s <fredericsk.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s FREDERICKS.COM mark under Policy ¶4(a)(i).

 

The Panel finds Policy ¶4(a)(i) satisfied.  

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Complainant must first make a prima facie case Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶4(a)(ii).  Then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it has rights or legitimate interests.  See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.”).

 

Complainant claims Respondent has not been commonly known by the disputed domain name. The WHOIS information identifies “www.jinmi.com / hu weisheng” as the registrant of the <fredericsk.com> domain name, which does not bear any apparent relationship to the disputed domain name. Based upon the information provided, this Panel concludes Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶4(c)(ii)See M. Shanken Commc’ns v. WORLDTRAVELERSONLINE.COM, FA 740335 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <cigaraficionada.com> domain name under Policy ¶4(c)(ii) based on the WHOIS information and other evidence in the record).

 

Respondent is not sponsored by or legitimately affiliated with Complainant in any way. Complainant has not given Respondent permission to use Complainant’s mark in a domain name.

 

Complainant claims Respondent is using the disputed domain name to redirect unsuspecting Internet users to a website featuring generic links to third-party websites, some of which directly compete with Complainant’s business. Respondent’s <fredericsk.com> domain name resolves to a website where Respondent provides links to Complainant’s own website, as well as other unrelated hyperlinks. Respondent presumably receives pay-per-click fees from these linked websites. In Disney Enters., Inc. v. Kamble, FA 918556 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 27, 2007), the panel held that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name was not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶4(c)(iii). This Panel agreed and holds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to provide links to Complainant’s website and to unrelated websites is not a Policy ¶4(c)(i) bona fide offering of goods and services or a Policy ¶4(c)(iii) legitimate noncommercial or fair use.

 

The Panel finds Policy ¶4(a)(ii) satisfied.  

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Complainant claims Respondent’s advertised pay-per-click links displayed on the resolving website promote products which compete with Complainant. Respondent’s <fredericsk.com> domain name links to a hyperlink directory providing links to Complainant’s website, as well as unrelated links titled “Michael Jones,” “Golf Swing,” “Feature Article,” and others. These links divert potential customers away from Complainant to third-party websites, which disrupts Complainant’s business. This constitutes bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶4(b)(iii).

 

Complainant claims Respondent is using the disputed domain name to attract and mislead consumers for its own profit. Respondent uses the domain name to host a hyperlink directory (or parking page), which provides links to Complainant’s website and websites unrelated to Complainant. Respondent is using the disputed domain name in connection with generating revenue as a “click through” website. Respondent’s setting up of a “click through” website for which it receives revenue (directly or indirectly) for each misdirected Internet user demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith under Policy ¶4(b)(iv). See Bank of Am. Fork v. Shen, FA 699645 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 11, 2006) (holding that the respondent’s previous use of the <bankofamericanfork.com> domain name to maintain a web directory was evidence of bad faith because the respondent presumably commercially benefited by receiving click-through fees for diverting Internet users to unrelated third-party websites).

 

Complainant claims Respondent’s typosquatting behavior is evidence of bad faith. This Panel does not accept “typosquatting” as an independent basis for finding bad faith.  This is not an enunciated reason for finding bad faith under the UDRP.  The point of “typosquatting” is to misdirect internet users in the hopes of Respondent’s financial gain.  Since bad faith can be proven under Policy ¶4(b)(iv) by respondent by using the domain name to attract Internet users to its web site for commercial gain by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark, the fact there is a typographical similarity between a mark and disputed domain name does not add anything to the analysis.  It is perfectly possible to be “typosquatting” and not  using the domain name to attract Internet users to its web site for commercial gain by creating a confusion about the true owner of the web site.

 

Policy ¶4(b)(iii) allows a panel to find bad faith if Respondent registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.  The fact the mark and the disputed domain name are typographically similar does not affect the analysis.  It is perfectly possible to be “typosquatting” and not  have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.

 

Nevertheless, the Panel finds Policy ¶4(a)(iii) satisfied.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered the <fredericsk.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Houston Putnam Lowry, Chartered Arbitrator, Panelist

Dated: Wednesday, June 12, 2013

 

 

 

 

Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.

Click Here to return to our Home Page