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Actual notice of a rescheduled arbitration hearing is sufficient to afford parties a “reasonable opportunity to be heard,” even if the notice does not comply with statutory requirements, according to a Nebraska appellate court.
In Damrow v. Murdoch, No. A-05-1200, 2007 WL 2471470 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2007), Damrow managed a feedlot in which he, Murdoch, and others were shareholders. The shareholders executed a repayment agreement in order to determine the amounts owed by individual shareholders to the feedlot’s corporation, CFI. The repayment agreement contained a provision that required arbitration of disputes over any shareholder’s individual liability should the shareholders fail to reach such an agreement amongst themselves.
When the shareholders failed to reach such an agreement, Damrow initiated an arbitration proceeding to resolve the dispute. Despite Damrow’s later assertion that he could not participate in arbitration for financial reasons, the administrator continued with the arbitration procedures, and notified all the parties that a hearing on the matter was to take place on February 1, 2002. Because of weather conditions, the hearing was rescheduled to March 8. A letter dated March 6 reminded the parties of this rescheduled hearing. Damrow did not attend the March 8 hearing. The hearing resulted in an award being rendered against Damrow.
Damrow later challenged the award on various procedural grounds, including that he received no notice of the rescheduled hearing on March 8. Over Damrow’s objections, the district court found that Damrow received actual notice of the hearing and confirmed the award. Damrow appealed, alleging that the court erred in confirming the arbitration award because the administrator failed to provide him notice of the rescheduled hearing in the manner required by statute.
The Court affirmed the award, in part finding that Damrow received statutory notice of the original February 1 hearing, and actual notice of the rescheduled March 8 hearing. The Court determined that actual notice of the rescheduled hearing was sufficient, even if the notice did not comply with the statute, because “the essential requirement” was “that the parties be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”
An attorney for the other shareholders had testified at the district court that she believed Damrow had been on the line for a telephone conversation in which the original hearing was rescheduled. The Court noted that there was no evidence offered by Damrow that denied his participation and his actual notice of the rescheduled date.
Since the district court examined the evidence and determined Damrow had actual notice of the rescheduled hearing, and actual notice could substitute for statutory notice of a rescheduled hearing, the Court declined to reexamine the evidence on notice and deferred to the district court’s findings.
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