A signatory's spousal status alone cannot bind his or her non-signatory spouse to arbitrate claims against a residential health care facility, according to a California state appellate court.

In Warfield v. Summerville Senior Living, Inc., No. G038392, 2007 WL 4472259 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2007), Yvonne and John Warfield were admitted to Summerville's residential health care facility. John Warfield executed admissions and arbitration agreements on behalf of himself and his wife upon admission.

Yvonne later brought a complaint against Summerville for elder abuse and other negligence claims. Summerville moved to compel arbitration of the claims pursuant to the agreements executed by John, maintaining that John had authority to bind Yvonne as both her ostensible agent and her spouse. The trial court denied the motion to compel, finding John had no such agency at the time of admission.

On appeal, the Court refused to distinguish the Warfield's case from prior precedent in Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC, 148 Cal.App.4th 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), holding that John had no authority to bind Yvonne to an arbitration agreement as her ostensible agent or as her spouse.

Summerville maintained Flores was distinguishable from Warfield's case because Flores addressed admission to skilled nursing facilities, not residential care facilities for the elderly. The Court, however, found no reason to make such a distinction between the two types of facilities and found the agency authority alleged by Summerville to be of the same type alleged and rejected in Flores.

The Court observed that absolutely no evidence of Yvonne's express or implied consent to John's agency was presented. Nevertheless, Summerville alternatively argued that John's relationship as spouse conferred binding agency status upon him. The Court again refused to distinguish Warfield's case from Flores, noting the Flores court holding that a "marital relationship cannot alone create an agency."

The Court did acknowledge that some courts had previously found that spousal relationships were enough to establish an agency relationship, but those findings were in very specific, distinguishable circumstances. For example, the Court opined that medical malpractice cases warranted a finding of agency in the spousal relationship because the non-signatory spouse's claim arose out of injuries suffered by the signatory spouse.

Furthermore, the Court distinguished the result in NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newton, 84 Cal.App.4th 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), from the Warfield's case. According to the Court, the result in NORCAL, binding the non-signatory wife to an arbitration provision, was warranted because the wife sought benefits under other provisions of the medical malpractice insurance contract which contained the contested arbitration provision.

The Court found the Warfield agreements distinguishable, holding that the admission and arbitration agreements executed by John were "separate agreements." Since Yvonne only received the benefit of care under the separate admission agreement, and not a benefit under the "different" and "optional" arbitration agreement, the receipt of care did not preclude Yvonne from challenging the arbitration agreement.