A California appellate court affirmed the confirmation of a second arbitral award granted by a Beis Din panel under Din Torah (Jewish law), for attorney fees incurred in contesting a vacatur motion; holding it permissible under California law because this procedure did not interfere with California's statutes governing attorney fees for prevailing parties, but rather concerned attorney fees incurred by "any party" opposing a vacatur motion.

In Soroudi v. Soroudi, No. M2006-02191-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4533429 (Cal. Ct. App.2d Dec. 27, 2007), Benham Soroudi and his three brothers, Medhi Soroudi, Behrouz Soroudi, and Mehran Soroudi (Respondents) were in dispute over many businesses, including a family owned business.

The parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration. The arbitration agreement granted the arbitrators authority to award attorney fees if any of the parties attempted to vacate the award. The panel, or Beis Din, consisted of three rabbis, according to Din Torah.

The Beis Din found in favor of the Respondents. In issuing the award, the Beis Din confirmed its power to grant an award of attorney fees if legal recourse were necessary to enforce the ruling and reserved jurisdiction to do so.

Benham attempted to vacate the award. The Respondents concurrently moved to confirm. The trial court confirmed the award. Subsequently, the Respondents requested that the Beis Din award them attorney fees totaling $82, 507.23, which was awarded.

Benham again sought to vacate the award. The trial court denied his motion and confirmed the second award to the Respondents.

This Court rejected Benham's argument that the Beis Din exceeded its authority in issuing the second award of attorney fees.

First, the Respondents were not required to seek the attorney fee award from the trial court under California law. A prevailing party must seek costs, including an award of attorney fees incurred in a judicial proceeding, from the trial court. See Ca. Civ. Pro. § 1293.2.

Here, however, the parties' arbitration agreement did not specifically refer to prevailing parties. Instead, it referred to "any party" that opposed a vacatur motion. Thus, the Beis Din properly relied on the arbitration agreement for determination of its jurisdiction.

Second, the Beis Din had jurisdiction to issue the second award. The parties granted this authority to the Beis Din in the arbitration agreement, in accordance with California law. See Ca. Civ. Pro. § 1284.2.

Moreover, the award granted was not a modification or amendment made after the confirmation of the first award, but part of a successive award. See Hightower v. Superior Court, 86 Cal.App.4th 1415 (2001); Roehl v. Ritchie, 147 Cal.App.4th 338, 347-348 (2007). Here, the parties explicitly agreed in the arbitration agreement that if a party attempted to vacate an award, the Beis Din had jurisdiction to award the associated attorney fees.

The second request involved the same arbitration agreement, the same controversy, and the same arbitration that was in question when Respondents first requested to have the arbitration award confirmed. The second request for confirmation involved an issue which would occur in the future and was therefore allowed under California law. See Ca. Civ. Pro. § 1292.6.

Further, the Beis Din noted this explicit grant of authority and reserved that authority to grant a future award to reimburse any party opposing a motion to vacate the award. The second award addressed only the issue of attorney fees incurred in opposition to Benham's attempt to vacate the first award. This could not have been addressed in the first arbitration.

Accordingly, this Court held that the Beis Din had jurisdiction to grant the second award. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's confirmation of the second award of attorney fees was affirmed.