In affirming vacatur of an arbitration award entered in a credit card dispute, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the statutory deadline for filing a motion to vacate an arbitration award does not apply where (1) the motion for vacatur is premised on the lack of an arbitration agreement and (2) the aggrieved party objected to the arbitration by disputing the existence of an arbitration agreement.

In, MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Christianson, No. 4349, 2008 WL 648695 (S.C. Ct. App. March 4, 2008), MBNA filed an arbitration claim against Christianson, alleging that Christianson had defaulted on a credit card agreement. Christianson responded that he never agreed to arbitrate. The arbitration proceeded, and the arbitrator issued an award in MBNA's favor.

MBNA subsequently filed for an application to confirm the arbitration award. In response, Christianson filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court found that MBNA had failed to prove that Christianson had agreed to arbitration. Accordingly, the trial court granted Christianson's motion to vacate.

On appeal, MBNA argued that the lower court erred in granting Christianson's motion to vacate the arbitration award because the motion was filed more than ninety days subsequent to the entry of the award and was thus untimely under South Carolina law, which requires that a motion to vacate be filed within ninety days.


The Court rejected MBNA's argument and held that the ninety day deadline does not apply where (1) the motion to vacate is premised on the lack of an arbitration agreement and (2) the party seeking vacatur objected to the arbitration by disputing the existence of an arbitration agreement. In reaching this holding, the Court reasoned that the existence of an arbitration agreement is a matter for the court to determine.

According to the Court, once Christianson disputed the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to enter an award until MBNA obtained a court order compelling arbitration. This dicta is a curious interpretation of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) because it reduces to mere surplusage the statutory provision authorizing a court to stay an ongoing arbitration where there is no arbitration agreement. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-20(b). If, as the Court suggests, the party who commenced the arbitration must obtain an order compelling arbitration, why would the party resisting arbitration ever need a court order staying the arbitration?

The Court's holding in this case was based partly on MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Boata, 926 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 2007). Subsequent case law in Connecticut has established that the statutory deadline applies unless the aggrieved party objects to the arbitration. See MBNA America Bank v. Bailey, 934 A.2d 316 (Conn. App. Ct. Nov. 20, 2007).