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Reversing a trial court's decision to vacate an arbitration award, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that it is within an arbitrator's broad authority to refuse to hear certain evidence, and courts may not review an arbitrator's decision for factual errors.
In McCann v. Department of Environmental Protection, No. 18102, 2008 WL 2854129 (Conn. Aug. 5, 2008), McCann was employed by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). During his employment, two memos were sent to all employees warning them of a zero tolerance policy for personal use of state-issued computers. McCann's personal use of his state-issued laptop was subsequently discovered, at which point the DEP told McCann to get his own computer for personal use. McCann was issued two more laptops, and the DEP later discovered that McCann had visited pornographic websites and sites that sold hallucinogenic mushrooms on those computers.
The DEP fired McCann. McCann filed a grievance alleging there was no just cause to terminate him, and the dispute was submitted to arbitration pursuant to the grievance procedure in the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The arbitrator held that McCann's dismissal was for just cause and issued an award in favor of the DEP.
McCann moved to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator failed to conduct a just cause analysis, disregarded the "doctrine of progressive discipline," and failed to receive evidence regarding the discipline of other DEP employees for misuse of state computers. The trial court vacated the award, holding that the arbitrator improperly ignored evidence that the DEP had not enforced its zero tolerance policy on other employees and had made findings not supported by the evidence. The DEP appealed.
On appeal, the DEP argued that Conn. Stat. § 52-418(a)(3), which provides that a court shall vacate an award if the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent to the dispute, did not justify vacatur in this case. The Court agreed, finding that the statute, which is nearly identical to § 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), requires that a challenging party prove that he was deprived of a full and fair hearing because of an arbitrator's evidentiary ruling.
The Court determined that it was within the arbitrator's broad authority to refuse to accept evidence of the DEP's discipline of other employees who had misused state computers. The arbitrator had refused to hear such evidence because it did not state the reasons for the disposition of those cases, which the Court found reasonable. Thus, the Court held that the rejection of such evidence did not deprive McCann of a full and fair hearing.
Furthermore, the Court determined that the arbitrator could have reasonably found that McCann's repeated and serious violations of the computer use policy justified his termination, even if McCann established that the zero tolerance policy was not regularly enforced.
The trial court had also vacated the award because the arbitrator "misconstrued the evidence and made erroneous factual findings." The Court agreed, conceding that the arbitrator's finding that a virus infection on McCann's laptop had threatened the state's entire computer network was erroneous, as was the arbitrator's finding that McCann had worked for the DEP for fifteen years instead of eighteen. However, the Court held that "these factual errors do not constitute grounds for vacating the arbitrator's decision," as "courts will not review the evidence" and "courts do not review [an] arbitrator's decision for factual errors." In addition, the Court opined that there was no reasonable probability that the arbitrator's decision would have been different without these factual errors.
Moreover, the Court held that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in violation of Conn. Stat. § 52-418(a)(4), which parallels § 10(a)(4) of the FAA. The trial court held that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by failing to consider whether the DEP had just cause to terminate McCann under the CBA. The Court reversed, finding that the arbitrator quoted the just cause portion of the CBA in his decision, and ultimately concluded that McCann's termination was for just cause.
Finally, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that the arbitrator ignored McCann's right to "progressive discipline and an opportunity to correct his conduct." The Court found that the arbitrator at least implicitly concluded that McCann had been warned and had been given an opportunity to correct his conduct. The Court observed that because such a conclusion was not obviously and egregiously wrong, it was not subject to vacatur under § 52-418(a)(4). Thus, the Court confirmed the arbitration award.
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