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A New York appellate court determined that a 90-day statute of limitations under New York law begins to run on the date on which the arbitrator’s decision was received by the parties, and not when the decision was mailed.
In In re Lowe, No. 07735, 2008 WL 4531665 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 10, 2008), Lowe pursued no-fault arbitration to recover personal injury protection benefits from Erie Insurance Company for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The arbitrator denied Lowe’s claim. On appeal, a no-fault master arbitrator affirmed the arbitrator’s decision.
The master arbitration award was mailed to parties on June 13, 2007, and Lowe’s attorney received the decision on June 18, 2007. Ninety-one days after the award was mailed and 86 days after it was received, Lowe sought to vacate the arbitration award under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules article 75 (C.P.L.R.). Erie Insurance argued that the proceeding was time-barred as N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7511(a) sets forth a 90-day statute of limitations.
The lower court determined that delivery under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7511(a) must be construed as the date of mailing rather than the date of receipt of the award.
On appeal, the Court reviewed this statutory construction. As the Court noted, the article states that an application to vacate or modify an arbitration award may be filed by a party within 90 days after the arbitration award is delivered to her. However, the statute does not define the term “delivery.” The Court determined that “delivery” means the actual receipt of the award.
The Court noted that case law supports that construction; several other cases have explicitly used the terms “receipt” and “received” in discussing the 90-day period set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7511(a). Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court’s determination and reinstated Lowe’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, as it was timely.
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