The provisions of the New York Convention that favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements do not incorporate the "transportation worker" exception contained in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), according to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

In Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, No. 07-55071, 2008 WL 4811882 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2008), Rogers was employed by Royal Caribbean as an attendant on a cruise ship. After a dispute arose over the payment of Rogers's wages, Rogers sued Royal Caribbean for violation of 46 U.S.C. § 10313(f), which requires payment of wages to seafarers within a limited time period after the end of a voyage.

Royal Caribbean moved to compel arbitration in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) reached with Rogers's union. The district court granted the motion.

On appeal, Rogers maintained that the arbitration agreement was not valid because his statutory seafarer's wage claim was not arbitrable. Specifically, he argued that Section 1 of the FAA exempted enforcement of arbitration agreements in seafarer employment contracts.

The Court determined that the FAA facially exempted seafarer employment contracts, but did not prohibit the enforcement of a CBA requiring arbitration of seafarer claims under the New York Convention, which requires the recognition of international arbitration agreements governing legal relationships considered commercial. 9 U.S.C. § 202.

According to the Court, the Section 1 exemption "does not state that transportation workers are not engaged in commerce," but merely states the FAA does not apply to them. The Court concluded that Section 202, which implements the New York Convention, did not incorporate the Section 1 exemption for seafarer employment contracts, and that Rogers was bound to arbitrate if the agreement was otherwise valid.

The Court also disposed of Rogers's argument that the statutory wage claim under Section 10313(f) was not arbitrable, finding that the clear language of Section 202 "specifically and expressly compels federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements." In light of that clear Congressional directive, the Court found no evidence that such statutory claims were not referable to arbitration.

The Court found no evidence that the agreement was unconscionable or in violation of public policy. The Court noted that the agreement was the product of negotiations between Rogers's designated union and the company, and there was no evidence that the union lacked any meaningful choice in entering the agreement.

Finally, the prohibition on direct selection of arbitrators by the employee was not unconscionable in light of the union's participation in the selection process on behalf of the employee.