national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

Merrick Pet Care, Inc. v. c/o merrickfood.com

Claim Number: FA0903001254168

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Merrick Pet Care, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Bruce Moseley, of Law Office of Chris Stewart, P.C., Texas, USA.  Respondent is c/o merrickfood.com (“Respondent”), Washington, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <merrickfood.com>, registered with Godaddy.com, Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Honorable Karl V. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on March 25, 2009; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on March 30, 2009.

 

On March 25, 2009, Godaddy.com, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <merrickfood.com> domain name is registered with Godaddy.com, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Godaddy.com, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Godaddy.com, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On April 8, 2009, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of April 28, 2009 by which Respondent could file a response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@merrickfood.com by e-mail.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On April 30, 2009, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Honorable Karl V. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent."  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A.  Complainant makes the following assertions:

 

1.      Respondent’s <merrickfood.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MERRICK mark.

 

2.      Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <merrickfood.com> domain name.

 

3.      Respondent registered and used the <merrickfood.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant, Merrick Pet Care, Inc., utilizes its MERRICK mark in connection with its provision of pet foods and treats.  Complainant has registered its MERRICK mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 3,114,011 issued July 11, 2006; filed March 30, 2005).  Complainant owns and operates the <merrickpetcare.com> domain name in conjunction with its business. 

 

Respondent registered the <merrickfood.com> domain name on July 20, 2005.  The disputed domain name resolves to a parked web page wherein competitive click-through advertisements are displayed.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)   the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)   Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)   the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has successfully demonstrated its rights in the MERRICK mark through its registration of the mark with the USPTO under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), and that such rights date back to the mark’s filing date with the USPTO.  See AOL LLC v. Interrante, FA 681239 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 23, 2006) (finding that where the complainant had submitted evidence of its registration with the USPTO, “such evidence establishes complainant’s rights in the mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Hershey Co. v. Reaves, FA 967818 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 8, 2007) (finding that the complainant’s rights in the KISSES trademark through registration of the mark with the USPTO “date back to the filing date of the trademark application and predate [the] respondent’s registration”).

 

The <merrickfood.com> domain name contains Complainant’s MERRICK mark while adding: (1) the descriptive term “food;” and (2) the generic top-level domain “.com.”  The Panel notes, at the outset, that the addition of a top-level domain is considered immaterial under the Policy due to the requirement of such an element in every domain name.  See Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (finding that the top level of the domain name such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar).  Moreover, the addition of the term “food,” which carries a clear and unambiguous relation to Complainant’s provision of pet food and other victuals, will not thwart the Panel’s consequent finding that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the mark.  See Miller Brewing Co. v. Domain Active Pty. Ltd., FA 243606 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 23, 2004) (finding that the <millerbeers.com> domain name was confusingly similar to the complainant’s MILLER mark, because “[t]he addition of a descriptive term that describes Complainant’s business to Complainant’s registered mark, does not remove the domain from the realm of confusing similarity  with regard to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).  For those reasons, the Panel finds that the <merrickfood.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MERRICK mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). 

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Complainant has alleged that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  Based upon the allegations made in the Complaint, the Panel finds that Complainant has established a prima facie case pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), thus shifting the burden of proof to Respondent.  Since Respondent has not responded to the Complaint, the Panel may presume that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  However, the Panel in its discretion chooses to examine the record to determine whether Respondent has any rights or legitimate interests pursuant to the factors outlined in Policy ¶ 4(c).  See AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names.”); see also Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name); see also Broadcom Corp. v. Ibecom PLC, FA 361190 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 22, 2004) (“Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint functions as an implicit admission that [Respondent] lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  It also allows the Panel to accept all reasonable allegations set forth…as true.”).

 

Respondent’s failure to file a response in the instant dispute leaves the Panel without any evidence to corroborate the WHOIS information’s registrant listing of Respondent as “c/o merrickfood.com.”  The mere inclusion of the disputed domain name in the WHOIS information has been held as an absolute failure in terms of constituting evidence that Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name.  In Gestmusic Endemol, S.A. v. operaciontriunfo.us, FA 214337 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 14, 2004), the Panel noted that, “[t]hough Respondent’s WHOIS information lists Respondent’s name as ‘o. operaciontriunfo.us’ and organization as ‘operaciontriunfo.us,’ there is no evidence before the Panel that Respondent was actually commonly known by the [<operaciontriunfo.us>] domain name.”  The underlying and unifying theme between that case and the instant dispute is the fundamental lack of corroborating evidence, as noted above.  Without any arguments, assertions, or exhibits demonstrating that Respondent is indeed known, and commonly at that, by the disputed domain name permits the inference by this Panel that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name.  This Panel agrees with the wisdom of the Gestmusic panel, and consequently finds that Respondent has not demonstrated rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Ultimate Elecs., Inc. v. Nichols, FA 195683 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 27, 2003) (“[O]ther than Respondent’s infringing use of the ULTIMATE ELECTRONICS mark on its web page and in its domain name . . . , there is no evidence that Respondent is commonly known by the <ultimateelectronics.net> domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), or that there is any other entity besides Complainant authorized to trade as ULTIMATE ELECTRONICS.”).

 

Respondent’s disputed domain name resolves to a parked web page.  This type of situation commonly occurs, wherein competitive advertisements and links for the third-party market challengers of Complainant are displayed.  Predictably, the same occurrence is present here.  The provision of the advertisements is commonly accomplished for the purposes of receiving click-through fees.  The Panel finds no reason why it should not infer the same in this case.  The Panel notes that such click-through endeavors have frequently been held to fail as bona fide offerings of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or legitimate noncommercial or fair uses under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See, e.g., Disney Enters., Inc. v. Kamble, FA 918556 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (holding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name was not a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).  While this web page appears to be parked, the Panel has no arguments before it suggesting that Respondent can show demonstrable preparations to use the disputed domain name in a way that would engender rights or legitimate interests under either Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).  As such, the Panel chooses to find that Respondent does lack rights and legitimate interests under both Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).  See Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

There can be little debate that the diversion of Internet users to the disputed domain name through the use of Complainant’s mark can and will cause disruption to Complainant’s business.  The unceremonious presentation of advertisements for Complainant’s competitors on this quasi-billboard will likely lead some of these Internet users away from conducting business with Complainant.  The Panel finds that Respondent has therefore registered and continues to use the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).  See David Hall Rare Coins v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 915206 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 9, 2007) (finding that the respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) because respondent used the disputed domain name to advertise goods and services of complainant’s competitors, thereby disrupting the complainant’s business); see also Tesco Pers. Fin. Ltd. v. Domain Mgmt. Servs., FA 877982 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 13, 2007) (concluding that the use of a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet users to a directory website containing commercial links to the websites of a complainant’s competitors represents bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)).

 

Moreover, this use of the disputed domain name by Respondent has already been found to exist for commercial gain, as noted by this Panel in its Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) analysis above.  Thus, the use of Complainant’s mark in the disputed domain name was intentionally accomplished in order to trade off the goodwill surrounding the mark.  The result is a likelihood of confusion in the eyes of the Internet user as to the source, sponsorship, and endorsement of, or affiliation with, the disputed domain name.  Internet users will likely be mystified at their diversion from what may appear to be a destination at Complainant’s website to Respondent’s marketing venture.  The Panel finds that Respondent has therefore registered and continues to use the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See AOL LLC v. AIM Profiles, FA 964479 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 20, 2007) (finding that the respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the respondent was commercially gaining from the likelihood of confusion between the complainant’s AIM mark and the competing instant messaging products and services advertised on the respondent’s website which resolved from the disputed domain name); see also Perot Sys. Corp. v. Perot.net, FA 95312 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 29, 2000) (finding bad faith where the domain name in question is obviously connected with the complainant’s well-known marks, thus creating a likelihood of confusion strictly for commercial gain).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <merrickfood.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Honorable Karl V. Fink (Ret.), Panelist

Dated:  May 14, 2009

 

 

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