Nike, Inc. v. Aristarkh Sanaev
Claim Number: FA1507001627307
Complainant is Nike, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Laura C. Gustafson of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP, California, USA. Respondent is Aristarkh Sanaev (“Respondent”), represented by Ivan Timshin of Albrecht and Vitte Ltd., Russia.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <nike-exclusive.com>, registered with Name.com, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Mr. Maninder Singh as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on July 2, 2015; the Forum received payment on July 6, 2015.
On July 6, 2015, Name.com, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <nike-exclusive.com> domain name is registered with Name.com, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Name.com, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Name.com, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On July 9, 2015, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of July 29, 2015 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@nike-exclusive.com. Also on July 9, 2015, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on July 28, 2015.
On 04/08/2015, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Mr. Maninder Singh as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
· Complainant claims to be a globally well-known company and the world’s leading seller of sports shoes and sports apparel with retails stores throughout the United States and countries around the world. Complainant claims to own and have been using the mark NIKE for over 40 years. It also states to operate a website at <Nike.com>; and sell NIKE brand products through its website.
· Complainant claims to have an established business in respect of a large variety of goods, including footwear, clothing, headgear, bags, eyewear, watches and other electronic products, and sports equipment. Complainant-Nike also claims to be world’s leading seller of sports shoes and sports apparel.
· Complainant further claims to have adopted the NIKE mark in 1971 and using the NIKE mark continuously since that time. Complainant claims to own numerous registrations and applications to register the NIKE mark around the world. Tabulated statements showing registrations owned by Complainant in the United States and Russia, have also been incorporated in the Complaint (Exhibit A). Complainant also claims to have registered NIKE marks in over 150 countries and regions, including in Russia.
· Complainant also claims that NIKE products are sold through NIKE retail stores in numerous cities throughout the U.S. and around the world, through the NIKE.com website and through third-party retail stores and online retail sites throughout the U.S. and around the world.
· Complainant claims to have developed significant goodwill in NIKE marks through extensive use and promotion. The NIKE mark is claimed to be among the most widely recognized marks throughout the world and a strong indicator of origin in Nike products. Complainant also claims that consumers of all kinds in the U.S. and throughout the world recognize the NIKE mark as a source identifier for NIKE products.
· The complainant claims to have significant sales of its products each year with sales in excess of USD $20 billion each year from 2012 to 2014 and total sales from 1979 to 2014 in excess of USD $ 300 billion.
· Complainant also claims to devote considerable sums to promoting its brand with advertising expenditures in excess of USD $2.5 billion each year from 2012 to 2014 and total expenditures from 1979 to 2014 in excess of USD $34 billion.
· Complainant claims that NIKE ranks among the highest valued brands in the world, according to Interbrand’s annual publication of the 100 “Best Global Brands” and is among the top apparel brands in the world in Brandz’s annual publication, “The 100 Most Powerful Brands”.
· Complainant claims that it promotes the NIKE marks through various high profile channels, including print ads in major publications, television, online and at major sporting events, such as the Olympics, The Wimbledon Tennis Championships, The French Open, The U.S. Open and other major sporting events, all of which are watched by millions of viewers around the world on television. Complainant also claims to have a long history of having on its roster numerous globally well-known athletes, all wearing Nike products.
· Complainant further claims that NIKE has been the official kit supplier of numerous national football teams, including in Brazil, the USA, the Netherlands, France, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand as well as of numerous professional club teams including FC Barcelona and Atletico Madrid from Spain, Manchester City from England, Inter Milan and Juventus from Italy, Celtic from Scotland, FC Porto from Portugal and Spartak from Russia. Further, NIKE is the official uniform outfitter for the NFL in the USA and the official kit supplier for the Indian Cricket Team.
· Complainant claims that in 2012 Summer Olympics in London, England, NIKE sponsored numerous athletes and teams. Over 400 athletes wore NIKE footwear in the Olympics. In 2014, Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, NIKE sponsored teams of United States, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Japan and many other countries.
· Complainant further claims that based on the long use, significant sales and advertising, the NIKE Marks are unquestionably famous marks and known throughout the world. It has also been claimed that Nike currently operates a website at <Nike.com>, which it has continuously maintained and operated since at least as early as 1997. The NIKE marks and NIKE website at <Nike.com>, as claimed, were in use and famous long-prior to Respondent’s registration and use of the infringing <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name.
Contentions regarding Respondent’s disputed domain name “Nike-exclusive.com” being identical to Complainant's "NIKE" marks.
· Complainant contends that Respondent’s <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name is nearly identical to its NIKE Marks, and its <Nike.com> domain name and is confusingly similar. Complainant contends that the only difference between Respondent’s domain name, <Nike-exclusive.com> and the NIKE mark is the addition of the generic term “exclusive” after the distinctive term NIKE and that the term “exclusive” does not distinguish the domain name and in fact suggests an affiliation, i.e. an “exclusive” Nike website.
· Complainant contends that the disputed domain name contains the term “exclusive” which is irrelevant as the addition of the generic term “exclusive” to the famous NIKE mark by Respondent does nothing to distinguish its obviously deceptive domain name <Nike-exclusive.com>. In this regard, it relies upon the following decisions : -
(i) Sanofi-Aventis v. Healthcare Online, WIPO Case D2004-0806 – holding that use of generic term “news” in conjunction with the Complainant’s trademark ACOMPLIA does not prevent the domain names in dispute from being found confusingly similar, as the generic term is lacking in distinctiveness.
(ii) Nike,Inc. v. Paul Verschoor, WIPO Case D2000-1707 – holding that addition of a descriptive term to a famous trade mark does little to alter the inherent trade mark nature of the term Nike, finding Nike-soccer.com, Nike-soccer.org and Nike-soccer.net confusingly similar to NIKE.
· Complainant contends that Respondent’s use of the famous NIKE mark in combination with the generic term “exclusive” increases the likelihood of confusion as the domain name, on its face, suggests it is an exclusive website of Nike or related to exclusive Nike products. Complainant further contends that Respondent’s confusingly similar <Nike-exclusive.com> diverts users trying to find the official Nike website, directing them away from the official site at <Nike.com> to the unauthorized site at <Nike-exclusive.com>.
Contentions regarding Respondent having no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name
· Complainant contends that Respondent is not using the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or service.
· Complainant contends that Respondent is not commonly known by the name NIKE-EXCLUSIVE, or Nike-exclusive.com, and does not own any trademark registrations for NIKE-EXCLUSIVE. Complainant also contends that it has not authorized Respondent in any way to use the NIKE marks or the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name.
· Complainant further contends that Respondent does not operate any bona fide business under the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name or NIKE EXCLUSIVE name nor could it as use of <Nike-exclusive.com> cannot be a legitimate use as it clearly infringes NIKE’s prior rights in its famous NIKE mark.
· Complainant further contends that Respondent’s domain name resolves to a website which displays content copied from the genuine Nike.com website and with an overall look and feel that mimics the legitimate Nike.com website; further, the website is falsely presented as an authorized Nike website and purports to sell-authorized NIKE branded products. Complainant contends that it has not authorized Respondent to sell NIKE branded products and the activity on this site infringes Complainant’s rights and is not legitimate.
· Complainant also contends that use of a domain name for the type of unauthorized activity engaged in by Respondent here is not a bona fide or legitimate use and does not establish a Respondent’s legitimate rights and interests in the domain name. In this regard, Complainant relies upon the decision in CWC Direct LLC v. Ju Yu, FA 1501001599464 (National Arbitration Forum Feb. 16, 2015) – where the respondent’s website resolved to a website offering clothes purporting to be Complainant’s products, and containing content from Complainant’s website, all without authorization, the panel found: “Because Respondent is attempting to pass itself off in order to sell counterfeit or unauthorized goods bearing the Complainant’s images, Respondent is not providing a bona fide offering of goods or service, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name.
· Complainant also contends that the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name diverts users from Complainant’s website at <Nike.com> and that Respondent’s website and sale of purported Nike brand product is not authorized by Complainant. Accordingly, Respondent is not providing a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name.
· Complainant further contends that Respondent’s use of the famous NIKE mark in its domain name to direct users to its unauthorized website is not a legitimate use. Complainant in this regard has relied upon decision in Chanel, Inc. v. Estco Technology Group, WIPO Case D-2000-0413. Complainant contends that upon keying Respondent’s domain name into the browser, unsuspecting internet users, looking for an official Nike website, are instead confronted with a website that is not affiliated with or authorized by Nike and has no connection with Nike. The deception is heightened by the misleading content and statements on the website. In this regard, Complainant relies upon the following decisions : -
(i) Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. R & S Tech., Inc., FA 96577 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb, 27, 2001) – holding that Respondent’s use of the domain name to confuse and divert internet traffic is not a legitimate use of the domain name.
(ii) Marriott International, Inc. v. Seocho, FA0303000149187 (D. Mass, 2002) – holding that because Respondent’s sole purpose in selecting the domain names was to cause confusion with Complainant’s website and marks, its use of the names was not in connection with the offering of goods or services or any other fair use.
· Complainant also contends that respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name.
Contentions
regarding Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith
· Complainant contends that Respondent registered the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name long after Complainant’s first use and registration of its NIKE marks and long after Complainant’s registration and use of the <Nike.com> domain name.
· Complainant contends that Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, internet users to its website, by creating a false association with Nike and a likelihood of confusion with the NIKE marks and the <Nike.com> domain name, as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of its website or location or of a product or service on its web site or location and that Respondent has registered and is using its domain name in bad faith.
· Complainant also contends that Respondent has registered and is using the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting Nike’s legitimate commercial interests by diverting consumers away from Nike’s legitimate website and online retail store at <Nike.com> and instead to Respondent’s unauthorized website at <Nike-exclusive.com>, thus evidencing Respondent’s bad faith. Respondent has specifically selected and registered the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name to draw traffic and business away from Nike and to Respondent’s website.
· Complainant contends that Respondent’s use of the famous NIKE mark evidences its obvious bad faith in the registration and use of the <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name. Respondent has intentionally attempted to benefit from the goodwill and fame of the NIKE marks in order to attract, for commercial gain, internet users to its web site, and divert users from Nike’s legitimate website. In selecting a domain name that incorporates the famous NIKE mark, Respondent is attempting to benefit from a perceived affiliation with Nike and the NIKE marks. Respondent uses its <Nike-exclusive.com> domain name to ensnare unsuspecting internet users and divert them from Complainant’s legitimate website and online retail location at <Nike.com> to Respondent’s unauthorized website. Complainant in this regard, has relied on decision in CWC Direct LLC v. Ju Yu, FA 1501001599464 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb, 16, 2015) - holding that Respondent’s use of domain name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the website constitutes bad faith.
· Complainant further contends that Respondent’s domain name and website content make clear that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights as Respondent purports to sell Nike products, when in fact Respondent is not authorized to do so. Reliance has again been placed on decision in CWC Direct LLC v. Ju Yu, FA 1501001599464 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb, 16, 2015) - holding that Respondent’s use of the <guess-factory.com> domain name to offer Complainant’s own products at the resolving website indicates that respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark and rights, a further indication of bad faith.
· Complainant contends that the fact that Respondent’s domain name consists of Nike’s well-known mark, with no ascertainable reason or purpose other than to infringe Complainant’s rights and disrupt its business, evidences Respondent’s bad faith, reflecting Respondent’s intent to mis-direct traffic intended for Nike to its website for commercial gain. It is well-established in UDRP decisions, that use of a famous trademark in a domain name, without any legitimate rights to such mark, is evidence of bad faith. Complainant has relied on decision in Nike, Inc. v. Crystal International, WIPO Case D2001-0102 – holding that the bad faith is indicated by the registration of a series of domain names which are confusingly similar to a famous brand name followed by the absence of any legitimate use.
B. Respondent
· Respondent did not reply to Complainant’s contentions. However, Respondent has consented to the transfer of the disputed domain name to Complainant. While taking note of the consent [ for transfer of the disputed domain name to the Complainant ] given by Respondent, the Panel has decided to proceed with the case for rendering its findings.
· The Panel finds that Complainant has rights in its mark NIKE through use and various registrations in United States and around the world including Russia and with the USPTO.
· Respondent has not replied to any of the contentions of the complainant. Respondent has given its consent for transfer of the disputed domain name to Complainant.
· The Panel finds that the use of the domain name <Nike-exclusive.com> by Respondent is in bad faith and Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in relation to the domain name.
· The Panel also finds that the domain name <Nike-exclusive.com> deserves to be transferred to Complainant and Respondent is not entitled to use this domain name. Complainant deserves to be allowed forthwith and the Panel decides accordingly. However, in terms of the ICANN Policy and the requirements thereunder, the formal observations / findings of the Panel are as under.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
· There is no doubt that Complainant has rights in the NIKE mark. Complainant uses the NIKE mark in connection with its business as the world’s largest sports shoes and sports apparel, with retail stores throughout the United States and countries around the world. Complainant owns the NIKE mark through its numerous trademark registrations around the world, including with the USPTO (e.g., Reg. No. 978,952, registered February 19, 1974). The Panel observes that previous panels have held that such registrations establish rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), even where a respondent resides or operates in a different country. The panel relies upon decision of this Forum in Vivendi Universal Games v. XBNetVentures Inc., FA 198803 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 11, 2003) – holding that Complainant's federal trademark registrations [with the USPTO] establish Complainant's rights in the BLIZZARD mark.; see also Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Fees, FA 937704 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 25, 2007) – holding that it is irrelevant whether the complainant has registered its trademark in the country of the respondent’s residence. Accordingly, the Panel finds that Complainant has rights in the NIKE mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
· The Panel agrees with Complainant’s contention that the <nike-exclusive.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the NIKE mark, as Respondent has simply added a hyphen, the generic term “exclusive,” and the gTLD “.com.” The Panel observes that previous panels have held that such small changes to a disputed domain name, such as the addition of punctuation and a gTLD, are of no consequence under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). The Panel places reliance on decision in InfoSpace.com, Inc. v. Ofer, D2000-0075 (WIPO Apr. 27, 2000) – holding that finding that “[t]he domain name ‘info-space.com’ is identical to Complainant’s INFOSPACE trademark. The addition of a hyphen and .com are not distinguishing features. Further, panels have also held that the addition of a generic term does not allow a respondent to escape the realm of confusing similarity. The Panel relies on decision in Am. Online Inc. v. Neticq.com Ltd., D2000-1606 (WIPO Feb. 12, 2001) – holding that the addition of the generic word “Net” to the complainant’s ICQ mark, makes the <neticq.com> domain name confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark. Therefore, the Panel concludes that the <nike-exclusive.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the NIKE mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
· The attention of the Panel is drawn to the fact that the Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), and then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. In this regard, following decisions are relevant:-
(i) Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 18, 2006) - holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name;
(ii) AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006) – holding that Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light. If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.
· The Panel finds that Complainant has discharged this burden. The Panel agrees with Complainant’s contention that Respondent is not commonly known by the name “nike-exclusive” or by <nike-exclusive.com> and does not own any trade mark registrations for “nike-exclusive”. Further, the Panel observes that Respondent has no permission / license / authority to use the NIKE mark in any manner whatsoever. The Panel has also observed that the available WHOIS information for the disputed domain name lists “Aristarkh Sanaev” as registrant of the disputed domain name. The Panel has also observed that Respondent has made no mention of being commonly known by the disputed domain name. Given the lack of evidence to infer otherwise, the Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). The Panel, in this regard, relies on an earlier decision of this forum in Instron Corp. v. Kaner, FA 768859 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 21, 2006) – holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain names because the WHOIS information listed “Andrew Kaner c/o Electromatic a/k/a Electromatic Equip't” as the registrant and there was no other evidence in the record to suggest that the respondent was commonly known by the domain names in dispute.
· Complainant contends that Respondent has not provided a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name. Rather, Respondent uses the disputed domain name to pass itself off as Complainant or an authorized seller of Complainant to sell Complainant’s own products. The Panel has observed that Complainant has submitted a screenshot of its own website along with a screenshot of the website located under Respondent’s disputed domain name for comparison (Exhibits D and E respectively). The Panel agrees with Complainant’s contention that Respondent has failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name according to Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and 4(c)(iii), respectively. The Panel finds it useful to refer to following decisions:-
(i) Caterpillar Inc. v. Huth, FA 169056 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 2, 2003) – holding that Respondent lacks rights in the disputed domain names because Respondent competes with Complainant by selling Complainant's parts without a license from Complainant to do so.
(ii) Kmart of Mich., Inc. v. Cone, FA 655014 (Nat. Arb. Forum April 25, 2006)- holding that the respondent’s attempt to pass itself of as the complainant was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) when the respondent used the disputed domain name to present users with a website that was nearly identical to the complainant’s website.
· The Panel finds that Respondent does not have any right or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain name pursuant to Policy 4(a)(ii).
· Complainant alleges that Respondent uses the disputed domain name to sell Complainant’s own products (Exhibit E). Complainant asserts that such conduct is disruptive of its business purposes, and is thus evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). The Panel observes that previous panels have also held that selling a complainant’s own goods or services is consistent with bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). In this regard, the Panel places reliance on decision in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Celebrex Cox-2 Vioxx.com, FA 124508 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 16, 2002) – holding that unauthorized use of Complainant’s CELEBREX mark to sell Complainant’s products represents bad faith use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Consequently, the Panel finds that Respondent’s actions disrupt Complainant’s business and are consistent with bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).
· Complainant has further alleged that Respondent uses that confusingly similar domain name to intentionally attract Internet users to its own website and then offers Complainant’s own products for its commercial gain. The Panel has observed that Complainant has submitted a screenshot of Respondent’s webpage, supposedly showing this behavior (Exhibit E). The Panel agrees with Complainant’s argument, and finds that Complainant has acted in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). The panel relies upon decision in Hunter Fan Co. v. MSS, FA 98067 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 23, 2001) – finding bad faith where the respondent used the disputed domain name to sell the complainant’s products without permission and mislead Internet users by implying that the respondent was affiliated with the complainant.
· The Complainant contends that due to the obvious connection between Complainant and Respondent’s infringing domain name, Respondent must have had actual and/or constructive notice of Complainant and its rights in the NIKE mark when it registered the disputed domain name. Although previous panels have not generally regarded constructive notice to be sufficient for a finding of bad faith, however, the Panel finds merit in Complainant’s contention that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant's mark and rights and therefore determine that Respondent registered the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). The panel places its reliance on decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Suger, D2002-0187 (WIPO Apr. 24, 2002) – holding that because the link between the complainant's mark and the content advertised on the respondent's website was obvious, the respondent "must have known about the Complainant's mark when it registered the subject domain name.
· The Panel has compared the screenshots of Complainant’s website (Exhibit D) which displays Complainant’s legitimate business at its <nike.com> website; with screenshots of Respondent’s website <nike-exclusive.com> i.e. the disputed domain name (Exhibit E). The Panel notes a distinct connection with the two websites sufficient to declare such use as “passing off.” “Passing off” is evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) as the Policy ¶ 4(b) elements under this prong of the Policy are non-exclusive. The Panel finds it useful to refer to an earlier decision of this Forum in Monsanto Co. v. Decepticons, FA 101536 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 18, 2001) – holding that the respondent's use of <monsantos.com> to misrepresent itself as the complainant and to provide misleading information to the public supported a finding of bad faith.
· The Panel concludes that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <nike-exclusive.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Maninder Singh, Panelist
Dated: 14.08.2015
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