Robinhood Markets, Inc. v. Htech Sprt
Claim Number: FA1705001732962
Complainant is Robinhood Markets, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by William Schultz of Merchant & Gould, P.C., Minnesota, USA. Respondent is Htech Sprt (“Respondent”), Ukraine.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <robinhoodllc.com>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Richard Hill as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on May 23, 2017; the Forum received payment on May 23, 2017.
On May 23, 2017, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <robinhoodllc.com> domain name is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On May 25, 2017, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of June 14, 2017 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@robinhoodllc.com. Also on May 25, 2017, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On June 20, 2017, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Richard Hill as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant states that it is a corporation with a principal place of business in California with multiple subsidiaries worldwide. It provides financial and stock trading services in the form of a free-trading app. The app provides consumers access to market data and quotes in real-time. Consumers may build personalized stock watch lists with historical market data and detailed charts, place stock orders, and track portfolio performance. Complainant’s products and services have been favorably described in various financial publications around the world. Complainant registered the ROBINHOOD mark in the United States in 2015, as well as in other jurisdictions. It uses that mark to market its various financial services.
According to Complainant, the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its mark because it incorporates the ROBINHOOD mark in its entirety, adding only the generic term “llc” and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com,” neither of which meaningfully distinguishes the domain name from Complainant’s registered mark. Complainant cites UDRP precedents to support its position.
Complainant alleges that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name, nor has Complainant authorized Respondent to use the ROBINHOOD marks for any purpose. Respondent also fails to use the disputed domain name in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or services, because the domain name resolves to a site that mimics Complainant’s in an attempt to trick Internet users (Respondent went so far as to fraudulently acquire an SSL certificate, and Complainant had to take steps to have it revoked). Further, Respondent has copied the “look and feel” of Complainant’s website on the disputed domain name in order to market its own products and services, which does not constitute a bona fide offering or legitimate noncommercial use of any kind. Complainant cites UDRP precedents to support its position.
Complainant alleges that Respondent registered and continues to use the disputed domain name in bad faith. Respondent has exhibited a pattern of bad faith registration—having registered multiple variations of domain names containing Complainant’s registered marks—which evidences bad faith. Further, Respondent’s use of the disputed domain involves attracting Internet users to its site using Complainant’s notoriety, so that it may financially profit through the sales of its own products and services. Additionally, since Respondent’s advertised services compete with those of Complainant, Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name disrupts Complainant’s business activities. Finally, Respondent must have had actual notice of Complainant’s rights in the ROBINHOOD marks because of the mark’s widespread notoriety, which is corroborated by Respondent’s registration of multiple domain names containing the ROBINHOOD marks. Complainant cites UDRP precedents to support its position.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Complainant owns the registered trademark ROBINHOOD with rights dating back to 2015.
The disputed domain name was registered in 2017.
Complainant has not licensed or otherwise authorized Respondent to use its mark.
The disputed domain name resolves to a web site that imitates the look and feel of Complainant’s web site and that offers services that compete with those of Complainant.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s ROBINHOOD mark because it includes the mark in its entirety, with only two minor additions: the generic term “llc,” and a “.com” gTLD. Neither of these sufficiently distinguishes the disputed domain name from Complainant’s mark. The addition of generic terms—particularly terms like “llc,” which pertain to a complainant’s corporate activities—fails to sufficiently distinguish domain names from registered marks. See Altec Industries, Inc. v Gopal Pai FA 1700564 (Forum Apr. 30, 2009) (holding that the addition of “llc” to complainant’s registered ALTEC mark does not adequately distinguish <altecllc.com> from complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). Further, the addition of the “.com” gTLD is insufficient to preclude a finding of confusing similarity. See, e.g., AOL Inc. v. Morgan, FA 1349260 (Forum Nov. 4, 2010) (concluding that the addition of the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com” does not distinguish the disputed domain name from the mark). Therefore, the Panel finds that the additions made to Complainant’s ROBINHOOD marks in the disputed domain name do not serve to differentiate the two for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant has neither authorized nor licensed Respondent’s use of the ROBINHOOD marks. Further, Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). When a respondent fails to submit a response, panels may look to the WHOIS records to establish the lack of affiliation between a registrant and a domain name. See Guardair Corporation v. Pablo Palermo, FA1407001571060 (Forum Aug. 28, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <guardair.com> domain name according to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information lists “Pablo Palermo” as registrant of the disputed domain name). Here, the Panel notes that the WHOIS information concerning <robinhoodllc.com> identifies “Htech Sprt” as the registrant, which provides no evidence that Respondent is commonly known by the domain name. As such, the Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by, and thus lacks rights and legitimate interest in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Respondent uses the resolving website to trick Internet users into believing that there is an affiliation between Respondent and Complainant—where there is none—so that Respondent can commercially profit through the sale services similar to those of Complainant. This constitutes neither a bona fide offering of goods and services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. See Nokia Corp. v. Eagle, FA 1125685 (Forum Feb. 7, 2008) (finding the respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to pass itself off as the complainant in order to advertise and sell similar products was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).
In addition to using a confusingly similar domain name, Respondent has mimicked the design scheme of Complainant’s website, so as to further confuse Internet users. Since Respondent capitalizes on this confusion in an attempt to generate sales revenue, Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name cannot be noncommercial; further, it does not qualify as a bona fide offering. See Kmart of Mich., Inc. v. Cone, FA 655014 (Forum Apr. 25, 2006) (The panel found the respondent’s attempt to pass itself of as the complainant was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) when the respondent used the disputed domain name to present users with a website that was nearly identical to the complainant’s website).
Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the dispute domain name under the Policy.
Respondent (who did not reply to Complainant’s contentions) has not presented any plausible explanation for its use of Complainant’s mark. In accordance with paragraph 14(b) of the Rules, the Panel shall draw such inferences from Respondent’s failure to reply as it considers appropriate. Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent did not have a legitimate use in mind when registering the disputed domain name.
Indeed, as already noted, Respondent uses the disputed domain name to market services that compete with those offered by Complainant, which disrupts Complainant’s business. This sort of disruption is evidence of bad faith on the part of a respondent. See DatingDirect.com Ltd. v. Aston, FA 593977 (Forum Dec. 28, 2005) (“Respondent is appropriating Complainant’s mark to divert Complainant’s customers to Respondent’s competing business. The Panel finds this diversion is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).”). Further, Respondent uses the disputed domain name to attract Internet users in order to personally profit by way of the aforementioned service sales. Capitalizing on the goodwill and notoriety of widely known marks in order to generate revenue for the holder of a domain name is also evidence of bad faith use and registration under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Allianz of Am. Corp. v. Bond, FA 680624 (Forum June 2, 2006) (finding bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) where the respondent was diverting Internet users searching for the complainant to its own website and likely profiting). Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv).
In addition, Complainant provides evidence showing that Respondent has registered multiple domain names containing variations of Complainant’s ROBINHOOD marks, and registered this particular disputed domain name only days after it received notice from Complainant concerning another domain name. Registering multiple domain names related to a complainant’s trademarks is evidence of bad faith on the part of a respondent. See H-D U.S.A., LLC v. zhangzongze / sweden / zhang jinxian / canada goose / harleydavidson / harley davidson, FA1410001587625 (Forum Dec. 10, 2014) (“The Panel agrees that the case relates to the same Respondent here, and Respondent’s history of bad faith suggests Respondent’s bad faith in the instant case pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(ii), especially given the presence of three domain names in this proceeding that incorporate the HARLEY-DAVIDSON mark.”); see also Revlon Consumer Products Corporation v. Domain Manager, PageUp Communications, D2003-0602 (WIPO, Sept. 29, 2003). As such, the Panel finds that Respondent has exhibited bad faith of the kind articulated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(ii).
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <robinhoodllc.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Richard Hill, Panelist
Dated: June 20, 2017
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