Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Tulip Trading Company
Claim Number: FA1707001739558
Complainant is Enterprise Holdings, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by David R. Haarz of Harness, Dickey & Pierce, PLC., Virginia, USA. Respondent is Tulip Trading Company (“Respondent”), Saint Kitts and Nevis.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <enterpriseexoticcars.com>, registered with Key-Systems, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Debrett G. Lyons as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on July 12, 2017; the Forum received payment on July 12, 2017.
On July 13, 2017, Key-Systems, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <enterpriseexoticcars.com> domain name is registered with Key-Systems, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Key-Systems, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the Key-Systems, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On July 14, 2017, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of August 3, 2017 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@enterpriseexoticcars.com. Also on July 14, 2017, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On August 10, 2017, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Debrett G. Lyons as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant asserts trademark rights in ENTERPRISE and alleges that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its trademark.
Complainant alleges that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
Complainant alleges that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
The factual findings pertinent to the decision in this case are that:
1. Complainant operates a vehicle rental business in the United States, Canada, and Europe by reference to the trademark ENTERPRISE;
2. Complainant owns United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) Reg. No. 1,343,167, registered June 18, 1985 for the word mark, ENTERPRISE;
3. the disputed domain name was registered on June 20, 2017 and resolves to a webpage with links to vehicle rental services; and
4. there is no commercial agreement between the parties and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its trademark or to register any domain name incorporating its trademark.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy requires a two-fold enquiry—a threshold investigation into whether a complainant has rights in a trademark, followed by an assessment of whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that trademark.
Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy does not distinguish between registered and unregistered trademark rights. It is well established by decisions under this Policy that a trademark registered with a national authority is evidence of trademark rights. Since Complainant provides proof of its USPTO registration for ENTERPRISE, the Panel is satisfied that it has trademark rights.[i]
For the purposes of comparison, the generic top-level domain (gTLD), “.com”, can be disregarded. The disputed domain names takes the trademark and appends the words “exotic cars” which, in the context of the services provided by Complainant under the trademark, are wholly descriptive and of no differentiating value. The Panel finds the disputed domain name to be confusingly similar to the trademark. [ii]
Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied the requirements of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy states that any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate rights or legitimate interests to a domain name for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy:
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trade mark or service mark at issue.
Complainant need only make out a prima facie case that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, after which the onus shifts to Respondent to rebut that case by demonstrating those rights or interests.[iii]
The publicly available WHOIS information identifies Respondent as “Tulip Trading Company”. There is no other evidence of how Respondent might be known and therefore no evidence that Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name.[iv] There is no evidence that Respondent has any trademark rights. The evidence is that the domain name resolves to a webpage with links under generic names such as “Cheap Car Rental Cars”, “Rental Car Companies” and “Car Rental at Lax”. The Panel finds that such use is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name.
Panel finds that Complainant has established a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name and that Respondent in failing to reply has not rebutted such prima facie case.
Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or interests in the domain name and so finds that Complainant has satisfied the second limb of the Policy.
Complainant must prove on the balance of probabilities both that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith and that it is being used in bad faith.
Further guidance on that requirement is found in paragraph 4(b) of the Policy, which sets out four circumstances, any one of which is taken to be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith if established.
The four specified circumstances are:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to respondent’s website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the respondent’s website or location or of a product or service on the site or location.
The Panel finds that Respondent’s conduct falls under paragraph 4(b)(iv) above. Panel has already found the terms to be confusingly similar. The requisite likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark therefore exists. The likelihood is that Respondent benefits from the use of the domain name by way of click through referral fees. It follows that registration of the domain name was for commercial gain. In terms of paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy, the Panel finds that it is more likely than not that Respondent is using the domain name to attract, for commercial gain, internet users to Respondent’s website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s trademark.[v]
Panel observes that the resolving webpage carries a statement that:
“The Sponsored Listings displayed above are served automatically by a third party. Neither the service provider nor the domain owner maintains any relationship with the advertisers. In case of trademark issues please contact the domain owner directly (contact information can be found in whois).”
It has been said that “where the overall circumstances of a case point to the respondent’s bad faith, the mere existence of a disclaimer cannot cure such bad faith. In such cases, panels may consider the respondent’s use of a disclaimer as an admission by the respondent that users may be confused.”[vi]
Panel finds registration and use in bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(iv) and accordingly finds that Complainant has satisfied the final element of the Policy.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <enterpriseexoticcars.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Debrett G. Lyons, Panelist
Dated: August 13, 2017
[i] See, for example, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Periasami Malain, FA 705262 (FORUM June 19, 2006) (“Complainant’s registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office of the trademark, STATE FARM, establishes its rights in the STATE FARM mark pursuant to Policy, paragraph 4(a)(i).”); see also Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. phix, FA 174052 (Forum Sept. 25, 2003) finding that the complainant’s registration of the MADD mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office establishes the complainant’s rights in the mark for purposes of Policy paragraph 4(a)(i)).
[ii] See, for example, Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) finding that the top level of the domain name does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar; see also U.S. News & World Report, Inc. v. Zhongqi, FA 917070 (FORUM Apr. 9, 2007) (“Elimination of punctuation and the space between the words of Complainant’s mark, as well as the addition of a gTLD does not sufficiently distinguish the disputed domain name from the mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Gillette Co. v. RFK Assocs., FA 492867 (FORUM July 28, 2005) finding that the addition of the term “batteries,” which described the complainant’s products was insufficient to distinguish the respondent’s <duracellbatteries.com> from the complainant’s DURACELL mark.
[iii] See, for example, Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000‑0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000).
[iv] See, for example, Coppertown Drive-Thru Sys., LLC v. Snowden, FA 715089 (FORUM July 17, 2006).
[v] See, for example, Affliction, Inc. v. Chinasupply, FA 1223521 (FORUM Oct. 23, 2008; Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. domain admin / private registrations aktien gesellschaft, FA1506001626253 (FORUM July 29, 2015).
[vi] See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”) where it is asked at section 3.7: How does a disclaimer on the webpage to which a disputed domain name resolves impact a panel’s assessment of bad faith?
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