DECISION

 

NIKE, Inc., and Nike Innovate, C.V. v. san mao

Claim Number: FA1709001750579

 

PARTIES

Complainant is NIKE, Inc., and Nike Innovate, C.V. (“Complainant”), represented by David J. Steele of Tucker Ellis, LLP, California, USA.  Respondent is san mao (“Respondent”), China.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <nikeplusinc.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Sandra J. Franklin as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on September 25, 2017; the Forum received payment on September 25, 2017.

 

On Sep 26, 2017, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On September 26, 2017, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of October 16, 2017 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@nikeplusinc.com.  Also on September 26, 2017, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On October 17, 2017, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Sandra J. Franklin as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

1.    Respondent’s <nikeplusinc.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s NIKE mark.

 

2.    Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name.

 

3.    Respondent registered and uses the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant is a global provider of athletic goods and services.  Complainant holds multiple registrations for its NIKE mark with trademark agencies throughout the world (e.g. USPTO—Reg. No. 978,952, registered Feb 19, 1974).

 

Respondent registered the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name on August 30, 2017, and uses it to fraudulently pass off as Complainant in an email scam.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

The Panel finds that Complainant’s registration of the NIKE mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Home Depot Product Authority, LLC v. Samy Yosef / Express Transporting, FA 1738124 (Forum July 28, 2017) (finding that registration with the USPTO was sufficient to establish the complainant’s rights in the HOME DEPOT mark).

 

Complainant claims common law rights in the NIKEPLUS mark, used in connection with its registered customer program through which customers can create a membership account online and access NIKEPLUS program benefits, including free shipping and 30-day trials, priority access, exclusive content, on-the-go workouts, and special invites.  Complainant includes a screen capture of the <nike.com> website, showing use of the NIKEPLUS mark.  The Panel finds Complainant’s contentions to be sufficient, and concludes that Complainant has established common law rights UNDER Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) by showing that the NIKEPLUS mark has taken on a secondary meaning in association with Complainant’s business.

 

Respondent’s <nikeplusinc.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the NIKE and/or NIKEPLUS marks, as the domain name contains each mark in its entirety, and merely adds the generic or descriptive terms “plus” and/or “inc” and the gTLD “.com.”  The addition to a mark of gTLD and a generic term or one descriptive of a complainant’s business does not distinguish the resultant domain name from the mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Microsoft Corporation v. Thong Tran Thanh, FA 1653187 (Forum Jan. 21, 2016) (determining that confusing similarity exists where [a disputed domain name] contains Complainant’s entire mark and differs only by the addition of a generic or descriptive phrase and top-level domain, the differences between the domain name and its contained trademark are insufficient to differentiate one from the other for the purposes of the Policy.). The Panel thus finds that Respondent’s <nikeplusinc.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s NIKE and NIKEPLUS marks.

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Once Complainant makes a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests.  See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.”).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in <nikeplusinc.com> and is not commonly known by the disputed domain name.  Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use the NIKE or NIKEPLUS marks in any way.  Originally, a privacy service was used by Respondent, but was lifted as a result of the commencement of this proceeding; the WHOIS information of record now identifies Respondent as “san mao.”  The Panel therefore finds under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name.  See Navistar International Corporation v. N Rahmany, FA1505001620789 (Forum June 8, 2015) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name where the complainant had never authorized the respondent to incorporate its NAVISTAR mark in any domain name registration); see also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Dale Anderson, FA1504001613011 (Forum May 21, 2015) (concluding that because the WHOIS record lists “Dale Anderson” as the registrant of the disputed domain name, the respondent was not commonly known by the <statefarmforum.com> domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii)); see also Kohler Co. v. Privacy Service, FA1505001621573 (Forum July 2, 2015) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) where “Privacy Service” was listed as the registrant of the disputed domain name).

 

Complainant further argues that Respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name is evinced by Respondent’s failure to use the name for a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.  Complainant demonstrates that Respondent uses an email address hosted at <nikeplusinc.com> to run a scheme wherein Respondent purports to be Complainant and contacts online third-party sellers of NIKE goods to report the items as counterfeit.  The Panel agrees that this use is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a noncommercial or fair use.  Respondent therefore lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).  See Emerson Electric Co. v. Adilcon Rocha, FA 1735949 (Forum July 11, 2017) (finding that respondent’s attempt to pass off as complainant through emails does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services and, as such, respondent lacked rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Respondent uses the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name to pass off as Complainant with an email address used for a fraudulent scheme.  The Panel finds that this disrupts Complainant’s business, for Respondent’s gain, and constitutes bad faith under Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv).  See Microsoft Corporation v. Terrence Green / Whois Agent / Whois Privacy Protection Service, Inc., FA 1661030 (Forum Apr. 4, 2016) (finding the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to send fraudulent emails supported a finding of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)); see also Abbvie, Inc. v. James Bulow, FA 1701075 (Forum Nov. 30, 2016) (“Respondent uses the <abbuie.com> domain name to impersonate Complainant’s CEO. Such use is undeniably disruptive to Complainant’s business and demonstrates bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), and/or Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)”).

 

Complainant contends that, in light of the fame and notoriety of Complainant's NIKE marks, it is inconceivable that Respondent could have registered the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name without knowledge of Complainant's rights in the mark.  The Panel agrees with Complainant, noting Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to impersonate Complainant, and finds that actual knowledge is additional evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).  Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name also constitutes opportunistic bad faith.  See Am. Online, Inc. v. Fu, D2000-1374 (WIPO Dec. 11, 2000) (finding that the ICQ mark is so obviously connected with the complainant and its products that the use of the domain names by the respondent, who has no connection with the complainant, suggests opportunistic bad faith).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <nikeplusinc.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Sandra J. Franklin, Panelist

Dated:  October 18, 2017

 

 

 

 

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