Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. eric willaims
Claim Number: FA1710001754731
Complainant is Chevron Intellectual Property LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Jenny T. Slocum of Dickinson Wright PLLC, District of Columbia, USA. Respondent is eric willaims (“Respondent”), Canada.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <chevronhrs.com>, registered with Google Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Bruce E. Meyerson as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on October 19, 2017; the Forum received payment on October 19, 2017.
On October 23, 2017, Google Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <chevronhrs.com> domain name is registered with Google Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Google Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Google Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On October 25, 2017, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of November 14, 2017 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@chevronhrs.com. Also on October 25, 2017, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On November 16, 2017, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Bruce E. Meyerson as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
1. Complainant, Chevron Intellectual Property Corporation, is one of the world's leading integrated energy companies. Complainant uses the CHEVRON mark in all aspects of its business. Complainant has rights in the mark based upon registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 364,683, registered Feb. 14, 1939.) Complainant also registered the CHEVRON mark with government trademark entities throughout North and South America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and Africa.
2. Respondent’s <chevronhrs.com>[1] is confusingly similar to the mark as it contains Complainant’s mark in its entirety, adding the letters “hrs” and the generic top level domain (“gTLD”) “.com.”
3. Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the <chevronhrs.com> domain name. Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name and Complainant has not granted Respondent permission or license to use the CHEVRON mark for any purpose.
4. Respondent is not using the domain name to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate non-commercial or fair use. Rather, Respondent is using the domain to pass itself off as Complainant through false employment emails and job offerings.
5. Respondent registered and used the <chevronhrs.com> domain name in bad faith. Respondent’s use of the domain name is disrupting Complainant’s business by giving the false impression to users that they have been offered employment opportunities.
6. Respondent attracts users for commercial gain by passing itself off as Complainant, phishing for users’ personal information and money.
7. Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s CHEVRON mark and business prior to registration and during subsequent use of the domain name.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Complainant holds trademark rights for the CHEVRON mark. Respondent’s domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHEVRON mark. Complainant has established that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the use of the <chevronhrs.com> domain name and that Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
Complainant has rights in the CHEVRON mark based upon its registration with the USPTO (e.g. Reg. No. 364,683, registered Feb. 14, 1939.) Complainant also registered the CHEVRON mark with government trademark entities throughout North and South America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and Africa. Registrations with multiple government trademark agencies, including USPTO, are sufficient to establish rights in a mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Am. Int’l Group, Inc. v. Morris, FA 569033 (Forum Dec. 6, 2005) (“Complainant has established rights in the AIG mark through registration of the mark with several trademark authorities throughout the world, including the United States Patent and Trademark Office (‘USPTO’)”). Therefore, the Panel finds that Complainant has established rights in the CHEVRON mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant asserts that <chevronhrs.com> is confusingly similar to the CHEVRON mark, as it contains the mark in its entirety, adding the abbreviation “hrs,” along with the gTLD “.com.” Slight differences between domain names and registered marks, such as the addition of abbreviated terms that describe the goods or services in connection with the mark, do not distinguish the domain name from the mark incorporated therein. See eBay Inc. v. eBay Motors, FA 1731822 (Forum June 26, 2017) (holding that “words like ‘online,’ which pertain to a complainant’s trademark-related activities—fails to sufficiently distinguish domain names from registered marks.”). Similarly, the addition of a gTLD to a mark is irrelevant in determining whether the disputed domain name is confusingly similar. See Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis). The Panel agrees with Complainant and finds that Respondent’s <chevronhrs.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHEVRON mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
The Panel finds Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant alleges that Respondent holds no rights or legitimate interests in the <chevronhrs.com> domain name. This allegation must be supported with a prima facie showing by Complainant under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). After a complainant successfully makes a prima facie case, a respondent is faced with the burden of proving it does have rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. In Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Admin, Domain, FA 873137 (Forum Feb. 13, 2007), the panel held that when a complainant produces a prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to the respondent to demonstrate its rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c); see also Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires v. Greenpeace Int’l, D2001-0376 (WIPO May 14, 2001) (“For the purposes of this sub paragraph, however, it is sufficient for the Complainant to show a prima facie case and the burden of proof is then shifted on to the shoulders of Respondent. In those circumstances, the common approach is for respondents to seek to bring themselves within one of the examples of paragraph 4(c) or put forward some other reason why they can fairly be said to have a relevant right or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name in question.”). The Panel holds that Complainant has made a prima facie case.
Complainant argues that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in <chevronhrs.com>, as Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name, nor has Complainant authorized Respondent to use the CHEVRON mark in any way. The WHOIS information of record identifies Respondent as “Eric Williams.” Where a response is lacking, WHOIS information can support a finding that a respondent is not commonly known by a domain name. See Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark.). Additionally, the lack of evidence in the record to indicate a respondent was authorized to register a domain name using a complainant’s mark supports a finding that a respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name. See Navistar International Corporation v. N Rahmany, FA1505001620789 (Forum June 8, 2015) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name where the complainant had never authorized the respondent to incorporate its NAVISTAR mark in any domain name registration). The Panel therefore finds, under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), that Respondent has not been commonly known by the <chevronhrs.com> domain name.
Complainant further argues that Respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests in the domain name is demonstrated by its failure to use the <chevronhrs.com> domain name to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Complainant has shown that Respondent uses the domain name to pass off as Complainant through false employment emails and job offers. An attempt to pass itself off as a complainant is further evidence that a respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests. See Nokia Corp. v. Eagle, FA 1125685 (Forum Feb. 7, 2008) (finding the respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to pass itself off as the complainant in order to advertise and sell unauthorized products of the complainant was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)). Therefore, the Panel agrees that Respondent has not used <chevronhrs.com> in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).
The Panel finds Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Complainant maintains that Complainant registered and is using <chevronhrs.com> in bad faith. Complainant has provided evidence that Respondent’s <chevronhrs.com> domain name attracts users for commercial gain by using the resolving website to pass itself off as Complainant, phishing for users’ personal information and money. Using the domain name for this purpose is evidence of bad faith registration and use. See Qatalyst Partners LP v. Devimore, FA 1393436 (Forum July 13, 2011). Likewise, the Respondent’s attempt to impersonate an employee of the Complainant is evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Smiths Group plc v. Snooks, FA 1372112 (Forum Mar. 18, 2011).
Complainant argues that Respondent’s use of the domain name is disrupting Complainant’s business by giving the false impression to users that they have been offered employment opportunities. A “[r]espondent’s use of the domain name’s e-mail suffix for fraudulent purposes illustrates Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith.” SHUAA Capital psc v. Oba Junkie / shuaa capital psc, FA14009001581255 (Forum Oct. 29, 2014); see Emdeon Business Services, LLC v. HR Emdeon Careers, FA1507001629459 (Forum Aug. 14, 2015) (finding that the respondent had engaged in an email phishing scheme indicating bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), where respondent was coordinating the disputed domain name to send emails to Internet users and advising them that they had been selected for a job interview with the complainant and was persuading the users to disclose personal information in the process). Given the evidence provided, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using <chevronhrs.com> in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iv) and 4(a)(iii).
Finally, Complainant argues that Respondent registered the <chevronhrs.com> domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark. Given Complainant’s presence as one of the world's largest integrated energy companies, it is inconceivable that Respondent did not have actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark when he registered the domain name. See Google Inc. v. Ahmed Humood, FA1411001591796 (Forum Jan. 7, 2015) (“This Panel makes that inference; Respondent has actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark at the time of domain name registration based on the fame of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark and Respondent’s use of one of the disputed domain names to detail Internet domain name registration and maintenance services related to an in competition with Complainant.) The Panel agrees that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the CHEVRON mark when it registered and subsequently used <chevronhrs.com>, thereby supporting a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
The Panel finds Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <chevronhrs.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Bruce E. Meyerson Panelist
Dated: November 24, 2017
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page