Phillips 66 Company v. Smart Xo / Milton Liqours lLC
Claim Number: FA1812001822236
Complainant is Phillips 66 Company (“Complainant”), represented by Steven M. Espenshade of Pirkey Barber PLLC, Texas, USA. Respondent is Smart Xo / Milton Liqours lLC (“Respondent”), Bulgaria.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <p6d6.com>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on December 21, 2018; the Forum received payment on December 21, 2018.
On December 21, 2018, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <p6d6.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On December 21, 2018, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of January 10, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@p6d6.com. Also on December 21, 2018, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On January 13, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant engages in the world-wide manufacture, marketing, distribution, and sale of petroleum products and services. Complainant has rights in the 66 mark based upon its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 255,508, registered Apr. 23, 1929). Respondent’s Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as Respondent incorporates the entire 66 mark and merely adds the letters “p” and “d” and a “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Complainant has not licensed or permitted Respondent to use Complainant’s 66 mark and Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name. Additionally, Respondent does not use the Domain Name for a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate non-commercial or fair use. The web site resolving from the Domain Name is inactive. Further, Respondent uses the Domain Name for email accounts which impersonate those of Complainant’s employees and direct Complainant’s customers to send money owed to Complainant to one or more bank accounts which are not Complainant’s accounts.
Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent uses the Domain Name to defraud Complainant and its customers by means of a fraudulent email scheme. Respondent engages in typosquatting by adding the letters “p” and “d” to the 66 mark, and Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the 66 mark prior to registering the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy provides that in order to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name, Complainant must prove each of the following three elements:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
Complainant registered its 66 mark with the USPTO (Reg. No. 255,508) on April 23, 1929. See, Complaint Exhibit C. Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes a complainant’s rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Haas Automation, Inc. v. Jim Fraser, FA 1627211 (Forum Aug. 4, 2015) (finding that Complainant’s USPTO registrations for the HAAS mark sufficiently demonstrate its rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)).
Respondent’s Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s 66 mark as it incorporates the two sixes and merely adds a “p” before the first 6, inserts a “d” between the two, and adds the gTLD “.com.” These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s 66 mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Am. Online, Inc. v. David, FA 104980 (Forum Apr. 10, 2002) (“The misspelling of a famous mark does not diminish the confusingly similar nature between the marks and the disputed domain names.”); see also Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis), Phillips 66 Company v. Cimpress Schweiz GmbH, FA 1808001802407 (Forum Sept. 17, 2018) (finding that the respondent’s <p-66.com> domain name is confusingly similar to the complainant’s 66 mark).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the 66 mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”) at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to respondent of the dispute, respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Complainant has not authorized or licensed it to use its 66 mark, (ii) it is not commonly known by the Domain Name, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services or as a legitimate noncommercial or other fair use because the web site resolving from it is inactive, and Respondent is using emails based upon the Domain Name to defraud Complainant and its customers. These allegations are supported by competent evidence.
Complainant states that it has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
The information furnished to The Forum by the registrar shows that the Domain Name is registered to “Smart Xo” and the registrant organization is “Milton Liqours [sic] ILC.” Neither of these names bears any resemblance to the Domain Name. UDRP panels have consistently held that evidence of a registrant name that is materially different from the domain name at issue is competent evidence that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Guardair Corporation v. Pablo Palermo, FA1407001571060 (Forum Aug. 28, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <guardair.com> domain name according to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information lists “Pablo Palermo” as registrant of the disputed domain name). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complaint Exhibit E is a screenshot of the landing page for the Domain Name. The only operative content on this page reads “This site can’t be reached.” Respondent is thus not using the Domain Name for an active web site, and this has often been held by UDRP panels to be evidence of a lack of rights or legitimate interests in a domain name. George Weston Bakeries Inc. v. McBroom, FA 933276 (Forum Apr. 25, 2007) (finding that the respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in a domain name under either Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) where it failed to make any active use of the domain name). The evidence of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name in connection with efforts to defraud Complainant and its customers as discussed below strongly suggests that Repondent does not intend ever to use the Domain Name inconnection with a bona fide offering of goods or services at the resolving web site.
Complaint Exhibit F consists of copies of correspondence sent by email to customers of Complainant purportedly from persons who Complainant states are in fact employed by it as sales support coordinators, but using the email address [coordinator’s name]@p6d6.com. This correspondence directs the customer to remit future invoice payments to a specified bank account in Romania, which Complainant states is not one of its accounts. Respondent is thus using the Domain Name in connection with an email address which he uses to defraud Complainant and its customers of money due from the customers to Complainant. Using a domain name to gain commercially through a fraudulent email scam is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“Passing off as a complainant through e-mails is evidence that a respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).”), Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Thomas Webber / Chev Ronoil Recreational Sport Limited, FA 1661076 (Forum Mar. 15, 2016) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services or any legitimate noncommercial or fair use, stating, “Respondent is using an email address to pass themselves off as an affiliate of Complainant. Complainant presents evidence showing that the email address that Respondent has created is used to solicit information and money on false pretenses. The disputed domain name is being used to cause the recipients of these emails to mistakenly believe Respondent has a connection with Complainant and is one of the Complainant’s affiliates.”).
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
(i) respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name;
(ii) respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct;
(iii) respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on respondent’s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name discussed above in connection with the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use. Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name for an email address from which it impersonates and passes itself off as Complainant for the purpose of defrauding Complainant and its customers. The domain name used by Complainant for its business operations is <p66.com> (see, Complaint Exhibit D), which is very similar to the Domain Name and obviously contributes to the likelihood that Respondent’s emails will be taken as genuinely originating with Complainant. The Policy recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and using a domain name to pose as a complainant to promote a fraudulent scheme has often been held to constitute bad faith. SHUAA Capital psc v. Oba Junkie / shuaa capital psc, FA14009001581255 (Forum Oct. 29, 2014) (“The Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the domain name’s e-mail suffix for fraudulent purposes illustrates Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith.”), Monsanto Co. v. Decepticons, FA 101536 (Forum Dec. 18, 2001) (finding that the respondent's use of <monsantos.com> to misrepresent itself as the complainant and to provide misleading information to the public supported a finding of bad faith), Microsoft Corporation v. Terrence Green / Whois Agent / Whois Privacy Protection Service, Inc., FA 1661030 (Forum Apr. 4, 2016) (finding the respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to send fraudulent emails supported a finding of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)), Smiths Group plc v. Snooks, FA 1372112 (Forum Mar. 18, 2011) (finding that the respondent’s attempt to impersonate an employee of the complainant was evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)).
Finally, it is evident from Complainant’s long-standing and well-known presence in markets around the world, and from the close similarity between Complainant’s domain name and Respondent’s Domain Name that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark when it registered the Domain Name. Further, the evidence of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name for emails in which it impersonates Complainant further demonstrates its prior knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the 66 mark, and its intent in registering that name to use it in connection with a scheme to defraud Complainant and its customers. In light of the open ended, non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in a mark prior to registering an identical or confusingly similar domain name has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name), Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (“Complainant contends Respondent’s appropriation of Complainant’s trademark was a clear intent to trade upon Complainant’s reputation and goodwill in order to confuse Internet users. Therefore, the Panel finds Respondent did have actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark prior to registration and this constitutes bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <p6d6.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
January 15, 2019
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