DECISION

 

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp.

Claim Number: FA1902001831778

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (“Complainant”), represented by Peter Kidd of Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, California, USA.  Respondent is Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp. (“Respondent”), Bahamas.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <laborp.com>, registered with Internet Domain Service BS Corp.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially, and, to the best of his knowledge, has no conflict of interests in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Terry F. Peppard as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on February 27, 2019; the Forum received payment on February 27, 2019.

 

On March 1, 2019, Internet Domain Service BS Corp confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <laborp.com> domain name is registered with Internet Domain Service BS Corp and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Internet Domain Service BS Corp has verified that Respondent is bound by the Internet Domain Service BS Corp registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On March 1, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of March 21, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@laborp.com.  Also on March 1, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On March 24, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Terry F. Peppard as sole Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Operating under the name and mark LABCORP, Complainant provides clinical, diagnostic and analytical laboratory services throughout the world.

 

Complainant holds a registration for the LABCORP service mark, which is on file with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as Registry No. 2,000,799, registered September 17, 1996, most recently renewed as of November 30, 2016. 

 

Respondent registered the domain name <laborp.com> on May 4, 2005.

 

The domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s LABCORP mark.

 

Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name.

 

Complainant has not licensed or otherwise permitted Respondent to use the LABCORP mark.

 

Respondent does not use the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.

 

Rather, Respondent uses the domain name to profit by offering at its resolving website advertisements that link to the websites of Complainant’s commercial competitors.

 

Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name.

 

The domain name is an instance of typo-squatting.

 

Respondent’s use of the domain name disrupts Complainant’s business.

 

Respondent knew of Complainant’s rights in the LABCORP mark when it registered the domain name.

 

Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is confusingly similar to a service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the same domain name was registered and is being used by Respondent in bad faith.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

i.      the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

ii.    Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

iii.   the domain name has been registered and is being used by Respondent in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel will, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules, decide this proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations, and, pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules, draw such inferences as it deems appropriate.  The Panel is entitled to accept as true all reasonable allegations and inferences set out in the Complaint unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (finding that a respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of a UDRP complaint to be deemed true).  See also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO February 29, 2000):  “In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

Complainant has rights in the LABCORP service mark sufficient for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) by reason of its registration of the mark with a national trademark authority, the USPTO.  See DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum December 30, 2018):

 

Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for …[its mark]… demonstrates its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

This is true without regard to whether Complainant’s rights in its mark arise from registration of the mark in a jurisdiction (here the United States) other than that in which Respondent resides or does business (here Bahamas).  See, for example, W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. Above.com Domain Privacy, FA 1334458 (Forum August 24, 2010):

 

[T]he Panel finds that USPTO registration is sufficient to establish these [Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)] rights even when Respondent lives or operates in a different country.

 

Turning to the core question posed by Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), we conclude from a review of the record that Respondent’s <laborp.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s LABCORP service mark.  The domain name contains the mark in its entirety, with only the omission of the letter “c” and the addition of the generic Top Level Domain (“gTLD”) “.com.”  These alterations of the mark, made in forming the domain name, do not save it from the realm of confusing similarity under the standards of the Policy.  See, for example, Morgan Stanley v. Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp., FA 1783121 (Forum June 1, 2018):

 

Respondent’s … domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s … mark as it wholly incorporates the mark, but for the omission of the letter ‘y’ and … appends the ‘.com’ gTLD.

 

As to the latter point, this is because every domain name requires a gTLD.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Under Policy 4(a)(ii), Complainant must make out a prima facie showing that Respondent lacks rights to and legitimate interests in the <laborp.com> domain name, whereupon the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have such rights or interests.  See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Forum August 18, 2006) (finding that a UDRP complainant must make a prima facie case that a respondent lacks rights to or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name under UDRP¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to that respondent to show that it does have such rights or interests).  See also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Forum September 25, 2006):

 

Complainant must … make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light.  If Complainant satisfies its burden, … the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.

 

Complainant has made a sufficient prima facie showing under this head of the Policy.  Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint therefore permits us to infer that Respondent does not have rights to or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  See Desotec N.V. v. Jacobi Carbons AB, D2000-1398 (WIPO December 21, 2000) (finding that a respondent’s failure to respond to a UDRP complaint allows a presumption that a complainant’s allegations are true unless they are clearly contradicted by the evidence).  Nonetheless, we will examine the record before us, in light of the several considerations set out in Policy ¶ 4(c) (i)-(iii), to determine whether there is in it any basis for concluding that Respondent has rights to or legitimate interests in the contested domain name that are cognizable under the Policy.

 

We begin by noting that Complainant contends, and Respondent does not deny, that Respondent has not been commonly known by the <laborp.com> domain name, and that Complainant has not licensed or otherwise permitted Respondent to use the LABCORP mark.  Moreover, the pertinent WHOIS information identifies the registrant of the domain name only as “Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp.,” which does not resemble the domain name.  On this record, we conclude that Respondent has not been commonly known by the disputed domain name so as to have acquired rights to or legitimate interests in it within the ambit of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See Google LLC v. Bhawana Chandel / Admission Virus, FA 1799694 (Forum September 4, 2018) (concluding, under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), that a respondent was not commonly known by a disputed domain name where the relevant WHOIS record identified that respondent as “Bhawana Chandel,” which did not resemble the domain name, and nothing in the record showed that that respondent was authorized to use a UDRP Complainant’s mark in any manner). 

 

We next observe that Complainant asserts, without objection from Respondent, that Respondent uses the <laborp.com> domain name to offer advertisements that link to Complainant’s commercial competitors. Using a domain name to display hyperlinks to websites offering services in competition with the business of a UDRP complainant does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services by means of the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of it under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) such as would confirm in Respondent rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name as provided in those subsections of the Policy.  See, for example, Barclays PLC v. Antwan Barnes, FA 1806411 (Forum October 20, 2018):

 

Using a domain name to offer links to [websites marketing] services in direct competition with [the business of] a [UDRP] complainant does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).

 

We also take note of the fact that Complainant alleges, again without objection from Respondent, that the <laborp.com> domain name is an instance of typo-squatting, i.e.: the deliberate misspelling of the mark of another in a domain name so as to take advantage of typing errors commonly made by Internet users in entering into their web browsers the names of enterprises with which they wish to do business online.  Typo-squatting is itself a demonstration that Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interest in the challenged domain name.  See Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA1503001610050 (Forum April 23, 2015):

 

Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark.  Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typo[-]squatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests [in a domain name that is confusingly similar to the mark of another] under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

The Panel therefore finds that Complainant has satisfied the proof requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

We are persuaded by the evidence that Respondent’s use of the <laborp.com> domain name as alleged in the Complaint disrupts Complainant’s business.  Under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), this stands as proof of Respondent’s bad faith in registering and using the domain name.  See, for example, Health Republic Insurance Company v. Above.com Legal, FA1506001622088 (Forum July 10, 2015):

 

The use of a domain name’s resolving website to host links to competitors of a complainant shows intent to disrupt that complainant’s business, thereby showing bad faith in use and registration under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).

 

We are also convinced by the evidence that Respondent employs the contested <laborp.com> domain name, which we have found to be confusingly similar to Complainant’s LABCORP service mark, to profit from the confusion thus caused among Internet users as to the possibility of Complainant’s association with the domain name.  Under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), this too illustrates Respondent’s bad faith in registering and using the domain name.  See, for example, Transamerica Corporation v. Carolina Rodrigues, FA 1798316 (Forum August 20, 2018):

 

Respondent's use of the domain name to link to competitors of Complainant, presumably generating pay-per-click or referral fees for Respondent, is indicative of bad faith under paragraphs 4(b)(iii) and 4(b)(iv).

 

Finally, under this head of the Policy, inasmuch as we have concluded that the <laborp.com> domain name is an instance of typo-squatting, that fact further shows Respondent’s bad faith in registering and using the domain name.  See Adorama, Inc. v. Moniker Privacy Services, FA1610020 (Forum May 1, 2015):

 

Respondent has also engaged in typo[-]squatting, which is additional evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). 

 

The Panel thus finds that Complainant has met its obligations of proof under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required to be proven under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that the relief requested must be, and it is hereby, GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <laborp.com> domain name be forthwith TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Terry F. Peppard, Panelist

Dated:  April 1, 2019

 

 

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