Banc of California, N.A. v. kevin heckemeyer
Claim Number: FA1903001836223
Complainant is Banc of California, N.A. (“Complainant”), represented by Lindsay Hulley of Rutan & Tucker LLP, California, USA. Respondent is kevin heckemeyer (“Respondent”), California, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <bancofcalifornia.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on March 27, 2019; the Forum received payment on March 27, 2019.
On March 28, 2019, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <bancofcalifornia.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On March 29, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of April 18, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@bancofcalifornia.com. Also on March 29, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On April 23, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a banking and financial institution. Complainant has common law rights in the BANC OF CALIFORNIA mark dating from July 2013 and based upon its registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., 4,728,280, registered April 28, 2015, filed July 1, 2013). Respondent’s Domain Name is identical to Complainant’s mark because it incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely adding the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name and is not authorized or permitted to use Complainant’s mark in any manner. Additionally, Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. The Domain Name was created in September 2005. Respondent acquired it on or about September 8, 2013. Before December 2014 the Domain Name was parked without use. The Domain Name currently redirects to another web site at <mortgagebankca.com>. The web site hosted at this domain is currently inactive, but as of December 2014 it displayed advertising for and information about a California-licensed mortgage (non-bank) lender named Mortgage Bank of California. The Domain Name currently sits unused.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. It acquired it opportunistically in 2013 just after Complainant was organized as a very large banking institution with much attendant publicity. Subsequently, Respondent has attempted on numerous occasions to sell the Domain Name to Complainant for exorbitantly high amounts. Additionally, Respondent currently passively holds the disputed domain name. Finally, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark when it acquired the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy provides that in order to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name, Complainant must prove each of the following three elements:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The BANC OF CALIFORNIA mark was registered to Complainant on the principal register of the USTPO (Reg. No 4,728,280) on April 28, 2015. Complaint Exhibit F. Registration of a mark with the USTPO is sufficient to establish a complainant’s rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (“Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”). For the purposes of the Policy, a complainant’s rights in a registered mark are deemed to commence as of the date the application for the mark was filed. Micha Advanced Health dba LEMYKA v. Shanshan Huang / This domain name is for sale, FA 1772893 (Forum Apr. 9, 2018) (“The relevant date for acquiring rights in a registered mark is the application filing date.”). In this case, Complainant’s application for the registration described above was filed on July 1, 2013. Complaint Exhibit F. Its rights in the mark are established as of that date.
Complainant also claims common law rights in the BANC OF CALIFORNIA mark. Common law rights in a trademark can be established by evidence of secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA 1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that Complainant established common law rights in her personal name since “[a] mark can generate a secondary meaning sufficient to establish Complainant’s rights when consistent and continuous use of the mark has created distinctive and significant good will… Complainant has published under the KAREN KOEHLER name extensively, and Complainant’s legal skills have been recognized by various organizations and groups with extensive positive media coverage. Complainant also operates an online blog associated with the KAREN KOEHLER mark.”), Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) (“Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”). The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”) ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including “(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys.”
Here, Complainant demonstrated that it was organized in July 2013 as a result of the high-profile merger of four banks with combined assets in excess of $3 billion and more than 60 banking locations. Complaint Annex J Complainant spent some $4.4 million on advertising that year (Complaint Annex N) and there was extensive press coverage surrounding the formation of the bank (Complaint Annex M). Since 2013 Complainant has continued its extensive advertising and publicity, all under the BANC OF CALIFORNIA mark. Complaint Annexes G and H. The Panel is satisfied that Complainant has adequately supported its claim of common law rights in the mark. Further, these rights were established even as of July 2013 when Complainant was organized, based upon the size and scope of the merger transaction involved, and the attendant publicity at that time. Future Festivals, LLC v WhoisProtectService.net and PROTECTSERVICE, LTD, FA 1689134 (Forum Oct. 3, 2016) (finding secondary meaning established in the DESERT TRIP mark for concerts “almost immediately upon announcement“ of the event and prior to actual sale of tickets and with intent-to-use application pending).
Respondent’s Domain Name is virtually identical to the BANC OF CALIFORNIA mark because it incorporates that mark in its entirety, merely eliminating the spaces between the words and adding the “.com” gTLD. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Marquette Golf Club v. Al Perkins, FA 1738263 (Forum July 27, 2017) (“When a respondent’s domain name incorporates a mark in its entirety and merely adds a generic top-level domain (gTLD), “.com”, then the Panel may find that the disputed domain name is identical to Complainant’s mark.”). The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”), at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name, and this establishes its confusing similarity to Complainant’s mark.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the BANC OF CALIFORNIA mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to respondent of the dispute, respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Respondent is not an authorized provider of Complainant’s services and Complainant has not licensed or otherwise permitted Respondent to use its mark, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services or for a legitimate noncommercial or other fair use because the web site resolving from it has no content and is not being used. These allegations are supported by competent evidence.
The WHOIS information submitted as Amended Complaint Annex Exhibit A lists the registrant of the Domain Name as “kevin heckemeyer.” This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. UDRP panels have consistently held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a registrant name that is materially different from the domain name at issue is competent evidence that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Guardair Corporation v. Pablo Palermo, FA1407001571060 (Forum Aug. 28, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <guardair.com> domain name according to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information lists “Pablo Palermo” as registrant of the disputed domain name). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that Respondent is not an authorized provider of Complainant’s services and Complainant has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Annex FF is a screenshot of a web page appearing at <mortgagebankca.com>. According to the Wayback Machine report submitted as Complaint Annex CC, the Domain Name was redirecting Internet traffic from the Domain Name to this web site in December of 2014. The Annex FF web page is an advertisement for an entity named Mortgage Bank of California, which was purportedly offering mortgage loan services and thus competing with Complainant. To the extent Respondent was responsible for the redirect to this web site from the Domain Name, it was at that time a competitor of Complainant. UDRP panels have consistently held that using a confusingly similar domain name to compete with a complainant does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc. v. Beaty Enters., FA 135008 (Forum Jan. 2, 2003) (finding that the respondent, as a competitor of the complainant, had no rights or legitimate interests in a domain name that utilized the complainant’s mark for its competing website).
Further, Complainant Annex CC is a screenshot of the web site currently resolving from the <mortgagebankca.com> web site. The only substantive content on this page says “SORRY! If you are the owner of this web site please contact your hosting provider.” The web site is obviously not active. Again, the Domain Name redirects traffic to this web site and to the extent Respondent is responsible for the redirect it is using the Domain Name to host an inactive web site. Moreover, Complaint Annex EE, which is a screenshot of the web page resolving from the Domain Name prior to December 2014, demonstrates that the Domain Name was not being actively used in that time period. Using a domain Name for this purpose does not qualify as bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Thermo Electron Corp. v. Xu, FA 713851 (Forum July 12, 2006) (finding that the respondent’s non-use of the disputed domain names demonstrates that the respondent is not using the disputed domain names for a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product of service on your web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name supports a finding of bad faith, based upon the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, the Declaration of John Grosvenor, general counsel for Complainant, submitted as Complaint Annex II, states that in October 2017 a person named Ryan Ploung, holding himself out as a VP/Branch Manager of California’s Mortgage Bank, contacted him, represented that his firm owned the Domain Name and proposed a sale of the name to Complainant. Mr. Grosvenor offered $50,000 and the Respondent countered at $2 million. Attached to this Declaration are copies of various emails from Mr. Ploung in which he refers to a possible sale of the Domain Name. From this it appears that Mr. Ploung was either acting on behalf of Respondent or falsely registered the Domain Name in the name of the Respondent.[i] In any event, the evidence demonstrates that the Domain Name was acquired and is being used primarily for the purpose of selling it to Complainant or a competitor for valuable consideration in excess of the out-of-pocket costs directly related to the Domain Name. This fits squarely within the circumstances articulated by Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). Regions lBank v. Darla atkins, FA 1786409 (Forum June 20, 2018) (finding that the respondent used the domain name in bad faith because he offered to sell the domain name for valuable consideration in excess of any out-of-pocket costs).
Second, the evidence of inactive use of the Domain Name discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis is evidence also of bad faith acquisition and use. Passively holding a confusingly similar domain name has been held to be evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). It disrupts Complainant’s business by creating initial interest confusion. Diversion of users by creating initial interest confusion has been held to constitute disruption for the purposes of a Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) analysis, even though, as here, to the extent that Respondent’s web site is and has been inactive, there is no evidence of actual competition. See PopSockets LLC v. san mao, FA 1740903 (Forum Aug. 27, 2017) (finding disruption of a complainant’s business which was not directly commercial competitive behavior was nonetheless sufficient to establish bad faith registration and use per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)), Love City Brewing Company v. Anker Fog / Love City Brewing Company, FA 1753144 (Forum Nov. 27, 2017) (Finding that Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business by pointing Internet users to an expired webpage. This may create the perception that Complainant is closed, never existed, or is not a legitimate business. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).).
The cited decisions found that this conduct fell within the circumstances articulated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), even though that paragraph seems to require that the respondent’s intent must be to disrupt “the business of a competitor.” Nevertheless, the examples of bad faith listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) are nonexclusive. Paragraph 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and causing initial interest confusion by using a domain name so nearly identical to a complainant’s mark as this one is, is strongly indicative of bad faith in and of itself. Similar to the facts in the Love City Brewing decision cited above, Respondent’s web site here is now and previously was inactive. An Internet user reaching it at such time thinking it was Complainant’s site would naturally question whether Complainant is still a viable, ongoing concern or whether it was experiencing serious problems with its Internet operations. This would be a substantial disruption of Complainant’s business and qualifies as bad faith acquisition and use. E. R. Marks, Inc. and QVC, Inc. v. Michelle Reid / SUNAQUA Properties, INC., F 1832303 (FORUM March 29, 2019).
Of course, to the extent that Respondent is actually a mortgage lender or is affiliated with one, as suggested by the Annex FF screenshot and the emails from Mr. Ploung, it fits precisely within the circumstances articulated by Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).
Third, as discussed above in the Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis Complainant was organized in mid-July 2013 as a result of the high-profile merger of four banks with combined assets in excess of $3 billion and more than 60 banking locations. There was extensive press coverage of surrounding the formation of the bank at that time (Complaint Annex M). Respondent acquired the Domain Name on or about September 8 of that same year. Complaint Annex A. As argued by Complainant, for determining the date upon which to consider bad faith registration, UDRP panels generally look to the date on which the respondent acquired the domain name rather than only to the domain’s initial date of creation. DirectTV, Inc. v. Toshi Amori, FA134254 (FORUM July 28, 2011) (“The operative date is the date when Respondent acquired the disputed domain name (assuming the Respondent is not a successor in interest to the previous domain name owner).”), Celilo Group Media, Inc. v. Domain Administrator, D2010-1119 (WIPO August 19, 2010) (“there has been a change of control amounting to a new registration for the purposes of this [bad faith] element of the Policy. What is significant is that the Domain Name was acquired on a date post-dating the coming into existence of the Complainant’s unregistered trade mark rights . . . “). This was clearly an opportunistic acquisition. UDRP panels have often held that acquiring a confusingly similar domain name at an opportunistic time qualifies as bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Taco Bell Corp. v. Jessica Terry, FA 1746740 (Forum Sep. 26, 2017) (finding the respondent’s opportunistic registration of the <tacobellweddings.com> weeks after the complainant’s announcement and promotion of its wedding service sufficient for a finding of bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)). The timing of Respondent’s acquiring the Domain Name also supports the finding above that its intent at the time was to leverage as much value as possible from a sale of the name to Complainant or one of its competitors.
Finally, it is evident from the fact that the Domain Name incorporates Complainant’s mark verbatim, with its unique and whimsical spelling of “bank” as “banc,” that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the BANC OF CALIFORNIA mark on September 8, 2013 when it acquired the Domain Name. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and actual knowledge of a complainant's rights in a mark prior to acquiring a confusingly similar domain name has often been held as evidence of bad faith). iFinex Inc. v. xu shuaiwei, FA 1760249 (Forum January 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s prior knowledge is evident from the notoriety of Complainant’s BITFINEX trademark as well as from Respondent’s use of its trademark laden domain name to direct internet traffic to a website which is a direct competitor of Complainant”); see also Dockeast LLC v. Jurmark, FA 149147 (Forum Apr. 24, 2003) (holding that the respondent’s renewal of the domain name registration, which changed the ownership of the domain name registration from its employer to itself, was effected in bad faith).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <bancofcalifornia.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
April 25, 2019
[i] The evidence before the Panel is not sufficient to enable it to make findings as to the relationship, if any, between the named Respondent, kevin heckemeyer, on the one hand, and Ryan Ploung and California’s Mortgage Bank on the other. Complainant treated them as the same, or at least as having common interest in the Domain Name. Since a UDRP proceeding is essentially in rem, focusing on the domain name itself, the Panel elects to follow that approach as well. All further references to “Respondent” in this Decision mean and refer to the person who actually registered the Domain Name.
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