Lonza Ltd. v. hugo hui
Claim Number: FA1903001836665
Complainant is Lonza Ltd. (“Complainant”), represented by Tonja Proehl of Greer, Burns & Crain, Ltd., USA. Respondent is hugo hui (“Respondent”), Ohio, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <10nza.com>, registered with Hostinger, UAB.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on March 29, 2019; the Forum received payment on March 29, 2019.
On April 2, 2019, Hostinger, UAB confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <10nza.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Hostinger, UAB and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Hostinger, UAB has verified that Respondent is bound by the Hostinger, UAB registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On April 3, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of April 23, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@10nza.com. Also on April 3, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On April 25, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a leading distributor of pharmaceutical, biotech and specialty ingredients products. It has rights in the LONZA mark based upon its registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 956,300, registered Apr. 3, 1973) Respondent’s Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as it incorporates the entire LONZA mark, merely replacing the letters “L” and “O” with the numbers “1” and “0” and adding the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Complainant has not permitted or licensed Respondent to use its LONZA mark and Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name. Further, Respondent does not use the Domain Name for a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate non-commercial or fair use. The web site resolving from the Domain Name is inactive but Respondent is using the Domain Name to conduct an email phishing scheme.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent attempts to disrupt Complainant’s business via an email address as part of a phishing scheme. In addition, Respondent fails to make an active use of the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy provides that in order to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name, Complainant must prove each of the following three elements:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0) at ¶ 4.3; eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The LONZA mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 956,300) on April 3, 1973. Complaint Exhibit 3. Registration of a mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish a complainant’s rights in a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Haas Automation, Inc. v. Jim Fraser, FA 1627211 (Forum Aug. 4, 2015) (finding that Complainant’s USPTO registrations for the HAAS mark sufficiently demonstrate its rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)).
Respondent’s Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s LONZA mark as it incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely replacing the letters “l” and “o” with the numerals “1” and “0” and adding the gTLD to the mark. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). J.P. Commc’ns, Inc. v Mainstream Adver., FA 1270452 (Forum July 11, 2009) (concluding that respondent’s substitution of the word “ten” in the complainant’s TOP TEN WHOLESALE mark for the numeral “10” in the <top10wholesale.com> domain name did not sufficiently distinguish respondent’s domain name from complainant’s mark due to their phonetic similarities), Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis). WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name, and this establishes its confusing similarity to Complainant’s mark.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the LONZA mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to respondent of the dispute, respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) the Domain Name is not yet being used for a web site but is being used for an email address which is used for fraudulent purposes to deceive Complainant, (ii) Complainant has not licensed or otherwise permitted Respondent to use its mark, (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services or for a legitimate noncommercial or other fair use because the web site resolving from it is not being used, and (iii) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name. The evidence relevant to these allegations is discussed below.
Complainant submitted a Declaration of Patrick Fogle, Complainant’s Global Head of Intellectual Property, in which Mr. Fogle described an email received by Complainant from the email address rodolfo.savitsky@10nza.com. Mr. Savitsky is a senior officer of Complainant. The email stated that he was in a conference, there was an urgent payment to be made to one of the company’s vendors, and could someone there process the payment “today.” Complainant furnished a copy of the email as Complaint Exhibit 6. It appears from this that Respondent, who was obviously responsible for the email, attempted to defraud Complainant by using the email address based upon the Domain Name to pass off as Mr. Savitsky. Passing off in furtherance of a phishing scheme does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“Passing off as a complainant through e-mails is evidence that a respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).”), Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Thomas Webber / Chev Ronoil Recreational Sport Limited, FA 1661076 (Forum Mar. 15, 2016) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services or any legitimate noncommercial or fair use, stating, “Respondent is using an email address to pass themselves off as an affiliate of Complainant. Complainant presents evidence showing that the email address that Respondent has created is used to solicit information and money on false pretenses. The disputed domain name is being used to cause the recipients of these emails to mistakenly believe Respondent has a connection with Complainant and is one of the Complainant’s affiliates.”).
Complainant states that it has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complainant alleges that the web site resolving from the Domain Name is inactive. Normally, complainants submit a screenshot of the web site to support this allegation. Complainant here did not do so. In the absence of evidence of the actual status of the web site, the Panel is unable to make findings as to that matter and determines that passive holding is not proven as to this Domain Name.
The WHOIS information submitted as Complaint Exhibit 4 lists the registrant of the Domain Name as “hugo hui.” This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. UDRP panels have consistently held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a registrant name that is materially different from the domain name at issue is competent evidence that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Guardair Corporation v. Pablo Palermo, FA1407001571060 (Forum Aug. 28, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <guardair.com> domain name according to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information lists “Pablo Palermo” as registrant of the disputed domain name). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product of service on your web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s use of the Domain Name discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use. While Respondent’s conduct may not fall neatly within any of the grounds articulated in Policy ¶ 4(b), that paragraph recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldwcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and impersonating a complainant in emails based upon the domain name which fraudulently attempt to deprive people of their money has been held to constitute bad faith. Qatalyst Partners LP v. Devimore, FA 1393436 (Forum July 13, 2011) (finding that using the disputed domain name as an e-mail address to pass itself off as the complainant in a phishing scheme is evidence of bad faith registration and use).
Second, Complainant did not assert the argument in connection with its bad faith allegations, but by substituting the “l” and the “o’” in Complainant’s mark with the similar-in-appearance “1” and “0,” Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of similar appearance in an email address or typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Given the nonexclusive, open-ended nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), typosquatting has, in and of itself, been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use. Adorama, Inc. v. Moniker Privacy Services, FA1503001610020 (Forum May 1, 2015) (“Respondent has also engaged in typosquatting, which is additional evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)”), Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).
Third, typosquatting necessarily implicates another factor that has also, by itself, been held by UDRP panels to constitute bad faith. It is evident from the world-wide notoriety of Complainant, from the extent to which Respondent copied Complainant’s mark in the Domain Name, and from the fact that its email phishing scheme specifically targeted Complainant, even to the point of using the name of one of Complainant’s senior officials, that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark when it registered the Domain Name. See, Complaint Exhibit 4 for registration date. Again, considering the nonexclusive, open-ended nature of Policy ¶ 4 (b), actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in a mark prior to registering an identical or confusingly similar domain name has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <10nza.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
April 29, 2019
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