national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

Broadcom Corporation v. Broad Communication Inc.

Claim Number:  FA0503000438754

 

PARTIES

 

Complainant is Broadcom Corporation (“Complainant”), represented by Gary J. Nelson, of Christie, Parker & Hale LLP, 350 West Colorado Boulevard, Suite 500, P.O. Box 7068, Pasadena, CA 91109-7068.  Respondent is Broad Communication Inc.  (“Respondent”), 2/25/27, Yunokawa-cho, Hakodate-shi, 042-0932, Hokkaido, JAPAN.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

 

The domain name at issue is <broad-com.com>, registered with Melbourne It, Ltd. d/b/a Internet Names Worldwide.

 

PANEL

 

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Louis E. Condon as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on March 10, 2005; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on March 11, 2005.

 

On March 14, 2005, Melbourne It, Ltd. d/b/a Internet Names Worldwide confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the domain name <broad-com.com> is registered with Melbourne It, Ltd. d/b/a Internet Names Worldwide and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Melbourne It, Ltd. d/b/a Internet Names Worldwide has verified that Respondent is bound by the Melbourne It, Ltd. d/b/a Internet Names Worldwide registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On March 16, 2005, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of April 5, 2005 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@broad-com.com by e-mail.

 

Having received no Response from Respondent, using the same contact details and methods as were used for the Commencement Notification, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On April 8, 2005, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Louis E. Condon as Panelist.

 

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent."  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any Response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

 

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

 

A.  Complainant makes the following assertions:

 

1.      Respondent’s <broad-com.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s BROADCOM mark.

 

2.      Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <broad-com.com> domain name.

 

3.      Respondent registered and used the <broad-com.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

 

Complainant is a provider of highly integrated circuits, computer hardware and software in the field of digital broadband communications.  Complainant provides highly integrated silicon solutions that enable broadband communications and networking of voice, video and data services. 

 

Complainant holds numerous trademark registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office for the BROADCOM mark (Reg. No. 2,132,930 issued January 27, 1998; Reg. No. 2,392,925 issued July 18, 2000; Reg. No. 2,326,387 issued March 7, 2000; Reg. No. 2,625,799 issued September 24, 2002 and Reg. No. 2,595,174 issued July 16, 2002) and has been continuously using the BROADCOM mark since November 1994.  Additionally, Complainant holds trademark registration rights in Japan for the BROADCOM mark (Reg. No. 4,280,890 issued June 4, 1999; Reg. No. 4,422,622 issued October 6, 2000; Reg. No. 4,422,624 issued October 6, 2000; Reg. No. 4,496,079 issued August 3, 2001 and Reg. No. 4496081 issued August 3, 2001).

 

Respondent registered the <broad-com> domain name on May 25, 2004.  Respondent’s domain name resolves to a website that features only a couple of Japanese characters.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)    the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)    Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)    the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant has established that it has rights in the BROADCOM mark through registration with the United States Patent and Trademark office and various international trademark authorities as well as through continuous use of its mark in commerce. See Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. v. Wick, FA 117861 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 16, 2002) (“Under U.S. trademark law, registered marks hold a presumption that they are inherently distinctive and have acquired secondary meaning.”); see also Janus Int’l Holding Co. v. Rademacher, D2002-0201 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2002) (finding that Panel decisions have held that registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive.  Respondent has the burden of refuting this assumption).

 

Respondent’s <broad-com.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because Respondent’s domain name incorporates the BROADCOM mark in its entirety and merely adds a hyphen between the words “broad” and “com.”  Adding a hyphen to Complainant’s registered mark does not circumvent Complainant’s rights in the mark and is insufficient to distinguish the domain name from Complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Chernow Communications, Inc. v. Kimball, D2000-0119 (WIPO May 18, 2000) (holding “that the use or absence of punctuation marks, such as hyphens, does not alter the fact that a name is identical to a mark"); see also Teleplace, Inc. v. De Oliveira, FA 95835 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that the domain names <teleplace.org>, <tele-place.com>, and <theteleplace.com> are confusingly similar to Complainant’s TELEPLACE trademark); see also Nintendo of Am. Inc. v. This Domain Is For Sale, D2000-1197 (WIPO Nov. 1, 2000) (finding <game-boy.com> identical and confusingly similar to Complainant’s GAME BOY mark, even though the domain name is a combination of two descriptive words divided by a hyphen).

 

Additionally, Respondent’s <broad-com.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s BROADCOM mark because the domain name incorporates Complainant’s mark in its entirety and deviates with the addition of the generic top-level domain “.com.”  The mere addition of generic top-level domains does not negate the confusing similarity between Respondent’s domain name and Complainant’s mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).  See Fed’n of Gay Games, Inc. v. Hodgson, D2000-0432 (WIPO June 28, 2000) (finding that the domain name <gaygames.com> is identical to Complainant's registered trademark GAY GAMES); see also Little Six, Inc. v. Domain For Sale, FA 96967 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 30, 2001) (finding that <mysticlake.net> is plainly identical to Complainant’s MYSTIC LAKE trademark and service mark).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Respondent has failed to respond to the Complaint.  Therefore, the Panel accepts all reasonable allegations set forth in the Complaint as true.  See Am. Online, Inc. v. Clowers, FA 199821 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 14, 2003) (finding that the failure to challenge a complainant’s allegations allows a panel to accept all of the complainant’s reasonable allegations and inferences as true); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Shing, FA 205699 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 8, 2003) (finding that the failure to respond to a complaint allows a panel to make reasonable inferences in favor of a complainant and accept the complainant’s allegations as true).

 

In addition, the Panel construes Respondent’s failure to respond as an admission that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  See Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Greenhouse Agency Ltd., D2000-1221 (WIPO Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that Respondents’ failure to respond can be construed as an admission that they have no legitimate interest in the domain names); see also Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Domain Deluxe, FA 269166 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 29, 2004) (“The failure of Respondent to respond to the Complaint functions both as an implicit admission that Respondent lacks rights to and legitimate interests in the domain names, as well as a presumption that Complainant’s reasonable allegations are true.”).

 

Furthermore, nothing in the record establishes that Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name.  Respondent is not licensed or authorized to register or use domain names that incorporate Complainant’s mark.  Therefore, the Panel concludes that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See RMO, Inc. v. Burbridge, FA 96949 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 16, 2001) (interpreting Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) "to require a showing that one has been commonly known by the domain name prior to registration of the domain name to prevail"); see also Charles Jourdan Holding AG v. AAIM, D2000-0403 (WIPO June 27, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where (1) The respondent is not a licensee of the complainant; (2) The complainant’s prior rights in the domain name precede the respondent’s registration; (3) The respondent is not commonly known by the domain name in question).

 

The disputed domain name resolves to a website that features only a couple of Japanese characters.  The combination of Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint, failure to develop a website for the disputed domain name and failure to present to the Panel demonstrable preparations to use the disputed domain name, is evidence that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  See Pharmacia & Upjohn AB v. Romero, D2000-1273 (WIPO Nov. 13, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where the respondent failed to submit a response to the complaint and had made no use of the domain name in question); see also Melbourne IT Ltd. v. Stafford, D2000-1167 (WIPO Oct. 16, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name where there is no proof that the respondent made preparations to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services before notice of the domain name dispute, the disputed domain name did not resolve to a website and the respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name).

 

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.

 

 

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

The Panel finds that there is no conceivable way Respondent could use the disputed domain name such that it would not infringe on Complainant’s BROADCOM mark, and therefore it is illogical to await Respondent’s use of the domain name to find bad faith use.  See Phat Fashions v. Kruger, FA 96193 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 29, 2000) (finding bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) even though the respondent has not used the domain name because “[I]t makes no sense whatever to wait until it actually ‘uses’ the name, when inevitably, when there is such use, it will create the confusion described in the Policy”); see also Alitalia –Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A v. Colour Digital, D2000-1260 (WIPO Nov. 23, 2000) (finding bad faith where the respondent made no use of the domain name in question and there are no other indications that the respondent could have registered and used the domain name in question for any non-infringing purpose); see also Red Bull GmbH v. Gutch, D2000-0766 (WIPO Sept. 21, 2000) (finding that the respondent’s expected use of the domain name <redbull.org> would lead people to believe that the domain name was connected with the complainant, and thus is the equivalent to bad faith use); see also Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Inja, Kil, D2000-1409 (WIPO Dec. 9, 2000) (finding bad faith registration and use where it is “inconceivable that the respondent could make any active use of the disputed domain names without creating a false impression of association with the Complainant”).

 

Furthermore, Respondent’s registration of the <broad-com.com> domain name, containing Complainant’s well-known BROADCOM mark in its entirety, suggests that Respondent knew of Complainant’s rights in the BROADCOM mark.  There is no evidence to suggest that Respondent has any connection to any products or services bearing this variation on Complainant’s BROADCOM mark.  Moreover, constructive knowledge of the mark may be inferred because the mark was registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office prior to Respondent’s registration of the domain name.  Thus, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name based on the distinctive and well-known qualities of Complainant’s mark.  See Kraft Foods (Norway) v. Wide, D2000-0911 (WIPO Sept. 23, 2000) (finding that the fact “that the Respondent chose to register a well known mark to which he has no connections or rights indicates that he was in bad faith when registering the domain name at issue”); see also Digi Int’l v. DDI Sys., FA 124506 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 24, 2002) (“[T]here is a legal presumption of bad faith, when Respondent reasonably should have been aware of Complainant’s trademarks, actually or constructively.”); see also Orange Glo Int’l v. Jeff Blume, FA 118313 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 4, 2002) (“Complainant’s OXICLEAN mark is listed on the Principal Register of the USPTO, a status that confers constructive notice on those seeking to register or use the mark or any confusingly similar variation thereof”).

 

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.

 

DECISION

 

Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief should be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <broad-com.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

 

 

Louis E. Condon, Panelist

Dated:  April 22, 2005

 

 


 

 

 

 

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