national arbitration forum

 

DECISION

 

Luxilon Sports NV v. Agilibus Tenis Servicios Deportivos SL

Claim Number:  FA0505000477930

 

PARTIES

Complainant, Luxilon Sports NV (“Complainant”), is represented by Jeff Davies, 5452 Coral Way, Orlando, FL 32839.  Respondent is Agilibus Tenis Servicios Deportivos SL (“Respondent”), Balcon al Mar 45 E Javea, Alicante 03730, Spain.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <luxilon.com>, registered with Tucows Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

James A. Crary as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on May 16, 2005; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on May 31, 2005.

 

On May 17, 2005, Tucows Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the domain name <luxilon.com> is registered with Tucows Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Tucows Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Tucows Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On June 8, 2005, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of June 28, 2005 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@luxilon.com by e-mail.

 

Having received no Response from Respondent, using the same contact details and methods as were used for the Commencement Notification, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On June 30, 2005, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed  James A. Crary as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent."  Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any Response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A.  Complainant makes the following assertions:

 

1.      Respondent’s <luxilon.com> domain name is identical to Complainant’s LUXILON mark.

 

2.      Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <luxilon.com> domain name.

 

3.      Respondent registered and used the <luxilon.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant, Luxilon Sports NV, is a Belgian company based in Antwerp that was established in 1959.  Complainant has become an International leader in manufacture ring filaments.  Complainant’s products involve the manufacture of high tech strings for racquet sports and are also used in the aerospace and medical industries.  

 

Complainant owns two Benelux trademark registrations (Reg. No. 456355, issued January 5, 1989 and Reg. No. 0707568, issued May 2, 2002) and one WIPO registration (Reg. No. 539210, issued May 23, 1989 for Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, France and Italy) in connection with plastic filaments and sports articles for tennis and other sporting goods.

 

Respondent registered the disputed domain name on November 9, 1999.

 

Complainant initially contacted Respondent on December 6, 2004 to notify Respondent of Complainant’s rights in the mark and request that Respondent transfer the domain name to Complainant.  At this time, Respondent’s domain name did not contain any Internet content, and it has not contained any Internet content in the six months since then.  As of today, the disputed domain name redirects Internet users to a search engine website containing links to various subjects such as mortgages and personal finance.

 

Respondent has declined to transfer the domain name to Complainant despite several requests, notices of Complainant’s trademark rights and offers to pay Respondent a reasonable sum covering registration fees for the domain name.  Respondent has demanded various sums of up to 30,000 Euros in exchange for the transfer of the domain name.

 

Respondent has also acknowledged that it’s intention is to use the domain name as part of a planned Internet “world tennis portal.”  Respondent also owns registrations for the <tenis.net> and <tenisdirecto.com> domain names.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) ("In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.").

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)    the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)    Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)    the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant has established that it has rights in the LUXILON mark through WIPO and Benelux registrations and through continuous use of the mark in commerce for the last forty-six years.  See Janus Int’l Holding Co. v. Rademacher, D2002-0201 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2002) (finding that panel decisions have held that registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive.  The respondent has the burden of refuting this assumption); see also KCTS Television Inc. v. Get-on-the-Web Ltd., D2001-0154 (WIPO Apr. 20, 2001) (holding that it does not matter for the purpose of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy whether the complainant’s mark is registered in a country other than that of the respondent’s place of business);.

 

The <luxilon.com> domain name registered by Respondent is identical to Complainant’s LUXILON mark because the only difference between the two is the addition of the generic top-level domain “.com.”  The addition of the generic top level domain is insufficient to distinguish the domain name from Complainant’s LUXILON trademark.  See Pomellato S.p.A v. Tonetti, D2000-0493 (WIPO July 7, 2000) (finding <pomellato.com> identical to the complainant’s mark because the generic top-level domain (gTLD) “.com” after the name POMELLATO is not relevant); see also Blue Sky Software Corp. v. Digital Sierra, Inc., D2000-0165 (WIPO Apr. 27, 2000) (holding that the domain name <robohelp.com> is identical to the complainant’s registered ROBOHELP trademark, and that the "addition of .com is not a distinguishing difference"); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., FA 153545 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (“The addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.”); see also Daedong-USA, Inc.  v. O’Bryan Implement Sales, FA 210302 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 29, 2003) (“Respondent's domain name, <kioti.com>, is identical to Complainant's KIOTI mark because adding a top-level domain name is irrelevant for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Nev. State Bank v. Modern Ltd. – Cayman Web Dev., FA 204063 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 6, 2003) (“It has been established that the addition of a generic top-level domain is irrelevant when considering whether a domain name is identical or confusingly similar under the Policy.”).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Complainant has established its rights in the LUXILON mark and alleges that Respondent has no such rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  The burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests once Complainant establishes a prima facie case pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  Due to Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint, the Panel assumes that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.  See G.D. Searle v. Martin Mktg., FA 118277 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 1, 2002) (“Because Complainant’s Submission constitutes a prima facie case under the Policy, the burden effectively shifts to Respondent. Respondent’s failure to respond means that Respondent has not presented any circumstances that would promote its rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”); see also Clerical Med. Inv. Group Ltd. v. Clericalmedical.com, D2000-1228 (WIPO Nov. 28, 2000) (finding that under certain circumstances the mere assertion by the complainant that the respondent has no right or legitimate interest is sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the respondent to demonstrate that such a right or legitimate interest does exist).

 

Respondent is using the disputed domain name to redirect Internet users to a search engine website where Respondent presumably receives click-through fees for redirecting Internet traffic to the various commercial links.  The Panel finds that Respondent’s commercial use of the disputed domain name, by receiving click-through fees for redirecting Internet users to a pay-per-click website, is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).  See FAO Schwarz v. Zuccarini, FA 95828 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 1, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names <faoscwartz.com>, <foaschwartz.com>, <faoshwartz.com>, and <faoswartz.com> where Respondent was using these domain names to link to an advertising website); see also Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l Inc. v. Chan, FA 154119 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 12, 2003) (finding that the respondent did not have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name that used the complainant’s mark and redirected Internet users to website that pays domain name registrants for referring those users to its search engine and pop-up advertisements); see also Tercent Inc. v. Lee Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (holding that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to host a series of hyperlinks and a banner advertisement was neither a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name).

 

Furthermore, Complainant asserts that Respondent is not commonly known by the <luxilon.com> domain name pursuant to Policy 4(c)(ii) of the Policy.  Nothing in the record clearly contradicts this assertion.  Thus, the Panel finds Respondent did not establish rights or legitimate interests in the dispute domain name under this element.  See Gallup Inc. v. Amish Country Store, FA 96209 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that Respondent does not have rights in a domain name when Respondent is not known by the mark); see also RMO, Inc. v. Burbridge, FA 96949 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 16, 2001) (interpreting Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) "to require a showing that one has been commonly known by the domain name prior to registration of the domain name to prevail").

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.

 

 

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Respondent has offered to sell the disputed domain name to Complainant for a price above and beyond the expenses Respondent acquired in the process of registering the domain name.  The Panel finds Respondent’s offer to sell the disputed domain name as evidence of bad faith registration pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Little Six, Inc v. Domain For Sale, FA 96967 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 30, 2001) (finding the respondent's offer to sell the domain name at issue to the complainant was evidence of bad faith); see also Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. Servability Ltd, D2001-0243 (WIPO Apr. 5, 2001) (finding bad faith where the respondent, a domain name dealer, rejected the complainant’s nominal offer of the domain in lieu of greater consideration); see also Banca Popolare Friuladria S.p.A. v. Zago, D2000-0793 (WIPO Sept. 3, 2000) (finding bad faith where Respondent offered the domain names for sale); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Avrasya Yayincilik Danismanlik Ltd., FA 93679 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 16, 2000) (finding bad faith where the respondent offered domain names for sale).

 

The Panel infers that Respondent is receiving click-through fees for using a domain name that is identical to Complainant’s mark to divert Internet users to a search engine website.  Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent’s commercial use of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy  ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See Kmart v. Khan, FA 127708 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 22, 2002) (finding that if the respondent profits from its diversionary use of the complainant's mark when the domain name resolves to commercial websites and the respondent fails to contest the Complaint, it may be concluded that the respondent is using the domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)); see also Qwest Communications Int’l Inc. v. Ling Shun Shing, FA 187431 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 6, 2003) (“Respondent’s attempt to commercially benefit from the misleading domain name is evidence of bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”).

 

The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <luxilon.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

James A. Crary, Panelist

Dated:  July 13, 2005

 

 

 

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