Anwar Kazi v. Domain Deluxe c/o Domain
Admin
Claim Number: FA0505000488845
PARTIES
Complainant
is Anwar Kazi (“Complainant”),
represented by Thomas D. Foster, 12760 High Bluff Drive, Suite 300,
San Diego, CA 92130. Respondent is Domain Deluxe c/o Domain Admin (“Respondent”)
represented by Ari Goldberger of ESQwire.com Law Firm, 35 Cameo Drive, Cherry Hill, NJ 08003.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <joblog.com>,
registered with Nameview, Inc.
PANEL
The
undersigned certify that they have acted independently and impartially and to
the best of their knowledge they have no known conflict in serving as Panelist
in this proceeding. Barry Schreiber, Esq., Diane Cabell, Esq., and Hon. Carolyn
Marks Johnson sit as Panelists.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically May 31,
2005; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint May
31, 2005.
On
May 31, 2005, Nameview, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration
Forum that the domain name <joblog.com>
is registered with Nameview, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current
registrant of the name. Nameview, Inc.
verified that Respondent is bound by the Nameview, Inc. registration agreement
and thereby has agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties
in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
“Policy”).
On
June 8, 2005, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of June 28,
2004, by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts, and to postmaster@joblog.com by e-mail.
A
timely Response was received and determined to be complete on June 28, 2005.
A
timely Additional Submission by Complainant was received on July 1, 2005.
On July 8, 2005, pursuant to Complainant’s request to
have the dispute decided by a three-member
Panel, the National Arbitration Forum
appointed Barry Schreiber, Esq., Diane Cabell, Esq. and Hon. Carolyn Marks
Johnson as Panelists.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant makes the following
allegations:
1. Respondent registered a domain name that
is identical to or confusingly similar to a mark in which Complainant has
exclusive rights.
2. Respondent has no rights to or legitimate
interests in the domain name that uses Complainant’s protected mark in its
entirety.
3. Respondent registered and held the domain
name in bad faith.
B. Respondent alleges as follows:
1. Complainant has no enforceable rights in
the mark.
2. Respondent has rights to and legitimate
interests in the mark and domain name because the name is descriptive and
anyone can register a descriptive name.
3. Respondent has used the domain name prior
to the initiation of this dispute.
C. Both parties filed Additional
Submissions.
1. Complainant urges that it has common law
rights consistent with its date of first use in commerce.
2. Respondent urges that it does not and
that moreover Complainant submitted no evidence to show secondary meaning at
any point.
FINDINGS
Complainant alleges that Respondent’s domain name is
confusingly similar to its mark JOBSLOG.COM and that Respondent has wrongfully
typosquatted a domain site using Complainant’s protected mark.
Complainant also alleges that Respondent has no
rights in the domain name using Complainant’s protected mark because Respondent
passively held it. After Complainant
registered its mark, Respondent started using the domain name site in the same
general area that Complainant is active in, providing information about
employment.
Complainant registered the service mark JOBSLOG with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Reg. No. 2,943,216, April 19,
2005. Complainant urged a first use in
commerce of December 31, 2002. Complainant filed the application May 16, 2003.
Complainant urges that it had common law rights in
the mark by December 31, 2002, and urges that Respondent did not post content
at the site prior to December 31, 2002.
Respondent registered
the <joblog.com> domain name August 30, 2001.
Respondent’s position is that the
Complaint must be dismissed because Complainant has no enforceable trademark
rights under the Policy. Complainant’s
registration is on the USPTO’s Supplemental Register only. Under US law, this is prima facie evidence
that the mark is merely descriptive and not sufficiently distinctive to entitle
Complainant to exclusive use of the mark.
Respondent also argues that it has rights
and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name because it incorporates
the descriptive term “JOB LOG.”
Respondent asserts that it is well established under the Policy that
anyone is entitled to register a domain name incorporating a common descriptive
term and that the first to register such domain has a legitimate interest in
it.
Furthermore, it is impossible for
Respondent to have registered it in bad faith because Complainant had no
plausible trademark rights at the time Respondent registered the disputed
domain. Respondent registered the
disputed domain name August 30, 2001, almost two years before Complainant filed
its trademark application for the JOBSLOG mark, and more than a year before
Complainant’s alleged December 31, 2002, first use date.
In response to Complainant’s additional submission,
Respondent points out that Complainant’s argument that it used the mark prior
to Respondent’s active use of the domain is irrelevant under the Policy. Under 4(c)(i), all that matters is whether
or not Respondent “before any notice…of the dispute” used the disputed domain
“in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services.” The Complainant acknowledges that
Respondent’s site was active long before notice of this dispute.
Lastly, Respondent denies the relevance
of Ski Utah, Inc. v. The Lodging Company Reservations, Ltd. No.
D2003-0776 (WIPO Nov. 7, 2003). In Ski
Utah, the mark owner had provided evidence that it was a decades’ old
enterprise with substantial consumer traffic, had invested millions of dollars in
marketing and had also owned a registered trademark for over 20 years. The panel determined that Ski Utah
had met the burden of proving that it common law mark had acquired secondary
meaning. Complainant presented no such
facts in the present case.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the
following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be
cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain
name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2)
Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3)
the domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant
asserts that it has established rights in the JOBSLOG mark through registration
of the mark on the Supplemental Register with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”). See
Action Sports Videos v. Reynolds, D2001-1239 (WIPO Dec. 13, 2001) (holding
that although the complainant's registration on the Supplemental Register
denotes a descriptive mark without secondary meaning, the complainant
nevertheless had standing to initiate a UDRP claim because the Policy at
paragraph 4a(i) requires only that the complainant have (mark)
"rights" in the disputed domain name, strong or weak though they be);
see also Cold War Museum v Jampol, FA 96594 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 26,
2001) (finding that the complainant had established rights in the COLD WAR
MUSEUM mark through registration of the mark on the Supplemental Register as
well as by virtue of the distinctiveness the mark has developed and recognition
of the mark by the U.S. government).
Complainant also contends
that it has established common law rights in the JOBSLOG mark through
continuous use of the mark in commerce since December 31, 2002. See Tuxedos
By Rose v. Nunez, FA
95248 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 17, 2000) (finding common law rights in a mark
where its use was continuous and ongoing, and secondary meaning was
established); see also S.A. Bendheim Co., Inc. v. Hollander Glass, FA
142318 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 13, 2003) (holding that the Complainant
established rights in the descriptive RESTORATION GLASS mark through proof of
secondary meaning associated with the mark).
Moreover,
Complainant alleges that Respondent’s <joblog.com> domain name is
confusingly similar to Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark, as the domain name merely omits
the letter “s” from Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark. The Panel may find that such a change is not enough to overcome
the confusingly similar aspects of Respondent’s domain name pursuant to Policy
¶ 4(a)(i). See Compaq Info. Techs. Group,
L.P. v. Seocho, FA 103879 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 25, 2002) (finding
that the domain name <compq.com> is confusingly similar to the
complainant’s COMPAQ mark because the omission of the letter “a” in the domain
name does not significantly change the overall impression of the mark); see also Victoria's Secret v. Internet Inv. Firm Trust, FA
94344 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 9, 2000) (finding the domain name
<victoriasecret.com> to be confusingly similar to the complainant’s
trademark, VICTORIA’S SECRET).
Furthermore,
the addition of the top-level domain “.com” is irrelevant in determining
whether the <joblog.com> domain name is confusingly similar to
Complainant’s mark. See Pomellato S.p.A v. Tonetti, D2000-0493
(WIPO July 7, 2000) (finding <pomellato.com> identical to the complainant’s
mark because the generic top-level domain (gTLD) “.com” after the name
POMELLATO is not relevant); see also Rollerblade,
Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (finding that the top
level of the domain name such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain
name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly
similar).
Notwithstanding
Complainant’s position and the support among the cases for Complainant’s
argument, different facts in this case distinguish those cases. Here, Respondent correctly argues that the <joblog.com>
domain name is not confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because
Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name predates any use or
registration of the JOBSLOG mark by Complainant by almost two years. See Phoenix Mortgage Corp. v. Toggas,
D2001-0101 (WIPO Mar. 30, 2001) (finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) “necessarily
implies that Complainant’s rights predate Respondent’s
registration . . . of the domain name”); see also
Intermark Media, Inc. v. Wang Logic Corp., FA 139660 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb.
19, 2003) (finding that any enforceable interest that the complainant may have
in its common law mark did not predate the respondent’s domain name
registration, therefore finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) had not been satisfied); see
also Transpark LLC v. Network Adm’r, FA 135602 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 21, 2003) (finding that
the complainant failed to satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) because the respondent's
domain name registration predated the complainant’s rights in its mark by
nearly two years); see also Bus. Architecture Group, Inc. v Reflex
Publ’g.,
FA 97051 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 5, 2001) (the complainant did not adequately
demonstrate common law rights that predated the domain name registration).
Respondent
further correctly asserts that Complainant does not have enforceable rights in
the JOBSLOG mark under the Policy because its mark was registered on the
Supplemental Register due to it being merely descriptive of Complainant’s
business. See Chiappetta v. Morales,
D2002-1103 (WIPO Jan. 20, 2003) (holding that the complainant’s registration of
the DISCOUNT HYDROPONICS mark on the Supplemental Register did not confer any
rights under the UDRP); see also CyberTrader, Inc. v. Bushell,
D2001-1019 (WIPO Oct. 30, 2001) (stating that Supplemental Register “provides
the Complainant with no protectable rights” in its marks); see also Am.’s
Cmty. Bankers Corp. v. Wing., D2000-1780 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2001) (“Relying
solely upon Complainant's registrations on the Supplemental Register, the Panel
must conclude that Complainant’s marks AMERICA’S COMMUNITY BANKER and AMERICA’S
COMMUNITY BANKERS are descriptive terms that have not acquired distinctiveness.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that Complainant has not proven the first prong of
the UDRP, which provides that the complainant must have rights in the mark upon
which the complaint is based.”).
The Panel finds that Complainant failed to show
enforceable rights in a mark contained within a domain name that was registered
by the Respondent the year before Complainant urges first use in commerce or
common law rights.
Complainant has not satisfied ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) to
show “confusing similarity” with a protected mark that predated the
registration and use.
Complainant argues that Respondent is not commonly
known by the <joblog.com> domain name
and therefore lacks rights and legitimate interests in the domain name pursuant
to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Tercent Inc.
v. Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in
Respondent’s WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’
the disputed domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii)
does not apply); see also Charles Jourdan Holding AG v. AAIM, D2000-0403 (WIPO June 27, 2000) (finding no
rights or legitimate interests where (1) Respondent is not a licensee of
Complainant; (2) Complainant’s prior rights in the mark precede Respondent’s
registration; (3) Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name in
question).
Complainant
asserts as well that although Respondent registered the <joblog.com> domain name in 2001, Respondent did not make any
use of the disputed domain name until 2004.
Complainant asserts that this period of inactivity is sufficient to
establish that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain
names pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).
See Vestel Elektronik
Sanayi ve Ticaret AS v. Kahveci, D2000-1244 (WIPO Nov. 11, 2000) (“[M]erely
registering the domain names is not sufficient to establish rights or
legitimate interests for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.”); see
also Chanel, Inc. v. Heyward,
D2000-1802 (WIPO Feb. 23, 2001) (finding no rights or legitimate interests
where “Respondent registered the domain name and did nothing with it”); see
also Ziegenfelder Co. v. VMH Enter.,
Inc., D2000-0039 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (finding that failure to provide a
product or service or develop the site demonstrates that the respondents have
not established any rights or legitimate interests in the domain name).
Complainant
also urges that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <joblog.com>
domain name because Respondent’s misspelling of Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark,
by omitting the letter ‘s,’ constitutes typosquatting. See Diners Club Int’l Ltd. v. Domain
Admin******It's all in the name******, FA 156839 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 23,
2003) (holding that Respondent’s <wwwdinersclub.com> domain name, a typosquatted version of
Complainant’s DINERS CLUB mark, was evidence in and of itself that Respondent
lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name vis-à-vis
Complainant); see also IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Ebeyer, FA 175292 (Nat. Arb. Forum
Sept. 19, 2003) (finding that Respondent lacked rights and legitimate interests
in the disputed domain names because it "engaged in the practice of typosquatting by taking
advantage of Internet users who attempt to access Complainant's
<indymac.com> website but mistakenly misspell Complainant's mark by
typing the letter 'x' instead of the letter 'c.'").
Again, despite
Complainant’s arguments and the cases that would support that view, the facts
here distinguish those holdings. Here,
Respondent correctly shows that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests
in the <joblog.com> domain name because Respondent registered the domain
name the year before Complainant urges that it acquired common law rights in
the mark and almost two years prior to Complainant’s filing a trademark
application for the phrase “Jobslog.” See
Warm Things, Inc. v.
Weiss, D2002-0085 (WIPO
Apr. 18, 2002) (finding that the Respondent had rights or legitimate interests
in a domain name when its registration of that domain name occurred before
Complainant had established rights in its alleged mark); see also Latent Tech. Group, Inc. v. Fritchie, FA
95285 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 1, 2000) (finding that the respondent did have a
legitimate interest in the domain name where the complainant applied for
registration of the mark after the respondent registered the domain name and
the complainant had not proven any earlier use of the mark); see also Parachute, Inc. v. Jones, FA 94947 (Nat.
Arb. Forum July 12, 2000) (denying transfer of the domain name because the
respondent’s use of the PARACHUTE mark and the domain name in question preceded
any use of the service mark the by complainant).
Moreover, Respondent also correctly
alleges that Complainant’s <joblog.com> domain name is merely
composed of descriptive terms, and therefore, Respondent has rights and
legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
See Energy Source
Inc. v. Your Energy Source, FA 96364 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2001)
(finding that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name
where “Respondent has persuasively shown that the domain name is comprised of
generic and/or descriptive terms, and, in any event, is not exclusively
associated with Complainant’s business”); see also iLeads.com
LLC v. Elec. Mktg. Sys., Inc., FA 187636
(Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 13, 2003) (finding that the respondent had rights and
legitimate interests in the <aleads.com> domain name because it used the
term “leads” in the generic sense to refer to the sale of leads over the
Internet).
Furthermore,
Respondent contends that Complainant failed to meet its burden in proving that
Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests because Complainant failed to
point to particular facts and circumstances supporting its allegations. See Lush LTD v. Lush Environs, FA
96217 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 13, 2001) (finding that even when the respondent
does file a response, the complainant must allege facts, which if true, would
establish that the respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests
in the disputed domain name); see also Graman USA Inc. v. Shenzhen Graman
Indus. Co., FA 133676 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2003) (finding that absent
a showing of any facts by the complainant that establish the respondent lacks
rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, the panel may
decline to transfer the disputed domain name).
The Panel finds that Respondent registered the domain
name the year before Complainant urges that it acquired common law rights by
first use in commerce and two years before Complainant applied for legal rights
in the mark.
Complainant did not show rights to and legitimate
interests in the mark that pre-dated Respondent’s registration of the
mark. Complainant has not satisfied
ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) requiring establishment of “rights or legitimate interests.”
Complainant further avers that Respondent
registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶
4(b)(iv) as Respondent is using the domain name <joblog.com> to
intentionally attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website, by
creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website. See H-D Michigan, Inc. v. Petersons Auto, FA 135608 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 8,
2003) (finding that the disputed domain name was registered and used in bad
faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) through the respondent’s registration and
use of the infringing domain name to intentionally attempt to attract Internet
users to its fraudulent website by using the complainant’s famous marks and
likeness); see also G.D. Searle & Co. v. Celebrex Drugstore, FA
123933 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 21, 2002) (finding that the respondent registered
and used the domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the
respondent was using the confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet
users to its commercial website).
Moreover,
Complainant argues that Respondent’s <joblog.com>
domain name causes Internet users to mistakenly believe that the disputed
domain name is affiliated with Complainant.
Complainant asserts that the initial user confusion that the domain name
causes is evidence that Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad
faith. See Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Kil, D2000-1409 (WIPO Dec. 9, 2000)
(finding bad faith registration and use where it is “inconceivable that the
respondent could make any active use of the disputed domain names without
creating a false impression of association with the Complainant”); see also
Perot Sys. Corp. v. Perot.net, FA
95312 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 29, 2000) (finding bad faith where the domain name
in question is obviously connected with the complainant’s well-known marks,
thus creating a likelihood of confusion strictly for commercial gain).
Furthermore,
Complainant contends that Respondent
registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith because Respondent’s
<joblog.com> domain name illustrates “typosquatting” because
Respondent misspelled Complainant’s famous mark by omitting the letter ‘s,’
causing Internet users seeking Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark to become
confused. See Zone Labs, Inc. v. Zuccarini, FA 190613 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 15, 2003) (“Respondent’s
registration and use of [the <zonelarm.com> domain name] that capitalizes
on the typographical error of an Internet user is considered typosquatting.
Typosquatting, itself is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues v. Zuccarini,
D2002-1011 (WIPO Jan. 21, 2003) (“Typosquatting is the intentional misspelling
of words with intent to intercept and siphon off traffic from its intended
destination, by preying on Internauts who make common typing errors. Typosquatting is inherently parasitic and of
itself evidence of bad faith”); see also Marriott
Int'l, Inc. v. Seocho, FA 149187 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 28, 2003) (finding that
the respondent's <marrriott.com>
domain name was confusingly similar to the complainant's MARRIOTT mark because
"Respondent's typosquatting, by its definition, renders the domain name confusingly
similar to Complainant's mark").
The
Complainant cannot prevail in this case because the facts support the
Respondent. Complainant failed to meet its burden in proving bad faith
registration and use because Complainant failed to point to particular facts
and circumstances supporting its allegations.
See Graman USA Inc. v. Shenzhen Graman Indus. Co., FA
133676 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2003) (finding that general allegations of bad
faith without supporting facts or specific examples do not supply a sufficient
basis upon which the panel may conclude that the respondent acted in bad
faith); see also White Pine
Software, Inc. v. Desktop Consulting, Inc., D2000-0539 (WIPO Aug. 31, 2000)
(declining to transfer the domain name where a full factual record has not been
presented to the panel such that a conclusive determination can be made
regarding the parties’ respective claims to the contested domain name).
Further, it is difficult to envision the
circumstance in which Complainant could show bad faith in this case. Respondent
registered the disputed domain name prior to the Complainant’s admitted first
use in commerce and Respondent used the <joblog.com>
domain name prior to any notice of this claim. See Reid v. Chao, FA 154587 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 29, 2003)
(finding that the respondent could not have registered the disputed domain name
in bad faith where its registration came months before the complainant filed
its trademark application and no evidence of common-law rights in the mark were
submitted to the panel); see also Aspen Grove, Inc. v. Aspen Grove,
D2001-0798 (WIPO Oct. 5, 2001) (finding that it is impossible for the
respondent to register a disputed domain name in bad faith if the complainant's
company did not exist at the time of registration); see also Open Sys. Computing AS v. degli Alessandri,
D2000-1393 (WIPO Dec. 11, 2000) (finding no bad faith where the respondent
registered the domain name in question before application and commencement of
use of the trademark by the complainant); see also Jensen Research
Corp. v. Future Media Architects, Inc., CPR00 0310 (CPR May 20, 2003):
“Some
panelists have interpreted paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy to require proof of
trademark rights in existence as of the date on which the disputed domain name
was registered or acquired. Other panelists consider present-day trademark
rights sufficient under paragraph 4(a)(i), but require proof of trademark
rights that predate the domain name in order to satisfy the bad faith
registration requirement contained in paragraph 4(a)(iii).”
Id. Furthermore, Respondent argues that its registration and
use of the <joblog.com> domain name does not constitute bad faith
if the Panel concludes that Respondent has been and is currently making a bona
fide offering of goods and services.
See DJF Assocs., Inc. v.
AIB Commc’ns, FA 95612 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 1, 2000) (finding the
respondent has shown that it has a legitimate interest in the domain name
because the respondent selected the name in good faith for its website, and was
offering services under the domain name prior to the initiation of the
dispute); see also Mule Lighting,
Inc. v. CPA, FA 95558 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 17, 2000) (finding no bad faith
where the respondent has an active website that has been in use for two years
and where there was no intent to cause confusion with the complainant’s website
and business); see also Schering
AG v. Metagen GmbH, D2000-0728 (WIPO Sept. 11, 2000) (finding that the
respondent did not register or use the domain name <metagen.com> in bad
faith where the respondent registered the domain name in connection with a fair
business interest and no likelihood of confusion was created).
The Panel finds that Complainant failed to satisfy the
requirements of ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) to show “bad faith registration and
use.”
DECISION
Having
established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel
concludes that relief shall be DENIED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the
Complaint be dismissed and that Respondent retain the <joblog.com>
domain name.
Barry Schreiber, Esq., Panel Chair
Dianne Cabell, Esq.
Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson
Dated: July 18, 2005
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