Nike, Inc. v. Domain Admin c/o Payphone Search LLC
Claim Number: FA0510000579896
Complainant is Nike, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Philip Davison, of Nike, Inc., One Bowerman Drive, DF/4, Legal Department, Beaverton, OR 97005. Respondent is Domain Admin c/o Payphone Search LLC (“Respondent”), P.O. Box 8188, Charlestown-Nevis, Kenya 00000.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN
NAME
The domain name at issue is <nikewoman.com>, registered with Moniker Online Services, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
James A. Crary as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on October 18, 2005; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on October 19, 2005.
On October 27, 2005, Moniker Online Services, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <nikewoman.com> domain name is registered with Moniker Online Services, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Moniker Online Services, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Moniker Online Services, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").
On October 31, 2005, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of November 21, 2005 by which Respondent could file a response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent's registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@nikewoman.com by e-mail.
Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On November 28, 2005, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed James A. Crary as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent." Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant makes the following assertions:
1. Respondent’s <nikewoman.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s NIKE mark.
2. Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <nikewoman.com> domain name.
3. Respondent registered and used the <nikewoman.com> domain name in bad faith.
B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Complainant, Nike Inc., is the world’s leading sports and fitness company. Complainant designs, manufactures and markets a broad range of athletic and leisure footwear, apparel and equipment. Complainant has been operating its business under the NIKE mark since as early as 1971. Complainant holds trademark rights in the NIKE mark through registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 978,952, issued February 19, 1974)
Respondent registered the <nikewoman.com> domain name on May 24, 2000. Respondent is using the disputed domain name to redirect Internet users to a search engine website displaying a variety of links to third party commercial websites.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant has established rights in the NIKE mark through
registration with the USPTO. See
Vivendi Universal Games v. XBNetVentures Inc., FA 198803 (Nat. Arb. Forum
Nov. 11, 2003) (“Complainant's federal trademark registrations establish
Complainant's rights in the BLIZZARD mark.”); see also Innomed Techs., Inc. v. DRP Servs., FA 221171 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 18, 2004) (“Registration
of the NASAL-AIRE mark with the USPTO establishes Complainant's rights in the
mark.”).
Complainant asserts that the <nikewoman.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s NIKE mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), as the domain name incorporates Complainant’s mark with the addition of the generic or descriptive term “woman.” The mere addition of a generic or descriptive word to a registered mark does not negate the confusing similarity of Respondent’s domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. ShopStarNetwork, FA 95404 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 14, 2000) (finding that combining the generic word “shop” with the complainant’s registered mark “llbean” does not circumvent the complainant’s rights in the mark nor avoid the confusing similarity aspect of the ICANN Policy); see also Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Ltd. v. Healy/BOSTH, D2001-0026 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2001) (finding confusing similarity where the domain name in dispute contains the identical mark of the complainant combined with a generic word or term).
Furthermore, the addition of the generic top-level domain “.com” does not negate the confusing similarity of Respondent’s domain name to Complainant’s NIKE mark, pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (finding that the top level of the domain name such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., FA 153545 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (“The addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.”).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied.
Complainant asserts that Respondent does not have rights or
legitimate interests in the <nikewoman.com> domain name. When a complainant establishes a prima
facie case pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden shifts to the
respondent to prove that it has rights or legitimate interests. Due to Respondent’s failure to respond to
the Complaint, the Panel infers that Respondent does not have rights or
legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. See Parfums
Christian Dior v. QTR Corp., D2000-0023 (WIPO Mar. 9, 2000) (finding that
by not submitting a response, the respondent has failed to invoke any circumstance
which could demonstrate any rights or legitimate interests in the domain name);
see also Bank of Am. Corp. v. McCall, FA 135012 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 31, 2002) (“Respondent's
failure to respond not only results in its failure to meet its burden, but also
will be viewed as evidence itself that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate
interests in the disputed domain name.”).
Additionally, Respondent has not offered any evidence and there is no proof in the record suggesting that Respondent is commonly known by the <nikewoman.com> domain name. Thus, the Panel concludes that Respondent has not established rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Tercent Inc. v. Lee Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’ the disputed domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) does not apply); see also G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cimock, FA 126829 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 13, 2003) (“Due to the fame of Complainant’s mark there must be strong evidence that Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name in order to find that Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). However, there is no evidence on record, and Respondent has not come forward with any proof to establish that it is commonly known as CELEBREXRX or <celebrexrx.com>.”).
Moreover, Respondent is using the <nikewoman.com> domain name to redirect Internet users to a search engine website featuring various links to third party commercial websites. The Panel finds that Respondent’s use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark to divert Internet users for Respondent’s own commercial gain does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See MSNBC Cable, LLC v. Tysys.com, D2000-1204 (WIPO Dec. 8, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests in the famous MSNBC mark where the respondent attempted to profit using the complainant’s mark by redirecting Internet traffic to its own website); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Tencent Communications Corp., FA 93668 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 21, 2000) (finding that use of the complainant’s mark “as a portal to suck surfers into a site sponsored by [the respondent] hardly seems legitimate”).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied.
Respondent intentionally registered a domain name that contains, in its entirety, Complainant’s well-known mark and did so for Respondent’s commercial gain. Respondent’s domain name diverts Internet users who seek complainant’s NIKE mark to Respondent’s commercial website through the use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. Furthermore, Respondent is unfairly and opportunistically benefiting from the goodwill associated with Complainant’s NIKE mark. Respondent’s practice of diversion, motivated by commercial gain, constitutes bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Celebrex Drugstore, FA 123933 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 21, 2002) (finding that the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the respondent was using the confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet users to its commercial website); see also Kmart v. Khan, FA 127708 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 22, 2002) (finding that if the respondent profits from its diversionary use of the complainant's mark when the domain name resolves to commercial websites and the respondent fails to contest the complaint, it may be concluded that the respondent is using the domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)).
The Panel finds that Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) has been satisfied.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <nikewoman.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
James A. Crary, Panelist
Dated: December 9, 2005
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