Suspensions, LLC v. The LBC Group, Inc. d/b/a
Creative Associates
Claim Number: FA0603000662305
PARTIES
Complainant is Suspensions, LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Amanda A. Neidert, of Miles & Stockbridge, 10 Light Street, Baltimore, MD 21202-1487. Respondent is The LBC Group, Inc., d/b/a Creative Associates (“Respondent”), represented by Scott S. Christie, of McCarter & English, LLP, Four Gateway Center, 100 Mulberry Street, Newark, NJ 07102.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The domain names at issue are <justsuspension.com> and <just-suspension.com>, registered with Go Daddy Software, Inc.
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and
impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving
as Panelist in this proceeding.
Jeffrey M. Samuels, as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum
electronically on March 17, 2006; the National Arbitration Forum received a
hard copy of the Complaint on March 20, 2006.
On March 20, 2006, Go Daddy Software, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the
National Arbitration Forum that the <justsuspension.com> and <just-suspension.com> domain names are registered with Go
Daddy Software, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the
name. Go Daddy Software, Inc. has
verified that Respondent is bound by the Go Daddy Software, Inc. registration
agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third
parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (the “Policy”).
On March 23, 2006, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of
Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline
of April 12, 2006 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint,
was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and
persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and
billing contacts, and to postmaster@justsuspension.com and postmaster@just-suspension.com
by e-mail.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on April
12, 2006.
On April 17, 2006, Complainant timely filed an “Additional Written
Statement by Complainant” under the Forum’s Supplemental Rule #7(a). Thereafter, on April 21, 2006, Respondent,
pursuant to Supplemental Rule #7(c), timely filed an “Additional Written
Statement of Respondent.”[1] An “Additional Statement of Complainant” was
submitted by Complainant on April 27, 2006 and was determined by the Forum to
be deficient. The Panel has chosen not
to consider this Additional Submission in its decision.
On April 21, 2006, pursuant to Complainant’s
request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National
Arbitration Forum appointed Jeffrey M. Samuels as Panelist.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from
Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
According to the Complaint, Complainant Suspensions LLC is the current
owner of the common law mark JUST SUSPENSION, which was first used by Just
Suspension Inc. in 1986 in connection with the sale and distribution of
automobile parts for classic American vehicles. Complainant purchased Just
Suspension, Inc. on or about March 24, 2005.
As part of the purchase agreement, Complainant purchased all right,
title, and interest in and to all intellectual property related to Just
Suspension, Inc. and the goodwill associated therewith, including the trade
name “Just Suspension,” all logos and service marks, the website, and all
registered domain names, including, but not limited to, <justsuspension.com>
and <just-suspension.com>.
Complainant
alleges that it has continued to do business under the JUST SUSPENSION mark and
has invested substantial sums to promote continued recognition of the mark,
including nationwide magazine ads, website ads and sales, and catalogs and
business cards.
Complainant maintains that it owns common law rights in the JUST
SUSPENSION mark and that the domain names in dispute are identical and
confusingly similar to the JUST SUSPENSION mark.
Complainant further contends that Respondent has no rights or
legitimate interests in the disputed domain names. According to Complainant, Respondent was hired to set up and
design a website for Just Suspension Inc. but instead of registering the domain
name <justsuspension.com> in the name of Just Suspensions Inc.,
Respondent, on September 27, 1999, registered the domain name in Respondent’s
name. On or about March 30, 2005,
Harrison Feather, Respondent’s president, advised Complainant that Respondent
owned the domain name <justsuspension.com> but would transfer it
to Complainant. On August 2, 2005,
without Complainant’s knowledge, Respondent registered the domain name <just-suspension.com>. Respondent then invoiced Complainant for
lease of <justsuspension.com> and the next day demanded $10,000
for the sale of <justsuspension.com>. Complainant’s counsel, on September 19, 2005, sent a “cease and desist”
letter to Respondent. A week later,
Respondent renewed its registration of the <justsuspension.com>
domain name
Complainant urges that Respondent is not making a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of either of the disputed domain names. It notes that Respondent’s only current use
of the domain name <justsuspension.com> is to lease the domain
name to Complainant so that Complainant can maintain its information on the web
site. Complainant further observes that
Respondent has not made any use of the domain name <just-suspension.com>.
The webpage found at this site currently is “parked free, courtesy of
GoDaddy.com” and contains sponsored links where consumers can be diverted to
websites for Complainant’s competitors.
See Exhibit J.
Complainant alleges that Respondent has registered and used both
disputed domain names in bad faith.
With respect to the <justsuspension.com> domain name,
Complainant argues that this name was registered in bad faith when Respondent
listed its own name as the registrant despite knowing that it was hired as an
agent to register the domain name. Complainant indicates that such bad faith is
further evidenced by the fact that Respondent apparently never told
Complainant’s predecessor that the domain name was registered in favor of
Respondent. Complainant also contends
that Respondent, following Complainant’s request to do so, agreed to transfer
the domain name to Complainant and that such acquiescence “is not indicative of
someone with a legitimate interest that had registered the domain name in good
faith.” According to Complainant, Respondent’s breach of its agreement to
transfer ownership of the domain name, followed by its demand for $10,000 for
the transfer of the registration, indicates that Respondent registered <justsuspension.com>
primarily for the purpose of selling it to Complainant.
With respect to the “bad faith” registration of the <just-suspension.com>
domain name, Complainant notes that Complainant had requested, and Respondent
had agreed to, transfer of the <justsuspension.com> name when
Respondent registered <just-suspension.com> in August 2005. At this point, Complainant declares,
Respondent was well aware of Complainant’s rights in the JUST SUSPENSION
mark. Noting that the web page at the <just-suspension.com>
site contains sponsored links to competitor sites, Complainant argues that it
may be inferred that Respondent registered <just-suspension.com>
in a deliberate attempt to attract internet users to other online locations by
creating confusion and denied Complainant the ability to reflect its own mark
in the corresponding domain name.
B. Respondent
In its Response, Respondent launches a multi-pronged attack against the
assertion that Complainant possesses trademark rights in JUST SUSPENSION. It argues that: (1) the Complaint is
predicated solely upon alleged trademark rights in JUST SUSPENSION and that the
asset purchase agreement does not mention trademarks, as opposed to service
marks; (2) that such agreement did not transfer rights in JUST SUSPENSION to
Complainant; (3) that Complainant’s rights in JUST SUSPENSION go only as far
back as the date of the asset sale, March 18, 2005, well after the date of
registration of the <justsuspension.com> domain name; (4)
Complainant has established that its rights (if any) in JUST SUSPENSION
commenced no earlier than November 2005; and (5) since JUST SUSPENSION is
descriptive, Complainant must establish that the mark possessed secondary
meaning before it may be protected.
Respondent
further argues that it has rights and legitimate interests in respect of the
disputed domain names. According to
Respondent, it provides technology business consulting, products and services
and, at the request of seven of its clients, has registered domain names to
facilitate and protect the internet presence of these clients. The Response
contends that, on or about September 27, 1999, Respondent registered the domain
names with the authorization of the owner of Just Suspension Inc. and that up
until September 26, 2002, Just Suspension, Inc. was invoiced by Respondent for
licensing of the domain names and paid a nominal license fee of $35 for each
domain name.
On or about September 26, 2002, the registration for <just-suspension.com>
lapsed. Thereafter, up until the asset
purchase by the Complainant on March 18, 2005, Respondent invoiced Just
Suspension Inc for licensing of the <justsuspension.com> domain
name and Just Suspension Inc. continued to pay an annual license fee of $35.
The Response maintains that, on or about August 2005, Respondent
learned that the domain name <just-suspension.com> remain
unregistered. Hoping to keep
Complainant as a client, Respondent re-registered the <just-suspension.com>
domain name on or about August 2, 2005.
Later that month, Respondent invoiced Complainant the $35 annual license
fee for <justsuspension.com> and Complainant paid the
invoice.
Respondent further argues that it never volunteered to transfer the
domain names in dispute to Complainant and that Complainant’s unsworn
statements to the contrary are not probative.[2]
In sum, Respondent urges that it has demonstrated that, before notice
of the instant dispute, it used the domain names in connection with the bona
fide offering of its domain name licensing service to Just Suspension Inc. and
that it was making fair use of the domain names.
Respondent also argues that, in view of the above, the domain names
were not registered, and are not being used, in bad faith. It also takes issue with Complainant’s
assertion that Respondent demanded $10,000 for the transfer of the <justsuspension.com
name>. According to the facts as
set forth in Mr. Feather’s sworn affidavit, on or about August 30, 2005,
Complainant inquired of Mr. Feather about purchasing the <justsuspension.com>
name. Mr. Feather invited an offer, and
Complainant offered $200. Mr. Feather
rejected the offer, advising that $10,000 was closer to a fair offer.
The Response also includes a claim that Complainant engaged in reverse
domain name hijacking. The bases of
such a claim are that: (1) Complainant submitted an incomplete asset purchase
agreement and misrepresented its terms; (2) Complainant failed to contact its
predecessor in interest to learn that it authorized Respondent to register the
domain names; and (3) Complainant falsely claimed that Respondent agreed to
transfer the domain name <justsuspension.com> to Complainant.
C. Additional Submissions
In its “Additional Submission,” Complainant argues that its common law
rights in the JUST SUSPENSION mark consist of both trademark and service mark
rights and that the mark was used by Just Suspension Inc. to promote its goods
and services as early as 1989 and has been used by Complainant continuously
ever since.[3] According to Complainant, Just Suspension
Inc. spent approximately $400,000 in advertising between 2001 and 2004.[4] Moreover, Complainant contends, the
Complaint’s reference to “trademark” and “mark” were meant to encompass
Complainant’s trademark and service mark rights.
Complainant also takes issue with Respondent’s contention that it was
authorized by Just Suspension Inc. to register the disputed domain names. Such contention, according to Complainant,
directly contradicts the Asset Purchase Agreement in which Just Suspension Inc.
represented and warranted that it owned the disputed domain names. Complainant notes that Respondent’s
contention is supported solely by Mr. Feather’s affidavit and that there is no
evidence of any written agreement between Just Suspension Inc. and Respondent.
The
Additional Submission of Respondent observes that Complainant failed to produce
any evidence of use of the JUST SUSPENSION mark for the entire decade of the
1990’s and, thus, at best, Complainant’s common law rights in the mark
commenced no earlier than January 2001.
On the issue of “rights and legitimate interests,” Respondent notes
that the parties’ respective affidavits create a factual issue on this question
and Complainant carries the burden of persuasion on this issue. Respondent also contends that Complainant
has failed to satisfy its burden of persuasion on the issue of “bad faith”
registration and use.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove
each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name
should be cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain name
registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark
or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2)
the Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3)
the domain name
has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
DECISION
The Panel has carefully reviewed the record
in this case and determines that this dispute is not amenable to resolution
through the UDRP. A critical issue governs the outcome of this proceeding: Was Respondent authorized by Just
Suspensions Inc. to not only register the domain names in dispute but to do so
in its own name? However, the evidence
presented by the parties with respect to this issue is equivocal at best. While Respondent offers a sworn affidavit
from its president that he registered the domain names in the name of the
Respondent “with the authorization of the owner of Just Suspensions Inc.,” a
review of the invoices submitted by Respondent does not directly support such
assertion. The invoices relate to work for registering and renewing the domain
names. Contrary to Respondent’s
assertion, in the Panel’s opinion, the invoices cannot be interpreted to
reflect the existence of a licensing agreement between Respondent and Just
Suspension Inc. and Complainant under which the latter two entities were
authorized to use domain names owned by
Respondent.
On the other hand, the Panel finds less than compelling Complainant’s
arguments in support of its claim that Respondent was hired as an agent to
register the domain names in the name of Just Suspension Inc. The fact that the Asset Purchase Agreement
assigned to Complainant rights in “all registered domain names” does not
necessarily mean that Complainant, in fact, owned
such domain names. Moreover, while
Complainant contends that Respondent voluntarily agreed to transfer the <justsuspension.com>
domain name, and asserts that such fact (if true) supports a determination that
Respondent did not register the domain names in good faith, Respondent has
submitted evidence that no such voluntary offer to transfer took place.
It is significant, in the Panel’s view, that neither party presented evidence from Just Suspensions Inc. as to its understanding of whether it or Respondent would own the domain name registrations. It seems to the Panel that such evidence is critical to determining if Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the domain names and whether the domain names were registered and are being used in bad faith. Absent such evidence, the Panel would just be flipping a coin in deciding this matter. Far better for the parties to have the opportunity to present a more complete record to a court of law that could also assess credibility.[5]
Complainant’s request for transfer to it of the domain names <justsuspension.com> and <just-suspension.com> is DENIED without prejudice and Respondent’s request to find that Complainant committed reverse domain name hijacking is DENIED without prejudice.
Jeffrey M. Samuels, Panelist
Dated: May 5, 2006
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National
Arbitration Forum
[1] In its “Additional Submission,” Respondent contended, in part, that Complainant’s April 17th “Additional Submission” should not be considered because it was not timely. The Panel notes, however, that the Forum determined that Complainant’s “Additional Submission” of April 17th was timely and, thus, will consider the arguments and evidence set forth therein in its decision.
[2] The Response includes a sworn affidavit signed by Mr. Feather in which he avers that he never offered to transfer the domain names to Complainant.
[3] The Additional Submission includes a number of exhibits demonstrating such use, including the Spring 1989 Direct Mail Catalog, a 1989 ad in Muscle Car Classics, and an ad in the January 2005 issue of Mopar Magazine.
[4] Complainant’s Additional Submission includes an affidavit from the President of Suspensions LLC indicating that Complainant spent nearly $100,000 in the first three quarters since acquiring Just Suspensions Inc. on advertising JUST SUSPENSION products and services.
[5] See Commercial Publ’g Co. v. EarthComm., Inc, FA 95013 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 20, 2000) (finding that the Policy’s administrative procedure is “intended only for the relatively narrow class of cases of `abusive registrations’. . . . The [P]olicy relegates all `legitimate disputes’ to the courts”). The Panel notes that Section 43(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(d), provides a civil cause of action for “cybersquatting” against one who in “bad faith” registers a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark. Having this dispute heard and decided by a court will also enable fuller development of the issue as to whether the unregistered mark JUST SUSPENSION is distinctive.