Instron Corporation v. Andrew Kaner c/o Electromatic a/k/a Electromatic Equip't
Claim Number: FA0608000768859
Complainant is Instron Corporation (“Complainant”), represented by Caroline L. Stevens, Two Prudential Plaza, Suite 4900, Chicago, IL 60601. Respondent is Andrew Kaner c/o Electromatic a/k/a Electromatic Equip't (“Respondent”), represented by David Bromley c/o Electromatic Equip't Co., Inc., 600 Oakland Ave, Cedarhurst, NY 11516.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The domain names at issue are <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com>, registered with Computer Services Langenbach Gmbh d/b/a Joker.com.
The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Dr. Reinhard Schanda as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on August 3, 2006; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on August 4, 2006.
On August 7, 2006, Computer Services Langenbach Gmbh d/b/a Joker.com confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names are registered with Computer Services Langenbach Gmbh d/b/a Joker.com and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the names. Computer Services Langenbach Gmbh d/b/a Joker.com has verified that Respondent is bound by the Computer Services Langenbach Gmbh d/b/a Joker.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On August 10, 2006, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of August 30, 2006 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to email@example.com and firstname.lastname@example.org by e-mail.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on August 30, 2006.
A timely Additional Submission from Complainant (Reply) was received and determined to be in compliance with Supplemental Rule # 7 on September 5, 2006.
A timely Additional Submission from Respondent (Reply Response) was received and determined to be in compliance with Supplemental Rule # 7 on September 8, 2006.
On September 8, 2006, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Dr. Reinhard Schanda as Panelist.
Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
Instron Corporation owns U.S. Reg. No. 2,180,421 for the “SHORE” trademark used in association with durometers, i.e., gauges to measure the hardness of rubber or plastic materials. Under U.S. law, Complainant has the exclusive right to use the “SHORE” mark for durometers, and Complainant’s registration is incontestable. Complainant also owns European trademark Registration No. 2,922,557 for the “SHORE” mark, with rights dating back many decades based on the underlying UK trademark Registration No. 768,976. Complainant owns the <shoreinstruments.com> domain name, which is linked to a website through which Complainant sells “SHORE” durometers.
Complainant, directly and through its predecessors in interest, has used the “SHORE” mark extensively in the U.S. since at least as early as 1907. Over the decades, Complainant has spent substantial sums of money to promote and protect the “SHORE” mark. As a result, the “SHORE” mark has become well-known and is recognized by consumers as a source indicator for high quality goods affiliated with Complainant.
Complainant contends that in February 2006, it became aware that Respondent had registered the domain name <shoredurometers.com>. Complainant was greatly concerned to learn this, because Respondent and Complainant are direct competitors in the sale of durometers, and the domain name included Complainant’s “SHORE” trademark and the generic term “durometers.” Furthermore, Respondent had linked the domain name to one of Respondent’s active websites. The website was used to advertise and promote the sale of Respondent’s own durometers and displayed the “SHORE” trademark as a banner title. The website also listed Respondent’s business name and provided Respondent’s contact information.
Therefore, on April 20, 2006, Complainant sent a letter to Respondent. Through this letter and a follow up letter, Complainant explained its rights in the “SHORE” mark. Complainant requested that Respondent cease unauthorized use of the “SHORE” trademark, and that Respondent transfer the domain name to Complainant. Complainant then learned that Respondent had also registered the <shoredurometer.com> domain name, and this domain name became part of Complainant’s initial objection. During the months of May and June 2006, Complainant and Respondent corresponded regarding this matter. Ultimately, Respondent refused to transfer the domain names to Complainant.
Complainant contends that the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names are clearly confusingly similar to Complainant’s “SHORE” trademark, because they incorporate the “SHORE” trademark in its entirety, as well as the generic word “durometer,” which describes the goods Complainant sells under the “SHORE” mark. Furthermore, the domain names were linked to a website that was confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark, because the website offered goods identical to Complainant’s goods and prominently displayed the “SHORE” trademark. The domain names were deactivated after Complainant sent its cease and desist letters.
According to Complainant, Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names at dispute. Respondent cannot show, prior to the filing of the complaint, use of or preparations to use the domain names or names corresponding to the domain names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. Furthermore, Respondent cannot show that it has been commonly known by the domain names, and Respondent cannot show that it has a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain names, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the “SHORE” mark. Respondent set up the website linked to the <shoredurometers.com> and <shoredurometer.com> domain names for commercial gain, and Respondent does not have a fair use defense, because Respondent is not using the “SHORE” mark to refer to Complainant’s products, and Complainant owns an incontestable trademark registration for the distinctive “SHORE” mark. Further, Respondent is not a licensee of Complainant, and Complainant did not authorize Respondent’s use of the “SHORE” mark in connection with the domain names at dispute. Respondent initially linked the domain names to one of its own websites, but deactivated the domain names after receiving Complainant’s cease and desist letters. Deactivating domain names and merely “sitting” on them does not give Respondent a legitimate interest in the domain names.
Finally, because Complainant began using the “SHORE” mark in connection with its goods long before Respondent registered the domain names, because Complainant’s use of the mark “SHORE” is known and associated with high quality goods, and because Respondent and Complainant are direct competitors, Respondent had constructive knowledge, if not actual knowledge, of Complainant’s use of the “SHORE” mark. According to Complainant the registration of the domain names with constructive knowledge of their use as a mark suggests no rights or legitimate interests and can serve as evidence of bad faith.
Complainant finally contends that the domain names at dispute were registered and are being used in bad faith by Respondent. As Complainant’s competitor, Respondent had constructive, if not actual, knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the “SHORE” mark, yet Respondent registered the domain names. Respondent relied on the recognition and goodwill associated with Complainant’s “SHORE” mark to redirect Internet users to Respondent’s own website, because Complainant and Respondent sell identical and competing goods. Reliance on the goodwill of Complainant’s trademark to redirect Internet users to a website unrelated to Complainant equates to bad faith.
Complainant and Respondent are direct competitors in the same line of business. Respondent’s registration and use of the domain names is evidence of an attempt to disrupt Complainant’s business, and is evidence of Respondent’s bad faith registration of the domain names. Even though Respondent has deactivated the domain names, mere passive holding of the domain names constitutes use of the domain name in bad faith.
Respondent contends that the term “SHORE” is a measuring unit which is identified or named after a discoverer or a person known to have worked in the field of endeavor where such units became identifiable and/or accepted like degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius for temperature. The units are generic and the instruments designed to measure those units are available from many manufacturers and other sources.
Specifically, a Shore Durometer is a Durometer (Hardness Tester) that measures hardness of a material by measuring the depth of penetration, in generic units, of a specific type of indentor when forced into the material with a known force. It is not necessarily a Shore-branded or trademarked durometer. The construction and location of the Indentor and the known force values vary with the Duromenter Type. Respondent has been marketing Durometers for over 20 years.
Respondent contends that the words “SHORE” and “shore,” as well as “durometer” have become generic. In no instance, did Respondent use the word Shore, in text or logo form, to confuse a potential buyer. Respondent used “shoredurometer” and “shoredurometers” to attract attention to the fact that it sold durometers suitable for measuring hardness, in Shore Hardness units, in accordance with the method described in American Society for Testing Materials.
Respondent’s Hardness Testers are not “identical” with, nor do they look like, the Complainant’s Testers. Respondent’s goods are not marketed under the Shore trademark. They are, and have been, marketed under Respondent’s registered CHECK-LINE trademark, Registration No. 1,741,076. In response to Complainant’s allegations, it should be noted that Respondent’s use of “shore” in its domain name <shoredurometers.com> referred to durometers calibrated with the same empirical Shore units advertised and offered by others. Respondent never displayed the “Shore” trademark.
Respondent contends that words or names identified as “Shore Durometers,” corresponding to the domain names at dispute are a bona fide offering of goods. Its use does not infringe in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or services. Respondent has used its Registered Trademark CHECK-LINE to advertise and sell its complete line of durometers, including those with generic-method Shore types, since before 1986. The purpose of the domain names is to alert the buying public to the fact that Respondent sells durometers with shore units and scales, and not to infer that Respondent’s durometers are the same as, or similar to, those sold under the Shore trademark. According to the Respondent “Shore” Durometers are generic, and not necessarily identified as a Shore-branded instrument.
Respondent asserts that it did not act in bad faith when it registered the domain names at dispute. Its goal was to advise prospective purchasers that durometers with generic Shore units and scales and information concern in this type of instrument were available by contacting the websites with the domain names at dispute.
In its Reply dated September 5, 2006, Complainant maintains that the domain names at issue are confusingly similar to Complainant’s registered trademark, that Respondent does not have a legitimate interest in the <shoredurometer.com> or <shoredurometers.com> domain names, and that the Domain Names were registered in bad faith.
In 1907, Complainant (through its predecessor in interest) adopted and began using the “SHORE” mark for “electrical equipment for testing physical properties of materials.” For nearly 100 years, Complainant has used the “SHORE” mark in association with testing equipment. Complainant’s “SHORE” mark has become well known within the industry, and people in the industry recognize the “SHORE” mark as a source indicator for Complainant’s goods. In an effort to protect its rights, Complainant enters into license agreements to control the parties authorized to use the “SHORE” mark in connection with durometers.
The USPTO has recognized that Complainant’s “SHORE” mark for durometers is not generic. The USPTO allowed registration of the mark on the Principal Register on the basis of inherent distinctiveness. Therefore, the mark is presumed valid under U.S. law. Furthermore, the USPTO has afforded Complainant incontestable rights to the “SHORE” mark for durometers under 15 U.S.C. § 1065, meaning that under U.S. law, the mark “SHORE” cannot be attacked on the grounds that it is merely descriptive. To the contrary, any third party challenging Complainant’s rights under U.S. law would have to prove that the mark has become generic for the goods. Proving that a registered mark has become generic under U.S. law requires a very heavy burden of proof. For a particular term to be “generic”, the public must perceive the term primarily as the designation of the article itself. Under U.S. law, once a mark is registered a presumption arises that it is not generic, and an attacker of the mark must overcome that presumption.
Respondent attempts to support its argument that the “SHORE” mark is generic by providing examples of alleged generic use of the “SHORE” mark. Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, these examples do not demonstrate that the “SHORE” mark is generic. Most of the examples are permissible fair uses, where the term “Shore” is used merely to identify the units of measurement, and the examples do not refer to “SHORE Durometers,” where “SHORE” is being used in a trademark sense to indicate the source of the goods. The remaining examples are few and either show third party uses of “SHORE” that are improper and infringing, or show uses of the mark in foreign countries where Complainant does not have trademark rights and where Complainant does not police its mark.
In conclusion, Complainant owns valid trademark rights in the “SHORE” mark for durometers, as acknowledged by the USPTO. The Domain Names at issue incorporate Complainant’s trademark followed by the descriptive terms “durometer” and “durometers.” The Domain Names were being used for a website that offers uses “SHORE Durometers” as a banner title and in a trademark sense to sell Respondent’s durometers. Thus, the Domain Names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s “SHORE” mark, which Respondent does not contest in its Response, and the Domain Names are likely to cause confusion among relevant consumers.
Despite Respondent’s claims, Respondent was not making a bona fide offering of goods, because Respondent had constructive (and likely actual) notice of Complainant’s rights in the “SHORE” mark, and Respondent was using the “SHORE” mark as a banner heading and in a trademark sense on the <shoredurometers.com> and <shoredurometer.com> websites and because Respondent and Complainant are direct competitors.
Finally Respondent has acted in bad faith, because the Domain Names are identical to Complainant’s mark, Respondent had constructive (and likely actual) notice of Complainant’s rights in the “SHORE” durometers mark when it registered the Domain Names, and in so doing, Respondent intended to direct Complainant’s potential customers to Respondent’s website for commercial gain.
In its Reply Response dated September 8, 2006, Respondent still maintains that the domain names at issue in this case are generic and not confusingly similar to Complainant’s registered trademark, that Respondent does have a legitimate interest in the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names and that the Domain Names were not registered in bad faith.
Respondent’s use of “shore” in the Domain Names was selected solely to identify Hardness Testers (Durometers) which use calibration units and the method described in Domestic and International Standards. Respondent contends that the combination of “shore” and “durometer” or “durometers” in the Domain Names should also be considered generic. Respondent could have provided a sufficient number of examples to demonstrate that the Complainant’s mark has become generic.
In conclusion, Respondent’s choice of “shoredurometer” and “shoredurometers” for domain names was to provide a website for persons looking to purchase durometers (hardness testers) that used the shore method and provided measurements in Shore scale units. It did not use SHORE as a trademark or brand, in any way. Respondent maintains that it does have a legitimate interest in the Domain Names because, before any notice of the dispute, Respondent used the generic words “shore,” “durometer” and “durometers” of the Domain Names in connection with its bona fide offering of its CHECK-LINEÒ shore-type durometers, as early as 1986.
Respondent’s registration of the Domain Names was not in bad faith, because “shore durometer” and “shore durometers” are not identified with the “SHORE” trademark.
In conclusion, Respondent’s sole purpose in registering the Domain Names was to advise the public of a source for products and information regarding generic “shore durometers”.
The Panel finds that:
1. The Domain Names <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> are confusingly similar to the Complainant’s registered trade marks.
2. Respondent has not established any right or legitimate interest in the Domain Names <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> and
3. Respondent has registered and is using the Domain Names <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> in bad faith.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant contends that it has registered the SHORE mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 2,180,421 issued August 11, 1998) in connection with the sale of durometers, gauges that measure the hardness of rubber and plastic materials. Complainant also alleges that it has registered the SHORE mark in the European Community (Reg. No. 2,922,557) and in the United Kingdom (Reg. No. 768,976). The Panel finds that these trademark registrations demonstrate Complainant’s rights in the SHORE mark for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Thermo Electron Corp et al. v. Xu, FA 713851 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 12, 2006) (holding that the complainants established rights in marks because the marks were registered with a trademark authority); see also Miller Brewing Co. v. The Miller Family, FA 104177 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 15, 2002) (finding that the complainant had established rights to the MILLER TIME mark through its federal trademark registrations).
With respect to the confusing similarity of the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names to Complainant’s SHORE mark, the Panel finds that Respondent has failed to sufficiently distinguish the disputed domain names from the mark by merely adding terms describing Complainant’s main products, durometers, to the SHORE mark. See Reed Elsevier Inc. & Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. v. Christodoulou, FA 97321(Nat. Arb. Forum June 26, 2001) (finding the <legallexis.com> and <legallexus.com> domain names were confusingly similar to Complainant’s LEXIS mark because the term “legal” describes the type of services Complainant offers under the LEXIS mark); see also Chanel, Inc. v. Cologne Zone, D2000-1809 (WIPO Feb. 22, 2001) (“CHANEL, the salient feature of the Domain Names, is identical to a mark in which Complainant has shown prior rights. The addition of the generic term, “perfumes” is not a distinguishing feature, and in this case seems to increase the likelihood of confusion because it is an apt term for Complainant’s business.”).
Respondent argues that Complainant’s SHORE mark refers to a common measuring unit for hardness and that Respondent only registered the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names because it contained this commonly-used term. Nevertheless, a mark that has been registered on the Principal Register of the USPTO for more than five years is considered inconstestible under U.S. trademark law. Therefore, the Panel decides to defer to the USPTO’s determination on issuing a valid trademark registration to Complainant. See Matchnet plc v. Josh Joffe, FA 159456 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 4, 2003) (“Genericness is a question of fact. However, when the mark owner has a federal registration, there is a presumption that the term is not generic, and the challenger bears the burden of rebutting the presumption.”); see also U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. MS Tech. Inc., FA 198898 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 9, 2003) (“[O]nce the USPTO has made a determination that a mark is registrable, by so issuing a registration, as indeed was the case here, an ICANN panel is not empowered to nor should it disturb that determination.”).
Complainant must show that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name. Respondent does not assume the burden of proof, but may establish a right or legitimate interest in a disputed domain name by demonstrating in accordance with paragraph 4(c) of the Policy:
(i) He has made preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to the dispute;
(ii) He is commonly known by the domain name, even if he has not acquired any trademark rights; or
(iii) He intends to make a legitimate, non-commercial or fair use of the domain name without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark.
The Panel determines that Complainant has discharged the onus of proof for the second criterion: Respondent has failed to demonstrate any legitimate right or interest.
According to the majority of Panel decisions this Panel also takes the position that while Complainant has the burden of proof on this issue, once Complainant has made a prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to Respondent to show by providing concrete evidence that it has rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name at issue. See Document Technologies, Inc. v. International Electronic Communications, Inc., D2000-0270 (WIPO June 6, 2000); Inter-Continental Hotel Corporation v. Khaled Ali Soussi, D2000-0252 WIPO July 5, 2000); Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (holding that, where the Complainant has asserted that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests with respect to the domain name, it is incumbent on the Respondent to come forward with concrete evidence rebutting this assertion because this information is “uniquely within the knowledge and control of the Respondent”); see also G.D. Searle v. Martin Mktg., FA 118277 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 1, 2002) (“Because Complainant’s Submission constitutes a prima facie case under the Policy, the burden effectively shifts to Respondent.”).
Complainant contends that because the WHOIS information lists the registrant of the domain names as “Andrew Kaner c/o Electromatic a/k/a Electromatic Equip't,” and there is no other evidence in the record indicating that Respondent is commonly known by any of the disputed domain names, Respondent is not commonly known by any of the disputed domain names. Complainant also asserts that Respondent is a competitor in the durometer products industry and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to register or use domain names incorporating a variation of Complainant’s SHORE mark. The Panel agrees that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names. As a result the Panel finds that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the domain names pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See The Braun Corp. v. Loney, FA 699652 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 7, 2006) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain names where the WHOIS information, as well as all other information in the record, gave no indication that the respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain names, and the complainant had not authorized the respondent to register a domain name containing its registered mark); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Onlyne Corp. Services11, Inc., FA 198969 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 17, 2003) (“Given the WHOIS contact information for the disputed domain [name], one can infer that Respondent, Onlyne Corporate Services11, is not commonly known by the name ‘welsfargo’ in any derivation.”).
Additionally, Complainant alleges that up until it sent Respondent a cease-and-desist letter, Respondent used the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names to redirect Internet users to Respondent’s own website, where Respondent markets and sells durometers in direct competition with Complainant and prominently displays Complainant’s SHORE mark. Complainant maintains that since sending Respondent a cease-and-desist letter, Respondent’s domain names do not resolve to an active website, but Complainant argues that nothing stops Respondent from restarting its diversionary use in the future. As a result of Complainant’s allegations, the Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to redirect Internet users to a competing website for its own commercial gain does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See Or. State Bar v. A Special Day, Inc., FA 99657 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 4, 2001) (“Respondent's advertising of legal services and sale of law-related books under Complainant's name is not a bona fide offering of goods and services because Respondent is using a mark confusingly similar to the Complainant's to sell competing goods.”); see also Glaxo Group Ltd. v. WWW Zban, FA 203164 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 1, 2003) (finding that the respondent was not using the domain name within the parameters of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii) because the respondent used the domain name to take advantage of the complainant's mark by diverting Internet users to a competing commercial site).
Complainant asserts that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain names to disrupt Complainant’s business, because Respondent is using the disputed domain names to operate a competing website. The Panel finds that Respondent has registered and used the disputed domain names in bad faith according to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). See Spark Networks PLC v. Houlihan, FA 653476 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 18, 2006) (holding that the respondent’s registration of a domain name substantially similar to Complainant’s AMERICAN SINGLES mark in order to operate a competing online dating website supported a finding that respondent registered and used the domain name to disrupt the complainant’s business under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)); see also Lubbock Radio Paging v. Venture Tele-Messaging, FA 96102 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 23, 2000) (concluding that domain names were registered and used in bad faith where the respondent and the complainant were in the same line of business in the same market area).
Complainant also contends that Respondent has registered and is using the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names in order to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users seeking Complainant’s durometer products to Respondent’s own website where it offers the same products for sale. The Panel finds that Respondent is taking advantage of the confusing similarity between the disputed domain names and the SHORE mark in order to profit from the goodwill associated with the mark in violation of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Identigene, Inc. v. Genetest Labs., D2000-1100 (WIPO Nov. 30, 2000) (finding bad faith where the respondent's use of the domain name at issue to resolve to a website where similar services are offered to Internet users is likely to confuse the user into believing that the complainant is the source of or is sponsoring the services offered at the site); see also Velv, LLC v. AAE, FA 677922 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 25, 2006) (find that the respondent’s use of the <arizonashuttle.net> domain name, which contained the complainant’s ARIZONA SHUTTLE mark, to attract Internet traffic to the respondent’s website offering competing travel services violated Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)).
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <shoredurometer.com> and <shoredurometers.com> domain names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Dr. Reinhard Schanda Panelist
Dated: September 21, 2006
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page
National Arbitration Forum