H-D Michigan, Inc. v. Chris and Luann
Kunze-Harmon d/b/a Panospheric
Claim Number: FA0608000777789
PARTIES
Complainant is H-D Michigan, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by David M. Kelly, of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner L.L.P., 901 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001. Respondent is Chris and Luann Kunze-Harmon d/b/a Panospheric (“Respondent”), 363 Thompson Creek Rd., Dillard, OR 97432.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The domain names at issue are <360harleydavidson.com>, <360harley-davidson.com>, <harleydavidson360.com> and <harley-davidson360.com>, registered with Go Daddy Software, Inc.
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and
impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in
serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Judge Irving H. Perluss (Retired) is the Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum
electronically on August 15, 2006; the National Arbitration Forum received a
hard copy of the Complaint on August 16, 2006.
On August 15, 2006, Go Daddy Software, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the
National Arbitration Forum that the <360harleydavidson.com>, <360harley-davidson.com>, <harleydavidson360.com> and <harley-davidson360.com> domain names are registered with Go
Daddy Software, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the
name. Go Daddy Software, Inc. has
verified that Respondent is bound by the Go Daddy Software, Inc. registration
agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by
third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (the “Policy”).
On August 17, 2006, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of
Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline
of September 6, 2006 by which Respondent could file a Response to the
Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all
entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical,
administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@360harleydavidson.com,
postmaster@360harley-davidson.com, postmaster@harleydavidson360.com and
postmater@harley-davidson360.com by e-mail.
A timely Response was received and determined to be incomplete on September
6, 2006 because Respondent failed ot submit a hardcopy as required by the Rules.
An Additional Submission was received from Complainant and determined
to be timely and complete on September 11, 2006.
On September 14, 2006, pursuant to Complainant’s
request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National
Arbitration Forum appointed Judge Irving H. Perluss (Retired) as Panelist.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from
Respondent to Complainant.
INTRODUCTION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove
each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name
should be cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain name
registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark
or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2)
the Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3)
the domain name
has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Although Respondent’s electronic submission
was received in a timely manner by the National Arbitration Forum, Respondent
failed to submit a hard copy of its Response.
Accordingly, the Panel has sole discretion as to whether to accept the
Response as well as the amount of weight given to it. See Telstra Corp. v. Chu, D2000-0423
(WIPO June 21, 2000). In J.W. Spear & Sons PLC v. Fun League
Mgmt., FA 180628 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 17, 2003), the panel found that
where the respondent submitted a timely response electronically, but failed to
submit a hard copy of the response on time, “[t]he Panel is of the view that
given the technical nature of the breach and the need to resolve the real
dispute between the parties that the submission should be allowed and given due
weight.” The panel in Strum v. Nordic Net Exch. AB, FA 102843
(Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 21, 2002), suggested leniency in situations involving
procedural deficiencies, stating that, “[R]uling a Response inadmissible
because of formal deficiencies would be an extreme remedy not consistent with
the basic principles of due process…”
The alleged deficient Response will be accepted
and considered.
PRELIMINARY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Respondent here has specifically agreed to
the cancellations of the disputed domain names. Moreover, it does not deny and does admit the following:
1.
That it
registered the disputed domain names on November 16, 2005 with actual knowledge
of H-D’s rights in its HARLEY and HARLEY-DAVIDSON marks, and without H-D’s
authorization. (Complaint ¶ 7b, 22;
Response ¶ 2.)
2. That the disputed domain names are
confusingly similar to Complainant’s HARLEY and HARLEY-DAVIDSON marks.
3. It admits that if offered to sell the
disputed domain names directly to Complainant for more than its out-of-pocket
expenses (specifically for $1,500 each) on two occasions, and that it also
offered to sell them for $1,500 each on its VRTECHDOMAINS.COM website. (Complaint ¶ 24-25; Response ¶ 15, 17,
Exhibits B and C.)
4. It admits that it has registered numerous
additional domain names that incorporate numerous third-party trademarks, and
that it also offers to sell those trademark-related domain names on its
VRTECHDOMAINS.COM website. (Complaint ¶
26; Response ¶ 25.)
Thus, Complainant, because of the evidence presented and Respondent’s
admissions, has established a prima facie
case entitling it to the disputed domain names because of confusing similarity,
legitimate interest and rights, and registration and use in bad faith. It follows that, under the circumstances
here presented, it is not necessary to have an elaborate discussion of the
Policy formulae.
Although Respondent has indicated that it is willing to “cancel” the
disputed domain names and not “transfer” them, nevertheless the Panelist may
order transfer. In State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Malain, FA 705262 (Nat. Arb.
Forum June 19, 2006), the panel found that the respondent’s agreement to cancel
the domain name was tantamount to an agreement to transfer the disputed domain
name to the complainant. Based on
finding confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and the
complainant’s mark, the panel felt that transfer of the domain name was
justified instead of canceling the domain name.[1]
In any event, the Panelist believes that cancellation might lead to
re-registration by a third party and, in his discretion, therefore, finds that
“transfer” rather than “cancellation” is the appropriate remedy.
DECISION
The Panel concludes that relief by transfer shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <360harleydavidson.com>, <360harley-davidson.com>, <harleydavidson360.com> and <harley-davidson360.com> domain names be TRANSFERRED
from Respondent to Complainant.
Judge Irving H. Perluss (Retired), Panelist
Dated: September 28, 2006
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[1] It also is of
interest to note that the panel in State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. did forgo the remainder of the UDRP analysis
stating that:
It is clear that Respondent has no objection to divesting himself of the disputed domain name based upon Complainant’s objection to the use of its trademark in the disputed domain name. It follows that Respondent has no objections to the transfer of the disputed domain name to Complainant. Under similar circumstances, Panels have decided that when it is clear that a respondent has no objection to a transfer of a domain name to complainant, its [sic] would be useless to make a formal analysis under UDRP elements. When it is obvious that Respondent does not oppose transfer, it is proper to order the transfer without further analysis. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Malain, FA 705262 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 19, 2006)