National Arbitration Forum
DECISION
Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc.
v. Chris Pallone
Claim Number: FA0612000874279
PARTIES
Complainant is Build-A-Bear Workshop, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Michelle
W. Alvey, of Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin LLP, 720 Olive Street, Suite 2400, St. Louis, MO 63101. Respondent is Chris Pallone (“Respondent”), represented by Harry Jacobs, of DomainStatute.com, 4142 Hayvenhurst Dr., Encino, CA 91436.
REGISTRAR AND
DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <bearbuilderz.com>, registered with Wild West
Domains, Inc.
PANEL
The undersigned certify that they have acted independently and
impartially and to the best of their knowledge have no known conflict in
serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Michael A.
Albert (chair), the Honorable Ralph Yachnin, and David E.
Sorkin as Panelists.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum
electronically on December 20, 2006; the National
Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on December 27, 2006.
On December 21, 2006, Wild West Domains, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to
the National Arbitration Forum that the <bearbuilderz.com> domain name is
registered with Wild West Domains, Inc.
and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Wild West
Domains, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Wild West Domains, Inc. registration agreement
and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties
in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
“Policy”).
On January 10, 2007, a Notification of
Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement
Notification”), setting a deadline of January 30, 2007 by which Respondent could file
a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and
fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as
technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@bearbuilderz.com by e-mail.
Respondent submitted a timely and complete Response to the National
Arbitration Forum on January
30, 2007, indicating it might hire an attorney. On the same
date, a Response from Respondent’s authorized representative also
arrived within the deadline for Response.
Respondent communicated to the National Arbitration Forum via e-mail
that it would like the Response filed by its authorized representative to be
considered its official Response.
On February
5, 2007, Complainant submitted an Additional Submission.
On February
12, 2007, Respondent submitted an Additional Submission.
The Panel is uncertain as to whether the Additional Submissions were
timely under Supplemental Rule 7.
Supplemental Rule 7(a) requires that a complainant that wishes to submit
an Additional Submission do so within “five (5) Calendar Days” of when the
Response is received by the Forum. As
the Response was received on January 30, 2007, five days thereafter would have been February 4, 2007. Similarly, Supplemental Rule 7(c) requires
that any Additional Submission by a respondent be within “five (5) Calendar
Days” of the additional submission by the complainant. As Complainant’s additional submission was
received by the Forum on February 5, 2007, five days thereafter would have been February 10, 2007. Hence the Additional Submissions appear to
have been one and two days late, respectively.
Inasmuch as the Forum certified both Additional Submissions as timely,
and, in any event, both submissions were received by the Panel with sufficient time
to be considered in rendering this decision, the Panel will consider the Additional
Submissions.
On February 9, 2007, pursuant to Complainant’s
request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the National
Arbitration Forum appointed Michael A.
Albert, the Honorable Ralph
Yachnin, and David
E. Sorkin
as Panelists.
On February
15, 2007, the Panel issued a procedural
order, requesting that Complainant submit better, more readable copies of two
of its exhibits to its Additional Submission. On February 16, 2007, the Forum forwarded better
copies of the relevant exhibits to the Panel.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from
Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
Complainant contends that:
·
Complainant
is the owner of rights in the marks BEAR
BUILDER, BEAR BUILDERS, BUILD-A-BEAR WORKSHOP, and BUILDABEAR.COM. Complainant has a variety of federal and
international registrations (and applications for registration) in the marks
BUILD-A-BEAR WORKSHOP and
BUILDABEAR.COM, as well as common law rights in the marks BEAR BUILDER and BEAR
BUILDERS. Complainant has used these
marks in commerce since at least 1997 in relation to retail locations where
customers construct teddy bears at its Build-A-Bear Workshop stores.
·
The
disputed domain name <bearbuilderz.com> is identical or confusingly similar to marks in which
Complainant has rights. The domain name
is identical to its BEAR
BUILDER and BEAR BUILDERS marks,
and confusingly similar to its BUILD-A-BEAR
WORKSHOP and BUILDABEAR.COM marks.
·
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests
in the disputed domain name. Respondent
uses the domain name to advertise its services involving the creation of
stuffed animals. Respondent is a direct
competitor of Complainant. Respondent is
not commonly known by the name “Bearbuilderz.”
It is not a right or legitimate interest for a respondent to use a
competitor’s marks to advertise its own services.
·
Respondent registered and is using the disputed
domain names in bad faith. Respondent is
using a domain name containing marks in which Complainant has rights to divert
consumers to a website that sells a competing service. Respondent also offered to sell the domain
name to Complainant for three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000), which
violates paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy.
Respondent also used the term “Build-A-Bear” on the text of Respondent’s
web site, further showing bad faith.
B. Respondent
Respondent contends that:
·
Complainant
has a history of engaging in reverse domain name hijacking by using the
trademark system to register highly descriptive marks and then using the UDRP
system to transfer domain names containing those marks to it. It has only filed an intent-to-use
application for registration of the trademark BUILDABEAR.COM, but filed a UDRP
action over the domain names <build-a-bear.com> and
<build-a-bear.net> before actually filing an affidavit of use in the
BUILDABEAR.COM registration.
·
The
disputed domain name is not identical or confusingly similar to marks in which
Complainant has rights. Complainant has
rights in BUILD-A-BEAR WORKSHOP,
but <bearbuilderz.com>
is not confusingly similar to this
mark. Complainant does not have rights
in BUILDABEAR.COM, as that mark is generic or highly descriptive and
Complainant has not shown that it uses BUILD A BEAR
as a separate mark. While the disputed
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the BEAR
BUILDER or BEAR BUILDERS marks,
Complainant has not shown that it has rights in these marks.
·
Respondent
has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Respondent has been operating its bear
stuffing business since 1992, five years before Complainant’s first use of any
of the marks in which it claims to have rights.
Respondent is merely using generic or highly descriptive words to
describe its business.
·
Respondent
did not register or use the disputed domain name in bad faith. Respondent has merely registered and used it
to describe its bear stuffing business, i.e., a bona fide offering of services.
In addition, because Complainant has no rights in the marks BEAR BUILDER or BEAR
BUILDERS, Respondent is under no obligation to transfer the domain name to
Complainant, and its high opening offer for such a transfer thus does not
indicate bad faith. Respondent regrets
the inclusion of the text “Build-A-Bear” in its web site, but immediately
removed it when informed of a concern by Complainant.
C. Additional Submissions
In its Additional Submission, Complainant contends that it has rights
in the BEAR BUILDER and BEAR BUILDERS marks, and appends exhibits purporting to
demonstrate its use of those marks. Complainant
also appends evidence that it is commonly known by the mark BUILD-A-BEAR alone.
Complainant also takes issue with some of Respondent’s exhibits relating
to a trademark registration application by a third party for the mark TEDDY BEAR BUILDERS.
Complainant further argues that its trademark registrations show that
its marks are not generic. Complainant
additionally argues that Respondent’s high price for the transfer of the domain
name shows bad faith, and that precedent in regards to such offers finds that
such offers are only made in good faith when negotiations are initiated by the
purchaser. Complainant also contends
that Respondent was on notice of its rights in its marks.
In its Additional Submission, Respondent presents further argument that
the mark BUILD-A-BEAR is generic
or highly descriptive. Respondent also
argues that Complainant’s further evidence of use of the marks BEAR BUILDER and BEAR
BUILDERS is inadequate to show common law rights. In addition, Respondent contends that
portions of Complainant’s Additional Submission raise new issues and present
evidence that should have been included in the original complaint.
FINDINGS
The Panel finds that Complainant has
established rights in the marks BUILD-A-BEAR
WORKSHOP and BUILDABEAR.COM, as a result of its registrations and substantial
use of those marks. In addition, the
Panel finds that Complainant has established that it has rights in the BUILD-A-BEAR mark, as this mark constitutes a substantial
portion of the prior two marks and Complainant has submitted evidence that it
is commonly known by this mark.
The Panel finds, however, that Complainant has
not established that it has common law rights in the marks BEAR BUILDER or BEAR
BUILDERS. Complainant submitted three
pieces of evidence to support its claimed rights in these marks. First, it submitted two web pages promoting
employment opportunities at Complainant that use the term “Bear Builder.” These web pages, however, postdate
Respondent’s registration of <bearbuilderz.com> on March 14, 2005, and, in any event, appear to use the term
to refer to a position at the company, rather than to designate goods or
services. Second, Complainant submitted
a number of news articles from 1998 to 2001 in which its retail employees were
referred to as “Master
Bear Builders”
and its customers as “Guest Bear Builders.”
These articles, however, fail to clearly establish that the term “Bear
Builder” is actually used in commerce by Complainant to designate the source or
origin of its goods or services. The
term seems rather to be used as an internal company title for certain
employees. Third, Complainant submitted
a copy of its 2004 Annual Report, asserting that it uses the term “Bear
Builder.” The Panel has been unable to
identify where such usage occurs in the Report (if at all); and in any event
this document certainly does not prominently indicate usage of that term in a
trademark sense. In sum, Complainant has
not established that it has rights in the marks BEAR
BUILDER and BEAR BUILDERS.
The Panel does not rely upon the parties’
discussion of the TEDDY BEAR
BUILDERS trademark registration application. This application was submitted by
a third party, and was abandoned before Complainant has a chance to oppose the
application. In addition, the
application added the word “Teddy” to
the words “Bear Builders,” a distinguishing term that does not apply to the disputed
domain name. Most importantly, there is
a factual dispute between the parties as to the accuracy of the exhibits
relating to this application that were submitted by Respondent. On the papers, the Panel is unable to gauge
whether these exhibits accurately reflect anything that occurred in the file
history of this application or not. The
Panel thus does not rely on any of these exhibits, or on either party’s
arguments relating to this application.
In sum, the Panel finds that Complainant has
not provided sufficient evidence that the disputed domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to marks in which Complainant has rights.
The Panel further finds that Complainant has
not provided sufficient evidence that Respondents lacks rights or legitimate
interests in the disputed domain names.
The Panel further finds that Complainant has
failed to establish that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain
name in bad faith.
Because Complainant has failed to establish
all three factors required by the Policy, the Panel denies Complainant’s
request for transfer.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove
each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name
should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the Respondent
is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
Complainant has rights;
(2) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is
being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or Confusingly
Similar
The Panel finds that <bearbuilderz.com> is not identical or confusingly similar to a mark in
which Complainant has rights. While
Respondent concedes that the domain name is either identical or confusingly
similar to the BEAR BUILDER
or BEAR BUILDERS marks,
Complainant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish that it has
rights in those marks, as discussed above.
Complainant does have rights in the marks
BUILD-A-BEAR, BUILD-A-BEAR WORKSHOP and BUILDABEAR.COM. As the generic top-level domain is irrelevant
to a finding of confusing similarity, see Pomellato
S.p.A v. Tonetti, D2000-0493
(WIPO Jul 7, 2000)
(addition of a generic top-level domain is “not relevant” to a
determination of similarity, as it is required, necessary, and functional), the
Panel must therefore compare the mark BUILD-A-BEAR
with the phrase “bearbuilderz.” While the question is a close one, the Panel is
not persuaded that an Internet user seeing “bearbuilderz” would find it
confusingly similar to Complainant’s BUILD-A-BEAR
marks. First, the domain name does not
contain the “workshop” portion of Complainant’s BUILD-A-BEAR
WORKSHOP mark, which is the mark for which Complainant has submitted by far the
most evidence of its extensive use.
Second, there are significant differences between BUILD-A-BEAR and the disputed domain name. While both use the terms “build” and “bear,”
the domain name uses them in the reverse order.
In addition, the word “build” is transformed from a verb to a noun in
the disputed domain name. Further,
“Build-A-Bear” explicitly describes the construction of a single bear, while
“bearbuilderz” could be singular or plural.
Finally, the added letter “z” provides a little (though admittedly not
much, as it is a common variant of the plural “s”) distinctiveness to the
domain name.
Whether the above described differences
between the two marks suffice to avoid confusion turns, in the Panel’s opinion,
on the strength of Complainant’s mark.
As to that issue, the record is sparse.
While Complainant has certainly submitted evidence that it has rights in the BUILD-A-BEAR (and BUILD-A-BEAR
WORKSHOP) marks, those rights may be relatively weak. The words “bear” and “build,” when applied to
the stuffing of teddy bears, seem fairly descriptive of the activity in
question. Complainant’s registrations of
marks containing BUILD-A-BEAR are
evidence that, to the extent those marks are descriptive, Complainant has
demonstrated secondary meaning in those marks.
But Complainant has submitted little or no evidence establishing the
strength of those marks or the extent of any secondary meaning in the minds of
consumers. Complainant has alleged that
its use of the BUILD-A-BEAR marks
since 1997 has been so extensive as to make the marks famous. That may be so, but the record before us does
not establish such a conclusion. The
Panel notes that the Annual Report submitted by Complainant only lists revenues
beginning in 1999, and a significant expansion in the number of stores and
revenues only seems to have occurred beginning in 2001 or 2002. Respondent credibly disputes that he had
Complainant in mind when he registered the domain name in 2005, and the Panel
notes that, even today, after significant expansion by Complainant,
Complainant’s closest retail location to Respondent’s address is 67 miles away,
and Complainant has not offered any evidence of actual confusion. Mindful that Complainant bears the burden of
proof in this proceeding, the Panel cannot conclude on this evidence that
Complaint’s use of marks containing BUILD-A-BEAR
is so extensive as to render the mark famous.
In the absence of better proof of strength or
fame of the marks, the differences between BUILD-A-BEAR
and <bearbuilderz.com>,
though subtle, are sufficient to leave the Panel in doubt as to whether there
is a likelihood of confusion between the disputed domain name and Complainant’s
marks. See Cigarettes Cheaper!, Inc. v. World Wide Brands,
FA 100490 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 21, 2001) (finding that the domain name <cigarettescheap.net>
was not confusingly similar to the complainant’s CIGARETTES CHEAPER!, as
the domain name was made up of two generic terms); see also Bank of Am. Corp. v.
Fluxxx, Inc., FA 103809 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 18, 2002) (“[I]n light
of the common use of the words ‘nations’ and
‘banking,’ this Panel fails to see how there is a likelihood of
confusion between NATIONSBANK and <nationsbanking.com>.”).
The Panel finds that Complainant has failed
to show that the domain names are confusingly similar to its trademarks under
ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Rights or Legitimate Interests
Because Complainant has failed to
establish the first element of its claim under the Policy, this Panel need not
resolve the questions of Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the
domain name or of Respondent’s bad faith.
Nevertheless, the Panel concludes that Complainant has failed to meet
its burden as to both elements.
The Panel finds that Complainant has failed to establish that
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. A complainant must make a prima facie showing, after which the
burden shifts to the respondent to show such rights or legitimate
interests. See Document Tech.,
Inc. v. Int’l Elec. Commc’ns Inc., D2000-0270 (WIPO Jun. 6, 2000) (“Although
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant prove the presence
of this element (along with the other two), once a Complainant makes out a prima
facie showing, the burden of production on this factor shifts to the
Respondent to rebut the showing by providing concrete evidence that it has
rights to or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.”); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006)
(“Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not
have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is
light. If Complainant satisfies its
burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights
or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.”).
In this case, Complainant did make
such a prima facie showing, but
Respondent successfully met its burden of showing rights or legitimate interests. Respondent claims to have been operating a bear
stuffing business at student parties since 1992, five years before
Complainant’s alleged first use in commerce.
While Respondent did not submit documentary evidence supporting this
assertion, Respondent certified that this statement was accurate, and
Complainant did not submit any argument that this claim was untrue or
implausible. The Panel also notes that,
since registration, the disputed domain name does appear to have been used to
advertise Respondent’s bear stuffing services.
While the Panel would have preferred to have more concrete evidence of
Respondent’s earlier use, it does not find such use implausible. If Respondent has been using the disputed
domain name in connection with a bona
fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), such
use gives rise to rights or legitimate interests for purposes of the
Policy. See Funskool (India) Ltd. v. funschool.com Corp.,
D2000-0796 (WIPO Nov.
30, 2000) (finding a bona fide use of the <funskool.com>
domain name where the respondent submitted an article that indicated that the
respondent had been using the similar <funschool.com> domain name to
resolve to a popular gaming website for school children prior to notice of the
dispute); see also Modern Props, Inc. v. Wallis, FA
152458 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 2, 2003) (finding that the respondent’s operation of
a bona fide business of online prop rentals for over two years was
evidence that the respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the disputed
domain name).
It is not clear to the Panel that Respondent’s use of the
domain name is bona fide; it may well
be infringing, as Complainant contends.
But Respondent’s assertions of bona
fide use and the evidence offered in support thereof are sufficient to
raise a legitimate trademark dispute, and such disputes are not amenable to
adjudication under the Policy. See ICANN Second
Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), Paragraph 4.1(c), available at <icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm>.
The Panel finds that Complainant has failed
to show that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests under
ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
The Panel finds that Complainant has not met
its burden of showing that Respondent registered and is using the disputed
domain name in bad faith. As discussed
above, Respondent has shown that it has rights or legitimate interests in the
disputed domain name, which supports a finding that Respondent did not register
and use the domain name in bad faith. See
Pensacola Christian Coll.
v. Gage, FA 101314 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 12, 2001) (“Because the Panel has found
that Respondent has rights and interests in respect of [sic] the domain name at
issue, there is no need to decide the issue of bad faith.”); see also Lee
Procurement Solutions Co. v. getLocalNews.com, Inc., FA 366270 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Jan. 7, 2005)
(“Respondent's rights and legitimate interests in the domain name pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), allow a finding that there was no bad faith
registration or use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”).
A respondent does not register or use
a disputed domain name in bad faith if the terms of a complainant’s mark are of
common usage and the respondent operates a business that could reasonably be
marketed under the disputed domain name.
See Jason Goepfert, President and CEO
v. Rogers, FA0612000861124 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 17, 2007)
(conclusion that <sentimenttrader.com>
consisted of commonly-used terms in field; no bad faith found); see also Miller Brewing Co. v. Hong, FA 192732 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 8, 2003)
(finding that because the respondent was using the <highlife.com> domain
name, a generic phrase, in connection with a search engine, the respondent did
not register and was not using the disputed domain name in bad faith); see also Trump v. olegevtushenko, FA 101509 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 11, 2001)
(finding that <porntrumps.com> does not infringe on the complainant’s
famous mark TRUMP, since the complainant does not have the exclusive right to
use every form of the word “trump”); see
also Canned Foods, Inc. v. Ult. Search
Inc., FA 96320 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 13, 2001) (holding that, where
the domain name is comprised of a generic term, it is difficult to conclude
that there was a deliberate attempt to confuse on behalf of the respondent, and
stating that “[i]t is precisely because generic words are incapable of
distinguishing one provider from another that trademark protection is denied them”).
Because the Panel is unwilling to discount
this argument, it also cannot find that Respondent’s $300,000 offer,
Complainant’s primary evidence of bad faith,
did in fact constitute bad faith.
Complainant correctly argues that a respondent asking an exorbitant
price for a domain name in which a complainant has rights and respondent does
not is bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i).
See Google Inc. v. Jennifer Burns, FA 726096
(Nat. Arb. Forum Aug.
16, 2006). But Policy ¶ 4(b)(i) requires that the purchase of the
domain name for purposes of selling it for consideration in excess of
out-of-pocket costs be to a “complainant who is the owner of the trademark or
service mark.” Here, the Panel is unable
to conclude that Complainant’s trademark rights cover the disputed domain
name. If they do not, Respondent is
under no obligation to transfer the domain name to Complainant, and offering to
sell it for an unusually high price thus does not show bad faith. If Complainant has no rights in the disputed
domain name, then Respondent is free to charge whatever price it can command in
the market, or alternatively to open negotiations at a chosen price with the
expectation that the final price will be lower.
The Panel finds that Complainant has failed
to show that Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith under
ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Reverse
Domain Name Hijacking
Respondent argues that Complainant has a
history of using the trademark system to register highly descriptive terms as
trademarks and then to obtain domain names through reverse domain name
hijacking, and implies that Complainant is doing so in the current case. The Panel disagrees.
First of all, the
case was not frivolous. Complainant does
indeed own trademark rights in the mark BUILD-A-BEAR,
BUILD-A-BEAR
WORKSHOP, and BUILDABEAR.COM, and as noted above, the disputed domain
name is similar to them (although, as we have found, not necessarily
confusingly so). In addition, although
Complainant has failed to establish rights in the BEAR
BUILDER or BEAR BUILDERS marks, it
may be able to do so in a trademark case.
If it did, the disputed domain name would be identical to such
marks. Complainant’s position is not
frivolous.
Second,
Respondent’s “legitimate interests” in the domain name are unclear. Respondent alleges that it was operating its
teddy bear stuffing business in 1992, five years before Complainant secured
rights in any relevant marks. But
Respondent did not provide documentary evidence of this business and the dates
it was in operation. In addition,
Respondent has not alleged whether it in fact uses the terms “bear builders” or
“BearBuilderz” to describe its business, and, if so, for how long.
Third, depending
upon the marks in which Complainant has rights, Respondent may arguably have
engaged in bad faith. If Complainant
were able to show that it has rights in the BEAR
BUILDER or BEAR BUILDERS marks in
a trademark suit, Respondent’s initial offer of $300,000 for the disputed
domain name might have supported a finding of bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(i)
of the Policy. The Panel is also
troubled by the apparent use of the
term “Build-A-Bear” in the text of the web site to which the disputed domain
name resolves, although Respondent’s immediate removal of that term somewhat
ameliorates this concern.
Fourth, the “Reverse Domain Hijacking”
argument is made in conclusory form, with evidence drawn solely from one prior
case, a case which was terminated without resolution. See SBC Communications Inc. v. eWorldWideWeb, Inc., D2002-0608 (WIPO Oct. 7, 2002) (rejecting
reverse domain name hijacking allegation where claim made only conclusorily).
In sum, the Panel
does not find that there was any “reverse domain name hijacking” here.
DECISION
Complainant having failed to establish all three elements required
under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be DENIED.
Michael A.
Albert (chair), the Honorable Ralph Yachnin, and David E.
Sorkin, Panelists
Dated: March 1,
2007
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